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ABSTRACT
TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS ON FUTURE URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT: 
IM PLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Ph.D. Thesis 
By: A ntar Abdel-All Abou-Korin
September 2004
Since the Industrial Revolution, technology achievements, especially in transportation, 
have introduced significant changes to city structures and urban systems in both the 
developed and developing countries. Technology advancements of the Post-Industrial 
era, especially in telecommunications, are expected to introduce a new substantial 
wave of urban change. This research examines the future urban impacts of technology 
in developing countries and aims, in the light of these expected changes, to define the 
necessary approaches for managing the urban future in these countries.
Based on the theoretical examination of the relationship between technology and 
urban change, the urban impacts of different technology forces, the analysis of 
patterns and problems of urban change in Africa and in Egypt, and the analysis of the 
main problems of the increasing primacy of Greater Cairo Region, the thesis proposes 
three necessary approaches for managing the urban future in developing countries. 
These approaches are: urban decentralisation, small-size settlements, and the
incremental planning and development of urban activities.
Although the review of current literature demonstrates that these approaches would be 
effective in managing the urban future in developing countries, and in a further step to 
confirm the validity of these approaches, the research carried out a forecasting survey 
of both technology and urban development experts’ opinions and expectations. The 
statistical analysis of the survey results has revealed that the future impacts of 
technology on developing countries are expected to be substantial and confirmed that 
the proposed approaches are valid. Also, this analysis has revealed that existing cities, 
especially large ones, are expected to face considerable changes regarding their future 
size and function.
The research concludes by presenting a summary of research findings, brief 
recommendations for the application of each these approaches, a critique of methods, 
and potentials for further future research.
DEDICATION
To
My mother and my father
and
My sincere wife, Magda Mehanni 
and my Children; Salma, Hossam, and Hazem 
in appreciation for their considerable love and support
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All praise and thanks are due to Allah, my Lord and the Lord of all that exists.
I am grateful to all members of my supervisory panel. I am particularly indebted to 
Professor Paul Syms, director of studies. His extensive research experience, 
stimulating suggestions, help and encouragement, in addition to his decent personality 
have significantly helped me during all the stages of this research. I am also thankful 
to Mr. Gordon Dabinett for his very useful discussions and critical comments. I am 
indebted to Dr. Paula Meth, who gave my lots of her time and support. Suggestions 
made by Gordon and Paula in relation to the direction and the content of the research 
have significantly helped to maintain its focus and rigour.
I would like to express my gratitude to all technology and urban development experts 
who participated in my forecasting survey. Their help is invaluable and significantly 
contributed to this study. I also thank all the academic and administrative members at 
the Centre for the Built Environment, Sheffield Hallam University for their continuous 
help and support. Special thanks are due to the librarians at the Adsetts Centre who 
have offered an efficient and timely service. I am also indebted to all my friends and 
colleagues at the Department of Architecture, Minia University, Egypt, for their 
appreciated help in collecting data about urban change in Egypt.
The continuous encouragement and support of my mother and my father are highly 
appreciated. I ask Allah to reward them the best in this life and in the hereafter. Also, I 
would like to stress my affectionate gratitude to my sincere wife Magda Mehanni. Her 
support and encouragement through a long journey of dedication and self-denial on 
her part are deeply acknowledged. Big thank you goes to my wonderful children 
Hossam, Salma, and Hazem, who added a meaning to my life, hoping soon I couldl 
have more time to enjoy with them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract............................................................................................................................................... Ill
List of Tables......................................................................................................................................................................... XII
List of Figures........................................................................................................................................................................XV
Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................................................XVIII
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH PROBLEM, HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY.................1
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.................................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES...............................................................................................................................................4
1.3 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH............................................................................................................................................5
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS...............................................................................................................................................7
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION............................................................................................ 9
CHAPTER TWO
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND URBAN
CHANGE........................................................................................................................................................................ 16
INTRODUCTION:...................................................................................................................................................................16
2.1 TECHNOLOGY - URBAN CHANGE PROCESS.........................................................................................................16
2.1.1 Technology and Urbanisation Definitions............................................................................16
2.1.1 Technology and Factors Affecting Urbanisation Process....................................................18
2.2 TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND URBANISATION..................................................................................20
2.2.1 Technology Impacts on Society through History................................................................20
2.2.2 Technology and Social Change Theories.............................................................................22
2.2.2.1 Theories about Technology’s Role in Social Change................................................... 24
2.2.2.2 Perceptions about the Future Role o f Technology in Human Development............... 29
2.2.3 Social Change and Urbanisation:.......................................................................................... 32
2.3 TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBAN CHANGE.......................................................................34
2.3.1 Technology and Economic Growth...................................................................................... 34
2.3.2 Economic Growth and Urban Change.................................................................................. 35
2.4 TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES AFFECTING URBAN CHANGE............................................................................. 39
2.5 TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALISATION AND URBAN CHANGE............................................................................... 40
2.5.1 Technology and Globalisation...............................................................................................40
2.5.2 Globalisation and Urban Change.......................................................................................... 41
2.5.2.1 Economic Globalisation and Urban Change................................................................. 44
2.5.2.2 Cultural Globalisation and Urban Change................................................................... 46
2.5.2.3 Political Globalisation and Urban Change................................................................... 47
2.5.2.4 Globalisation and Urbanisation in Developing Countries........................................... 47
2.5.3 Globalisation and Technology Transfer to Developing Countries.....................................49
CONCLUSION:........................................................................................................................................................................ 50
CHAPTER THREE
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE URBAN IMPACTS OF THE MAIN TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES...................52
INTRODUCTION:...................................................................................................................................................................52
3.1 TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES....................................................................................................................53
3.1.1 Transportation as a Tool for Increasing Mobility and Improving Accessibility.............. 53
3.1.2 Transportation: Increasing Diffusion and Falling Costs......................................................54
3.1.3 Transportation and Space-Time Convergence......................................................................55
3.1.4 Transportation and Urban Change: Key Debates................................................................ 55
3.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES.......................................................................................................... 60
3.2.1 Diffusion of Telecommunication Technologies.................................................................. 60
3.2.2 Growing Reach and Falling Costs........................................................................................ 61
3.2.3 Socio-economic Impacts of Telecommunications...............................................................62
3.2.3.1 Emergence and Growth o f Telecommuting Activities:.................................................. 62
3.2.3.2 Telecommuting and Travel: Main Arguments................................................................ 63
3.2.3.3 Tele-shopping and E-Commerce:................................................................................... 65
3.2.3.4 Changes to Workplace:....................................................................................................65
3.2.3.5 Changes to Home Environment...................................................................................... 66
3.2.4 Telecommunications and Urban Change: Main Debates................................................... 67
3.2.4.1 Cities and Telecommunications Determinism................................................................ 69
3.2.4.2 Telecommunications: Death o f Distance ’ and Death o f Cities ’.................................70
3.3 RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES................................................................................................................74
3.3.1 Advantages of Renewable Energy:....................................................................................... 74
3.3.3 Renewable Energy and Urban Future.................................................................................78
3.4 URBAN UTILITIES..........................................................................................................................................................80
3.4.1 Water Supply Technologies................................................................................................... 80
3.4.2 Sanitation Technologies........................................................................................................ 82
3.4.3 New Urban Utilities and the Urban Future...........................................................................83
CONCLUSION:........................................................................................................................................................................ 83
CHAPTER FOUR
TECHNOLOGY AND PATTERNS URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES................................. 86
INTRODUCTION:...................................................................................................................................................................86
4.1 TECHNOLOGY AND PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS................................. 86
4.1.1 Changes in the Size of Urban Settlements............................................................................87
4.1.2 Spatial Changes in Urban systems.........................................................................................88
4.2 TECHNOLOGY LEVEL AND PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES 92
4.3 PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF AFRICA.................... 100
4.3.1 Patterns of Urban Change in Africa.....................................................................................100
4.3.1.1 Rapid Urbanisation:...................................................................................................... 100
4.3.1.2 Urban Primacy and Concentration o f Urban Population:.........................................102
4.3.2 Is there a link between economic and urban growth in Africa?....................................... 105
4.3.2.1 Economic Growth and Urbanisation Level in Africa...................................................105
4.3.2.2 Economic Growth and Urban Concentration in Africa.............................................. 106
4.3.3 Globalization and Urban Change in Africa........................................................................ 107
4.3.4 African Large Cities in the Global Urban System............................................................. 108
4.3.5 Urbanisation and the Quality of Life in Large African Cities.......................................... 108
4.3.5.1 Urban Poverty and Unemployment:............................................................................109
4.3.5.2 Environmental Problems................................................................................................ 110
CONCLUSION:...................................................................................................................................................................... I l l
CHAPTER FIVE
AN ANALYSIS OF URBAN CHANGE PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS IN EGYPT................... 113
INTRODUCTION:................................................................................................................................................................. 113
5.1 EGYPT: DEVELOPMENT HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY STATUS.............................................................113
5.1.1 Geographic Settings:.............................................................................................................113
5.1.2 Development History............................................................................................................114
5.1.3 Technology Status................................................................................................................ 115
5.2 PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS OF URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT....................................................................... 118
5.2.1 Urban Concentration.............................................................................................................120
5.2.1.1 Migration from South to North and the Canal Zone................................................... 121
5.2.1.2 Migration from the hinterland to Cairo and Alexandria............................................ 121
5.2.1.3 Migration Streams: Origin and Destination................................................................ 122
5.2.1.4 New Towns and Urban Concentration:....................................................................... 125
5.2.2 Differential Growth of Different Settlement Sizes............................................................ 126
5.3 PROBLEMS OF URBAN PRIMACY: THE CASE OF CAIRO, EGYPT................................................................129
5.3.1 Primacy Factors in Greater Cairo Region...........................................................................129
5.3.1.1 Demographic Factors:...................................................................................................129
5.3.1.2 Economic Factors:......................................................................................................... 131
5.3.1.3 Political Factors:........................................................................................................... 132
5.3.2 Problems of Urban Primacy in Greater Cairo Region.......................................................134
5.3.2.1 Urban Poverty: Social Problems, Housing Shortage, and Slum Growth in GCR... 134
5.3.2.2 Transportation and infrastructure................................................................................ 143
5.3.2.3 Environmental Problems o f GCR's Urban Primacy....................................................145
CONCLUSION:...............................................................................................................................   147
CHAPTER SIX
PROPOSED APPROACHES FOR MANAGING THE URBAN FUTURE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES...............................................................................................................................................................148
INTRODUCTION:..............................................................  148
6.1 URBAN DECENTRALISATION..................................................................................................................................148
6.1.1 Arguments for Urban Decentralisation............................................................................... 149
6.1.1.1 Advantages o f Urban Decentralisation fo r Developing Countries............................ 151
6.1.2 Arguments Against Urban Decentralisation.......................................................................153
6.1.3 Technology as an Enabler for Urban Decentralisation ............................................154
6.1.4 An Appraisal of Urban Decentralisation in Egypt............................................................. 158
6.1.5 Urban Decentralisation: Approach Assessment.................................................................159
6.2 SMALL-SIZE URBAN SETTLEMENT.......................................................................................................................160
6.2.1 Arguments for Small-Size Urban Settlements....................................................................160
6.2.2 Declining Attractiveness of Large Urban Settlements...................................................... 165
6.2.2.1 Agglomeration Economies Old Arguments...................................................................165
6.2.2.2 Environmental Costs o f Large Urban Concentrations............................................... 167
6.2.2.3 The Social Costs o f Urban Scale................................................................................... 168
6.2.2.4 Large Cities and the Natural and Human-made Disasters......................................... 169
6.2.3 Will Technological Achievements Facilitate the Adoption of Small-Size
Settlement Approach?............................................................................................................ 170
6.2.4 An Appraisal of the Application of Small-Settlements Approach in Egypt.................... 170
6.2.5 Small-Size Urban Settlement: Approach Assessment....................................................... 171
6.3 INCREMENTAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN SETTLEMENTS.......................................173
6.3.1 Analysis of Incremental Planning........................................................................................174
6.3.2 An Appraisal of the Application of Incremental Planning Approach in Egypt...............176
6.3.3 Incremental Planning: Approach Assessment....................................................................177
CONCLUSION:...................................................................................................................................................................... 178
CHAPTER SEVEN
AN APPLICATION OF FUTURE RESEARCH IN URBAN STUDIES.................................................................. 179
INTRODUCTION:................................................................................................................................................................. 179
7.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FORECASTING STUDIES......................................................................... 179
7.1.1 Expansion of Urban forecasting Studies:...........................................................................181
7.2 FORECASTING SURVEY METHODOLOGY...........................................................................................................182
7.2.1 Selection of Forecasting Method........................................................................................ 182
7.2.1.1 Anticipatory and Exploratory Approaches.................................................................. 182
7.2.1.2 Judgmental and Statistical Approaches....................................................................... 183
7.2.1.3 Delphi technique:........................................................................................................... 184
7.2.2 Setting the forecasting time-horizon................................................................................... 186
7.3 SURVEY DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION............................................................ 188
7.3.1 Questionnaire I -  to Science & Technology Experts:........................................................189
7.3.1.1 Questionnaire Design:...................................................................................................189
7.3.1.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:....................................................................... 189
7.3.2 Questionnaire II -  to Science & Technology Experts:......................................................190
7.3.2.1 Questionnaire Design:...................................................................................................190
7.3.2.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:....................................................................... 191
7.3.3 Questionnaire III -  to Urban Development Experts:......................................................... 191
7.3.3.1 Questionnaire Design:...................................................................................................191
7.2.3.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:........................................................................192
7.4 SURVEY SCORING AND DATA EVALUATION................................................................................................... 194
CONCLUSION:...................................................................................................................................................................... 195
CHAPTER EIGHT
FORECASTING SURVEY: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION...................................... 197
INTRODUCTION:.................................................................................................................................................................197
8.1 QUESTIONNAIRE I: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION........................................................................ 198
8.1.1 Characteristics of Experts Group: Area of Interest and Degree of Relevance................198
Question 1:...................................................................................................................................198
Question 2:...................................................................................................................................199
8.1.2 Extent and Nature of Expected Technological Change.................................................... 200
Question 3:.................................................................................................................................. 200
Question 4:.................................................................................................................................. 201
8.2 QUESTIONNAIRE II: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION......................................................................202
8.2.1 Experts Relevance to Main Areas of Technology.............................................................202
Question 1:.................................................................................................................................. 202
Question 2:.................................................................................................................................. 203
8.2.2 Expected Impacts of Technology....................................................................................... 204
Question 3:...................................................................................................................................204
Question 4:...................................................................................................................................205
Question 5:...................................................................................................................................207
Question 6:...................................................................................................................................209
Question 7:...................................................................................................................................211
Question 8:...................................................................................................................................213
Question 9:...................................................................................................................................215
8.2.3 Technology Transfer and its Impacts in Developing Countries.......................................217
Question 10:.................................................................................................................................217
Question 11:..........................   218
8.3 QUESTIONNAIRE III: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.....................................................................220
8.3.1 Experts Relevance to Main Areas of Urban Development............................................. 220
ix
Question 1:.................................................................................................................................. 220
8.3.2 Expected Urban Impacts of Main Technological Forces.................................................. 221
Question 2:.................................................................................................................................. 221
Question 3:.................................................................................................................................. 222
Question 4:.................................................................................................................................. 223
Question 5:.................................................................................................................................. 226
Question 6:.................................................................................................................................. 229
Question 7:.................................................................................................................................. 231
Question 8:.................................................................................................................................. 232
Question 9:.................................................................................................................................. 235
8.3.3 Technology and Future New Settlements...........................................................................237
Question 10:................................................................................................................................ 237
Question 11:................................................................................................................................ 238
Question 12:................................................................................................................................ 240
Question 13:................................................................................................................................ 241
Question 14:................................................................................................................................ 243
8.3.4 Technology and Existing Settlements................................................................................245
Question 15:................................................................................................................................ 245
Question 16:................................................................................................................................ 246
8.4 RECEIVED COMMENTS..........................................................................................................................................248
CONCLUSION:......................................................................................................................................................................248
CHAPTER NINE
FORECASTING SURVEY: AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES................249
INTRODUCTION:..........................................................................................................................  249
9.1 EXTENT AND NATURE OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS.............................................................. 249
Findings:......................................................................................................................................252
9.2 URBAN DECENTRALISATION APPROACH..........................................................................................................253
Findings:......................................................................................................................................255
9.3 SMALL-SIZE URBAN SETTLEMENTS APPROACH.............................................................................................256
Findings:......................................................................................................................................259
9.4 INCREMENTAL PLANNING APPROACH...............................................................................................................260
Findings:......................................................................................................................................260
9.5 TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS............................................................... 261
Findings:......................................................................................................................................262
CONCLUSION:......................................................................................................................................................................262
CHAPTER TEN
RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...........................................................................264
10.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.........................................................................................................................................264
10.1.1 Technology and urban change...........................................................................................264
- Technology, Social Change, and Urbanisation:.................................................................... 265
- Technology, economic Growth, and Urban Change:............................................................265
- Technology, Globalisation, and Urban Change:................................................................... 265
- Urban Impacts o f Main technological Forces:.......................................................................266
- Technology and Urban Change: Forecasting Survey Results.............................................. 268
10.1.2 Patterns and Problems of Urban Change in Developing Countries............................... 269
10.1.3 Proposed Approaches for Managing Urban Future in Developing Countries.............. 271
10.2 AN APPRAISAL OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS..........................................................................................271
x
10.3 AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES........................................................................................272
10.3.1 Urban Decentralisation Approach....................................................................................272
A-Indications from the Literature Review:.............................................................................. 273
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:............................................................................ 277
10.3.2 Small-Size Urban Settlements Approach........................................................................ 278
A-Indications from the Literature Review:...............................................................................278
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:............................................................................ 281
10.3.3 Incremental Planning Approach.......................................................................................283
A-Indications from the Literature Review:...............................................................................283
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:............................................................................ 285
10.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS.............................................................286
10.5 CRITIQUE OF METHODS..........................................................................................................................................287
10.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE...................................................................................................................... 287
10.7 POTENTIALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH............................................................................................................. 289
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................................291
APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE I: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS........................................................316
Questionnaire I: Form....................................................................................................................316
Questionnaire I: List of Participating Experts.............................................................................318
APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE II: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS......................................................319
Questionnaire II: Form..................................................................................................................319
Questionnaire II: List of Participating Experts............................................................................322
APPENDIX 3
QUESTIONNAIRE III: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS.................................................... 323
Questionnaire III: Form................................................................................................................ 323
Questionnaire III: List of Participating Experts...........................................................................327
APPENDIX 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES II AND III...........................................329
A4.1 Frequency Distribution of Responses to Questionnaire II................................................ 329
A4.2 Frequency Distribution of Responses to Questionnaire III............................................... 332
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1: Technological Characteristics of Agricultural, Industrial, and Information Societies21
Table 2.2: Dominant Theories of Socio-Economic Impacts of Technology................................24
Table 2.3: Summary of major technological stages and corresponding economical and urban
development cycles during 1800-2000.......................................................................... 35
Table 3.1. Growth in passenger-kilometres travelled..................................................................... 54
Table 3.2: Transport technology and urbanisation changes on the local and regional levels 59
Table 4.1: Change in the average size of different size-categories of cities in Africa 1975-2015 
(1000)............................................................................................................................  103
Table 5.1: Migration movement on the govemorates and regional levels, 1986-1996............. 124
Table 5.2: The targeted and percentage occupancy of new cities around Cairo, 1996.............  125
Table 5.3: The Number and the Population Change of Different Urban Settlements’ Sizes in
Egypt Since 1976.......................................................................................................... 127
Table 7.1: Main Characteristics of Different Group Communication Techniques................... 186
Table 8.1: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise.............. 198
Table 8.2: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ field of specialisation...................... 199
Table 8.3: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise............................ 200
Table 8.4: Frequency distribution and descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses
about the main technological achievements expected to influence the future of urban 
development in the next 30-40 years?......................................................................... 201
Table 8.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ relevance to main areas of technology 
 202
Table 8.6: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ work relevance................................. 203
Table 8.7: Descriptive statistics of responses to the extent to which current operation and
production systems expected to changed in the next Thirty to forty years..............205
Table 8.8: Descriptive statistics of responses to the expected influence of technological
achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years............................................206
Table 8.9: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in urban transport technologies............................................................208
Table 8.10: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc) on some urban aspects..............210
Table 8.11: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in
urban utilities technologies.......................................................................................... 211
Table 8.12: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
telecommunication and information technologies..................................................... 213
Table 8.13: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
overall technological achievements on urban patterns...............................................215
Table 8.14: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses about how the rate of 
technology transfer is expected to affect urban life in progressive developing 
countries in the next 30-40 years.................................................................................217
Table 8.15: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses about the past and the
expected levels of technology transfer to developing countries................................ 218
Table 8.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ relevance to main areas of expertise 220
Table 8.17: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of
technological achievements on urban life aspects during the next 30-40 years 224
Table 8.18: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of urban 
transport technologies in developing countries...........................................................226
Table 8.19: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries....................... 229
Table 8.20: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries....................231
Table 8.21: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about impacts of
telecommunication & information technology in developing countries during the 
next 30-40 years............................................................................................................ 233
Table 8.22: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries.............235
Table 8.23: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of
future urban settlement..................................................................................................237
Table 8.24: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for the
provision of services in future new urban settlements............................................... 239
Table 8.25: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the location of future new 
urban settlements........................................................................................................... 241
Table 8.26: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future new 
urban settlements........................................................................................................... 241
Table 8.27: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development of the
future new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years................................................ 244
Table 8.28: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of existing urban 
settlements in the next 30-40 years..............................................................................245
Table 8.29: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years.................................................... 246
Table A4.1: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected influence of technological
achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years............................................329
Table A4.2: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected impacts of advancements in
urban transport technologies........................................................................................ 329
Table A4.3: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc)..................................................... 329
Table A4.4: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in 
urban utilities technologies.......................................................................................... 330
Table A4.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
telecommunication and information technologies..................................................... 330
Table A4.6: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
overall technological achievements on urban patterns............................................... 330
Table A4.7: Frequency distribution of the technology experts’ responses about technology
transfer to developing countries................................................................................... 331
Table A4.8: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of
technological achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years................... 332
Table A4.9: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
transport technologies in developing countries...........................................................332
Table A4.10: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries........................332
Table A4.11: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries....................333
Table A4.12: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of 
telecommunication & information technology in developing countries during the 
next 30-40 years............................................................................................................333
Table A4.13: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of 
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries 333
Table A4.14: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of 
future urban settlement................................................................................................. 334
Table A4.15: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for
the provision of services in future new urban settlements........................................ 334
Table A4.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future
new urban settlements.................................................................................................. 334
Table A4.17: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development of the 
future new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years................................................335
Table A4.18: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of existing urban 
settlements in the next 30-40 years............................................................................. 335
Table A4.19: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years.................................................... 335
xiv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Analysis of Research Approaches and M ethods......................................11
Figure 1.2: Research Methodology and Organisation..................................................................... 13
Figure 2.1: Ways in which technology affects urbanisation................. ......................................... 19
Figure 2.2: Mutual relationships between technology and human development..........................30
Figure 2.4: The association between nations’ per capita incomes and their levels of urbanization
..................................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 2.5 Structural-Model of Technological on Urban Change Process................................... 38
Figure 2.4 Main Circuits of Information Economy Flow Among Regional 'World Cities' 43
Figure 2.2: Growth of technology transfer payments and foreign direct investments inflows to
developing countries during 1976-1995...................................................................................50
Figure 3.1: Urban transport and changes in urban patterns.............................................................57
Figure 3.2 Impacts of Information Technology on Urban System Components..........................68
Figure 3.3: Technology as an Enabler for Social Decisions- i.e. the decision to move............. 70
Figure 4.1: Historical changes to the physical form of settlements.............................................87
Figure 4.2: Generalised Stages of Differential Urbanisation....................................................... 88
Figure 4.3: Conceptual Phases of Urban Change Process............................................................ 90
Figure 4.4: Urban population shares of urban settlements of more than 10 million inhabitants 93
Figure 4.5: The average size of urban settlements of more than 10 million inhabitants........... 94
Figure 4.6: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants.............95
Figure 4.7: The average size of urban settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants......................... 95
Figure 4.8: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 1-5 million inhabitants...............96
Figure 4.9: The average size of urban settlements of 1-5 million inhabitants........................... 97
Figure 4.10: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 500,000-1 million inhabitants... 98
Figure 4.11: The average size of urban settlements of 500,000-1 million inhabitants................ 98
Figure 4.12: Urban population shares of urban settlements of less than 500,000 inhabitants.... 99
Figure 4.13: Growth of urban and rural populations in Africa during 1950-2030..................... 101
Figure 4.14: Growth of urban population percentage in Egypt and South Africa during 1950-
2030........................................................................................................................................... 102
Figure 4.15: Change in the percentage of urban population in different size-categories of cities
in Africa 1975-2015................................................................................................................  103
Figure 5.1: Geographic Settings of Egypt..................................................................................... 114
Figure 5.2: Egypt’s Temporal Urban and Total Population Growth............................................ 118
Figure 5.3: Egypt’s urban and total population growth during the last two centuries............... 119
Figure 5.4: Geographic distribution of the Egyptian govemorates and Planning Regions 122
Figure 5.5: Urban/Rural Migration by Type of Movement, Egypt, 1976-1996........................ 123
Figure 5.6: Magnitude of net urban migration at the regional level, 1996.................................  124
xv
Figure 5.7: Percentage of net urban migration at the regional level, 1996................................. 124
Figure 5.8: New cities, satellite towns, and new settlements around Greater Cairo Region......126
Figure 5.9: The Greater Cairo Region (GCR)................................................................................130
Figure 5.10: Types and Scale of Urban Poverty in Egypt.............................................................135
Figure 6.1: Technology and the Spatial Dimensions of Urban development............................. 156
Figure 7.1: Characteristics of Forecasting Methods and Their Relationships............................. 184
Figure 7.2: Stages of conducting the forecasting Survey..............................................................188
Figure 8.1: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise............................ 199
Figure 8.2: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise............................200
Figure 8.3: Expected influence of different technological sectors on the future of urban
development in the next 30-40 years......................................................................................201
Figure 8.4: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ relevance to main areas of technology
................................................................................................................................................... 203
Figure 8.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ work relevance................................204
Figure 8.6: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected influence of technological
achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years...................................................... 207
Figure 8.7: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected impacts of advancements in
urban transport technologies.................................................................................................. 209
Figure 8.8: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc)................................................................211
Figure 8.9: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in
urban utilities technologies.....................................................................................................212
Figure 8.10: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
telecommunication and information technologies................................................................214
Figure 8.11: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
overall technological achievements on urban patterns..........................................................216
Figure 8.12: Frequency distribution of the technology experts’ responses about technology
transfer to developing countries............................................................................................. 219
Figure 8.13: Frequency distribution of responses about experts’ relevance to the main areas of
expertise................................................................................................................................... 221
Figure 8.14: Frequency distribution of responses about the expected technology impacts on
urban development in developing countries...........................................................................222
Figure 8.15: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected influence of
different technology sectors on urban development future.................................................. 223
Figure 8.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of
technological achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years..............................225
Figure 8.17: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
transport technologies in developing countries..................................................................... 228
xvi
Figure 8.18: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries.................................230
Figure 8.19: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries.............................232
Figure 8.20: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of
telecommunication & information technology in developing countries........................... 234
Figure 8.21: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries..................... 236
Figure 8.22: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of
future urban settlement...........................................................................................................238
Figure 8.23: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for the
provision of services in future new urban settlements........................................................ 240
Figure 8.24: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future new
urban settlements.................................................................................................................... 243
Figure 8.25: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development of the
future new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years......................................................... 244
Figure 8.26: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of existing urban
settlements in the next 30-40 years.......................................................................................246
Figure 8.27: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of 
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years............................................................. 247
ABBREVIATIONS
CAPMAS.............Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Egypt
D G E..................... Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
DTI....................... Department of Trade and Industry, UK
EIA....................... Energy Information Administration, USA
FD I....................... Foreign Direct Investments
G CR ..................... Greater Cairo Region
GLC...................... Greater London Council
GOPP................... General Organisation for Physical Planning, Egypt
ICTs...................... Information and Communications Technologies
IMF....................... International Monetary Fund
InfoDev................The Information for Development Program, World Bank Group
ITU....................... International Telecommunication Union
kWh...................... kilowatthour. An SI unit of energy measurement, 1 kW for 1 hour
LDCs.................... less-developed countries
MENA Report Middle East and North Africa, Business Report
MHNCU...............Ministry of Housing, New Communities and Utilities, Egypt
M oH..................... Ministry of Housing, Egypt
M W ...................... Megawatt. An SI unit of power measurement (1,000 kW)
N ICs..................... Newly Industrialized Countries
N U PS................... National Urban Policy Study, Egypt
PV......................... Photovoltaic
PWV..................... Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging metropolitan region, Johannesburg
RCP...................... Rational Comprehensive Planning
R ES...................... Renewable Energy Sources
RO U nits..............Reverse Osmosis Water Filtering Units For Safe Drinking Water
SAPs..................... Structural Adjustment Programmes
SFD...................... Social Fund for Development, Egypt
SIDA.................... Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIS........................ State Information Service, Egypt
SPECTRE.............Spatial Planning & Emerging Communication Technology in the Regions of Europe
SPSS..................... Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSA...................... Sub-Saharan Africa
SSA...................... Sub-Saharan Africa
TETC.................... Transit and External Traffics Committee, Egypt
TIW ...................... Telesystem International Wireless
TNCs.................... Transnational Corporations
TTP....................... Technology Transfer Payments
UK- DFID............UK Government Department for International Development
UN, DESA...........United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNCHS................United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, Habitat
UNCTAD.............United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP................... United Nations Development Program
UNESCO..............United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNPD................... United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
US DOT, BTS United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
US, CIA................United States, Central Intelligence Agency
WBCSD...............World Business Council for Sustainable Development
W HO.................... World Health Organization
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH PROBLEM , HYPOTHESIS AND  
M ETHODOLOGY
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Throughout history, since the Stone Age through the Industrial Revolution and into 
the Post-Industrial era, civilisations have been characterised by the type of technology 
they use. In all civilizations, technology has played a significant role in shaping the 
city, both physically and socially. Technology has been, and is expected to continue 
being, a powerful dynamic force of change in city structure and urban systems 
(Mumford 1961; Morris 1972; Fathy 1991). The structural analysis of any old city 
clearly reveals the impact of the subsequent technological statuses on the city 
structure. Also, technology has significantly altered the city function within its 
regional settings. Although gathering people in cities was the best way for defending 
them during the pre-industrial era, this situation has completely reversed after the 
proliferation of mass-destruction weapons of the Industrial and Post-Industrial eras.
In Greco-Roman cities, improvements in basic infrastructure such as the introduction 
of sewerage systems and water supply networks greatly altered building arrangements 
and the urban environments of these cities. For the industrial city, the generation of 
electrical power and the motorcar brought about dramatic changes. Electricity has led 
to the creation new machinery and manufacturing techniques for mass production in 
large factories. It also led to the creation of new modes of transportation - the 
tramway, which dispersed social activities into wider areas. Motorcar radically altered 
accessibility between residents, materials, and markets. It broke down the existing 
pedestrian network patterns (Mumford 1961). The motorcar was the prime factor in 
the emergence and development of suburbs, satellite towns, and residential expansion 
at the growing edges of most metropolitan areas (Clawson 1971; Fathy 1991).
The major technological achievements of the industrial revolution; electricity, tram, 
car, train, aeroplane, and the telephone, which occurred in a span of only one century, 
greatly changed the time-distance and the urban-rural relationships and consequently 
affected the urban life in both the developed and developing countries. Old cities often 
failed to accommodate present demands rather than the future increase in car 
ownership. In cities like Cairo, car ownership increased sharply from 10 cars per 1000 
inhabitant in 1974 to 75 in 1998 (Afifi 1991; CAPMAS 1999). These rapid changes 
have been reflected on cities and urban systems through a series of socio-economic 
problems and physical transformations.
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Due to these rapid and impressive changes, almost all cities are currently suffering
serious problems. Cities such as Cairo, Delhi, Tehran, which were very effective in 
meeting their population needs hundred years ago are now suffering very serious
physical, socio-economic, and environmental problems on the local and regional
levels. Moreover, some of Ebenezer Howard’s planned garden cities in England; such 
as Letchworth built in 1903 and Welwyn built in 1920, are suffering serious problems 
nowadays. In addition, serious problems of urban concentration, as a result of acute 
regional imbalances in the distribution of urban population, are evident in almost all 
developing countries.
Although technological achievements of the 20th century was very rapid and 
impressive, future technological achievements, especially in the area of information
technology, transportation, and infrastructure, are expected to be faster and more
influential in shaping the urban future. Despite this, many new towns under 
construction in developing countries, such as Egypt, are planned according to the 
prevailing technical, economic, and social conditions without taking into account the 
impact of the future technological achievements.
Technology transfer to developing countries, especially in the areas of information
technology and telecommunications, is very rapid. Despite its short age, Internet is 
widely spread in some of the developing countries at a rate that is higher than that it 
reached in some developed countries only five years ago. In areas of satellite channels
and the cellular phone, the situation is not an exception. The TV, telephone, and car
ownership rate in some of the developing countries such as Egypt is higher than that 
of some developed countries only ten years ago (CAPMAS 2000).
For Egypt, technology impacts have mounted sharply over the last 30 years. In the 
area of telecommunications, the number of telephone lines increased from 0.51 
million in 1981 to 4.3 millions in 1997. The number of cities covered by automatic 
phone service increased from 7 in 1981 to 220 cities in 1994. Furthermore, the number 
of Fax lines increased by 63 fold between 1986 and 1994 (Huzayyin 1995; CAPMAS 
1999). Cellular phone service is now covering the whole country with very high 
subscription rate - more that 8 percent in 2003 (MENA Report, 2000). In the area of 
transportation, Egypt is experiencing substantial growth in the number of motor 
vehicles of all types, especially intercity taxi and private cars. The vehicle fleet 
increased sharply from 126,000 in 1965 to 2,343,000 in 1998 (PADCO, Inc. 1982; 
CAPMAS 1999). Moreover, car ownership increased sharply from about 4 cars per 
1000 inhabitants in 1965 to 38 in 1998 (Afifi 1991; CAPMAS 1999). To cope with 
this unprecedented growth of motor vehicles, lengths of paved road network increased 
from 17,700 km in 1981 (SIS, 2001) to 50,000 km in 2000/01 (CIA, 2001). In
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addition, Egypt constructed the Cairo underground metro to be the first in Africa and 
the Middle East. The first metro line was opened to service in 1987. This 42 km line is 
currently carrying about one million passengers every day. The second metro line, 
about 20 km long, was opened to service in 1999 and designed to carry some 4 million 
passengers every day. These few indicators show how much technological 
achievements have influenced urban development in developing countries (section 
5.1.3).
Such trend of increasing technological capabilities of developing countries is expected 
to continue growing rapidly as technology transfer activities are considerably 
increasing (Kumar, N. 1997; UNCTAD, 2001-a). This is mainly because technology 
transfer is of mutual benefit for both the developed and developing countries. For 
developed countries, it offers good opportunities to open new markets, and for 
developing countries, it is a necessity to produce competitive products and exploit 
natural resources. Investments of technology producing companies in developing 
countries, especially through joint ventures, have increased in the last decades. 
Therefore, technology products and achievements of developed countries, especially 
in areas of information technologies, telecommunication, and transportation, transfer 
very quickly to developing countries (section 2.5).
The main problem here is that developing countries are not well prepared to deal with 
the expected substantial social and economic impacts of these technologies. These 
impacts are expected to be of considerable influence in shaping the urban future in 
these countries.
The analysis of the different urban change patterns and problems in the more, less, and 
least developed countries (presented in Chapter 4) shows that urban systems in less 
and least developed countries are suffering mounting structural imbalances. The ever- 
increasing size of large metropolitan areas, the mounting trend of urban concentration, 
and the declining role of small urban settlements are the most important of the 
imbalances. Controlling such imbalances requires the adoption of rational strategies 
that take into account the future impacts of technology and that employ these 
technologies in overcoming such imbalances. Moreover, the extensive analysis of 
urban problems in Egypt (presented in Chapter 5) confirms that: (1) the urban system 
of Egypt suffers high urban concentration levels in certain regions of the country; 
namely Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and Canal cities. To these three regions, all 
migration streams are heading from all over the country, from both the urban and rural 
areas. Upper Egypt regions are the main losers of both urban and rural populations, (2) 
new towns built in Egypt since 1977 were of very limited influence in correcting this 
pattern of urban concentration, (3) the urban system of Egypt suffers high differential
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growth of the different settlement sizes as large cities are usually growing faster than 
smaller ones, which usually lose their population in favour of larger cities. In 2003, 
51% of the country’s urban population were in only 2 large cities of over a million 
people in size: Greater Cairo 38 percent, and Alexandria 13 percent.
These mounting problems clearly demonstrate that developing countries are facing 
serious urban problems that are expected to be further aggravated if alternative 
approaches to urban development, that take into account the current and the future 
socio-economic and urban impacts of technology advancements, are not appropriately 
developed and applied.
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this thesis is to find out how technology will influence the 
future of urban development in developing countries and to define the necessary 
approaches needed manage the urban future in these countries. But, it is not the 
objective of the thesis to forecast how the urban future in developing countries will be, 
but rather how it should be. In that context, the thesis has three objectives:
1. To investigate the relationship between technology and urban change and to 
explore the urban impacts of technological achievements in the areas of
transportation, telecommunication, and infrastructure. Investigating such 
relationship is of considerable importance for the development of urban 
development approaches necessary to manage the urban future in developing 
countries.
2. To examine the nature and extent of the main urban change problems in
developing countries and how they are different from those in more developed 
countries. Defining these problems is of considerable importance in devising and 
developing the necessary urban development approaches that could utilise future 
technological achievements in addressing these problems.
3. To develop alternative urban development approaches that could be more
effective in addressing the main urban problems in developing countries and 
that could efficiently meet the expected impacts of future technological
achievements? Also, these approaches should be designed to best utilise 
technological forces in achieving balanced and sustainable urban development. 
Meanwhile, these approaches should take into account the social and economical 
status of communities. Special recommendations are to be suggested to make these 
approaches more appropriate for developing countries.
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Taking into account the fact that managing the development of new urban settlements 
is not enough to achieve a more balanced and more sustainable urban development 
process, the thesis aims to define the expected impacts of future technological 
achievements on existing cities and to define the most appropriate future function and 
size of these settlements.
1.3 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
Because the scope of the thesis is mainly about technology and urban change, it is 
important to explain how the thesis views the role of technology in society. Although 
there are many schools of thought on this subject, the thesis does not view technology 
as an autonomous or deterministic factor, but rather as a tool for human development 
that enables people to increase their incomes, improve their living standards, and 
participate more in their communities. In addition, and concerning urban analysis, 
considering technology as the prime cause for urban change seriously underestimates 
the social and political factors in this process (section 3.2.4.1).
The thesis focuses on developing countries, and mainly those experiencing increasing 
technological capabilities and improving economic and social conditions. This is 
mainly because these countries are facing or are expected to face increasing social and 
economic impacts of technologies and having a good opportunity to manage their 
urban future. The thesis focuses on Egypt, as an example of these countries, in 
defining the main urban problems in developing countries. Focusing on Egypt is 
mainly because the country represents a good example of developing countries 
experiencing increasing technological capabilities and mounting urban problems and 
because the researcher is of good experience about urban problems in Egypt. Despite 
focusing on developing countries, the thesis recommendations may be valid, to some 
extent, for some of the developed countries as well.
Concerning types of technologies studied, and because of studying urban development 
in developing countries, the thesis focuses on two main aspects of technology: the 
communications and infrastructure technologies, as they are the most influential 
technologies in shaping the urban future in these countries. In this regard,
communications has two main facets: transportation and telecommunications.
Transportation is seen as the physical aspect of communication, responsible for the
movement of people and goods. Telecommunications, especially information
technologies, is seen as the virtual aspect of communications responsible for the
movement of data and information. On the other hand, infrastructure technologies 
especially in the areas of water and power supply systems and sanitary networks are
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expected to be of considerable importance in shaping future urban development in 
developing countries.
For the time horizon of this study, and because of focusing on urban future in
developing countries, a time horizon of about 30-40 years is seen to be more 
appropriate for the purpose of this study. Taking into account the history of socio­
economic change, the proposed 30-40 years time-horizon goes well with both the 
short- and the long-wave economic cycles of Kuznets and Kondratieff (Knox, P.L. 
1994, 9). It is the double of Kuznets short-wave cycle (15-20 years) and slightly less 
than a single long-wave Kondratieff cycle (50 years). However, this time horizon can 
be regarded as the first phase in a continuous forecasting process to ensure the 
continuous evaluation and revision of the planning process (section 7.1.2).
Rationale o f Studying the Future Urban Impacts o f Technology in Developing Countries:
Some may argue that studying the future urban impacts of technology in developing 
countries is unrealistic or irrelevant, as many of these countries have limited 
technological capabilities when compared to developed countries. Although this 
argument may seem sound, it neglects the fact that the rate of technological change in 
developing countries is very high (see 2.5). For developing countries, the utilisation of 
new technologies is the most economic alternative to overcome the majority of its
socio-economic problems mainly in areas of food production, health, energy, and 
education. This demonstrates the increasing need for technology and consequently its 
mounting future impacts in developing countries. Moreover, while developed 
countries are better equipped to utilise and manage its technological change, the 
sudden and accelerating rate of technological change in progressive developing 
countries makes the management of future technology impacts in these countries of 
considerable importance.
Concerning the expected future impacts of technology on urban development, it seems 
that developing countries currently have better chances to benefit from these
technologies much more than developed countries could do. Developing countries 
have the opportunity to look at the future and to reshape its urban structure in a better 
way and not to go through the long way that urban development processes in many 
developed countries have been through. In developed countries, the huge investments 
made in urban infrastructure; such as regional highways, communications and energy 
networks, and business facilities; have made these countries less encouraged and less 
able to fully utilise the modem technological achievements in managing its urban
future as these achievements may foster urban sprawl and urban decentralisation out 
of existing large urban centres. In contrast, progressive developing countries have 
better chances of managing their urban future on the basis of utilising future
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technological achievements. The utilisation of these achievements is expected to 
reduce the costs of their urban programs, especially concerning urban infrastructure.
Although there are many studies that have investigated the future urban impacts of 
technology in developed countries, this issue is poorly examined in the case of 
developing countries. This research aims to fill some of this gap through providing a 
rational assessment of these impacts and defining the necessary approaches for 
managing future urban changes in these countries.
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Before formulating the thesis hypotheses, the relevant literature has extensively 
examined. According to many studies, hypotheses are tentative predication about the 
nature of the relationship between two or more variables (Gass, 2000; Dixon et al. 
1987; Christensen 2004-a). Hypotheses could simply be stated in if-then sentences, 
that can be categorized in certain logical forms, such as no difference (null 
hypothesis), associated difference, directionality of difference, and magnitude of
difference (Bryman, 2001; O'Connor, 2002, Janda 2001). Blaxter et al. (2001) and 
Christensen (2004-b) argue that hypotheses should be tested through subjecting them 
to some sort of empirical scrutiny methods that should be defined in advance.
Accordingly, and based on the review of literature about the nature and extent of 
technology impacts on urban change the thesis came to the following hypothesis:
That the future technological achievements of the 21st century will have
considerable impacts on shaping the urban future in many of the developing 
countries, as the prevailing economic and social forces and institutions will 
undergo significant changes.
Based on this hypothesis, and taking into account that while technology has created 
some urban problems it has opened up new possibilities for urban management, the
thesis proposes three complementary approaches, that could be highly facilitated by
future technological achievements, for managing the urban future in Egypt:
First, decentralization and dispersion of urban population, mainly at the regional 
level, is a necessary approach for managing the urban future in developing 
countries. This approach is expected to minimise the ever-increasing 
concentration of urban population in certain regions and metropolitan areas, such 
as the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) in Egypt. Urban decentralization is also 
expected to correct the regional development imbalances that exist in most of the 
developing countries. The thesis argues that future technological achievements 
would increase population mobility and would introduce and enhance new forms
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of work, education, and entertainment, and consequently would facilitate the 
adoption of such an approach (section 6.1);
Second, Small-size urban settlement is seen as a necessary approach to avoid the 
problems of current large-scale urban centres and to implement the proposed 
urban decentralization approach. The thesis argues that small-scale urban 
settlements approach is more effective and more flexible in meeting the future 
technological changes and their associated socio-economic impacts. In addition, it 
argues that this approach ensures, to a reasonable extent, the wise use of 
investments as it enables the flexibility to build according to actual needs and 
changing socio-economic and technological conditions. Although there are some 
constraints on the application of such an approach; mainly concerning 
accessibility and the provision of infrastructure and basic services; future 
technological achievements especially in transportation, renewable energy, 
utilities, and telecommunication are expected to offer reasonable solutions to
these constraints and facilitate the adoption of such an approach (section 6.2);
Third, the incremental planning and development of the future urban settlements 
is a necessary approach to deal with uncertainties that will always exist 
regarding the nature and extent of future technological change and its urban 
impacts, especially in developing countries suffering the lack of reliable and 
systematically organized data. The low occupancy rate in almost all the new 
towns of Egypt that have been built 25 years ago (section 5.2.1.4) clearly 
demonstrates that the incremental development could have been a more
appropriate approach for the development of such cities. Therefore, the thesis 
argues that this approach provides better chances for the optimal use of financial 
and environmental resources as it continuously evaluates the socio-economic,
technological, and environmental changes in the society. In addition, the thesis 
argues that this approach ensures the gradual transition from the existing to the 
targeted situations and consequently protects societies from the unexpected socio­
economic impacts of sudden changes (section 6.3).
These proposed approaches have been developed through three consecutive stages: (1) 
the review of literature about the future urban impacts of technology; (2) the analysis 
of the different urban change patterns and problems in the more, less, and least
developed countries (section 4.4) and the analysis of urban problems in Africa (section 
5-1) and in Egypt (section 6.2); and (3) the theoretical examination of the main 
advantages and drawbacks of each of these approaches and the appraisal of their 
application in Egypt’s case. Then, the importance and applicability of these 
approaches has been assessed through the survey of opinions of science and
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technology specialist and urban development experts. Through this four-stage process, 
it is expected that the proposed approaches have been properly developed and 
assessed.
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
I f  we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would it?1
Albert Einstein (1879-1955)
Before defining the appropriate methodology of this research, it is useful to start by 
exploring the main advantages and disadvantages of dominant social research types, 
approaches and methods.
For types of social research, two dimensions are particularly important in classifying 
types of research (Hakim, 1997; Borgatti, 2000). First: 'Applied' versus 'Basic' 
research. Applied research is research designed to solve a particular problem in a 
particular circumstance. Basic research is designed to understand the underlying 
principles behind human behaviour. Second: 'Exploratory' versus 'Confirmatory'
research. Exploratory research is research into a relatively unknown area. 
Confirmatory research is research into a subject we have a good idea about it. That is 
when we have a theory (or several theories), and the objective of the research is to find 
out if the theory is supported by the facts.
For social research approaches to understand the relationship between theory and 
research, many writers on methodological issues, such as Alan Bryman, (2001) and 
Oppenheim (1992), classify these approaches into either 'deductive' or 'inductive' 
approaches. Deductive research usually moves from general ideas/theories to specific 
particular & situations: the particular is deduced from the general, e.g. broad theories. 
In such approach, the researcher, and on the basis of what is known about a particular 
domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that domain, deduces a 
hypothesis that must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny. Inductive research moves 
from particular situations to make or infer broad general ideas/theories. In such 
approach, the researcher infers research findings for the theory that prompted the 
whole exercise. The findings are fed back into the stock of theory and the research 
findings associated with a certain domain of enquiry. However, Bryman, (2001) 
argues that it is useful to think of the relationship between theory and research in 
terms of deductive and inductive strategies. He also argues that it is possibly better, to 
a large extent, to think of deductive and inductive strategies as tendencies rather than 
as a hard-and-fast distinction.
1 The Quotations Database, www.quotedb.com.
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For social research methods, many writers on methodological issues classify social 
research methods to either 'quantitative' or 'qualitative' methods (Bryman, 2001;
Gephart, 1988; and Oppenheim, 1992). Bryman (2001) argues that the status of the 
distinction between the two is ambiguous because it is almost simultaneously regarded 
by some writers as a fundamental contrast and by others as no longer useful or even 
simply as 'false' (Layder, 1993, 110). However, Bryman (2001) has identified a 
number of differences between quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitative 
research emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data. Also, it 
embodies the view of social reality as an external, objective reality. By contrast, 
qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantification in collection and 
analysis of data. It embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent 
property of individual's creation. Generally (with many exceptions), confirmatory 
studies tend to be quantitative, while exploratory studies tend to be qualitative.
For this research, and because of its nature looking into the future, the thesis applied 
the inductive and deductive approaches and both the qualitative and qualitative
research methods. A growing number of researchers argue that no method per se has 
the monopoly on inference and that quantitative and qualitative methods should not be 
considered antagonistic, but rather as complementary (Bryman, 2001; May, 2001; 
Pedersen, 1992; Cook and Reichardt, 1979). Moreover, Hofstede and Neuijen (1990) 
argue that in examining a complex social phenomenon it is better to start with a 
qualitative orientation and then followed up with a quantitative verification. Bums 
(2000) and Mouton (1996) identified four distinct phases any good qualitative
research should have: conceptualisation, instrumentation, information gathering, and 
closure. The phases of quantitative research differ from those of qualitative research 
except for the conceptualisation phase. Figure 1.1 (adapted from Mouton and Marais, 
1988; Neuman, 2000; Babbie and Mouton, 2001) clearly indicates the integration of
the deductive and inductive approaches and the qualitative and qualitative methods 
followed in this research, and the conceptualisation and empirical research phases.
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual Analysis of Research Approaches and Methods
The complexity of the construct and research questions of this study necessitated the 
use of a triangulation approach (multiple methods). Some researchers experienced in 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods reported that blending and 
integrating methods and data in studying the same phenomena can "...capture a more 
complete, holistic and contextual portrayal" of the subject under study, by eliciting 
data leading to new hypotheses or conclusions, for which single methods would be 
blind (Pedersen, 1992). Many studies have pointed out the hidden assumption of 
triangulation: that the weaknesses and limitations of each individual method will be 
counterbalanced by the other method, exploiting the assets, and neutralizing, rather 
that compounding, the liabilities (Hilton, 2002; Jick, 1983, Van Maanen, J. 1983).
Regarding the research design, this research can be classified as an exploratory and 
confirmatory study. Although the thesis started by exploring the relationship between 
technology and urban change and the possible ways in which technology forces could 
affect urbanisation in developing countries, it then tries to confirm the role of the 
proposed approaches for managing the urban future in Egypt by surveying the 
opinions of both technology and urban development experts about these approaches.
Regarding research organisation, the thesis is organised into two parts (see Figure
1.2). Part One is mainly concerned with providing reasoned answers to the following 
questions: what are the nature and the extent o f technology impacts on urban change? 
And how technology affects urban change patterns'? In reaching these answers, Part 
One discusses the theoretical foundations of the relationship between technology and 
urban change and examines the main urban change patterns and problems in 
developing countries. It starts by an examination of the socio-economic impacts of
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technology and then it examines the urban impacts of the main technology forces. 
Then, it tries to examine the relationship between the levels of technology and the
different patterns of urban change prevailing in different societies. In doing so, the
thesis presents an analysis of different urban change patterns in the more, less, and
least developed countries. Also, Part One presents a detailed investigation of urban 
change patterns in Africa as a group sample of developing countries, giving more
emphasis for patterns of urban change in Egypt and South Africa as they are of the 
largest urban populations in Africa and having the first two 'Mega Cities' in the 
continent (UN, DESA, 2002). Finally, Part One presents an extensive analysis of 
urban change patterns in Egypt and the problems of urban primacy, taking Greater 
Cairo Region as an example.
Part Two is concerned with reaching an answer for the following question: what range 
o f urban development approaches can be proposed fo r addressing the process o f  
urban change and the consequential multi-faceted problems which are associated with 
rapid and ongoing technological changes particularly in transportation, 
telecommunications and infrastructure? In dealing with this question, Part Two starts 
by investigating the proposed urban development approaches through a theoretical 
examination of the main advantages and drawbacks of each of these approaches and 
the appraisal of their application in Egypt’s case and the possible role of technological 
achievements in implementing them. Then, the thesis tries to empirically test the 
research hypothesis and to assess the effectiveness and applicability of each of these 
approaches through the forecasting survey of opinions and expectations of both 
technology and urban development experts. The survey methodology, design, sample 
selection and data collection are presented in Chapter 7. Finally, Part Two presents an 
appraisal of the proposed approaches in the light of the statistical analysis of 
forecasting survey results. Figure 1.2 depicts an outline of the research organisation 
and methodology.
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Organising the thesis in two parts relates to the combined deductive-inductive method 
of reasoning to research. The use of the combined method of reasoning is underpinned 
by a subjective research theory that is based on an ontological assumption of 
nominalism1; an epistemological assumption of anti-positivism2; and an assumption of 
voluntarism concerning man-environment relationship3 (Cohen and Manion, 1989). 
Such methodology usually starts inductively from observations or specific premises in 
a particular context to form the hypotheses and then deductively from these 
hypotheses to its application and implications, assessing its validity against the givens 
of such context. Accordingly, Part One follows an inductive methodology and tries to 
provide the theoretical and analytical underpinnings of technology and urban change 
relationship in developing countries. Part Two adopts a deductive methodology that 
utilises the conclusions of Part One as a basis for proposing alternative urban 
development approaches for developing countries and to assess the validity of such 
approaches. Generally, the thesis methodology and organisation can be summarized in 
the following four points:
First to investigate the theoretical foundations of the relationship between technology 
and urban change, the current literature on the different schools of thought about 
technological change and its impacts on the socio-economic and environmental 
conditions of societies is examined in Chapter Two. Then, a comprehensive review 
of the expected role of ICTs, transportation, renewable energy, and utilities 
technologies in shaping the urban future is presented in Chapter Three.
Second, to provide the analytical basis of the research hypothesis, a detailed 
investigation of the relationship between technology and patterns of urban change 
is presented in Chapter Four. In this chapter, the thesis empirically examines the 
main differences in patterns and problems of urban change in countries of different 
technological statuses (developed, less, and least developing countries) (section
4.2). Finally, the thesis examines the main characteristics and factors affecting 
urban change patterns and problems in Africa, as a group sample of developing 
countries (section 4.3). Then, the thesis extensively examines urban change patterns 
and problems and the technological status of Egypt, as an example of the 
progressive developing countries (Chapter 5). It also examines the problems of 
urban primacy in Greater Cairo Region (section 5.3). Through this analysis, the 
thesis demonstrates two main points: (1) that developing countries are experiencing 
increasing technological capabilities in all areas of technologies concerned in this
1 Such assumption argues that social reality is a product of personal interpretation -  not o f independent existence.
2 The epistemological assumption of anti-positivism stresses that knowledge of reality is based on personal
experience and insight -  not universally acquired and neutrally transmitted.
3 Voluntarism assumption argues that man shapes and controls his environment with a free will-not being its product
or mechanically responding to it.
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research, (2) that these countries suffer some serious urban change problems, 
regarding the size and the spatial distribution of urban settlements. The thesis 
argues that these problems could be better managed through urban development 
approaches that could better address the future impacts of technological 
achievements.
Third: based on the theoretical underpinning of the future relationship between 
technology and urban change and on the analysis of ongoing urban change patterns 
and problems in Africa and in Egypt as an example of developing countries, the 
thesis proposes three urban development approaches for managing future urban 
change in developing countries: (1) urban decentralisation, (2) small-size
settlements, and (3) incremental planning and development of urban settlements. In 
developing these approaches, the thesis theoretically investigates the main 
advantages and drawbacks of each of the proposed approaches and presents an 
appraisal of their application in Egypt’s case and the role technology achievements 
in implementing them (Chapter 6).
Fourth, although the proposed approaches have been developed based on an extensive 
review of literature about technology and urban change and on a detailed 
examination of urban change patterns and problems in developing countries, the 
thesis tries to assess the effectiveness and applicability of these approaches in the 
light of the expected high rate of technological change. In doing so, the thesis 
employs the Delphi technique to survey the expectations of both technology 
specialists and urban development experts. The methodology adopted in 
performing this forecasting study is presented in the survey section in Chapter 
Seven. The statistical analysis and the discussion of the survey results are presented 
in Chapter Eight. Based on this analysis and discussion, the thesis presents in 
Chapter Nine an appraisal of the research hypothesis and the proposed approaches 
through formulating a synthetic evidence for the validity of each of them from the 
results of different questions in the three questionnaires of the forecasting survey. It 
also includes an analysis of the prospects of and constraints on applying the 
proposed approaches in Egypt.
Through its different stages, the thesis had faced several limitations that restricted data 
collection and analysis. As is the case for most forecasting studies, the low responses 
rate was the most serious problem. Also, the lack of dependable, systematically 
organized, and ready to use data in developing countries was another problem. 
However, this thesis attempted to use relatively extensive and reliable data.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
TECHNOLOGY AND URBAN CHANGE
Introduction:
In order to investigate the relationship between technology and urban change, this 
chapter starts by a theoretical examination of the technology-urban change process 
and how technology affects the characterising aspects of urbanisation. The thesis has 
identified three possible ways through which technology could affect urbanisation: (1) 
social change, (2) economic growth and (3) technological forces of direct impacts on 
the physical environment. In addition, and because of the increasing awareness about 
future impacts of globalisation, the thesis examines how technology affects 
globalisation and discusses its urban impacts, especially in developing countries.
2.1 TECHNOLOGY - URBAN CHANGE PROCESS
In investigative how technology affects urban change process, the thesis adopted two 
complementary approaches. First, is to define the characterising features of 
urbanisation that differentiate between urban and rural communities and then to 
examine how technology affects these features. Second, is to define the main factors 
affecting urbanisation process and then to discuss how technology affects each of 
these factors.
2.1.1 Technology and Urbanisation Definitions
In exploring the relationship between technology and urbanisation, it is important to 
investigate the impacts of technology on the defining characteristics of urbanisation 
such as the population size, the economic base, and the lifestyle characteristics of 
communities. Therefore, the thesis tries here to discuss the different views of how 
these characteristics are used to differentiate between urban and rural communities and 
how technology could interfere and change each of these characteristics.
Regarding population-size, although urban places are usually larger than rural ones the 
turning point at which the village becomes a town is still defined in different ways. 
Although the United Nations defines urban populations as “localities with 20,000 or 
more inhabitants”, many countries have their own size-classification for urban 
settlements (Barba and Rabuco 1997). For several Scandinavian countries, including 
Denmark and Sweden, any settlement which has more 200 inhabitants is classed as 
urban in the national census, at least 1,000 inhabitants forms the required threshold in
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Canada, but 2,500 is the minimum for the USA. Many countries impose much higher 
thresholds, such as Greece, with 10,000 and Japan with 30,000 (Herbert and Thomas 
1997). In Egypt, although the administrative and economic functions are more 
important than the population size in defining the urban settlement, the size of smallest 
urban settlement is about 50,000 inhabitants. This diversity is initially confusing, but 
has some logic if considered with its societal context. Concerning the role of
technology in defining settlement size, numerous studies proved that people usually
concentrate in centres of better economic and employment opportunities. No doubt 
that technology is one the main driving forces for economic growth and job creation.
The growth of industrial cities during Industrial Revolution era proves the effective
role of technology in promoting urbanisation. On the other hand, technology - 
especially transportation and infrastructure technologies - has considerably facilitated 
the growth of large cities as it has highly facilitated the rural-urban migration and the 
emergence of suburbs (Hall 1993; Pacione 2001; Herbert and Thomas 1997; Hart 
2001).
Regarding the functions and activities of communities, urban places have at least two
kinds of activities that distinguish them from rural settlements. F irst they are non-
agricultural, and second, they are primarily concerned with the exchange rather than 
with the production of goods. Such criterion, combined with population-size, is
employed in India, where a threshold of 75 percent of the adult male population is
used (Herbert and Thomas 1997). In this regard, the nature and level of technology 
available to societies are decisive factors in determining the nature of functions and 
activities prevailing in different communities. The current classification of countries 
as developed and developing, which is usually parallel to being industrial or 
agricultural countries, demonstrates the important role of technology in determining
the nature of the main activities prevailing in societies. Moreover, technology is
currently introducing many new functions and activities such as. tele-working that is 
expected to change the current occupational structure of rural settlements. In addition, 
technological achievements in agriculture had reduced the amount of labour force 
needed, a matter expected to reduce the dominance of agriculture as a major 
employing sector in rural areas (Hall 1999, 173; Cane 1996; Chandrasekhar 2001).
Evidence of lifestyle differences between urban and rural places is therefore
ambiguous and contrasts maybe more real at some stages of societal development than 
others. Urban-rural differences are blurred in many advanced western societies, as 
they are, for different reasons, in Third World societies which have experienced recent 
and large-scale rural-to-urban migration. There are many situations, however, in 
which urban places exhibit distinctive lifestyle characteristics. These are not
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necessarily urban-rural differences but are as likely to be inner city-suburban or small 
town-large city contrasts. These contrasts are products of social dimensions, such as 
class or race, rather than of place (Herbert and Thomas 1997). Taking the social
dimensions and lifestyle patterns into consideration in differentiation between urban 
and rural communities, again technology had introduced substantial changes in these 
aspects. The role of technology in health, nutrition, and education during the last thirty 
years is undeniable. Moreover, the role of technology in media production and 
information dissemination through the radio, TV, satellite channels, and the Internet 
had significantly improved people’s perception of local and global issues, increased
their social and political participation, and reduced cultural and lifestyle differences
not only between rural and urban communities but also between developed and 
developing countries (Fogel 1979; Marks 1983; UNDP 2001).
Potter (1985) defines urbanisation as the process that leads to increase the number of 
people living in large, dense and non-agricultural settlements. Some other definitions 
argue that the fundamental nature of urbanisation is the increasing concentration of 
both people, and secondary and tertiary economic activities in space (Yeates and
Camer 1980). Although this is undoubtedly true as a description, it is not clear if
process terms are taken into consideration and seem as circular an argument as stating 
that city is a city (Potter 1985). However, technology seems to be a necessary tool for 
meeting the requirements of the increasing number of people living in these large,
dense and non-agricultural settlements.
This analysis clearly demonstrates that technology significantly affects the definition 
of urbanisation.
2.1.1 Technology and Factors Affecting Urbanisation Process
In exploring the relation between technology and urban change, it is useful to
highlight first the main causes and factors affecting urbanisation and then to
investigate the impact of technology on these factors.
Based on the previous analysis of how technology affects the defining characteristics 
of urbanisation, technology could affect urbanisation in three possible ways: (1) 
through changing the social behaviour and the nature of human needs and aspirations 
which in turn affect pattern of urban change (2) through improving the prevailing 
economic conditions which affect the human abilities to meet their needs and 
aspirations, which in turn affects the pace and scale of urban change, and (3) through 
introducing and improving many technological forces; mainly transportation, 
telecommunications, energy and urban utilities which yield direct physical urban
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changes (Figure 2.1). These three factors are highly interrelated and affect each other. 
This chapter presents the main arguments of how technology influences urban 
development through each of these three ways.
Political Process
Technological Forces 
Transportation, telecommunications, Infrastructure
Figure 2.1: Ways in which technology affects urbanisation
Because of the increasing international economic, cultural and political interaction, 
many studies, such as UN-HABITAT and UK-DFID (2002), Friedmann (1986; 1995), 
Hall (1997), Sassen (1991, 1994a, 1994b; 2002; 2003; 2004), stress the role of 
globalisation in shaping the urban future in both the developed and developing 
countries. Therefore, and in addition to three factors mentioned earlier, the urban 
impacts of globalisation and the role of technology in this process will be discussed in 
details in this chapter.
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2.2 TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND URBANISATION
In this section, the thesis tries to investigate the relationship between technology and 
social change and how social change affects urban change process.
2.2.1 Technology Impacts on Society through History
Although perception of technology differs from time to time according to the level of 
technology available and its impacts on the society, technology has always played a 
significant role in the transformation of the socio-economic and urban environments 
of all nations through history. The evolution of societies from agricultural to industrial 
to post-industrial or information societies was driven by the advancement of their 
technological capabilities. Clearly, from the discovery of fire, to the creation of 
gunpowder, to the invention of the computer—from the printing press to the computer, 
from the first use of penicillin to the widespread use of vaccines; each technological 
advance has pushed the limits of human capabilities and changed, to some extent, 
social patterns. Societies are now in the Information Age, where computers and 
communication technologies are again changing the way of thinking about the future 
(UNDP 2001).
The Agricultural Revolution - started in 8000 B.C. - had introduced cultivation as the 
main technological achievement of that era. Settling and the emergence of permanent 
human settlements were the most dramatic social changes brought about by the 
Agriculture Revolution. Agrarian societies, because they were based on large-scale 
agriculture, were far more efficient than earlier societies and typically had a huge food 
surplus. This supports a complex division of labour and the emergence of commercial 
exchange. Because of the profound impact of the Agricultural Revolution on society, 
many people call this era the "dawn of civilization” (Board of Curators. 1995).
The Industrial Revolution, which emerged during the 17th century, represents an 
important shift in the application of technology. It was a dramatic change in the nature 
of production in which machines replaced tools, steam and other energy sources 
replaced human or animal power, and skilled workers (artisan) were replaced with 
mostly unskilled workers. The Industrial Revolution shifted production from reliance 
on manual labour to mechanised, steam-engine-powered and automated fabrication 
processes. Through the mechanisation and standardisation, the Industrial Revolution 
introduced new materials, products, and commodities (Board of Curators. 1995).
The Post-Industrial or Information Revolution emerged by the start of the second half 
of the twentieth century and opened up a new era of the development and application 
of technology. Since then service jobs (ranging from high technology, highly skilled
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professions to low-skill jobs like short-order cook) are more common than jobs in 
manufacturing or agriculture. Post-Industrial societies are dominated by information, 
services, and high technology more than the production of goods. The product of 
skilled professionals is the information or knowledge they provide. The information 
revolution began with the invention of the integrated circuit or computer chip. These 
chips have revolutionized modem life, running appliances, providing calculators, 
computers, and other electronic devices to control our world. Table 2.1 summarises 
the main characteristics of the technology applied in each of these societies.
Eventually, and due to the adoption of advanced technology, the three “societies” 
coexist simultaneously in any society (Board of Curators. 1995).
It is still too early to define precisely all the implications of the Information 
Revolution on future social life. But certainly changes such as the information
superhighway permitting people to communicate using computers all around the 
globe, fax machines, satellite dishes, and cellular phones are changing how families
spend their time, the kind of work, and many other aspects of social activities. The 
current, rather than the future, impacts of this new information society are not yet 
clear. In fact, even the phrase "Post-Industrial" belies the fact that it is not yet quite 
known what will follow industrial societies or the forms they will take. The thesis 
aims here to improve understanding about the future attitudes and the ramifications of 
this new technological era on the social and urban environments.
Indeed, as technical prowess grows uncertainty over its social assimilation persists.
Technological advances do not occur in a vacuum but are shaped by social forces. For 
instance, industry recognizes that the acceptance of new technologies is driven by 
consumer awareness, needs, lifestyles, values, and a host of other market factors (John 
1995, 57). Moreover, national research and development funding is often subject to 
the whim of politics. Because of all these confounding influences, the record of social 
forecasting is poor (Halal; Kull; and Leffmann 2001).
Table 2.1: Technological Characteristics of Agricultural, Industrial, and Information Societies
Characteristics Agriculture Industrial Information
Beginning of Society 8000 B.C. 17th Century 1950s
Country of Origin Egypt England U.S.A.
Basic Technology Manual labour Steam Engine Semiconductors
Tech. Achievement Agricultural Tools Energy Information
Role of Technology Extraction Fabrication Process
Technological Focus Farming & Irrigation Mechanisation & 
Standardisation
Processing
Main Product Food Commodities Knowledge
Main Labour Force Farmers Factory Workers Information Workers
Social Institution Farm Steel Mills-Auto Factories R&D Centres-Universities
Source: Based on: Fathy 1991.
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- TECHNOLOGY AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SOCIAL PATTERNS
Digital and communication technologies may mold social paradigms and influence 
social stratification in the coming twenty years. Chareonwongsak, (2002) argues that 
because of the rapid diffusion of information technology new social patterns are
emerging. Tele-commuting and virtual relationships, e-commerce, and changes to 
home, work, and education environments are the most important of these emerging 
patterns expected to have significant urban impacts. In section 3.2.3, the thesis 
presents a detailed analysis about the causes and impacts of these emerging patterns.
2.2.2 Technology and Social Change Theories
The crucial role of science and technology in transforming the socio-economic
structures in industrial societies has been emphasised in studies of several European
social scientists, such as Radovan Richta (1967), Serge Mallet (1963), and Andre Gorz 
(1968). Also, the influential role of technology in socio-economic transformations has 
been expressed in many recent studies such as Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) 
Brynnjolfsson and Hitt (2000, 23), and Smith (2001).
The technology impacts on socio-economic conditions of societies have been 
conceptualised by three competing schools of thought. These are the subjective
preference theory of value, the cost-of-production theory of value, and the abstract
labour theory of value. Each of these schools is concerned with technology's impact on 
socio-economic activities as a way of understanding the valuation of human activity 
(Cole et al 1983; Fathy 1991; Patterson 2002).
The subjective preference theory o f value — developed by Pareto and Fisher in the first 
half of the twentieth century and then elaborated by Friedman (1953), Brittan (1975), 
and Arrow (1963) — views technology as an autonomous development in a self- 
contained political and economic system. It proposes that the individual is endowed 
with tastes and talents and calculates actions to maximize his or her benefits in a free 
market (Cole et al 1983). In that context tastes define preferences among alternative 
consumption patterns, and talents determine the ability to fulfil these desires through
productive activities. For this school, technology reduces prices for higher
consumption through mass production and substituting machines for labour, and
allows individuals to apply talents in the production process. Due to the apparent 
separation between the individual as consumer and the individual as producer, society 
is the aggregate of various individuals engaged in both production and consumption 
activities (Fathy 1991).
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The cost-of-production theory o f value -- originated in the works of Veblen (1932) and 
Marshall (1947), and elaborated by Keynes (1936) Chamberlin (1933), Robinson 
(1933) and Galbraith (1958) -- argues that value is determined mainly by decisions to 
produce, rather than decisions to consume. The prevailing technology dictates the 
nature and method of production, and therefore determines the technical division of 
labour, which in turn necessitates exchange of products at exchange rates (prices) 
based on each good's cost of production including distribution of social product 
between wages and profits. According to this theory, technology plays a deterministic 
role in production process. Therefore, the temporal equilibrium of political-economic 
forces of ever-changing interest groups is threatened by technological change. Hence, 
there is a possibility of sectional opposition to the introduction of new techniques. 
Technology, it is suggested, must be tamed, if the accelerative thrust is to be brought 
under control (Winner, L. 1977).
The third school, labour theory o f value, emerged from the Marxist philosophy where 
material environment is transformed through production process to goods that 
individuals wish to use. According to Marxist philosophy, the industrial mode of 
production (economic structure of society) is defined as the "techniques of production 
and technical knowledge concerned with the development and use of resources”. In 
addition, the mode of production (the base structure in his terms) is seen to affect 
social institutions and social relations. Its influence on superstructure (ideology, state, 
and social institutions) is the basic line of causation in history (Marx 1970). 
Technology (human productive forces) initiates a change in relation of production, and 
therefore, it has a determining role in human history (Elliott 1985). Therefore, and for 
this theory the type of technology employed, as in cost-of-production theory, 
determines the technical division of labour; but it depends upon a relationship of 
power over the means of production. The entire structure of production, distribution, 
and consumption reflects social relations of production (Sweezy 1939, 1968; Fine, B. 
1975). Table 2.2 presents a comparison of the main characteristics of these schools.
It can be concluded that these three schools of thought share the idea that the 
economic growth process is essentially a profit-investment-technology model and that 
the growth rate in potential output depends on resources (capital, land, and labour) and 
technology. Moreover, technology is seen as capital investment. By increasing labour 
productivity and decreasing costs, technological improvements raise the potential 
output and profit for further investment. Thus, the profitability of investment depends 
on consumption as well as technology. In comparison, employment, the sources of 
wage income, and consumption depend on the relation between the flow of investment 
and technology (Elliott 1985). Moreover, these studies, despite their differences,
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clearly confirm that technology has introduced a series of rapid socio-economic 
transformations in both the developed and developing countries.
Table 2.2: Dominant Theories of Socio-Economic Impacts of Technology
Subjective Preference Cost-of-Production Labour
Determination of 
Value
Individual Utility: in 
consumption
Technology Distribution: 
in production
Social Relations: 
Historic
Political Conflict No conflict in Free Exchange Conflict over distribution
Conflict Fundamental 
to Society
Political Institutions Representative Pluralist Class Power
Theory of Social 
Change
Gradual: Development 
of New Ideas
Evolutionary:
Technology
Development
Revolutionary: Class 
Struggle
Role of Technology Autonomous Determinist Structure to Superstructure
Emerging Ideas Determinism + Essentialism + Reductionism
New Conditions Emergence of Information Society
Source: Based on: Fathy 1991; Cole, K., Cameron, J. and Edward, C.1983.
2.2.2.1 Theories about Technology’s Role in Social Change
The central controversy among scholars who study the history of technology is how 
far technology does or does not condition social change. Each of them emphasizes
different factors in technological change. No neat explanation is reached and rigorous 
proof is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain or demonstrate (Chandler, 1995). 
Although the previous theories of industrialism have successfully analysed the 
technology impacts during the Industrial Revolution era, they failed to explain the role 
of technology in the new socio-economic conditions of the modem information
society. They limited technology to three fundamental ideas: technological
determinism, essentialism, and reductionism (Sabel, C.1982; Fathy 1991).
- TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM:
Technological determinism is a very persuasive stance still the most popular and 
influential theory in understanding the relationship between technology and society. 
However, it has been increasingly subject to critical review by scholars in recent 
times. In approaching this theory, it should noted that the term 'deterministic' tends to 
be a negative one for many social scientists, and modem sociologists in particular 
often use the word as a term of abuse (Chandler 1995). Technological determinism 
usually seeks to explain social and historical phenomena in terms of one principal or 
determining factor. It is a doctrine of historical or causal primacy. The term
'technological determinism' was apparently coined by the American sociologist and 
economist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) (Ellul 1964; Jones 1990). Since then,
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various theorists such as Sigfried Giedion, Leslie White, Lynn White Jr, Harold Innis 
and Marshall McLuhan have adopted the stance of technological determinism 
(Chandler 1995).
Technological determinism depends mainly on three main hypotheses: first that
technology is an autonomous, independent, and self-expanding force; second that 
technological changes are the single most important source of change in society 
(Winner, L. 1977), and third that it is unstoppable and their 'progress' is inevitable, 
unavoidable and irreversible, known as 'Technological Imperative' {Chandler 1995).
For technological autonomy, technology is seen as an independent, self-controlling, 
self-generating, self-propelling, self-perpetuating and self-expanding force, rather than 
as a product of society and an integral part of it. Ellul (1964, 138), the most proponent 
of technological autonomy, declared that 'there can be no human autonomy in the face 
of technical autonomy. He stressed that technological autonomy reduces the human 
being to 'a slug inserted into a slot machine' (p. 135). Critics of the notion of 
technological autonomy argue that technology itself is shaped by society and is subject 
to human control.
For the significance of technology’s role in the society, and as technology-led theory, 
technological determinism views technology as 'the prime mover' in history. In its 
most extreme form, it views the entire form of society as being determined by 
technology. New technologies are seen to transform society at every level, including 
institutions, social interaction and individuals. For example, the British biologist Sir 
Peter Medawar has argued that technological evolution has contributed more to our 
biological success than our biological evolution and suggests that in developing 
technologies, we shape ourselves (Pursell 1994, 33). In its modest form, a wide range 
of social and cultural phenomena is seen as shaped by technology. Within this 
technology-led theory, 'Human factors' and social arrangements are seen as secondary. 
In economics, this is known as a 'technology-push' theory rather than a 'demand-pull' 
theory (Chandler 1995).
Concerning 'Technological Imperative' stance, its advocates argue that technological 
developments, once under way, are unstoppable. Their 'progress' is inevitable, 
unavoidable and irreversible. In favour of the inevitability of technological 
developments (and against the mysticism of inspired genius) many theorists cite 
simultaneous invention widely dispersed geographically. The essence of the 
technological imperative is that as technology makes doing something technically 
possible, the action to do it is either ought to (as a moral imperative), must (as an 
operational requirement) or inevitably will (in time) be taken (Ozbekhan 1968). In that 
sense, technological imperative is commonly taken to be 'the lure of always pushing
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toward the greatest feat of technical performance or complexity which is currently 
available' (Pacey 1983, 79). With some alarm, the mathematician John von Neumann 
wrote that 'technological possibilities are irresistible to man.' (Mumford 1971, 186). 
Similarly, Jacques Soustelle declared of the atomic bomb that 'Since it was possible, it 
was necessary' (Ellul 1964, 99). Chandler (1995) argues that fatalists might add that as 
we can now destroy the planet, in future we will. The technological imperative is a 
common assumption amongst commentators on 'new technologies'. They tell us, for 
instance, that the 'information technology revolution' is inevitably on its way and our 
task as users is to learn to cope with it. Critics of technological imperative argue that 
there are countless examples of 'useless' inventions that no one wants and which are 
not developed but fade away, and stressing that societies decide what technology to 
develop as although the Chinese had discovered gunpowder they chose not to develop 
the gun (Shallis 1984, 64-5).
Generally, the main objection to technological determinism is that the performance 
standards of any technological system can be met in several ways. The fit between 
what needs to be done and how it can be done is rarely as tight as the determinists 
imagine. Factories using comparable technologies can divide the necessary work in
various ways while it is possible to produce the same goods via different technologies. 
Ford Motor Company, for example, is one of many firms that owns and operates
factories in different regions of the world. Despite the similarities among these
factories, in terms of ample access to technological knowledge, capital, engineers,
production facilities, and products manufactured, the technology in use is different. 
The relative cost of labour versus machinery is one of the main factors responsible for 
such variation in technology applied in different locations (Melman, S., et al 1972; 
Fathy, 1991; Chandler, D. 1995). Therefore, the great weakness of technological 
determinism is its inability to accept events that are exogenous to the single closed 
decision system, which is its main constituent (Ozbekhan, H. 1968). Dabinett (2002, 
232) argues that the predilection of many policies and planning initiatives towards 
technological determinism means that many of these suffer from ambiguity and 
inconsistency.
However, Chandler (1995) recommends that it is not very helpful to retreat to the 
extreme position that 'everything causes everything' and that it is a great mistake to 
jump from the conclusion that the relationship between technology and society is not 
simple to the conclusion that the use of a particular technology in a specific context 
has no consequences at all. He also argues that any technological change, which is 
great enough, is likely to produce some social change, and that some of these changes 
may be widespread and major. In addition, Ruth Finnegan, who is strongly critical of
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technological determinism, feels able to accept that 'writing... can be seen as having 
vast consequences for society' (1975, 87).
Therefore, and although the thesis acknowledges the increasing impact of technology 
on the society, it rejects the technological determinism stances of “technological 
Autonomy’ and “Technological I m p e r a t i v e And rather, the thesis adopts the 
“Technological Neutrality’ stance that views technology as 'neutral' or 'value-free' 
(neither good or bad in itself), and that what counts is not the technology but the way 
in which we choose to use it (Chandler 1995). In this research, technology is viewed 
only as a tool for human development that enables people to increase their incomes, 
improve their living standards, participate more in their communities and lead more 
creative lives (UNDP 2001). Also, technological advance and human development are 
viewed as mutually reinforcing, dependent, and creating a virtuous circle.
- TECHNOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM:
Technological Essentialism is an offspring of determinism. It claims that what is true 
for society as a whole is true for its parts. For technological essentialism, the more 
advanced an industrial society, the more clearly modem forms of organization 
predominate in each of its parts. Consequently, differences between industrial 
societies are expected to disappear, each becoming more internally homogeneous. 
During the last fifty years, it has been clear that the mode of production does not unify 
societies. Cultural differences have not disappeared, and the same forces of production 
exist within a variety of different systems of social relations (Fathy 1991; Bell 1973).
The objection to essentialism is that radically different forms of organization are often 
interdependent. Advances in some industries create preconditions for the survival of 
outdated forms of industrial organization. The existence of the "backward" small firms 
is sometimes essential for the survival of large industrial organizations to meet flexible 
demand for maintenance and repair (Fathy 1991).
- TECHNOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM:
Technological reductionism also belongs to determinism. It is the doctrine that focuses 
on causality - cause and effect relationships and that "experience determines thought", 
a focus usually associated with 'scientific' explanation. Any exploration of 
communications technology has to recognize the difficulty of isolating 'causes' and 
'effects', or even in distinguishing causes from effects. As an explanation of change, 
technological determinism is 'monistic' or mono-causal (rather than 'multi-causal'): it 
offers a single cause or 'independent variable' (Chandler 1995).
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Reductionism represents a simple 'billiard ball model' of change that contrasts with 
'holism', which is broadly concerned with the whole phenomenon and with complex 
interactions within it rather than with the study of isolated parts 'atomism'. In holistic 
interpretations there are no single independent causes. Holistic interpretation proceeds 
from the whole and relationships are presented as non-directional or non-linear. It is 
holistic to affirm that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, a proposition with 
which it is difficult to disagree when you think of a working motor compared with the 
stacked parts (Chandler 1995; Melman, S., et al 1972).
In that sense, reductionism holds the view that everyday experience in modem 
societies determines the aspirations and desires of those societies' members. 
Reductionists argue that human wants are not fixed, but rather change over time, 
stimulated by society's capacity to satisfy them. The development of technology, for 
example, produces new goods that awaken new needs and desires, spurring further 
technological advances, and so on the cycle continues (Sabel 1982). Thus, 
industrialization means the end of ideology. If industrialization produces a uniform 
experience of life, and if the experience produces agreement that technology should be 
efficiently used to satisfy wants, ideologies have lost their significance (Bell 1967).
The objection to reductionism is that technological development is usually shaped by 
social choices imposed through the political and economic structures of the society. 
For example, changing oil prices and environmental concerns have forced changes in 
automobile and household appliances design (Sabel 1982).
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2.2.2.2 Perceptions about the Future Role of Technology in Human Development
Again, and in confirmation with the previous discussion about the social impacts of 
technology, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) views technological 
achievements as crucial for human development progress achieved during the
twentieth century. Technological advances from the printing press to the computer,
from the first use of penicillin to the widespread use of vaccines, were effective tools
for improving health, raising productivity and facilitating learning and communication 
(UNDP 2001; Garson and Hershey 2000).
The UNDP (2001) argues that technological innovation is of considerable importance 
for the future of human development for two reasons. First, it can directly enhance 
human capabilities. Many technological products such as farming, breeding and
irrigation technologies, vaccines, clean energy sources, Internet access for information 
and communications directly improve people’s health, nutrition, knowledge and living 
standards. A matter which increased people’s ability to participate more actively in the 
social, economic and political life of a community. Second, technological innovation 
is a means to human development because of its impact on economic growth through 
the productivity gains it generates. It raises the crop yields of farmers, the output of 
factory workers and the efficiency of service providers and small businesses.
Moreover, it creates new activities and industries—such as the information and 
communications technology sector—contributing to economic growth and
employment creation (Diaz Martinez 2000, 669).
On the other hand, human development is also an important means to technology 
development. Technological innovation is an expression of human potential. Higher 
levels of education and training make especially powerful contributions to technology 
creation and diffusion. More scientists can undertake research and development, and 
better-educated farmers and factory workers can learn, master and use new techniques 
with greater ease and effectiveness. In addition, social and political freedom, 
participation and access to material resources create conditions that encourage 
people’s creativity (Szanto, B. 2001, 673; UNDP 2001). Therefore, technological 
advance and human development are in fact mutually reinforcing, dependent, and
creating a virtuous circle. Technological breakthroughs in agriculture, medicine, 
energy, manufacturing and communications have been important—though not the
only—factors behind the gains in human development and poverty eradication. These 
innovations have effectively broken the high-cost and bureaucracy barriers to progress 
and have made more rapid gains possible (UNDP 2001, Garson and Hershey 2000). 
Figure 2.2 summarises the role of technology in human development.
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Figure 2.2: Mutual relationships between technology and human development
Sometimes, technology is seen as a reward of development, making it inevitable that 
the digital divide follows the income divide. It is true that as incomes rise people gain 
access to the benefits of more technological advances. But many technologies are 
tools of human development that enable people to increase their incomes, improve 
their living standards, participate more in their communities and lead more creative 
lives. Throughout history, people have devised tools to meet the challenges of 
existence, from war to health care to crop production. In addition, technology is like 
education—it enables people to lift themselves out of poverty. Thus technology is a 
tool for, not just a reward of, growth and development (UNDP 2001).
On the other hand, it should be noted that every technological advance brings potential 
benefits and risks, some of which are not easy to predict. Technology is not inherently 
good or bad—the outcome mainly depends on how it is used. But certainly people can 
create and use technology to improve human lives, especially to reduce poverty. The 
benefits of technologies can be far greater than what their creators foresaw. But, the 
hidden costs of technologies can also be devastating. Nuclear power,
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and the bovine spongiform encephalitis - mad cow
disease - are examples of the devastating impacts of the misuse of advanced
technologies. Societies respond to these uncertainties by seeking to maximize the 
benefits and minimize the risks of technological change. Doing so is not easy:
managing such change can be complex and politically controversial (UNDP 2001).
- TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH
Medical breakthroughs of the 20th century, such as immunizations and antibiotics, 
have helped developing countries in Latin America and East Asia to achieve health 
development faster than what Europe had achieved through better nutrition and 
sanitation in the 19th century. From the 1930s onwards, human health and survival in 
both regions began to improve dramatically (Chen, L. 1983). By the 1970s, life
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expectancy at birth had jumped to more than 60 years, achieving in four decades an 
increase that took Europe 15 decades starting in the early 1800s (UNDP 2001).
During the 1980s, the use of two new medical breakthroughs —oral rehydration 
therapy and vaccines had better adapted to the conditions of developing countries. 
These technologies had been diffused through a major global campaign and resulted in 
major reductions in child mortality. Deaths from major childhood diseases and from 
diarrhoea-related illnesses in developing countries were cut by about 3 million in a 
span of ten years only, 1980-1990. More important is that such impressive 
achievement came during that “lost decade” of economic growth, when income 
growth was stagnant or negative (WHO. 1998; UNESCO. 2000) Under-five mortality 
rates were cut by nearly half between 1970 and 1999, from 170 to 90 per 1,000 
(UNDP 2001). Also, a recent World Bank study revealed that technical progress 
accounted for 40-50 percent of mortality reductions between 1960 and 1990 (WHO. 
1997; Wang, J. et. al 1999).
- FOOD PRODUCTION AND NUTRITION
Technological progress has played a similar role in accelerating food production. It 
took nearly 1,000 years for wheat yields in England to increase from 0.5 tonnes per 
hectare to 2, but only 40 years to go from 2 tonnes per hectare to 6 (Hazell, 2000; 
World Bank. 2001-a) The green revolution of plant breeding, fertilizer use, better 
seeds and water control, that started in 1960, significantly improved land and labour 
productivity around the world. This increased food production, reduced food prices 
and eliminated much of the under-nutrition and chronic famine in many of the 
developing countries. Because the poorest families rely on agriculture for their 
livelihood and spend half their incomes on food, this also contributed to huge declines 
in income poverty (UNDP 2001).
- PARTICIPATION
The increasing communication facilities of the twentieth century, such as the 
telephone, radio, television, fax, and the Internet, had effectively reduced people 
isolation and enabled them to be better informed and to participate in decisions that 
affect their lives. Tied to these technologies is the free media, a pillar of all 
functioning democracies. The advent of the fax machine in the 1980s enabled much 
more rapid popular mobilization both nationally and globally.
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- EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
During the 1970s, the acquisition and adaptation of manufacturing technology brought 
rapid gains in employment and incomes to the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore. The industrial revolution was triggered by technological change, and 
economists argue that technological progress plays a pivotal role in sustained long­
term economic growth (Lee, J. 2001; Romer, 1986, 1003; 1990, 67; Aghion, P. and 
Howitt, P. 1992, p.323). Cross-country studies suggest that technological change 
accounts for a large portion of differences in growth rates (Lee, J. 2001).
2.2.3 Social Change and Urbanisation:
Throughout history, social factors were the driving force for the emergence and the 
growth of cities. Human needs for protection and socialising were the driving force for 
the emergence of cities, while the continuous change in the nature of social needs and 
preferences was the main factor behind the continuous change in city structure, 
function and image. In the twentieth century many urban sociology studies analysed 
the social forces affecting urbanisation. The most important of these studies are those 
developed by the 'Chicago School' from the 1920s to the 1940s. The main two 
concepts developed at that school are: (1) the 'ecological approach' in urban analysis 
developed by Robert Park, and (2) the characterisation of 'urbanism as a way of life' 
developed by Louis Wirth (Giddens, 2001).
The urban ecology approach stresses the social dimension of cities and views them as 
'human communities' and 'human ecology' centres. According to this approach, the 
sitting of major urban settlements and the distribution of different types of 
neighbourhoods within them is perceived in similar principles of plant and animal 
organisms that tend to be distributed over the terrain resulting in a balance or 
equilibrium between different species. In addition; patterns of location, movement and 
relocation in cities is seen to have a similar form. Different neighbourhoods develop 
through the adjustments made by inhabitants as they struggle to gain their livelihoods. 
According to this approach, a city can be pictured as a map of areas of distinct and 
contrasting social characteristics (Park, 1952).
Wirth's thesis of urbanism as a way o f life stresses more the social dimension of 
urbanisation process. Such thesis is concerned less with the internal differentiations of 
cities than with what urbanism is as a form of social existence. Wirth argues that:
"the degree to which the contemporary world may be said to be 'urban' is 
not fully or accurately measured by the proportions o f the total population 
living in cities. The influences which cities exert on the social life o f man are
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greater than the ratio o f the urban population could indicate, fo r  the city is 
not only increasingly the dwelling-place and the workshop o f modern man, 
but it is the initiating and controlling centre o f economic, political and 
cultural life that has drawn the most remote communities o f the world into 
its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples and activities into a cosmos. 
(Wirth, 1938, 342)
In addition, Wirth (1964) argues that because the city is the product of growth rather 
than of instantaneous creation, it is to be expected that the influences which it exerts 
upon the modes of life should not be able to wipe out completely the previously 
dominant modes of human association. Therefore, our social life bares the imprint of 
an earlier folk society, the characteristic modes of settlement of which were the farm, 
the manor, and the village. This historic influence is reinforced by the circumstances 
that the population of the city itself is in large measure recruited from the countryside, 
where a mode of life reminiscent of this earlier form of existence persists. Hence we 
should not expect to find abrupt and discontinuous variation between urban and rural 
types of personality.
In addition to the urban sociology concepts developed at the 'Chicago School', there 
are some recent theories that stress the social factors in urbanisation process. Most of 
these theories, especially those of David Harvey and Manuel Castells, stress that 
urbanism is not an autonomous process and has to be analysed in relation to major 
patterns of social, political, and economic change (Harvey 1973, Castells 1977, 1983).
Harvey argues that urbanism is just one aspect of the created environment brought 
about by the spread of industrial capitalism. He argues that while modes of social life 
in urban and rural areas were clearly different in traditional societies, industry in 
modem societies greatly blurs such difference. In similar vein, Castells in his analysis 
of 'urbanism and social movements' argues that the spatial form of a society is closely 
linked to the overall mechanisms of its development. To understand cities, he argues 
that the processes whereby spatial forms are created and transformed should be closely 
investigated. In addition, he argues that the lay-out and architectural features of cities 
reflect struggles and conflicts between different groups in the society. In other words, 
urban environments should be viewed as symbolic and spatial manifestations of 
broader social forces (Giddens, 2001).
Through this analysis it has been clear that technology is of considerable social 
impacts on societies. Also, this analysis shows that these social impacts considerably 
affect urban change process. In addition, it clearly shows that technology is of 
considerable importance for the future of human development.
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2.3 TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBAN CHANGE
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, economic growth is one of the main factors 
that affect urbanisation. Therefore, the thesis tries in this section to investigate the 
relationship between technology, economic growth and urbanisation. Although the 
economic impacts of technology are quite clear, the thesis highlights these impacts 
and investigates how they affect urban change process.
2.3.1 Technology and Economic Growth
Technological change and industrialisation was one of the driving forces for economic 
development during the last three centuries, especially in technology-advanced 
societies (Pacione 2001, 6). This explains the continuous shift in human economic 
activities from hunting to agriculture to industrialisation and to information in modem 
societies. In addition, the historical review of urbanisation reveals the fact that 
urbanisation moves with such inventions; from Mesopotamia and Egypt where 
agriculture is invented to England and Europe where industrial revolution took place 
to USA where information revolution is overwhelming.
Michael Pacione (2001) argues that these technology systems shaped not only the 
evolving national economies but also the pace and character of urbanisation. Each 
technological stage has been followed by a corresponding economic and city-building 
cycle; known as Kondratiev cycle (Pacione 2001, 6). Each cycle has been marked by a 
progressive acceleration in the arte of price increases for about 20 years, followed by a 
rapid inflationary spiral. After the peak, prices collapse, eventually reaching a trough 
some 50 to 55 years after the start of the cycle. This periodicity, that seems to be 
linked in a cause-and-effect manner with technology systems, has provided the 
political economy of capitalism with a remarkable rhythm that has reverberated 
widely to influence social and institutional structures, politics, demographics, and 
even culture. Cities have been in the middle of these reverberations, echoing changes 
while simultaneously transforming themselves (Berry 1991, 33; Dassbach 1995).
Simon Kuznets identified 25-year cycles of economic growth, each characterised by 
an acceleration phase of 11-15 years, followed by a deceleration phase of similar 
duration. These cycles have affected many aspects of economic development, 
including the rhythm of investment in transport infrastructure and in city building 
(Knox 1994, 11). It should be stressed here that these cycles represent only
investments in infrastructure and city building not urbanisation as population 
movement to urban centres were progressively increasing during the last 100 years. 
Table 2.3 depicts the main features of technological change and corresponding 
economic and city building cycles.
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Table 2.3: Summary of major technological stages and corresponding economical and urban 
development cycles during 1800-2000
Long-wave 
Turning Points 1815 1865 1920 1980
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2.3.2 Economic Growth and Urban Change
Many studies, such as those of Pacione, M. (2001, 3) and Carter, H. (1995, 19), 
emphasize that economic development and urbanisation are intimately associated and 
that economic development process necessarily involves urban increase. Also, David 
Satterthwaite (2002) argues that the more urbanized a nation, the stronger and more 
productive its economy. He also stresses the strong association between nations’ 
average per capita incomes and their level of urbanization in the light of the fact that 
all the world’s wealthier nations have high proportions of their population living in 
urban areas (see Figure 2.4). Moreover, he argues that the concentration of the world’s
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large cities in its largest economies clearly confirms the link between economic
strength and urbanization level. In 2000, the world's five largest economies (USA, 
China, Japan, India and Germany) had nine of the world’s 16 largest cities (the so 
called ‘mega-cities’ each with 10 million or more inhabitants) and nearly half of all 
the cities with one million or more inhabitants. By 2000, all but two of the world’s 16 
mega-cities and more than two thirds of its million-cities were in the 20 largest
economies. Similarly, within each of the world’s regions, most of the largest cities are 
concentrated in the largest economies -  for instance, Egypt and South Africa in
Africa; Brazil and Mexico in Latin America and China, India, Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea in Asia (Satterthwaite, D. 2002).
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Figure 2.4: The association between nations’ per capita incomes and their levels of urbanization
Although such argument seems sound and although Figure 2.4 shows some degree of 
correlation between economic growth and urbanisation level, it does not explain why 
some countries such as those in group (A) on Figure 2.4 are less urbanized than those 
in group (B) although they are of much higher per capita gross national income.
Moreover, and in counteracting such argument, Africa is often singled out as an 
example of a region where particularly rapid urban growth is taking place without
economic growth. Certainly, and despite the fact that many African nations have had 
very little economic growth in recent decades, Africa has some of the world’s fastest 
growing cities over the last fifty years and that the rates of natural increase in these 
cities are high despite the spread of AIDS (Simon, 1997). The World Bank and
various other researchers have suggested that sub-Saharan Africa is unusual because it 
has been urbanising rapidly without economic growth (World Bank, 1999, p. 130).
There are two main explanations for such phenomenon: (1) because it began from 
such a small base (Potts, 1995); and (2) the achievement of political independence and
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the removal colonial restrictions on the rights of national populations to live and work 
in urban centres (Satterthwaite, 2002). A more detailed analysis of such phenomenon 
is presented in section 4.3.2.1 that discusses economic growth and urbanisation level 
in Africa. In support of the economic-urban growth association argument, David 
Simon (1997) argues that African urbanisation rates were highest during the 
immediate post-colonial period, coinciding with the economic boom years of the 
1960s and early 1970s.
Nijkamp and Schubert (1985, 79) stressed the role of social change associated to the 
economic impacts of technology in urbanisation process. They argue that to 
understand the process through which technology could affect urban change, it is 
necessary first to examine the motivational forces behind the use of technology. Two 
main motivational forces have been identified: on the supply side; maintaining 
economic growth and profit-for-private-sector industry; on the demand side, meeting 
human needs and aspirations. Supply-demand change and innovation have been an
integral part of all economic systems. Technological change and economic growth are 
interlinked through the ability of new technology to lower costs, to improve the 
quality of products and to increase output and profitability. Demand-induced change is 
a function of the appetite and lifestyle among the population of an increasing array of 
‘needs’. Concerning supply-induced changes, resources are shifting from material and 
energy to information and knowledge. Technological breakthroughs require research 
and development and then production, and locational decisions are required at each 
stage. Technological change leads to changes in the resource inputs used in
production. This is resulting in less inputs of materials, energy and labour and greater 
input of knowledge. The main consequences of this shift include the reduction in
demand for materials and energy, and job loss in production. Job loss thereby accrues 
to cities unevenly as location decisions also change. On the demand side, emerging 
higher order human needs and aspirations are seen to play an increasing role in this 
process, and will, in turn, involve locational decisions associated with residential 
development and infrastructure provision (Brochie et al 1985, 8). Figure 2.5 depicts 
process in which the economic impact of technology affects urban change.
Many economists agree that at each stage of economic development, the dominant 
technology that available to the society (coal, steam power, electricity or micro­
electronics) determines its prevailing pattern of production across the main sectors of 
the economy (such as agriculture, industry and commerce). Production requirements 
and the technology capabilities determine the scale, concentration, and location of
economic activities, which in turn influence the pattern of human settlement and the 
flows of trade. Consequently, technology is considered to influence where people live
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and work, the nature of the work they undertake as producers and the means by which 
they are able to travel. The totality of these influences is a crucial determinant of the 
pattern of urbanisation at each stage of economic development (Hay 1990).
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Figure 2.5 Structural-Model of Technological on Urban Change Process
Peter Hall (1985, 23) argued that technology had influenced urbanisation in Europe in 
two ways. F irst the capital substitution in manufacturing and goods handling activities 
has played a major role in the contraction of these industries in congested inner-city 
locations and in older-industrialised regions. Second, the rapid technological 
development in transportation and telecommunications sector in almost all countries 
of Europe, during the period 1950-80, have introduced considerable urban impacts on 
both the inter-regional and intra-regional levels.
Knox (1994, 11) argues that the economy, as one of the driving forces for urban 
change, has been carried along by a succession of technology systems that have been 
fundamental to the changing economic conditions. The most important of these 
technologies are the clusters of energy sources, transportation technologies, and key 
industries that characterised each of technology systems emerged since the 
seventeenth century. In addition, he argues that technological advances in farm 
productivity had fuelled urbanisation in two ways. First, it provided the extra food 
necessary to support the increased numbers of townspeople. Second, it released 
farmers and agricultural workers who then moved to towns and cities to swell the 
numbers of producers and consumers. Improved agricultural productivity came about 
through the application of improved tools, machinery and techniques (Knox 1994, 11).
This analysis clearly reveals that technology, economic growth and urbanisation are 
highly interrelated.
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2.4 TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES AFFECTING URBAN CHANGE
In addition to the economic role of technology in urbanisation process, technology had 
significantly facilitated this process and in many cases it had been developed to 
respond to some urban problems. Technology achievements in the area of 
transportation, such as the railways and automobile, have facilitated the process of 
rural- urban migration. Significant urban growth was noticeable after the introduction 
of both the railways and the automobile. In addition, technology has provided 
technical solution for the problems of gathering large number of people in towns and 
cities. This is mainly in areas of transportation, telecommunications, and infrastructure 
systems. In the next chapter, the thesis presents a detailed examination of the urban 
impacts of each of these forces.
39
2.5 TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALISATION AND URBAN CHANGE
Because of its mounting impacts, there is a growing consensus that globalisation is 
much more than the worldwide production and consumption of products. It is not just 
an economic or cultural trend but a movement of ideas, lifestyles, and developments 
that could affect our families, our employment, and the future of the world 
(Chareonwongsak, 2002). This is mainly because the forces by which it was decreed 
promise to make its mandate even more enforceable in the foreseeable future (Gomory 
and Baumol, 2004).
During the last two decades, the causes and impacts of globalisation were the subject 
of fierce debates. However, globalisation is still not an easy concept to pin down. Nor is 
it easy to specify the ways in which the process of economic, political, and social 
globalisation is affected by, and affecting, the production, distribution, and transfer of 
technology (Rycroft, 2003). Therefore, the thesis tries in this section to investigate how 
technology affects globalisation and the possible impacts of globalisation on the urban 
future in developing countries. It also sheds light on globalisation and technology
transfer to developing countries.
2.5.1 Technology and Globalisation
Today, it is widely accepted that technology achievements, especially in areas of 
transportation and telecommunications technologies, are important catalysts for 
globalisation (Graham, 2004; James, 2002; Ohmae, 2001; Kaplinsky and Fitter, 2004). 
By collapsing time and distance, they enable countries, cities, organizations, and
individuals to develop networks of interest that transcend national boundaries. These
technologies significantly increase the integration of production systems and markets, 
the speed of communications, and the velocity of capital flows with corresponding
increases in complexity and volatility. In addition, by reducing the cost of search, the 
cost of knowledge, and transaction costs they contribute to a more "frictionless" global 
capitalist system which favours the swift, the well-educated, and the well-connected, 
while contributing to growing disparities. In the twenty-first century, it is expected 
that information infrastructures will differentiate the political and economic influence 
of countries, the performance of corporations, and the well-being of individuals across 
diverse cultural contexts (Agnew, 2001).
Chareonwongsak, (2002) argues globalisation and technology are integrally connected 
and share a causal relationship, each gaining from and building on the other. He views 
information technology as the “bones and sinews” of globalisation that has taken our 
lives out of the temporal and into the imaginary and unseen. Reality is no longer
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defined in terms of things we can see, feel, and measure; but rather by ideas and by the 
ability of people to generate and communicate them.
2.5.2 Globalisation and Urban Change
During the last two decades there has been an extensive literature about the possible 
impacts of globalisation on the future of cities and urbanisation. This literature 
extensively affirms the influential role of globalisation in the emergence of global 
functions for some cities and regions all over the world. In the 1980s, Friedmann 
(1986) presented his fundamental thesis -  the world city hypothesis- arguing that 
around thirty "world cities" are the main centres of the global economy and have
certain characteristics in common (Friedmann, 1995). In a similar vein, Saskia Sassen
(1991, 1994a, 1994b) asserted a triad of ’global cities' (i.e. London, New York, and
Tokyo) and thoroughly analysed the ongoing development of the economic structure
in global cities (1996; 1998). In 1997, Peter Hall stressed the increasing impacts of 
globalisation in shaping the urban future arguing that:
A new kind of city is emerging: globalised (connected to other cities in 
global networks); tertiarized and even quaternarized (dependent almost 
entirely for its economic existence on advanced services);
‘ informationalised’ (using information as a raw material); and polycentric 
(dispersing residences and decentralising employment into multiple 
centres or ‘edge cities’) (Hall, 1997).
Sassen, S. (2002; 2003; 2004) stresses the role of globalisation in the emergence of the 
global networks of cities and argues that the urban future in the 21st century, especially 
in developing countries is highly affected by the phenomenon of globalisation, which 
has already brought dramatic changes. Wilheim (1999) argues that globalisation gives 
shape to the “global village”, predicted by the Canadian Marshall McLuhan, and 
accentuates a “new urban geography” in both the developed and developing countries.
Fu-chen and Yeung (1998) argue that there will be growing interaction between
urbanization and globalisation. They view globalisation as a multifaceted process of 
drawing countries, cities and people ever closer together through increasing flows of
goods, services, capital, technology and ideas. The world cities have come to the fore 
because they perform special functions in the new global economy. In a globalising
world, countries and cities are increasingly linked in interdependent and interlocking 
relationships. In the next century, cities will be centres of economic production, social 
organization and knowledge generation. World cities will be especially influential in 
shaping the development of the global economy. Technological advances and easy
access to information will enable cities to evolve more efficient ways of production, 
capitalizing on the cheapest sources of materials (Fu-chen and Yeung 1998).
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Next, in this section, the thesis will discuss the main hypotheses about the urban 
impacts of globalisation: Friedmann's "world city" hypothesis and Sassan's triad of 
"world cities". Also, the thesis will examine the urban impacts of economic, cultural 
and political globalisation. Then, it will highlight the urban impacts of globalisation in 
developing countries. And finally, the thesis will examine the role globalisation in 
technology transfer to developing countries.
- FRIEDMANN'S "WORLD CITY" HYPOTHESES
Friedmann’s (1986) ‘hypotheses’ argue that the ‘new international division of labour’ 
is organized through 'world cities'. These cities are unique because they act as nodal 
points and control centres for the interdependent skein of material, financial, and 
cultural flows which, together, support and sustain globalisation (Hall, 1996; Short 
and Kim, 1999). Moreover, they provide an interface between the global and the local, 
containing economic, socio-cultural and institutional settings that facilitate the 
articulation of regional and metropolitan resources and impulses into globalising 
processes while, conversely, mediating the impulses of globalisation to local political 
economies (Knox, 2002).
In addition, Friedmann (1986) asserts that the internationalization of capital has led to 
the emergence of a hierarchy of cities with particular roles in the capitalist economic 
system (Rakodi, 1997). At the apex of that hierarchy are the so called "world or global 
cities," which are sites for the control and management of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) operations, specialized business services, and nodes in the world banking and 
commercial system (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1985; 1994; Thrift, 1987). 
Second to these global cities are the regional or continental cities, which perform 
similar functions within the world capitalist system to global cities, but within a more 
restricted geographical region (Sit, 1993, Yeung and Lo, 1996). The third level in that 
hierarchy is national cities, which are foci for national accumulation but also provide a 
location for transnational offices and operations, banks, and corporate services, and 
are thus linked into the world economic system (Sit, 1993; Simon, 1992, 1993, 1995).
In confirmation with Friedmann's argument, the University of Loughborough’s 
Globalisation and World Cities (GaWC) Research Group analysed the key 'world city' 
functions (international accountancy, advertising, banking, and legal services) in 122 
cities and confirmed that there is a three-fold hierarchy (Knox, 2002). At the top of the 
hierarchy are ten ‘alpha’ world cities, each of global significance in all four service 
areas. Not surprisingly, the cities with the highest scores are London, Paris, New 
York, and Tokyo; followed closely by Chicago, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Los Angeles, 
Milan and Singapore. A second tier of ten ‘beta’ world cities, headed by San
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Francisco, Sydney, Toronto, and Zurich, is of global significance in three of the four 
key world-city functions. Cities of Brussels, Madrid, Mexico City, Sao Paolo,
Moscow and Seoul came after in the same group. Beneath these in the hierarchy are 
35 ‘gamma’ world cities, each of global significance in two of the four key world-city 
functions; these include Amsterdam, Boston, Caracas, Dallas, Dusseldorf, Geneva,
Houston, Jakarta, Johannesburg, Melbourne, Osaka, Prague, Santiago, Taipei, and in 
an irony of alphabetical order -  Washington (Knox, 2002; Fossaert, 2001).
The linkages between world cities, along with their relationships to processes of 
globalisation, have been subject to rather less attention. World-system theory tends to 
portray world cities as the "cotter pins" that hold together the global hierarchy of core, 
semi-periphery, and periphery. Knox (2002) argues that there are three main circuits 
of traffic (the Americas, Europe/Middle East, and Asia/Oceania) that dominate the
"space of flows" of the informational economy between leading 'world cities' (Figure
2.4).
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Figure 2.4 Main Circuits of Information Economy Flow Among Regional 'World Cities'
- SASSEN'S TRIAD OF WORLD CITIES
Sassen's (1991, 1994a, 1996) work is particularly important for her careful
specification of the nature of global cities. Although she identifies changes in 
international banking and finance as vital in the emergence of her triad, she contends 
that world cities are more than just financial centres. For Sassen (1991) finance is just 
one of a series of advanced producer services which serve to define global cities as 
post-industrial production sites. This contrasts with Friedmann's (1986) original idea
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of world cities as general 'command centres' because a concentration of corporate 
headquarters is not identified by Sassen as an essential component of a city if it is to 
be classified as a world city. The crucial difference is that for Sassen a world city is 
the loci for the critical servicing of global capital not just its specific management.
This analysis of both Friedmann's and Sassan's views about world cities clearly 
reveals that today’s world cities are both cause and effect of economic, political and 
cultural globalisation. Therefore, the thesis tries in the following sections to 
investigate the urban impacts o f economic, political and cultural globalisation.
2.5.2.1 Economic Globalisation and Urban Change
Economic globalisation - or the progressive integration of various parts of the world 
into a global economy and global finance system - has attracted considerable debate 
over the past decade (Dieleman and Hamnett, 1994). Although the relationship
between economic globalisation and urban development is complex, and quite 
difficult to trace and to validate empirically (Shachar, 1997, p. 22), the thesis tries this 
section to highlight the main economic impacts of globalisation and their associated 
urban effects.
- GLOBALISATION AND THE DEMISE OF URBAN FORMAL ECONOMIES
There is a growing consensus among economists that, in the current phase of
globalisation, "a new structure of global competition has arisen" as a result of the 
appearance of "global" markets and "global" production complexes (Thrift, 1994; 
Rogerson, 1997; Castells, 1992; 1996). Rogerson (1997) argues that although many 
factors contribute to the making of this new structure of competition, particular 
importance is attached to new innovations in technology, such as micro-electronics, 
telecommunications, or materials science, which exert a profound impact on 
refashioning world production systems. The growth of transnational production and 
the increasing openness of and interdependence among national economies are the key 
elements in economic globalisation. Alongside new globalised production strategies 
there has been a parallel integration of financial markets which, together with a vastly 
improved global telecommunications and transportation infrastructure, has increased 
global economic integration in general (Doohan, 1994, p. 26).
Such changes have profound impacts at the level of both national and urban 
economies and for individual enterprises. At the level of national and urban 
economies, the major impact has been an intensification of international and local
competition for markets and investments. Increasingly, rates of growth of GDP and of
employment hinge on an economy's ability to compete successfully within the new
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system of globalised production. At the level of the enterprise, the effects have been to 
stress the importance of adopting new process technologies, of new flexible systems 
of work organization, and of shifting towards flexible rather than Fordist mass 
production systems. This process is widely expected to result in the demise of formal 
economies at both national and urban levels (Rogerson, 1997).
For developing countries, especially Africa and its cities, the impacts of recent
economic globalisation trends and the associated changes are disturbing. However, 
many economists argue that it is better for national and urban economies in these 
countries to be affected by these trends than to be left out. Despite all its negative side- 
effects, exposure to "the new competition" seems to be increasingly essential for
augmented growth, efficiency, and sustained job creation (Storper, 1992; Doohan, 
1994; Rogerson, 1997).
- GLOBALISATION AND THE NEW REGIONALISM: GLOBAL CITY REGIONS
Contrary to many recent predictions that globalisation will lead to the end of
geography (e.g. O’Brien, 1992), many recent studies (e.g. Hall, 1966; Castells, 1996; 
Friedman and Wolff, 1982; Sassan, 2004) assert the increasing importance of 
geography in the era of globalisation. They argue that globalisation enhances the 
possibilities of heightened geographic differentiation and locational specialization. In
addition, as globalisation proceeds, an extended archipelago or mosaic of large city- 
regions is evidently coming into being, and these peculiar agglomerations are now 
beginning to function as the spatial foundations of the new world system that has been 
taking shape since the end of the 1970s (Scott, 1998, 2001). The internal and external 
relations of these city-regions and their complex growth dynamics present a number of 
extraordinarily perplexing challenges to researchers and policy makers alike as we 
enter the 21st century.
Most of the extensive literature available on "world cities" and "global cities" focuses 
on a concept of the cosmopolitan metropolis as a command post for the operations of 
multinational corporations, as a centre of advanced services and information- 
processing activities, and as a deeply segmented social space marked by extremes of 
poverty and wealth. Most of these studies assert the emergence of wider metropolitan 
regions, or 'global city-region', that act as political-economic units with increasing 
autonomy of action on the national and world stages (Scott, 2001).
Analysts such as Hall (1966), Castells (1996), Friedmann and Wolff (1982), Sassen 
(1991), Knox (1995) and Scott (2001) define 'global city-regions' as dense 
megalopolitan spaces that are bound up in intricate ways in intensifying and far-flung 
extra-national relationships. As such, 'global city-regions' represent an outgrowth of
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large metropolitan areas - or contiguous sets of metropolitan areas -- together with 
surrounding hinterlands of variable extent which may themselves be sites of scattered 
urban settlements. In parallel with these developments, 'global city-regions'
consolidate into definite political entities as contiguous local government areas unite
together to form spatial coalitions in search of effective bases from which to deal with 
both the threats and the opportunities of globalisation. So far from being dissolved 
away as definite geographic entities by processes of globalisation, city-regions are by 
and large actually thriving at the present time, and they are, if anything, becoming 
increasingly central to the conduct and coordination of modem life (Scott, 2001; 
Taylor, 2000; Knox, 1995; Porter, 2001).
2.5.2.2 Cultural Globalisation and Urban Change
As global cities embody and articulate the various processes and outcomes of 
globalisation, and taking into account that a great deal of attention has been devoted to 
economic globalisation and the city, it is important to highlight the main impacts of
cultural globalisation on the city. Short (2002) argues that cultural globalisation has
two main impacts on the city. The first is the increasing heterogeneity of global cities 
as they are the home to a variety of ethnic diversities. The global city is the 
heterogeneous city and a growing indicator of provincialism is homogeneity. Global 
cities are sites of both reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation. An important feature 
is the extent to which certain ethnicities are tied to certain niches in the socio­
economic hierarchy as well as to certain urban social spaces. Transnational 
communities of both rich and poor of very different national and ethnic groups have 
been recognized. The second is the extent to which these communities are both the 
bearers and transmission lines of economic globalisation. Much of the literature has 
equated economic globalisation with the penetration of local markets by large 
multinational companies. Short (2002) argues that this gigantist view of economic 
globalisation ignores the extent to which economic globalisation occurs in and through 
transnational communities in cities around the world. Transnational communities are 
the sites between the intersection of local and family ties and global flows of people, 
money, capital, goods and services (Appadurai, 1996; Short, 2002).
Therefore, cultural globalisation is expected to have considerable impacts on large 
cites in developing countries, especially primate cities such as Cairo, Lagos, and 
Johannesburg. These cities start experiencing increasing levels of ethnic diversity and 
social heterogeneity.
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2.5.2.3 Political Globalisation and Urban Change
In recent years, there have been some predictions that globalisation will lead to the 
death of the nation state. However, many analysts such as Clarke and Gaile (1997), 
Short (2002) and Sassen (1999) assert that with globalisation the state becomes more
important as a mechanism for mediation between global forces and national social
formations. They argue that because of globalisation, interconnections between city, 
regional and national governments have become more complex. A post Keynesian, 
post federal state with marked inequality in the national space economy, has replaced 
the Keynesian state committed to a large range of free public services nationally 
available. In states with a non-primate urban distribution and a federal structure, city- 
states can be identified in which the regional and city governments have become much 
more important as vehicles for globalising cities. In other countries, those with a larger 
degree of central governmental power and a primate urban hierarchy, the national 
government along with regional and local governments can also play a part in
ensuring the global competitiveness of primate cities. Short, (2002) argues that the
grande ensembles of Paris or the heavy UK government investment in London are two 
examples of national governments ensuring global city competitiveness.
However, the relationship between global cities and the state is complex. In some
cases the city region may be separating of from the fortunes of the rest of the national
space economy; in others the fortunes of nation state and global city are inextricably 
linked. Also, the different levels of the state are involved in such relationship in
different ways (Short, 2002).
For developing countries, political globalisation highly influences the capital cities of 
many of these countries. Because of their political and economic role on the
international level, these cities became more dominant and primate in their national
urban systems. Moreover, governments and elite groups have pushed for the
development of these cities as primate political, economic and service provision
centres. This attitude has resulted in many socio-economic and urban problems at both
the local and national levels. Cairo, Egypt, is one of the best examples in this regard.
2.5.2.4 Globalisation and Urbanisation in Developing Countries
Many researchers argue that globalisation has not been a boon to all cities. While it 
has brought new opportunities and wealth to some cities, it has marginalized others, 
especially those in developing countries and particularly in Africa (Fu-chen and 
Yeung 1998). In addition, the changes associated with globalisation are disturbing for 
almost all developing countries. However, Rakodi (1997), Storper (1992), and Doohan
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(1994) argue that it is better for national and urban economies in developing countries 
to be affected by them than to be left out. Despite all the side-effects of globalisation, 
exposure to "the new competition" seems to be increasingly essential for augmented 
growth, efficiency, and sustained job creation. Many of these countries realised this
fact and try to maximise their benefits from globalisation and strive to avoid, or 
minimise, its negative impacts.
Regarding the possible impacts of globalisation on urbanisation in developing
countries, it should be noted that the relationship between the two has its old and
recent dimensions. For the old dimensions of such relationship, most of the developing 
countries were formerly colonies and the foundations for their incorporation into the
world economic and political system were established during the colonial period. 
Colonial urbanisation was marked by a reorientation of urban patterns to serve the
needs of trade and administration. In meeting these needs, some existing settlements
prospered, while others stagnated or decayed, and a series of new centres was
established (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Mehretu, 1983; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991).
In addition, although political independence did bring some degree of autonomy for 
these countries, this was largely eroded by superpowers interests and continued
economic dependence. Many of the developing countries were overwhelmed by a 
wide range of domestic political difficulties, resulting in political instability and
administrative weakness (Chazan et al., 1988). These two problems largely influenced 
patterns of urbanization and adversely affected the capacity of local governments to 
manage urban growth in many developing countries of these countries.
The early phase of post-colonial urbanization in many of the developing countries, 
especially those in Africa, was predominantly geared to the expansion of colonial
physical and social space to incorporate new indigenous interests and needs and 
thereby spreading the "fruits of independence". But there were real limits to physical 
and social incorporation in the context of finite resources, particularly in a situation of 
rapid population growth. As a result, existing urban problems of poverty and 
inequality, unemployment, pressure on resources, deterioration of services and 
infrastructure, and the weakening of social and spatial order and control were 
exacerbated in many of the developing countries (Aina, 1997). In Chapter Four, the 
thesis tries to investigate globalisation impacts on urban change patterns in Africa 
(section 4.3.3) and tries to define the position of African large cities in the global
urban system (section 4.3.4).
In recent years, the rate of urban growth in all developing countries has significantly 
increased due to expansion of public sector employment, industrialisation, 
development of transportation systems, an increased rate of natural increase, and
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relative neglect of rural areas Rakodi, 1997). Indeed, globalisation has its impacts on 
each of these factors.
2.5.3 Globalisation and Technology Transfer to Developing Countries
Many studies stress the role of globalisation in facilitating technology transfer to 
developing countries (UNCTAD, 2001-a; Kumar, 1997; Fu-chen and Yeung 1998). 
The last twenty years have witnessed an increasing trend of technology transfer to 
developing countries. Both the developed and developing countries have supported 
this trend. For developing countries, technology transfer is at the core of development 
debate and political agenda. Transformation of developing countries from a stage of 
low technological development to a more developed stage would not be possible 
except through transfer of technology. For developed countries, technology transfer to 
developing countries has its economic benefits. It provides an access to the markets of 
developing countries. Moreover, technology transfer enables developed countries to 
utilise the available natural resources and the cheap labour force.
In measuring technology transfer, the global flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
and the Technology Transfer Payments (TTP) are the most practical indicators. 
According to the World Investment Report 2001 published by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the FDI is reaching many more 
countries than in the past. The number of countries receiving an annual average of 
more than $1 billion rose from 17 (six of which were developing countries) in the 
mid-1980s to 51 (23 of them developing countries) at the end of the 1990s. In the case 
of outflows, 33 countries (11 of them developing countries) invested more than $1 
billion at the end of the 1990s, compared to 13 countries (only one of them a 
developing country) in the mid-1980s (UNCTAD, 2001-a).
For developing countries, FDI inflows have registered an explosive growth over the 
past 25 years, especially since the mid- 1980s. The annual technology transfer 
payments by developing countries rose from $ 1.8 billions in 1976 to $ 18 billions in 
1995. Similarly, the annual FDI inflows to developing countries rose from $ 6.3 
billions in 1975 (Kumar, N. 1997) to $113.3 billion in 1995 to 240 billions in 2001 
(UNCTAD, 2001-a). Figure 2.2 presents the developing countries technology transfer 
payments and foreign direct investment inflows during 1975 to2001.
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Source: Prepared by the researcher; data from: Kumar, N. 1997; UNCTAD, 2001-b 
Figure 2.2: Growth of technology transfer payments and foreign direct investments inflows to
developing countries during 1976-1995
Concerning technology transfer to Egypt, the country is receiving an increasing 
amount of Foreign Direct Investments. Although FDI inflows into Africa had declined 
from $10.5 billion in 1999 to $9.1 billion in 2000, after an increase of $2 billion 
during the previous year, and while Inflows to major recipients such as Angola, 
Morocco and South Africa halved, Egypt remained the most important recipient of 
FDI flows in North Africa, with increasing inflows of about 20% ($1.2 billion 
compared to $1 billion in 1999). Since the early 1980s, multinational joint ventures 
have increased investments in Egypt. FDI stocks in Egypt tripled during 1985-2000 
(UNCTAD 2001-b). A more detailed analysis of the increasing technological 
capabilities of Egypt is presented in section 5.1.3.
This increasing trend o f technology transfer to developing countries suggests 
that technology will have considerable impacts on the socioeconomic and 
urban structures o f these countries. Although the research acknowledges the 
difference between the use of technology (as products) and its invention, it views the 
use of technology, especially in areas of transportation, telecommunications and 
infrastructure, as an effective factor in shaping the urban future in developing 
countries.
Conclusion:
Through this chapter, the thesis has thoroughly investigated the relationship between 
technology and urban change. In doing so, the thesis has identified and analysed the 
four main ways through which technology affects urbanisation: social change,
economic growth, technological forces, and globalisation.
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For the relationship between technology and social change and how social change
affects urban change process, numerous studies have emphasised the crucial role of 
science and technology in transforming the socio-economic structures of societies. In 
addition, the analysis of the main theories about technology and social change reveals 
that, despite their different views on how technology introduces social change, all 
these theories agree that technology affects the social structures of all societies. Also, 
the analysis of technology’s role in the improvement of health, food and nutrition, and 
economic growth, affirms that technology is of considerable importance for the future 
of human development. In addition, the analysis of the main urban sociology concepts, 
especially the 'ecological approach' in urban analysis developed by Robert Park, and 
the characterisation of 'urbanism as a way of life' developed by Louis Wirth, reveals 
that social factors are of considerable impacts on urban change process.
For the relationship between technology and economic growth and how economic
growth affects urban change process, there is an extensive literature that stresses the 
role of technological change and industrialisation in economic development. Many
economists argue that each technological stage has been followed by a corresponding 
economic cycle; such as Kondarative and Kuznets cycles, and a city development 
cycle. This analysis reveals that economic growth is one of the driving forces for
urban change.
For globalisation and how it is affected by technology and how it affects urbanisation, 
there is an extensive literature that views technology achievements, especially in areas 
of transportation and telecommunications technologies, as important catalysts for 
globalisation. Many studies argue that these technologies significantly increase the
integration of production systems and markets, the speed of communications, and the 
velocity of capital flows. For the urban impacts of globalisation, many analysts stress 
the influential role of globalisation in the emergence of global functions for some 
cities and regions all over the world. The seminal work of John Friedmann, Peter Hall, 
and Saskia Sassen about 'world cities', 'global cities' and 'global city regions'
emphasise the influential role of globalisation in shaping the urban future in both
developed and developing countries.
For the technological forces that yield direct physical impacts on cities and urban 
systems, the thesis argue that transportation, telecommunications, and infrastructure
technologies are the most influential of these forces. In the next chapter, the thesis 
presents a detailed examination of the urban impacts of each of these forces.
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Chapter Three
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE URBAN IMPACTS OF THE MAIN 
TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES
Introduction:
In this chapter, the thesis tries to explore the urban impacts of the main technology 
forces and their role in shaping the urban future. In doing so, the thesis looks at how 
these technologies affected urban change in the past and tries to analyse the possible 
ways in which each of these technologies could affect the urban future. Because of 
focusing on developing countries, the thesis focuses on two main aspects of 
technology: the communications and infrastructure technologies, as they are the most 
influential technologies in shaping the urban future in these countries. In this regard,
communications has two main facets: transportation and telecommunications.
Transportation is seen as the physical aspect of communication, responsible for the 
physical movement of people and goods. While telecommunications, especially 
information technologies, is seen as the virtual aspect of communications responsible 
for the movement of data and information. Infrastructure technologies, especially in 
the areas of energy production and the increasing use of renewable energies, and in the 
area of urban utilities technologies, mainly water treatment and sanitary systems, are 
of considerable importance in shaping the urban future in developing countries. In this 
chapter, the socio-economic and urban impacts of each of these technologies will be 
thoroughly reviewed.
Many urban studies view the application of technology as an integral force in the
development of towns and cities, in the past, in the present and in the future. In his
book ‘Victorian Cities’, Asa Briggs (2000, 16) viewed Victorian cities as:
. . . .  Cities o f the railway and tramway age, o f the age o f steam and o f gas, o f a society 
sometimes restless... Perhaps their outstanding feature was hidden from public view -  their 
hidden network o f pipes and drains and sewers, one o f the biggest technical and social 
achievements o f the age, a sanitary ‘system ’ more comprehensive than the transport system.
Angus McIntosh (1997, 43) argues that as technology develops, it has an accelerating 
impact on urban development. Such impact has not been anticipated by physical town 
planners. Unless we begin to measure and understand its significance, technology will 
continue to rule urban areas, rather than be harnessed to benefit cities and towns. 
McIntosh also defined technologies that mainly affect urban development as: 
construction material technology; farm technology, water & steam technologies, urban 
railway, automobile, air transport technology, electric technology, and computer & 
information technology.
52
3.1 TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES
In examining the urban impacts of transportation technologies, the thesis will start by 
discussing the increasing mobility, increasing diffusion and falling costs of
transportation, and space-time convergence. Then, it discusses the urban impacts of 
successive transport technologies shedding light on the future advancements of
transport technologies. Finally, the research analytically reviews the key debates about 
the future urban impacts of transportation.
3.1.1 Transportation as a Tool for Increasing Mobility and Improving Accessibility
Mobility is an essential human need and people usually seek to increase their mobility 
in order to improve accessibility — “the ease by which desired social and economic 
activities can be reached from a specific point in space” (US DOT, BTS 1997; p. 136). 
People desire mobility both for its own sake and because it enables them to overcome 
the distance. Businesses also need mobility because it helps them overcome distance 
— the distance that separates them from their sources of raw materials, from their 
markets, and from their employees (WBCSD. 2001, 11). In that sense, transportation 
is a necessary tool for overcoming space which characterizes a variety of human and 
physical constraints such as distance, time, administrative divisions and topography. 
Such constraints confer a friction to any movement, commonly known as the friction 
of space. The cost of overcoming these constraints and the friction they create varies 
greatly according to factors such as the distance involved and the nature of what is 
being transported. The goal of transportation is thus to transform the geographical 
attributes of freight, people or information, from an origin to a destination, conferring
them an added value in the process (Rodrigue, Jean-Paul 2002a).
Throughout most of human history, people and goods were moving at speeds that 
were limited to the strength of people and the animals they domesticated. By the 
nineteenth century, the image has substantially changed when humans harnessed 
steam energy and used it to transport their goods and themselves at significantly faster 
speeds. The invention of the petroleum-fuelled motor vehicle at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the aeroplane at the beginning of the twentieth century opened 
up new opportunities for greatly increased speed and greater travel flexibility. Roads 
could go where railways could not, and aeroplanes only needed runways on which to 
arrive and depart. As a result of these transport innovations, the twentieth century was 
the “golden age” of mobility and improved accessibility (WBCSD. 2001, 11).
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3.1.2 Transportation: Increasing Diffusion and Falling Costs
During the last half-century, the broad patterns of travel behaviour - known for 
increasing trip frequency, trip distance, and travel expenditure as incomes rise - have 
become evident in the statistics of passenger transportation all over the world. 
Between 1950 and 1997, the total number of kilometres travelled each year by each 
person increased more than threefold. The total transportation system, accommodating 
both that per capita increase and population increase, provided over eight times more 
passenger-kilometres in 1997 than in 1950. Also, the average world growth rate of 
kilometres travelled annually has been rising at an impressive rate of 4.6% per year. 
Surprisingly, the growth rate in some developing regions is even higher. China is the 
premier example, growing at 9.4% per year, although from an admittedly low base 
(Table 3.1) (MIT and CRAI. 2001, p.36).
On the other side, there have been major shifts among means of transport. It is argued 
that as people earn more and travel more, they use faster and more convenient 
vehicles, automobiles in particular. Worldwide, the greatest loser is therefore travel by 
rail. Since 1950, rail travel has decreased dramatically as a share of the total travel, 
especially in developing regions where it was the dominant form of motorized travel 
(MIT and CRAI. 2001, p.37).
Table 3.1. Growth in passenger-kilometres travelled
1950 1997 AAGR*, %/yr
Per
Capita
4,479
Total
(billions)
2,628
Per Capita Total(billions) Per Capita
Total
(billions)
Industrialized Regions 16,645 14,951 2.8 4.8
Other Regions 373 717 2,627 12,998 4.2 6.4
World 1,334 3,345 4,781 27,949 2.8 4.6
Specific Segments
United States 11,205 1,706 24,373 6,530 1.7 2.9
Western Europe 1,668 542 12,631 5,658 4.4 5.1
Former Soviet Union 705 127 4,152 1,250 4.8 5.0
China NA NA 1,313 1,634 NA NA
India 348 125 1,457 1,392 4.1 5.3
Source: MIT and CRAI. 2001, p.37
Since the 1950s, the number of automobiles has considerably increased in both the
developed and developing countries. This process of motorization involved a
significant reduction in the number of people per automobile, from 48.2 in 1950 to
11.5 in 1999. In 1999, the global automobile fleet was estimated to be around 520 
million vehicles, with an annual car production of around 35-40 million cars. Along 
with the number of vehicles, the distance travelled per vehicle is also increasing 
(Table 3.1). More important, transport costs have considerably declined during the
20th century, notably through the application of economies of scale. In 1960, maritime 
transport costs were a third of their 1920 level. Air transportation costs have followed
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a similar trend, but over a much shorter time span. Air transportation boomed after 
World War Two with the application of significant technological improvements (such 
as the je t engine) (Rodrigue, Jean-Paul 2002a).
3.1.3 Transportation and Space-Time Convergence
Transportation significantly and continually changes the relationship between time 
and space. The development of transportation technologies resulted in so called 
‘space-time convergence’ because the amount of time needed to move between two 
points decreases significantly. The development of stagecoach services in the 18th and 
early 19th centuries has substantially declined travel times. The development of rail 
networks initiated a new phase of space-time convergence and by the early 20th 
century travel times were significantly decreasing. The development of highways and 
then air transportation systems from the mid 20th century reduced travel times more 
than anytime before. For example, the travel time from London to Edinburgh (520 km 
apart) reduced from 20000 minutes in year 1650 to only 100 minutes in 2000, and the 
New York and Boston (310 km apart) reduced from about 2700 minutes in year 1800 
to only 70 minutes in year 2000 (Janelle 1968; Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. 2002b).
3.1.4 Transportation and Urban Change: Key Debates
In all city-planning theories, transportation was a key factor in defining a city's size, 
form, structure, and function within the regional settings. In Garden Cities o f
Tomorrow (1902), Ebenezer Howard envisaged a garden city depending on 
comprehensive railway systems of internal communications. Also, Le Corbusier’s 
linear-city ideas in 1920s were founded mainly on a sound transport strategy,
including public transportation. In addition, the linear city model, developed by Don
Arturo Soria Y Mata in 1892, was based mainly on railways. In England, the suburbs 
that grew between 1850-1920 owe their existence mainly to the railways, and their 
development during this period. Railway development has significantly facilitated the 
population redistribution away from the crowded city centres and within easy walking 
distance of railway stations (McIntosh 1997, 45).
Urban growth has historically been strongly related to transport technology. The reach 
of development has traditionally been constrained by the available vehicles, rights-of- 
way, landforms, and the costs of dealing with each. Automobiles and trucks have 
dominated the transport technology of the last half of the 20th century. The 
technologies of these vehicles are continually improving and the development of a
system of high speed express rights-of-way has significantly reduced travel times and 
costs. Even terrain obstacles (rivers, deserts, mountains, etc.) have been conquered and 
landform has almost faded away as a barrier through advances in engineering. In
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short, all of the constraining variables have been continually loosening. Vehicles are 
becoming faster, more flexible, and less expensive (if externalities are ignored). 
Transport technology has also become highly individualized enabling individuals to 
travel according to their own schedule and needs (Bolan et al 1997).
Transportation capabilities are argued to determine how large cities could grow. The 
average city in ancient Greece is said to have had a population of only about 10,000; 
this was the most that could be supported by the transportation systems that connected 
these cities and their immediate hinterlands. However, the population of ancient Rome 
managed to grow to about 1,000,000 because the Romans were able to transport large 
quantities of grain from Egypt using high-capacity (for that time) ships. Moreover, the 
inexpensive, reliable freight transport technologies has transformed otherwise 
worthless substances - such as remotely located deposits of low-grade iron ore - into 
valuable resources. Indeed, the improvement of personal and goods mobility has made 
the present globalised economy possible (WBCSD. 2001, p. 16).
Van der Berg et al (1982, 26) argue that the spatial form of a town is determined to a 
great extent by the prevailing transport facilities and traffic provisions. The stage of 
the economic development and income level force those who work in the town to 
settle there, their choice of residence is limited by the available transport facilities. 
They argue that as transport technologies develop, the spatial shape of the town 
evolves. During the early days of the Industrial Revolution, workers had to walk to 
work, so that houses had to be built near to factories. With the advent of the railways 
and tramways, longer distances could be bridged and towns expanded along the tracks 
and around the stations. As public transport in town is the main mode of conveyance, 
residents’ mobility is restricted to the town where they live, which consequently is 
characterised by a high residential density.
Peter Hall (1970) asserted that there is a close interrelationship between the available 
forms of urban transport and the form of urban growth. In addition, he argues that at 
any point in a city’s history, its form had affected the available choices of 
transportation, which afterwards affected the subsequent urban growth and the city 
form. In the pre-public-transport city, there was a very dense concentration of people 
and activities within walking distances of the centre. In the early public transport city, 
horse bus and horse tram and steam railway were the main transportation modes and 
urban growth was along the main radial arteries. The later public transport city was 
dependent on the finer-grained accessibility of the electric train and motor bus, a 
matter that allowed the overall spread of medium density housing while employment 
still concentrated at the centre or in well-defined factory or warehouse areas (Hall 
1970, 131).
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Simmons (1973) argues that transportation technologies significantly affect urban 
development through increasing population mobility. The links between transport 
technology, individual mobility, urban form, and spatial dimensions of urbanisation 
process are an important but elusive aspect of urban research. Many studies, especially 
those about nineteenth-century cities, have primarily focused on the impact of 
railways on urban growth (Simmons 1973, 277; Hume 1983, 179), or on the role of 
omnibuses and trams in the process of suburbanisation (Dickinson 1959, 214; Dennis 
1984, p. 110).
Pooley and Turnbull (2000, 360) identified several factors that influence the 
relationship between transport technologies and urbanisation patterns. Although the
nature and direction of links between the key factors of this process are uncertain, it is 
possible to summarise these factors and their inter-links as shown in Figure 3.1. It is 
likely that all these factors operated in some places and time periods, and that cause 
and effect relationships will be difficult to disentangle. However, it is possible to 
identify a series of significant trends that may be identified. First, new transport
technologies of the twentieth century had definitely increased mobility for many,
though they were not necessarily available to all (Freeman 1986, 80; Thrift 1990, 
453). Second, changes in urban form, with the decentralization of homes and 
workplaces, created increasingly complex commuting patterns inside and between
urban settlements during the second half of the twentieth century. Third, the rise in 
real incomes and the improvement of working arrangements increased choices for 
urban residents in terms of where to live and work. Fourth, and based on these points, 
many people increasingly chose longer journeys to work over migration. Whereas in 
the nineteenth century a change of work would have necessitated a residential move, 
in the twentieth century it could be accommodated by a longer and more complex 
journey to work (Pooley and Turnbull 2000, 360; Green et al 1999, 49; Pooley and 
Turnbull 1999, 127).
New Transport Technologies Decentralisation o f Industries\ & Other Activities
New Transport Routes — Changes In Urban Transport f
^  Changes In Urban Unit Changes
W  Urban Patterns ^  Form, Size, Function
Political Decisions  Urban Spatial Changes
Suburbanisation, DecentralisationAffecting Urban Transport
Individual
Decisions
Source: Adapted from: Pooley and Turnbull 2000, 360. 
Figure 3.1: Urban transport and changes in urban patterns
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In his investigation of the relationship between transportation technologies and
urbanisation patterns, Pacione (2001, 248) identified four stages of transportation
technologies and four corresponding patterns of urbanisation (Table 3.2). In the pre­
industrial stage, when most people had to walk to engage in necessary daily activities, 
cities were necessarily compact and citizens lived at or close to their workplaces. 
Consequently, high-density living environments in small, functionally integrated cities 
were the prevailing patterns. Only during the Industrial Revolution, vehicles of
relatively high capacity and speed allowed greater distances to be travelled and larger 
quantities of goods to be exchanged. This situation relaxed restrictions of city size and 
established the interdependence between transport technology and urbanisation. The
development of railways and trams during the nineteenth century was crucial in
separating home and workplace, encouraging functional specialisation of land uses in 
the city, and in promoting the expansion on the surrounding countryside along the 
more accessible transport corridors (Pacione 2001, p.248). This proves that
technological changes have introduced parallel changes in urban patterns.
Again, as it has been said earlier, the automobile has substantially transformed the 
urban environment as it encouraged the development of areas that are not along 
railway lines, which results in returning to the circular shape of the city that was
prevailing before the industrial age. In addition, it encouraged the emergence of the
suburbs at city edges that usually were not along railway lines. Moreover, the 
automobile was a major force in the development of cities that are not connected to 
railway lines.
The urban impacts of transport technology at the regional level were profound. In the 
pre-industrial era, cities were in a balanced relationship with each other and with the 
rural surroundings. This situation explains why these cities were of similar size. Only 
during the Industrial Revolution and since the introduction of new transportation 
modes that affect the regional setting, especially the railways and the automobile, the 
previous balanced relationship had changed significantly. Rural to urban migration 
was the most significant phenomenon during this period and resulted in a sharp size- 
difference between cities. This era witnessed the emergence of multimillion 
settlements, the primate cities, and what are called the metropolitan regions. Table 3.2 
presents a summary of the relationships between transport technologies and 
urbanisation changes at local and regional levels.
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Table 3.2: Transport technology and urbanisation changes on the local and regional levels
Urban Unit Level Urban Regional Level
Transport
Technology Urban Functions Urban Form
Transport
Technology Urban System
Stage 1 
Pre-industrial
Pedestrian,
horse-drawn
vehicles
Multi-functional, 
Defence, 
marketing, 
political-symbolic, 
craft industry
Compact, small, 
concentric, low- 
rise settlements
Draught animal 
(Camel caravans)
Dispersed, 
independent & of 
similar size units, 
short distances 
between adjacent 
settlements
Stage 2 
Early Industrial
Electric tram, 
streetcar, public 
transportation
Emergence of 
specialisation - 
Basic industries, 
secondary, 
manufacturing
Large & eccentric- 
growth along tram 
lines, 
suburbanisation, 
satellite form
Railways, public 
transport
Differential growth 
of cities -  emergence 
of large cities-  
interdependence 
among cities
Stage 3 
Industrial
Motor bus, 
underground 
systems Public 
transport, 
private cars
Specialised 
function- industry 
or service centres -  
tertiary activities
Population 
concentration-Large 
cities- polycentric- 
high-rise, 
suburbanisation, 
industrial 
decentralisation
Railways, Public 
transport, free 
ways, private cars, 
public air 
transport
Emergence of 
primate cities & 
urban regions-new 
towns
Stage 4 
Post Industrial
(HYPOTHETICAL)
High-speed rail 
travel, moving 
pavements, 
smart car & 
bikes, personal 
rapid transit, 
horizontal 
elevators..?!!
Specialised 
functions: IT, 
education, health, 
service centres -  
provision o f  daily 
service activities 
Or
Combination o f  
related activities
Population 
deconcentration, 
Post­
suburbanisation  -  
Edge city -  
dependent- 
dispersed & 
small settlements
High-speed 
national & 
international 
railways, 
Automated &  
intelligent 
highways, more 
advanced cars, 
public &  private 
air transport
Urban 
decentralisation &  
diffusion o f  
settlements - 
new small settlement 
around and away o f  
existing cities- 
new role o f  rural 
settlements
Source: prepared by the research; data partially from: Hall 1993, Pacione 2001, Herbert and Thomas
1997, Hart 2001,
For the future impacts of transport technologies, Peter Hall (1993, 883) expects that 
new technologies of high-speed ground transport, automated transit and ‘smart streets’ 
(intelligent Vehicle-High way Systems) will be of high influence in shaping the future 
of urban development in Europe. In addition, the emerging new transport technologies 
such as the moving pavements, smart cars and bikes, and personal rapid transit are
expected to make life in both the existing and new cities more enjoyable (Richard
2001, 101). Developments in information technology are expected to be highly
effective in shaping the role of transport in the city of tomorrow. Electronic
transmission of information could replace the movement of hard copy.
Telecommuting is starting to replace traditional physical movement of people to work. 
The question is how these new technologies will be used. In particular, this depends 
both on the extent to which telecommunications act as a complement or a substitute 
for the physical movement of goods and people, and, where it is a substitute, what new 
pattern of activities develops (Gwilliam 1996).
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3.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES
Since the 1990s, telecommunications systems are increasingly viewed as the virtual 
form of transportation systems and as a substitute for the physical movement of people 
and services. The growing use of telecommunications systems is not only affecting 
where people work and live, but also changing the character of activities that occur in 
the home, workplace, and automobile. Information and telecommunications 
technologies are changing the everyday urban life and transforming the home into an 
extension of the office, shopping mall, and classroom; allowing the automobile and 
aeroplane to become workplaces; and converting the office building into a hub for 
social interaction and interpersonal contact.
The main purpose here is to give an idea about the growing diffusion of 
telecommunications technologies and to define the main socio-economic changes 
introduced by telecommunications technology. Then, the research discusses the main 
debates regarding the urban impacts of these changes.
3.2.1 Diffusion of Telecommunication Technologies
Since the late 1970s, telecommunications technologies have been in continuous and 
progressive development. In less than three decades, the telecommunications industry 
has grown to become the world's fastest growing industry and it is on the verge of 
becoming the world's largest one (Graham and Marvin 1996, 11). Because of these 
technological advances, the previously separated areas of telecommunications, 
computing, and media technologies, are now converging in a core group known as 
Telematics.
The diffusion of mobile telecommunications is impressive all over the world. In 2001, 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) reported that mobile cellular 
phones constitute almost one-third of all telephone connections in the world and 
growing at twice the rate of fixed telephony. It seems likely that the number of mobile 
cellular subscribers will surpass conventional fixed lines during the early part of this 
decade (ITU 2001-B;TIW 2002). In Europe, mobile telecommunications was gaining 
an annual revenue growth rate of more than 30% during 1995-1998, reaching a market 
size of 21 billion ECU. In 1997, the number of new subscribers increased by 57% at a 
penetration rate of 14% for total Europe and reached 50% in Finland (Gruber and 
Verboven 1998, 2). On the international level, and by the end of 2000, there were an 
estimated 700 million mobile cellular subscribers across the globe - up from 300 
million in 1998. The number of mobile subscribers worldwide has been doubling 
every 20 months since the early 1990s. The expected growth in mobile voice and data
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revenues is projected to push the total market for mobile services to over US$700
billion in revenues by 2005. In fact, revenues from fixed-line telephone service have 
been in decline globally since 1996. At current trends, the value of mobile revenue 
will overtake total fixed-line revenue worldwide in 2004. In the developing world, 
mobile cellular is often the most convenient and cost-effective solution to fixed-line
shortages (TIW 2002).
3.2.2 Growing Reach and Falling Costs
Information and telecommunications innovations in microelectronics, computing 
(hardware and software), telecommunications and opto-electronics (microprocessors, 
semiconductors, fibre optics, etc..) enabled the processing and storage of enormous
amounts of information, along with rapid distribution of information through 
communication networks. Moore’s Law predicts the doubling of computing power
every 18-24 months because of the rapid evolution of microprocessor technology.
Gilder’s Law predicts the doubling of communications power every six months—a 
bandwidth explosion—due to advances in fibre-optic network technologies (Gilder 
2000). Both are accompanied by huge reductions in costs and massive increases in 
speed and quantity (UNDP 2001, 30).
The growth in information transmission has been very rapid. The UNDP’s Human
Development Report (UNDP 2001) stated that in 2001 more information could be sent 
over a single cable in a second than that was sent over the entire Internet in a month in 
1997, only four years before the Report (UNDP 2001, 30; Gilder 2000). In 1990, an 
international phone call was on average at 1 to 5% of its 1940 cost. With fibre optic
cables and decreased costs for satellite use, telecommunications are accessible
throughout the world. The current mass diffusion of cellular phones is likely to further 
decrease costs. Another significant wave of innovation involves information
technologies, as indicated by the excessively rapid decrease of computer costs since
their initial introduction (mainframes) in the 1960s (Rodrigue, Jean-Paul 2002a). The
cost of transmitting a trillion bits of information from Boston to Los Angeles has 
fallen drastically from $150,000 in 1970 to 12 cents today, and the cost of a three- 
minute phone call from New York to London that in 1930 cost more than $300 (in 
2001 prices) costs less than 20 cents today (Hall 1999, 173; Cane 1996;
Chandrasekhar 2001). E-mailing a 40-page document from Chile to Kenya costs less 
than 10 cents while faxing it costs about $10 and sending it by courier costs about $50 
(UNDP 2001, 30). Such achievement radically improves the access to information and 
the structure of communication for both business and home activities and extends the
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networked reach to all comers of the world. Stressing the future urban impacts of 
telecommunications, Moss and Townsend (2000, 33) wrote:
.... the deployment o f new telecommunications systems is altering the activities that 
occur in the key elements o f urban society -  the home, the office, the automobile, and 
even the hotel room and public parks and streets. Telecommunications systems are 
blurring the separation between the home and the workplace, radically changing 
office design and function, transforming the automobile into an extension o f the 
workplace, and moving street crime into the shadows o f cyberspace.
3.2.3 Socio-economic Impacts o f Telecommunications
In order to understand the possible urban impacts of telecommunications, the research 
tries first to examine the main socio-economic impacts of telecommunications which 
are of considerable importance in shaping the urban future.
3.2.3.1 Emergence and Growth of Telecommuting Activities:
Technological advances of the last two decades in computers and network
communications have changed the ways in which people practice their activities. 
Information and telecommunications technologies introduced many new, but widely 
used, prefixes especially Tele... and Distance... (telework, telecommute, telemedicine,
distance work, distance education, ...etc). The increasing number of terms causes
some confusion in identifying each of them. The most confusing terms are 
telecommuting and teleworking (widely used in Europe) or distance working (widely 
used in USA) as they sometimes are used interchangeably. While teleworking can be 
defined as the way in which employees could work from home and commute to their 
offices through the use of telecommunications technologies such as telephones, 
computers, modems, fax machines, and electronic mail, telecommuting seems to be
more comprehensive and includes other types of teleactivities especially distance 
education (Wilczynski 1996; Niles 2002).
Telecommuting for both work and education has many social and economical 
advantages. From the social point of view, telecommuting allows more families to be 
united and stable and allows people to work or educate while enjoying the family 
environment. From the economical point of view, telecommuting significantly reduces 
the costs for both the employee (or the student) and the employer (or school or 
university administration). In addition, telecommuting increases flexibility that is 
considered as one of the main benefits for students and employees because it helps 
achieve the desired balance between ones workload and ones private life (Glory 1994, 
p.32). Also, telecommuting reduces energy consumption and air pollution as a result
62
of decreased automobile traffic (Mokhtarian; Handy; Salomon 1995; Sharman 1994). 
Finally, telecommuting offers good work and education opportunities for mobility-
impaired individuals (Wilczynski 1996; Pacific Bell. 1996). All these advantages 
make teleworking a growing activity all over the world.
For developed countries and during the last half of the twentieth century, distance
education was one of the most clearly valuable applications of ICTs. It also has proven 
to be a particularly successful model for developing countries where affordability and 
geography are the real barriers to access. The six largest distance-learning universities 
in the world are located in developing countries: Turkey, Indonesia, China, India,
Thailand and Korea (InfoDev, World Bank Group. 2000).
3.2.3.2 Telecommuting and Travel: Main Arguments
Many studies argue that wireless telephony and other telecommunications
technologies have transformed transportation and travel across the world, converting 
the automobile, the train, the hotel room, and even the airport into an information­
intensive infrastructure. In addition, it is expect that telecommunications will make the 
automobile commute into a productive part of the workday, as it had been possible to 
send and receive e-mails, faxes, and telephone calls from any street or highway. It is 
argued that telecommunications technologies will make traffic jams and congestion 
more tolerated, as there will be more chances to catch up with telephone messages and 
e-mails (Moss and Townsend 2000, 38).
Many other studies suggest that telecommunications encourages telecommuting, 
which in turn yields travel savings, and therefore it could offer clean and
dematerialised substitutions for the material ills of transportation (Bly et al 1993; 
Davenport 1993; Egido 1988; Hadden and O'Connor 1993). SPECTRE (2002) argues
that in many cases telecommunications serve as a substitute for physical contact, 
which in earlier times necessitated travel or transportation. Moreover, it argues that
there is a direct link between transportation infrastructure and telecommunications 
infrastructure as the advent of new transport modes; i.e. postal coach, railways, 
automobile, aeroplane, was accompanied by the introduction of new communication 
technologies and infrastructures (SPECTRE 2002, 13).
On the contrary, Niles (1994) suggests that telecommunications not only yields some 
travel savings through telecommuting and other travel substitution effects, but also it 
sets up a countervailing mechanism of travel stimulation that needs to be more widely 
recognized and better understood. Graham (1997, 25) argues that in reality transport 
and telecommunications tend to grow together and to be mutually reinforcing in three 
ways. First, telecommunication can actually generate or induce many new demands
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for physical movement. As telecommunications increase the number of participants in 
business or recreation networks, this creates a demand for physical co-presence
leading to new forms of physical travel that might not be possible without the 
telecommunications linkage. Second, as telecommunications saves the travel-to-work 
time for telecommuters, it increases the leisure time available to them. Therefore, 
telecommuters may travel further total distances than before, not to work but for social 
and shopping trips during the working day and holidays. Third, telecommunications 
have played a significant role in increasing the efficiency, safety, and attractiveness of 
all transport modes. Consequently, the travel costs reduced and the travel
attractiveness increased significantly (Graham 1997, 26). Niles (1994) stressed that a 
number of distinct travel stimulation effects can be identified. For example, the 
increasing millions watching soccer on TV provide a growing pool of people who 
begin to consider going to the stadium occasionally. Similarly, intensive telephone, 
video, and fax interchanges between people who barely know each other create desire 
for follow-up face-to-face meetings. It should be noted here that such an effect could 
be valid for occasional and temporary events and not for business activities that 
require continuous and regular contacts (Niles 1994).
In confirmation with the all the previous arguments, and despite the increasing impact
of telecommunications in the British society, the annual travelled miles per person has
increased during the last twenty-five years. But, it should be noted that the rate of
growth in the last ten years was very low. The growth in annual travelled miles per 
person during the last ten years (1989/91 to 1997/99) was only 332 miles; which is 
only 28% of the corresponding growth during the proceeding five years (1985/86 to 
1989/91) that was 1157 miles. So, telecommunications may have had an effect in 
lowering the growth rate of annual travelled miles per person during the last ten years 
as this period had witnessed an unprecedented growth in the use of
telecommunications facilities, especially the Internet and the cell phone, that have
commercially emerged during that period.
Therefore, telecommunications may have an effective role in reducing business travel. 
To make it clearer, one must think of an answer for the following question: what will 
be the travel volume if the current business in the country is to run at the same level of 
efficiency in absence of telecommunications facilities; Internet, telephony, faxing, 
etc., taking into account the implications of stopping all forms of telework? In the
meantime, transportation is expected to continue being an integral part in business 
activities for the physical movement of raw material and finished products.
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3.2.3.3 Tele-shopping and E-Commerce:
The convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies has 
revolutionized the way companies acquire, store, retrieve, and share information and 
has created what is widely known as the information economy. Commercial 
transactions on the Internet, whether retail business-to-customer or business-to- 
business, are commonly called e-commerce. In 1995, it was estimated that about 1 to 2 
million people in the Untied States used the Internet for some form of commercial 
transaction. By the next year, Internet traffic, including e-commerce, was doubling 
every 100 days. One 1998 industry estimate projected that U.S. retail transactions 
would reach $7 billion by 2000—a figure now widely accepted as having been 
reached in the year that the report came out. It also estimated that, by 2003, business- 
to-business transactions would have reached $1.5 trillion, up from $131 billion in 
1999 (McLoughlin 2000, 196).
For the UK, the proportion of businesses with access to the Internet reached 94% in 
2001 (up from 90% in 2000) -  and comes just behind Sweden (98%), Germany (97%) 
and Canada (95%), and equal with the USA. The proportion of employees accessing 
the Internet increased during 2000. In 2001, the UK had the third highest proportion 
(35%) of employees who work in businesses that have Internet access making daily 
use of e-mail for external communication. In addition, the proportion of businesses
with a website continues to grow rapidly; reached 80% in 2001 (up from 66% in 2000)
(DTI, UK. 2001).
For developing countries, although e-commerce is not highly practiced, the future is
promising due to the very high rate of Internet use. Although the Western
industrialized nations dominate Internet development and use, by 2003 it is expected 
that more than half of the material posted on the Internet will be in languages other 
than English. This has large ramifications for e-commerce and ease of transactions, 
security, and privacy issues (McLoughlin 2000, 197). E-commerce is expected to 
increase the ability of developing countries to be more involved in international 
markets. On the local level, it may minimize the role of large cities as a commercial 
centre and increase the competitiveness of small cities in this regard. Also, small cities 
could be more efficient in attracting new commercial enterprises as they could offer 
cheaper land prices and better employment opportunities. These aspects could have 
considerable impacts on urban structure on both the regional and local levels.
3.2.3.4 Changes to Workplace:
The emergence of telematics has profoundly altered the physical design of office 
buildings and the type of activities that occur within them. New office buildings
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increasingly feature advanced telecommunications infrastructure built into their walls 
and floors. In large cities such as London many older office buildings are unable to 
meet today's technological requirements, generating a demand for new buildings that 
can meet today's spatial and technological requirements. Thus, Canary Wharf in the 
London Dockyards has attracted leading financial institutions to areas that are not
contiguous to the city's traditional financial district (Moss and Townsend 2000, 36).
More important, office work is generally becoming more mobile, more complex, and 
more diverse. And yet there is often the need for some concentrated, individual work 
in the same place. This has resulted in one of the eternal conflicts in office design: the 
need to accommodate communication and interaction as well as individual work 
(Duffy 1998). Corporations such as IBM have reduced the size of individual offices 
and rely on flexible office arrangements such as "hot-desking," but there is 
simultaneous a greater emphasis on the use of conference rooms and centres for
mobilizing workers, encouraging interaction, and bringing experts together to work in 
team efforts (Moss and Townsend 2000, 36).
3.2.3.5 Changes to Home Environment
Because of the increasing application of telecommunications technologies, the home is 
undergoing a fundamental change in its function and design. Throughout history, the
home has functioned primarily as a site for social-emotional functions of the family,
explicitly designed as a refuge from the workplace. This separation of home and work 
is disappearing as new information technologies are becoming widely available.
Currently, there is a rapid diffusion of new information-based services in the home -  
for security, climate control, and entertainment. Moreover, many of public services 
that were usually provided within designated public buildings such as schools, 
libraries, or prisons are now being provided in the home. It is quite obvious that 
telecommunications technologies, especially the Internet, have facilitated the 
emergence and development of "home-schooling" and “distance education”(Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 39).
During the twenty-first century, it is expected that home's attractiveness will be judged 
by the speed of its dial-up connections and extent of its intelligent infrastructure, 
rather than conventional measures such as the number of bedrooms or bathrooms. 
Moreover, it is believed that "everything" in the home will be connected to the Internet 
-  not just electronic devices (Beiser 1999). Definitely, the movement of information 
into the home will expand its social and economic functions, allowing all members of 
a household to participate in a wide array of different economic and social activities 
and making the home far more than a site for housing family members (Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 39).
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3.2.4 Telecommunications and Urban Change: Main Debates
The diffusion of information technologies is expected to drastically increase the 
complexity of cities through increasing the numbers and types of interactions among 
individuals, firms, technical systems, and the external environment. Information 
systems are opening new opportunities for new combinations of people, equipment, 
and places. Therefore, a dramatic change in the spatial organization of activities within 
cities and large metropolitan regions is highly expected. Old ideas and assumptions 
about the development, planning and management of the modem, industrial city seem 
less and less useful (Graham and Marvin 1996). Dabinett (2002, 232) stressed that
ICTs will have consequences on how places are used, on future patterns of spatial 
development, and on the context that strategic planning operates within. Moreover, the 
fundamental elements of urban life -  housing, transportation, work, and leisure -  are 
expected to become far more complex logistically, spatially, and temporally (Moss 
and Townsend 2000, 31). In a similar vein, Nijkamp (1985, 209) argued that
information technology would affect all components of urban systems. This argument 
is based on the suggestion that innovation technology will affect land-use planning, 
economic and industrial planning, infrastructure planning, energy and environmental
planning, and housing planning. Figure 3.2 presents a summary of this argument.
Although cities are centres for activities that rely on both face-to-face and electronic 
communication and despite the popular expectations that new technologies will alter 
the urban space, remarkably little research has been done to understand ways in which 
communications technologies affect the function of cities in an information-based 
economy. Local governments are more concerned about the effects of new 
technologies on economic development in rural and urban areas (Miller and Stone 
1996; Moss 1999). Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (1996, 6) confirmed that
telecommunications remain far from being a central focus in urban studies or urban 
policy-making. Moss (1999) considered the subject of telecommunications and cities 
as being remarkably neglected and extremely immature field of policy and research.
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Figure 3.2 Impacts o f Information Technology on Urban System Components
The academic literature on new information technologies reflects a growing belief that 
electronic communications will lead to the economic decline of cities as they make it 
possible to replace the face-to-face activities that occur in central locations (Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 32). More than thirty years ago, Ronald Abler (1970), a pioneer in 
the study of communications and urban space, suggested that advances in information 
transmission would quickly permit the dispersal of information-gathering and 
decision-making activities away from metropolitan centres. Moreover, he expected 
that electronic communications media would make all kinds of information equally 
abundant everywhere in the world (Ronald 1970).
On the other hand, geographers such as John Goddard, Jean Gottman, and Allen Scott 
have a different argument. Gottmann argues that communications technologies work 
in two directions: by making it possible to concentrate and disperse economic 
activities. He argues that the telephone has had a “dual impact” on office location. 
First it has freed the office from the previous necessity of locating next to the 
operations it directed; second, it has helped to gather offices in large concentrations in 
special areas (Gottmann 1977, 310).
In his study; Telecommunications and the Future o f Cities: Debunking the Myths:; 
Stephen Graham (1997, 21) criticised the over-simplification of the relationship 
between telecommunications and cities. He viewed these studies as being based on 
poorly-informed technological forecasts and aimed mainly at attracting media 
attention or generating sales for technological equipments.
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3.2.4.1 Cities and Telecommunications Determinism
It is more often in the mainstream of social research on technology and cities to view 
new telecommunications technologies to directly cause urban change. Most of these 
scenarios view the forces that stem from new telecommunications technologies as 
having some autonomy from social and political processes. Moreover, they often 
assume that current or future urban changes are to be determined by technological 
change in a simple, linear cause-and-effect manner. In addition, they suggest that 
technological development is somehow separated from society, rather than being 
designed, applied and shaped within specific social, economic, and political contexts. 
Graham (1997, 22) viewed the effect of telecommunications as much more complex 
than the simple vision of these scenarios for two reasons: (1) the biased nature of the 
design and production of telecommunications in favour of large, trans-national 
corporations while people in disadvantaged areas are lucky to access a pay phone; (2) 
the political and social influences can redirect telecommunications application as they 
can redirect the shaping of the built environment. Therefore, Graham (1997, 22) 
argues that the relationship between telecommunications and cities is complex and 
indeterminate and that there can be very different effects in different places and times. 
In a similar vein, Dabinett (2002, 233) views technology as only playing a part in 
enabling the many processes and relationships that characterise regional patterns of 
uneven spatial development.
In fact such arguments could be valid for all aspects of technology and seem to be 
more concerned with conceptualising and theorising the relationship between 
technology and urban change. Also, they could be viewed as a call for not 
exaggerating the role of technology in shaping urbanisation, and they appear similar to 
the arguments raised at the start of Industrial Revolution calling for not exaggerating 
the impact of industrialisation. Although the cause-and-effect approach in 
understanding the technology-urbanisation relationship is over simplistic, the 
unprecedented changes in the built environment following the Industrial Revolution 
are undeniable and prove that there is some relation between technology and 
urbanisation.
On the other hand, these arguments prove that considering technology as the prime 
cause for urban change underestimates the social and political factors in this process. 
Technology should be viewed no more than a tool for meeting social needs and 
desires. For example, the decision to move to a new location depends on three main 
factors: the disadvantages of the old location, the advantages of the new one, and how 
to make this possible - and this is the area where technology takes place. The decision 
to move will not be taken just because it is technically possible, but mainly because
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there are socio-economic and environmental needs and desires to move to an 
advantaged location (Figure 3.3). Therefore, technology should be regarded just as a 
tool or a facilitator to overcome social problems and to fulfil social desires.
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Figure 3.3: Technology as an Enabler for Social Decisions- i.e. the decision to move.
3.2.4.2 Telecommunications: ‘Death of Distance’ and ‘Death of Cities’
In 1960, Constantinos Doxiadis was the first to write about the death of cities. His 
argument stressed the role of the machine, among other factors of population growth 
and political socialisation, on cities and how it deteriorated the conditions of human 
settlements. Also, he argued that architects, planners and administrators are unable to 
deal with this triple growing of urban units, unless they proceed to remodelling and 
demolition. In 1997 and 2000, Frances Caimcross wrote two books about the “death 
of distance” stressing that distance would no longer determine the cost of 
communicating electronically. This means that the traditional distance-deterrence 
effects, embodied in all locational models, will diminish to zero and that the entire 
world will become a frictionless plain on which it is perfectly easy to locate any 
activity anywhere. According to this vision, companies will tend to locate screen- 
based activities wherever they find the best bargain of skills and productivity 
(Caimcross 1997, 238). George Gilder and Peter, T. (1995) elaborated more on this 
argument when they anticipated the “death of cities” because of “death of distance” 
due to the continued growth of personal computing and distributed organizations 
advances. They viewed cities as the leftover baggage of the industrial era. According 
to this vision, cities are no longer needed to access a wide range of cultural activities 
and information sources, because telecommunications can bring the library, concert 
hall, or business meeting into any home or office (Moss and Townsend 2000, 32).
Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson (1997, 95) argue that the rapid advances in 
communications technologies will facilitate the movement out of cities that the
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automobile had initiated. For them today's cities will continue to become less compact 
and the city of the future will be anything but compact. Many other studies argue that 
technology will eliminate the need for cities as centres of interaction (Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 32; UNCHS-Habitat 1995; Caimcross 1997, 18). Nicholas
Negroponte (1996, 165) and Wheeler et al (2000, 3) argue that the post-information 
age will remove the limitations of geography. Digital living will be less and less 
dependent upon being in a specific place at a specific time, and the transmission of 
place itself will start to become possible. Even the concept of the "edge city," a label 
that Joel Garreau (1991) applied to clusters of suburban office parks linked by 
freeways, is an indication of how both transportation and communication technologies 
are considered as forces that have fostered the out-migration of work and housing 
from the central city (Moss and Townsend 2000, 32).
Admittedly, researchers such as Jean Gottman (1983), Allen Scott (1995), and James 
Wheeler, Yuko Aoyama, and Barney Warf (2000) have carefully examined the ways 
in which telecommunications could both centralize and decentralize urban activities. 
Gottmann (1983, 411) argues that communications technologies could help both to 
concentrate and to disperse economic activities. He views telecommunication
technologies as of "dual impact" on office location. First they have freed the office 
from the previous necessity of locating next to the operations it directed. Second, they 
have helped to gather offices in large concentrations in special areas. Moss and 
Townsend (1996, 1997, 1998) have agreed to this spatial imperative and emphasized
the role of technology in reinforcing the position of major cities in the United States.
Nigel Thrift (1996, 1487) stressed the need for face-to-face contact in an era of high­
speed communications by claiming that telecommunications networks generate a 
demand for instant information in the financial services sector that is best achieved in 
a face-to-face environment. Thrift argued that the principal function of major financial 
centres is interpreting in real time the massive amounts of information that are 
generated each day: "Since the international financial system generates such a
massive load o f information, power goes to those who are able to offer the most 
convincing interpretations o f the moment." Interpreting information depends as much
on face-to-face interaction as on advanced technologies, an activity that is necessarily
and increasingly centralized in the leading world financial centres (Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 33).
SPECTRE (2002), a study about telecommunications impacts on urban Europe, argues 
that although electronic communication could surmount distance not only through 
‘shrinking of space’ but also through ‘extension of people’ into a position in which 
they can bridge distances, distance has not lost its relevance. In this regard, the study
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argues that both the huge concentration of activities in urban centres, where space is at 
the premium, and the flows of commuters, moving in and out of cities and becoming 
stuck in traffic jams prove that distance has not lost its significance yet. In addition, it 
suggests that logistical matters and the transportation of goods are becoming 
increasingly disentangled and that the mobile telecommunication revolution will help 
overcome the spatial barriers to communication. But, the study affirms that people will 
not stop face-to-face contact (SPECTRE 2002, 13).
In the same vein, Jed Kolko (1998, 4) argued that telecommunications have led to the 
"death of distance" but not to the "death of cities." He also found that "city size is 
positively related to domain density, and significantly so" (Kolko 1998, 17). In 
addition, Peter Hall (1999) considered the argument that the ‘death of distance’ will 
lead to the ‘death of cities’ as exaggerating simply because it ignores the significance 
of face-to-face contact and the continuing significance of agglomeration. He argues 
that although telecommunications cost is falling sharply, it never falls to zero and it 
will always cost more to call far away areas, and that the informational economy 
agglomeration still does very much matter as many information businesses still favour 
agglomerated locations (Hall 1999, 176). Despite the fact that these points stress the 
need for the city in the information age, they evoke more questions about the 
locational-preference. For example: would the diminishing difference of
telecommunications-cost between near and far locations be a determining factor in 
choosing location? And for how long could it be? Moreover, the increasing number of 
businesses moving out of large urban centres and teleworkers pose another question 
about the appropriate size of the agglomerations in the information age.
Also, and against the prophets of urban dissolution, Graham (1997, 23) argues that 
globalisation and advances in telematics actually tend to compound the many existing 
advantages of urban agglomerations as they facilitate both tele-mediated and face-to- 
face communications. In addition, he stresses the urban dominance of
telecommunications investments as, for example, Paris, which houses only 15 percent 
of French population, receives 80 percent of telecommunications investment; and
Tokyo has 30 percent of Japanese computers and more telephones than in the whole of 
sub-Saharan Africa. He also suggests that the concentration of telecommunications 
and computer networks will facilitate two things for the city: (a) telematics will help 
cities to weave together into fast-moving and integrated transactional systems; (b) 
telematics supports the dominance of cities as service centres for more distant 
hinterlands. He also argues that telematics will allow ‘action at a distance’ and remote 
control from cities, enabling cities to extend their dominance over more distant places, 
i.e. smaller towns and rural areas. Moreover, he stresses the need to avoid the
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dangerously simplistic concepts which continue to feed the myth of urban dissolution 
(Graham 1997, 24).
Although it is true that urban agglomerations receive the highest share in 
telecommunications investments, the most appropriate indicator is the rate of growth 
not the absolute growth. If the growth rate is taken into account, it becomes clear that 
investments in smaller cities and rural regions are growing faster. Also, the argument 
that telematics will help cities to be integrated into a larger transactional system and to 
be more effective on the regional level is also valid for smaller cities, rural
settlements, and remote areas. In fact, telecommunications have added new
advantages to these unprivileged areas as they become more physically and virtually 
accessible. Moreover, small cities and rural settlements may have many other 
advantages that are not available in large urban agglomerations (cleaner environment 
and lower land prices). Therefore, although it is true that the idea of “death of cities” is 
over simplistic and seems to be unrealistic in the foreseeable future, such an idea 
should not be completely rejected as many cities throughout history have disappeared 
as a result of serious changes in prevailing social, economic, and technological 
conditions. In addition, it is unclear whether the idea of ‘death of cities’ is concerned 
with existing cities or future cities. If it is concerned with existing cities, it is
undeniable that existing cities will face radical transformations regarding their
function, size, and structure.
In relation to the argument that death of distance will lead to the death of cities, it 
seems that there is some confusion between the meaning of ‘distance’ and ‘location’. 
While telecommunications will significantly shrink the space and consequently reduce 
the effect of distance as a deterrent factor, site location will continue to be influential. 
For example, although the distance has not become the determining factor in choice 
between two locations, location advantages (i.e. regional settings, natural resources, 
environmental advantages) became more and more important in this regard. Therefore, 
the decision to settle or to build a new settlement in any location will not be mainly 
governed by the matter of distance but rather by the advantages of such location. This 
will increase the possibility of developing rural, remote and under-developed regions 
and incorporating them in the national development plans.
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3.3 RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Energy is another important technological force for urban change. It is the backbone 
of all modem technologies, which are usually known as energy intensive technologies. 
Without energy the whole fabric of modem societies would crumble; the effect of a 
24-hour cut in electricity supplies to a city shows how totally dependent we are on that
particularly useful form of energy. In such a situation, computers, lifts, and metros
would cease to function, hospitals would sink to a care and maintenance level and the 
lights would go out. Due to the rapidly growing population, the need for more and 
more energy is exacerbated. Enhanced lifestyle and energy demand rise together and 
the wealthy industrialized economies which contain 25% of the world's population 
consume 75% of the world's energy supply (Dincer, I. 2000, 157).
Through globalisation and international trade rules, high-energy converters are 
transferring into the developing world. The energy crisis of the 1970s placed the 
spotlight on energy conversion and renewable sources of energy. Consequently, new 
large infrastructure investments in non-renewable resources worldwide are made and 
their use moved on to a rapidly rising curve (Kapur, J.C. 1999, 1246).
3.3.1 Advantages o f Renewable Energy:
Renewable energy is seen as the main effective alternative for the depleting fossil
energies. Most contemporary fuel sources are due to expire well within this century as 
widely available and relatively peacefully contested sources, and much of this reality 
will become globally pervasive within the next thirty to fifty years. Even conservative 
industry, national and international governmental sources estimate that oil will expire 
by 2050 — the depletion of the more easily accessible supply sources is likely to take 
place already in the 2020-2030 time frame (Scheer, H. 1999). Given rising use rate 
scenarios natural gas is likely to run out by 2040 (Droege, P. 2001).
The main advantages of renewable energy are that it is abundant, with well-
established technology and that its main ingredients are completely free. Sunlight 
reaching the land surface of the earth can produce the equivalence of 1,600 times the 
total energy consumption of the world. That is, the amount of solar energy derived 
from the sun's radiation on just one square kilometre is about 4,000 megawatts, 
enough to light a small town (Irfan, H. 2001).
These advantages are of considerable importance if the fact that only eight countries 
have 81% of all world crude oil reserves, six countries have 70% of all natural gas 
reserves and eight countries have 89% of all coal reserves is taken into account. More 
than half of Asia, Africa and Latin America import over half of all their commercial
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energy. This problem is worsened by the fact that power generation is continuously 
increasing in these oil-importing countries. Moreover, the world population keeps 
increasing at 1.2±2% per year, and is projected to double every 60 years. And 
consequently, world energy demand has increased from 70 millions oil barrels/day in 
1940 to 350 millions oil barrels/day in 2000 (Sayigh, A. 1999, 15).
From the environmental point of view, problems with energy supply and use are 
related not only to global warming, but also to such environmental concerns as air 
pollution, acid precipitation, ozone depletion, forest destruction, and emission of 
radioactive substances. These issues must be taken into consideration simultaneously 
if humanity is to achieve a bright energy future with minimal environmental impacts. 
Fossil fuels are seen to have caused many environmental problems. It is well 
established that global warming is happening and that the temperature rise during the 
last 70 years is estimated between 1.3 to 2.3 °c. The increase of CO2 since 1760 is 
20%, while methane increased by 7%. These situations led to global warming with a 
temperature rise of 1+0.5 °C. During the last 100 years, rain has increased by 15% and 
the sea level has risen by 10.5 cm. It is projected that if the temperature rises by 0.3°C 
every 10 years, this will result in a 4 cm rise in sea level per decade. In addition, CO2 
emissions are steadily increasing worldwide (Sayigh, A. 1999, 16).
Sayigh (1999, 17) affirmed that the cost of power generation from renewable sources 
has dropped significantly over the past decade and several technologies are now cost 
effective not only for off-grid applications but for grid-connected power as well. This 
is despite the fact that there are some barriers that still stand in the way of pressing 
ahead with the use of renewable energy; mainly the unequal access to investment
capital, distorted energy market and inadequate institutional capacity to commercialise 
immature technologies.
For developing countries, photovoltaic (PV) technology offers a unique opportunity 
for supplying electricity to remote and scattered rural and desert settlements without 
the need for the extremely expensive networks. The World Energy Council reports 
that single-family homes in much of Egypt's rural territories, which are more than half 
a kilometre from existing electric-lines, are more cost-effectively served by solar
energy than by extending the electric-grid. Even diesel is more expensive than solar
energy in these instances. A diesel-generator of equivalent capacity has a lifecycle cost 
almost twice that of a (PV) system. Thus, there exists an opportunity for Egypt to 
provide cost-effective PV electrical generating capacity to those living beyond a 
reasonably priced electrical grid (Taylor, R. and Abulfotuh, F. 1997).
Renewable energy sources (RES) represent the most promising option for the 
considerable energy needs of desalination processes. Especially in remote and arid
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regions where there is acute shortage of potable water, RES-powered desalination 
plants may be an attractive alternative. In most cases fresh water scarcity co-exists
with abundant RES potential. Stand-alone RES-powered desalination schemes are 
selected mainly for remote areas where a grid connection is impossible or very 
expensive (Voivontas, D. e ta l 2001, 176).
Dincer (2000) argues that the overall benefits of renewable energy technologies are 
often not well understood and consequently they are often evaluated to be not as cost 
effective as traditional technologies. In order to assess comprehensively renewable 
energy technologies, however, some of their benefits that are often not considered 
must be accounted for. Renewable energy technologies are sometimes seen as direct 
substitutes for existing technologies so that their benefits and costs are conceived in 
terms of assessment methods developed for the existing technologies. For example,
solar and other renewable energy technologies can provide small incremental capacity 
additions to the existing energy systems with short lead times. Such power generation 
units usually provide more flexibility in incremental supply than large, long lead-time 
units such as nuclear power stations (Dincer, I. 2000, 167).
Despite having such difficulties and challenges, the research and development on 
renewable energy resources and technologies has been expanded during the past two 
decades because of the facts listed above. Nowadays, significant progress is made in 
improving the collection and conversion efficiencies, lowering the initial and 
maintenance costs, and increasing the reliability and applicability.
In 1995 Shell Petroleum Group predicted that by the year 2050, solar power would be 
main source of electricity on earth. Several projects have been slowly developing
along this timeline. According to Shell Solar, a part of Shell Renewables of Shell
Petroleum Group, the costs of providing solar energy have fallen by more than 50% 
over the last 10 years. Shell Solar is currently building one of the world’s largest roof- 
mounted PV plant on the roof of the new Munich Trade Fair Centre. 7,560 solar
modules from Shell Solar are being installed on an area of 63,000 m^, providing a 
nominal peak output of 1.058 megawatt (MW) (Shell Solar, 2002-a). At the same time 
Shell Solar optimises manufacturing to reduce production costs and overheads to be 
more competitive in world market that is growing at over 30 percent per year with 
global production capacity increased significantly from 400MWp in 2001 to 760MWp 
in 2002, nearly doubled in a single year (Shell Solar, 2002-b).
British Petroleum (BP) is currently collaborating with the Philippine government to 
develop the largest rural infrastructure solar energy project ever. This project aims to 
bring electricity for the first time to over 400 isolated, small villages, benefiting 
approximately 700,000 people. The company stresses that in the world's poorest areas,
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solar energy is often the most cost-effective way to supply basic needs such as 
lighting, water pumping, and irrigation (BP, 2002).
Since 1996, The World Solar Program coordinated many efforts such as the Arab 
Solar Energy Programs of Morocco and Oman, the Clean Energy Fund, and promoted 
the role of private banks in financing renewable energy sources (Irfan, H. 2001).
The real success of renewable energy is its falling costs and increasing efficiency. The 
cost of electricity produced from wind power has in some European countries fallen as 
low as 0.3 Euro/kWh, which is cheaper than from gas (Sayigh, A. 2002, 19). Since 
1954 photovoltaic technology has progressed very rapidly. The improved efficiency, 
declining cost and high reliability have contributed to the expansion of PV worldwide. 
The world accumulated photovoltaic production increased substantially from less than 
5000 MW in 1994 to more than 15000 in 2000 and expected to reach 70000 in 2010. 
More important, the price of photovoltaic power production declined sharply from 
$100/w in 1970 to less than $2/w in 2000 (Sayigh, A. 1999, 27).
PV installations are increasing substantially all over the world and projected to reach 
one million roofs by the year 2010 in the USA. In Japan, PV installations is planned to 
provide electricity at a cost of $0.27 per Kwh which is very close to the electricity 
from the Japanese utility (Sayigh, A. 1999, 27).
Many of the developing countries have progressively started production and 
installation the PV units. India shipment was about 6.0 (MW), China was 1.5 (MW), 
and Singapore and Taiwan shipments were 2.5 (MW). Since 1988, Indonesia has led 
the way among the developing countries in the use of PV. The country has thousands 
of villages scattered throughout the thousands of islands with no electricity service. In 
1992, 8000 PV systems were installed to serve more than 100,000 people in remote 
areas. The Energy produced is used mainly for street lighting, public television, radio, 
telecommunications, security lighting, waterway lighting and individual home 
lighting. In 1993, Indonesia increased PV usage nationwide to 60 MW, installing 
about one million PV systems in 27 provinces (Sayigh, A. 1999, 28).
Since 1996, The World Solar Program has coordinated several efforts such as the Arab 
Solar Energy Programs of Morocco and Oman, the Clean Energy Fund, and has 
promoted the role of private banks in financing renewable energy sources. Although 
passive heating of water by solar energy for domestic purposes has provided only 2% 
of total energy use in Jordan, the savings incurred in the initial phases of its use has 
already allowed Jordan to pay back its investment costs in the project. Four projects 
by Friends of the Earth in the Middle East are seeking to provide solar power facilities 
to communities that lack power and water resources such as the New Basis Village in 
Egypt and other projects in the area. Some of these systems will include desalination
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plants and generators to power reverse osmosis water with a peak power of 250kwp. 
Being able to pump water from rural springs will allow the population of about 5,000 
to have solar electricity supply and desalinated water for domestic and communal use 
(Irfan, H. 2001). Even oil-exporting countries have started to utilise renewable energy 
technologies. In 1970, Saudi Arabia initiated a solar energy program called the “Solar 
Village”. The project depends on the direct conversion of solar energy into electric 
power with a capacity of 1000 KW. Such a project supplies electricity to a community 
of 3500 residents near the capital city Riyadh (Al-Amoudi, A.O. 2002).
3.3.3 Renewable Energy and Urban Future
Droege, P. (2001) argues that the form of the built environment, as cultural,
economical and technological system, is deeply affected by the nature of its basic fuel 
supply. Since the beginning of the 20th century, fossil energy introduced many changes 
in the general urban structure. These changes were highlighted by the leaders of the 
great modem design movements: Futurism in Italy, Constructivism in the Soviet
Union, De Stijl in the Netherlands, Das Bauhaus in Germany, and the declarations of 
the International Modern Architecture Congresses. These movements, and the broader 
societal changes they express, were supported by the dawn of the fossil machine age.
This new age, an outgrowth of earlier stages of the Industrial Revolution when hydro­
power was a main driver of textile mill operations, was boosted by the discovery of 
coals’ potential and the discovery of electricity, giving rise to ideas about the 
mechanization of manufacturing and later the increasingly urban and automated global 
production-consumption systems of the advanced industrial age, boosting global 
power consumption at an exponential rate Droege, P. (2001).
Droege, P. (2001) argues that although some local urban systems theoretically are 
relatively safe of fossil fuel depletion through their reliance on hydro-electric, nuclear 
or bio-energetic power, no currently utilized alternative energy source alone can help 
the vast majority of cities world-wide. Therefore, he argues that the only viable option 
to secure the continuity of urban civilization in this century is a system-wide turn to a 
broad portfolio of renewable energy sources.
Renewable energy opens up new opportunities not only for urban development but 
also for the comprehensive development process at both regional and national levels. 
Renewable energies provide distributed, ubiquitous and redundant renewable power 
supply systems that are highly needed for the vast undeveloped deserts in many 
developing countries. Abdel-Aal and Al-Naafa (1998) argue that solar energy will 
open new opportunities for desert development in countries such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. They argue that it provides a relatively cheap and ubiquitous source of energy
78
that is necessary for water pumping or water desalinisation and other agricultural, 
industrial, and residential purposes. Selecting a location will be more dependent on the 
availability of natural resources and site qualities rather than being close to the 
national grid. Consequently, it is expected that renewable energies will increase 
dispersing development activities out of congested over-exploited regions to desert 
regions.
For urban development, there is no doubt that these technologies will minimise the 
role of energy supply sources as determining factors in selecting the location and size 
of future urban settlements. It clearly adds more freedom in locating urban 
development projects and not to be strictly located near electricity grids. As each 
house will be self-sufficient, there will be a less need to group residential projects and 
other urban activities around a power station or near an electricity grid. Therefore, 
urban settlements are expected to be smaller and more dispersed to more 
environmentally advantaged locations.
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3.4 URBAN UTILITIES
Utilities, especially water purification and distribution and sanitation, are of 
considerable importance in shaping cities and patterns of urbanisation. And in many 
cases they were the direct motivation for population concentration around water 
purification stations. For the economic functioning of water and sanitation units, large- 
scale stations were usually used, a matter that somehow facilitated the rapid growth of 
many cities.
To overcome the acute shortage of water supply and sanitation facilities in rural areas 
and because of the high cost of water and sanitation networks, many private, 
international development and research agencies have been involved in developing 
new effective technologies for sustainable water and sanitation systems. The most 
important of these is the World Bank “Water and Sanitation Program” which is 
concerned with water and sanitation services for the poor. This program has supported 
some technologies for provision of water and sanitation in rural communities. 
Concerning water supply, the program has supported many technologies for utilization 
of ground water, surface water, and rainwater. Concerning sanitation, the program has 
supported many technologies, mainly the ecological sanitation and many of the small 
sanitation units’ techniques.
3.4.1 W ater Supply Technologies
Water shortage is an increasing problem, especially for developing countries. Many of 
the Third World cities will face extreme water shortages by the year 2010, threatening 
the life and health of the inhabitants. Globally, some 80 countries with 40% of the 
world’s population are already suffering from water shortages at some time during the 
year (UNCHS-Habitat, 1996).
These problems have forced many countries to increase their water supply through 
developing new technologies for the use of groundwater, surface water, and rain 
harvest. In addition many technologies have been developed for well-digging, solar 
and wind powered pumps, water treatment, and storage tanks. These technologies will 
be of considerable benefit to both rural and small urban communities.
For the use of ground water, many new types of wells have been developed. The most 
important of these are the solar- and wind-powered pumps. Solar pumps are primarily 
designed to run directly from the solar panels, but most can also be run from battery 
systems. The advantages of solar water pumping are many. Solar pumping systems are 
reliable stand-alone systems that require no fuel and very little attention. Generally, 
water is needed most when the sun shines the brightest. Solar panels generate
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maximum power in full sun conditions when larger quantities of water are typically 
needed. Because of this natural matching effect, solar water pumping is an obvious 
and economical choice over windmills and engine-driven generators for most 
locations away from utility power (Sun Pumps, 2002). Solar pumping systems are 
very suitable for delivering water for farms, ranches, remote homes, cabins 
campgrounds, third world villages and off-grid industrial and government sites.
Because of the rapid developments and the increased competitiveness, the prices of 
solar pumps are decreasing sharply. According to ClearSkies company, the current 
price of the SunPump System 2000 is now starting at $1,500.00 (ClearSkies, 2002). 
Similarly, the wind-powered water pumps are widely available and maybe more than 
solar pumps. The most prominent example for the success of wind pumps in 
developing countries is the 10 kW Bergey wind-electric pumping systems installed at
Ain Tolba and Dar el Hamra in Morocco. The system includes a 50 m^ storage tank to 
ensure the stable and economical supply of water to 4 villages of 3500 inhabitants 
(Bergey Windpower, 2002).
Another important water supply technology, which is currently in market, is the Solar 
RO Unit. The Unit is an innovative solar powered system, which uses reverse osmosis 
to desalinate salty borehole water. This system is mainly designed for applications in 
areas with low or limited access to electrical power. The Solar RO Unit is simple to 
use and once set up it will start automatically when the sun starts to shine. It can 
provide up to 1600 litres of purified water per day and is easy to use and maintain and 
is fully portable (SABS, 2002). Also, the AquaTech and AgraTech solar pumping 
systems for domestic and agricultural purposes are currently available in the market. 
These two systems can pump from as deep as 2000 feet (ERA Tech. 2002, 33).
Regarding water treatment, many new chemical and biological water treatment 
systems have been developed to suit rural and small urban communities. Micro­
filtration is one of the most effective water-treatment systems and offers an attractive 
means to remove particulate contaminants such as clay, algae, bacteria and 
Cryptosporidia from drinking water to meet the increasingly stringent regulatory 
requirements (Meier-Haack, J. et al 2003, 585). As many developing countries cannot 
afford conventional means of water treatment, solar disinfection is a revolutionary 
system for water-treatment in these countries. Solar disinfection is thought to be a 
viable water treatment option because of the minimal investment cost and the simple 
disinfection procedure. This process produces pathogen-free water by exposing water 
bottles to sunlight. To ensure adequate microbial inactivation, 3-5 hours of solar 
radiation above 500W/m2 should be available, a matter that is widely available in 
many developing countries, especially Egypt (Oates, P.M. et al 2003,47).
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Another water treatment technology is the Aquanow Portable Water Purification 
System that produces sterile drinking water from even the most unhygienic and dirty 
water source. A series of filtration systems form the heart of the unit with U.V. lamps 
and OZONE employed in the sterilisation process. An output of between 3000 and 
4000 litres per hour can be achieved, depending on water quality, using a push button 
control system (SABS, 2002).
Regarding water-storage tanks; a wide variety of new forms and sizes of different
materials are currently available. Many of these types are resistant to both rust and 
corrosion and are suitable for placing above- or underground. Moreover, they are 
environmental friendly and of high durability (CorrTech 2002; AGASA 2002; Sydney 
Water 2002).
3.4.2 Sanitation Technologies
Adequate sanitation is a major problem for many rural and urban communities in 
developing countries. Today, nearly 3 billion people lack adequate sanitation 
(WSSCC-WHO. 2000). Most cities, and almost all rural communities, in the Third 
World cannot afford the necessary resources, in terms of water, money and 
institutional capacity, to provide a flush-and-discharge sanitation system. Flush-and- 
discharge approaches can work well and achieve an acceptable level of pathogen 
destruction. However, in the Third World, sewage is nearly always discharged into the 
environment at large without treatment (SIDA 1998, 1).
During the last two decades, many international development and research agencies
were involved in developing effective and affordable sanitation systems that suit the 
socio-economic conditions of developing countries. The World Bank, through its 
water and sanitation program, has developed and applied many sanitation systems that 
suit the socio-economic conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Almost all of 
these efforts focus on developing and promote a sustainable sanitation system, known 
as “Ecological Sanitation” or “Eco-San” for short.
Ecological sanitation is an approach to sanitation that respects ecological integrity, 
conserves and protects fresh water resources, promotes dignified and healthy living, 
and recycles nutrients from human excreta for use in agriculture. It is a cycle - a 
sustainable, closed-loop system, and applies a new understanding of sanitation as a 
holistic system based on healthy ecosystems. More important, residual material is 
recycled and reused as part of an eco-cycle process. External inputs into the system 
and "waste" that exits the system are reduced to a minimum or eliminated. Very little
or no water is used. Excreta are processed and rendered safe close to the point of
excretion, pollution is minimized, ground and surface water sources are protected, and
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nutrients and carbon are returned to the land and made productive. The holistic and 
ecological approach becomes safe and non-polluting. It can be gender and culturally 
acceptable, economically feasible, and environmentally sustainable (World Bank. 
2002). In this approach, higher temperature degrees of the climate help to get rid of 
almost all pathogens. In hot climates, almost all pathogens die in two to three weeks, 
while this may take years in cool, moist, shady environments. This makes ecological 
sanitation highly suitable for desert countries in Africa (SIDA 1998,20).
3.4.3 New Urban Utilities and the Urban Future
The available new, affordable, small, simple, and environmental friendly systems for 
water and sanitation are expected to highly affect the location and the size of future 
urban settlements.
Regarding location, these systems are expected to decrease the effect of utilities 
availability as a deterrent factor for locating of housing activities out of congested and 
environmentally polluted cities. Many people in such cities are willing to move to 
more environmentally advantaged locations but utilities availability are the main 
deterring factor, especially in developing countries. Such water and sanitation systems 
will open up new opportunities and removes one of the main obstacles for inhabiting 
many desert and rural areas. Moreover, these systems will improve the infrastructure
status of many rural communities that could later be upgraded to urban status.
Regarding the possible effects of these water and sanitation systems on the size of
future urban settlements, two main expectations arise. First, the large size of 
population needed for the economic functioning of water and sanitation stations is no 
longer required. Many of the currently available water and sanitation systems are 
suitable for small urban or rural communities, and even for single houses. Second. 
such systems represent an economical alternative for utilities networks in remote rural 
locations, and sometimes in urban fringes. These advantages make the construction 
and functioning of small urban communities technically and economically possible.
Conclusion:
In this chapter, the thesis examined the possible urban impacts of transportation, 
telecommunications, renewable energy and urban utilities technologies. Through this 
analysis, the thesis came to some important conclusions.
First, advancements in transportation technology have resulted in increasing mobility, 
improving accessibility, increasing diffusion and falling costs of transportation
facilities, and space-time convergence. These changes have significantly influenced
city's size, form, structure, and function within the regional settings. The urban
83
impacts of transport technology at the regional level were profound. In the pre­
industrial era, cities were in a balanced relationship with each other and with the rural 
surroundings. This situation explains why these cities were of similar size. Only
during the Industrial Revolution and since the introduction of new transportation
modes that affect the regional setting, especially the railways and the automobile, such 
balance had significantly changed. New technologies of high-speed ground transport, 
automated transit and ‘smart streets’ (intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems) are 
expected to be of high influence in shaping the future of urban development.
Second, the increasing diffusion of information technologies is not only affecting
where people work and live, but also changing the character of activities that occur in 
the home, workplace, and automobile. Information and telecommunications 
technologies introduced many new, but widely used, prefixes especially Tele... and 
Distance... (telework, telecommute, telemedicine, tele-shopping, distance education, 
...etc). These technologies have also changed the home environment, function and 
design. Many of public services that were usually provided within designated public 
buildings such as schools, libraries, or prisons are now being provided in the home. 
The diffusion of information technologies is expected to drastically increase the 
complexity of cities through increasing the numbers and types of interactions among 
individuals, firms, technical systems, and the external environment. Information 
systems are opening new opportunities for new combinations of people, equipment,
and places. Therefore, a dramatic change in the spatial organization of activities within 
cities and large metropolitan regions is highly expected.
Although there are some predictions that telecommunications will lead to "death of 
distance" and that "death of distance" will lead to "death of cities", many analysts 
assert that telecommunication could both centralize and decentralize urban activities. 
Peter Hall (1999) considered the argument that the ‘death of distance’ will lead to the 
‘death of cities’ as exaggerating simply because it ignores the significance of face-to- 
face contact and the continuing significance of agglomeration. Moreover, while 
telecommunications will significantly shrink the space and consequently reduce the 
effect of distance as a deterrent factor, advantages of site location will continue to be 
influential. This will facilitate the development of rural, remote and under-developed 
regions and incorporating them in the national development plans.
Third, renewable energy is the main effective alternative for the depleting fossil 
energies because it is abundant, with well-established technology and that its main 
ingredients are completely free. The cost of power generation from renewable sources 
has dropped significantly over the past decade and several technologies are now cost 
effective not only for off-grid applications but for grid-connected power as well. Many 
of the developing countries, such as Indonesia, India, China, Egypt and Morocco, have
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progressively started production and installation the PV units. Renewable energy 
opens up new opportunities not only for urban development but also for the 
comprehensive development process at both regional and national levels. Renewable 
energies provide distributed, ubiquitous and redundant renewable power supply 
systems that are highly needed for the vast undeveloped deserts in many developing 
countries. For urban development, there is no doubt that these technologies will 
minimise the role of energy supply sources as determining factors in selecting the 
location and size of future urban settlements. It clearly adds more freedom in locating 
urban development projects and not to be strictly located near electricity grids.
Fourth, new utilities technologies are of considerable importance in shaping cities and 
patterns of urbanisation. Technology advancements in areas of water supply and the 
use of solar pumps are rapidly advancing. In the area of sanitation, the World Bank 
supports the ecological sanitation approach which is designed to suite the need on 
remote location. Such approach respects ecological integrity, conserves and protects 
fresh water resources, promotes dignified and healthy living, and recycles nutrients for 
use in agriculture. Because of the rapid developments and the increased 
competitiveness, the prices of many of these technologies are decreasing sharply. 
Advancements in urban utilities technologies are expected to affect the urban 
environment in two ways. First, the large size of population needed for the economic 
functioning of water and sanitation stations is no longer required. Many of the 
currently available water and sanitation systems are suitable for small urban or rural 
communities, and even for single houses. Second, such systems represent an 
economical alternative for utilities networks in remote rural locations, and sometimes 
in urban fringes. These advantages make the construction and the functioning of small 
urban communities technically and economically possible.
The analysis reveals that although new urban utilities technologies will have 
considerable impacts on existing settlements, they open up new opportunities for 
managing the urban future in many of the developing counties. Also, these 
technologies will facilitate the spread of development activities to remote and under­
developed regions.
In the next chapter, the thesis starts by a theoretical examination of the relationship 
between technology and patterns of urban change. To investigate the relationship 
between the technology status of a society and patterns of urban change prevailing in 
that society, the thesis empirically examines the main differences in patterns of urban 
change in countries of different technological statuses (developed, less, and least 
developing countries). Then, the thesis examines urban change patterns in Africa, as a 
group sample of developing countries.
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Chapter Four
TECHNOLOGY AND PATTERNS URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Introduction:
During the last three centuries, urban development in both the developed and 
developing countries had faced many physical and socio-economical changes. The 
spatial distribution of urban settlements as well as the size of these settlements had 
changed significantly during this period. Such urban changes had been highly affected 
by the successive influential socio-economic changes that technology was one of the 
main driving forces behind them.
This chapter aims to investigate the relationship between technology and patterns of 
urban change and to identify the main differences in patterns of urban change in 
technology advanced countries and developing countries. It also aims at defining the 
main patterns and problems of urban change in developing countries. In doing so, it 
starts by discussing the main arguments about technology and patterns of urban 
change. In this regard, the thesis focuses on changes in the size of urban settlements 
and the concentration of urban population, as they are the most prominent features of 
urban change in developing countries. Then, and to investigate the relationship 
between the technology status of a society and patterns of urban change prevailing in 
that society, the thesis empirically examines the main differences in patterns of urban 
change in countries of different technological statuses (developed, less, and least 
developing countries). Finally, the thesis examines the main characteristics and factors 
affecting urban change patterns in Africa, as a group sample of developing countries.
4.1 TECHNOLOGY AND PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE: THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS
The twentieth century had been an age of urban transition. By the end of that century, 
more than half of the world's people were living in cities. Two hundred years ago 
(around 1800 A.D.) there was only one city in the world - London - with a population 
of one million. At the beginning of the twentieth century, almost a hundred years ago, 
there were three cities with a population of one million or more. By the end of it, there 
are 281 cities with a population of over 1 million (UNCHS-Habitat 2002).
During the last two hundred year, all characteristics and patterns of urbanisation, in 
both the developed and developing countries, had faced serious changes. These 
changes were profound on both the city and the system of cities. Therefore, the
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research will focus on changes in the size and the spatial distribution of urban 
settlements, as they were the most prominent features of urban change affected by 
technological change experienced during the last two centuries.
4.1.1 Changes in the Size of Urban Settlements
Throughout history, the size of urban settlements has undergone a series of change and 
was on of the striking features of urban change. Potter (1985, 26) and Kolars and 
Nystuen (1974) argue that during the prehistoric period, human settlements were first 
non-permanent and later small and isolated. But, for later historic and current eras, 
cities grow bigger and primate cities start to appear. Moreover, they argue that cities 
will continue to grow bigger and may join together forming large megalopolis (see 
Figure 4.1). In that sense, the shift from non-permanent to permanent settlements was 
a direct result to the shift to practicing agriculture, which represents the first wave of 
technological development.
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Figure 4.1: Historical changes to the physical form of settlements
Based on the principles of central place theory (Christler 1966; Losch 1954), the roles 
of market forces (Isard 1972), locational attributes (Richardson 1973; Ullman 1958), 
technological innovation diffusion (Berry 1972; Hagerstand 1965; Pred 1977; 
Stephens and Holly, 1980), development axes in the development of urban systems 
(Geyer 1987; Stewart, 1958; Berry 1972; Sheppard 1982), and agglomeration 
economies (Hirschman 1958; Myrdal 1957; Pred 1966); Geyer and Kontuly (1993,
158) have identified five stages in the development of urban systems. The
classification of these stages is mainly based on the relative size of settlements in each
stage and the corresponding spatial patterns of population movement -  which depends, 
to large extent, on the nature and level of technology prevailing in each stage. Michael 
Pacione (2001, 75) grouped these five stages of change in settlement size into three 
general phases: the primate city phase, intermediate city phase, and small city phase. 
Each of these stages was mainly formulated according to successive waves of
technological change.
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Figure 4.2 presents a summary of the three main phases of urban growth and shows 
the net migration gains and losses for primate, intermediate-sized, small-sized cities 
over time. In addition, it helps to compare the positions of different developed and 
developing countries on the same graph at different points in time as they advance 
through consecutive cycles of urban development. Geyer and Kontuly (1993, 166) 
argue that these three phases represent only the first cycle of urban development and 
that the conclusion of the small city stage signifies the start of a new cycle. They argue 
that during this new cycle a second sequence of major metropolitan, intermediate­
sized, and small city growth will occur.
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Figure 4.2: Generalised Stages of Differential Urbanisation
4.1.2 Spatial Changes in Urban systems
Urban systems spatially change through time in a variety of ways as the social, 
economic, technological and geographical conditions around them evolve. 
Developments in transport, railroads, the automobile and aircraft technologies, have 
considerably modified the locational advantages of existing urban centres, have 
created opportunities for new centres in previously less accessible areas, and have 
permitted different spatial patterns both within cities and the surrounding hinterlands. 
Advances in communications have similarly permitted greater flexibility in the 
location of productive facilities. Certain high-technology industries need no longer to
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be situated in cities or even in close proximity to them (Oakley and Cooper 1989, 
347).
Peter Hall (1985, 24) stressed the spatial effects of technological development, 
especially in transportation and telecommunications, on migration flows on both the 
inter-regional and intra-regional levels. He argues that at urban inter-regional level, 
the effect has been to shrink effective distance through big reductions in the time and 
cost of communication. Transport achievements have brought provincial cities 
effectively closer to national capitals. Generally, the main effect has been to reduce the 
role of provincial cities to subsidiary centres, controlled from national capitals. At 
intra-regional level, he argues that the effects were more varied and complex as the 
level of investment in transportation and telecommunications varies considerably from 
country to country. But, he stressed that these achievements have facilitated the 
emergence of primate cities and new towns of national impact in many countries.
The differential urbanisation model of Geyer and Kontuly (1993), as well as most of 
urban development theories, acknowledge the role of the regional forces, mainly inter- 
and intra-regional migration patterns, in determining the size and the spatial diffusion 
patterns of urban settlements (Hall, P. 1985; Pacione, M. 2001; Elliot, J. 1997; Eke, 
E.F. 1982; Jefferson, M. 1939; Berry, B. 1976).
Emphasizing the role migration in urban change, Geyer and Kontuly (1993, 171) 
elaborated more on their model of differential urbanisation explaining the role of 
migration flow on the growth of cities and the development of urban systems. They 
argue that more affluent, better-educated people usually tend to deconcentrate in 
search for better living conditions (environmentalism), while less affluent people tend 
concentrate in search for better livelihood (productionism). If a small proportion of a 
country’s population is wealthy while the majority is less well to do, then population 
majority will tend to concentrate while the minority will tend to deconcentrate. Figure
4.3 presents the expanded model with both mainstream and substream migration 
flows.
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Figure 4.3: Conceptual Phases of Urban Change Process
During the last decade, an estimated 16 million people migrate each year from rural to 
urban areas of developing countries, excluding China, accounting for about half of 
recent urban growth. In addition, about 2 to 4 million people migrate internationally 
each year. Another 18 million people—over five times the number 20 years ago— 
have fled their own countries, as refugees. Also, about 20 million people are internally 
displaced (Gardner and Blackburn 1996). Such massive population movements will 
certainly affect the future of urban development in developing countries.
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In investigating the role the role of population migration in altering urban systems,
many studies have identified several phases or stages of urban development. The
development-phasing approach is first devised by Peter Hall (1971), who suggested a
four-stage model of metropolitan-area development, beginning with a period of 
centralisation whereby people become more concentrated in the core at the expense of 
the ring, continuing with periods of relative and then absolute decentralisation in 
which the core grows less rapidly than the ring and then experiences absolute loss of 
population to the ring, and ends up with a stage in which the metropolitan area as a 
whole moves into overall decline because the core’s loss becomes greater than the
ring’s gain. Klaassen and Scimeni (1981, 18) added an additional feature to this
approach, which is the idea of recurring cycle. According to this idea, after the phase 
which defined by Hall (1971, 118-19) as ‘decentralisation in decline’, there follows a 
process of reconcentration which leads on to a second cycle beginning with renewed
growth overall and centralisation within the core (Champion 2001, 147). This cyclic
model is further developed incorporating extra elements by Van der Berg, L. et al 
(1982). Later, Geyer and Kontuly (1993, 171) introduced the differential urbanisation 
model, arguing that urban systems have went through consecutive stages of 
urbanisation, suburbanisation, counterurbanisation, and reurbanisation. Each of these
stages is characterised by different spatial patterns which is shaped by different socio­
economic and technological forces.
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4.2 TECHNOLOGY LEVEL AND PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE: 
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
In order to investigate whether technology level prevailing in a society could influence 
the urban pattern in that society, the thesis tries in this section to examine the main 
differences in urban patterns in both the developed and developing countries. The 
thesis focuses on urban settlements’ size and urban population concentration, as they 
are the main patterns of urban change in developing countries. This analysis also aims 
to give a clear idea about the main patterns and problems of urban change in 
developing countries. In this analysis the thesis adopts the UN development 
classification of countries as more, less, and least developed. Although such 
classification is set according to the development status in general, it reflects the 
technological status of countries and usually matches with other classifications such as 
industrial and non-industrial. Moreover, such classification of more, less, and least 
developed countries presents different levels of technological status, a matter that is 
useful in drawing a general guideline about the relation between technology level and 
patterns of urban change.
The thesis extensive analysis of urban change patterns in all world regions reveals two 
main important facts. First, is that developed and developing countries present 
different trends regarding the shares of different sizes of settlements of their national 
urban populations. In more developed, and more technically advanced countries, the 
share of large urban settlements is considerably decreasing and the share of smaller 
ones is increasing. This is while almost all developing regions present a different 
pattern of increasing share of large settlements and sharply declining share of smaller 
ones. Second, is that the developed and developing countries present contrasting 
trends regarding the average size of settlements. While the average size of large urban 
settlements experiences a declining rate of growth in more developed countries, it 
experiences a mounting growth rate in developing countries. This situation explicitly 
indicates the increasing rate of urban concentration in developing countries.
For large urban settlements of more than 10 million inhabitants, their share of the total 
urban population was increasing sharply in both less and least developing countries 
while it was declining in more developed countries during 1985-2000 period. 
According to UN population statistics, this trend is expected to continue during 2000- 
2015 period (Figure 4.4). Moreover, the average size of these settlements is growing at 
a rapid rate in the least and less developed countries while it is growing at very low 
rate in more developed countries (Figure 4.5). This is despite the fact that the number 
of these settlements in more developed countries had remained constant at four
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settlements since 1985 and expected to remain constant till 2015, while in less 
developed countries the number of these settlements (of more than 10 million 
inhabitants) has grown from 5 in 1985 to 12 in 2000 and expected to reach 17 in 2015. 
This situation demonstrates the clear difference in the role of these settlements 
between the more developed and less and least developed countries. It also proves the 
increasing primacy of large urban settlements, and consequently urban concentration 
in large metropolitan areas in less and least developing countries.
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Figure 4.4: Urban population shares of urban settlements of more than 10 million inhabitants
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Figure 4.5: The average size of urban settlements of more than 10 million inhabitants
Urban settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants and those of 1-5 million inhabitants 
present similar trends, though at lower rates, regarding their shares of total urban 
population and regarding changes in their average size during 2005-2015 period. In 
least and less developing countries, settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants show that 
their shares of total urban population are growing at higher rates than that of more 
developed countries (Figure 4.6). Moreover, the average size of these settlements is 
growing at a rapid rate in the least developed countries while it is growing at low rates 
in both less and more developed countries (Figure 4.7). This is despite the fact that 
while the number of settlements of this size category has declined in more developed 
countries from 8 in 1975 to 5 in 2000 and expected to be 6 in 2015, it has increased in 
less developed countries from 8 in 1975 to 18 in 2000 and expected to be 31 in 2015. 
For least developing countries, this number was only 1 in 1990 and expected to reach 
5 in 2015. This situation demonstrates that settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants 
have an increasing role in urban system of least and less developing countries more 
than that in more developed countries.
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Figure 4.6: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants
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Figure 4.7: The average size of urban settlements of 5-10 million inhabitants
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On the other hand, smaller settlements of less than 5 million inhabitants show a 
different trend regarding their shares of total urban population and regarding changes 
in their average size. In least and less developed countries, these settlements show that 
their shares of total urban population are declining at higher rates than that of more 
developed countries. For settlements of 1-5 million inhabitants, their share of total 
urban population is the highest in more developed countries and increasing in both 
more and less developing countries while it is declining in least developing countries 
(Figure 4.8). Moreover, the average size of these settlements in more developed 
countries is declining during 2000-2005 and expected to increase at a modest rate till 
2015 (Figure 4.9). This shows that urban system in these countries experience more 
urban deconcentration in this category of settlements. In contrary, the average size of 
these settlements continues to increase at higher rates in least developed countries.
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Figure 4.8: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 1-5 million inhabitants
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Figure 4.9: The average size of urban settlements of 1-5 million inhabitants
Settlements of 500,000-1 million inhabitants show similar trends as their share of the 
total urban population is decreasing in both less and least developed countries while 
increasing in more developed countries (Figure 4.10). Also, the average size of these 
settlements is expected to decline in more developed countries during 2010-2015 
period while it is expected to increase during the same period in both the less and least 
developed countries (Figure 4.11). The decreasing size and the declining share of this 
settlement category of total urban population in less and least developed countries 
show that this settlement category is less effective in their urban systems.
This trend is more evident in settlements of less than 500,000 inhabitants. Their share 
of the total urban population is sharply declining in both less and least developed 
countries while almost unchanged in more developed countries (Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.10: Urban population shares of urban settlements of 500,000-1 million inhabitants
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Figure 4.11: The average size of urban settlements of 500,000-1 million inhabitants
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Figure 4.12: Urban population shares of urban settlements of less than 500,000 inhabitants
This analysis clearly shows that there are contrasting trends regarding the growth of 
different settlement-size categories in more developed countries (usually of more 
technological capabilities) and those in less and least developed countries. This 
situation demonstrates that the prevailing level of technology in a society is of 
considerable impact on shaping urban change patterns in that society. More developed 
countries show declining rates in the growth of large and medium cities and higher 
rates in the growth of smaller cities compared to both less and least developing 
countries.
In addition, this analysis clearly demonstrates that urban systems in developing 
countries suffer growing urban structure imbalances regarding the ever-increasing size 
of large metropolitan areas and the mounting trend of urban concentration and the 
declining role of small urban settlements. Controlling such imbalances requires the 
adoption of rational urban development approaches that take into account the future 
impacts of technology and that employ these technologies in overcoming such 
imbalances.
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4.3 PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE
OF AFRICA
After reviewing the main differences of urban change patterns in developed and 
developing countries, presented in Section 4.4, and to provide a more detailed 
examination of these issues, the thesis tries in this chapter to closely investigate urban 
change patterns in Africa, as a group sample of developing countries, giving more 
emphasis for patterns of urban change in Egypt and South Africa as they are of the 
largest urban populations in Africa and having the first two 'Mega Cities' in the 
continent (UN, DESA, 2002). In addition, the thesis tries in this chapter to discuss the 
role of globalisation and economic growth in shaping urban change patterns in Africa. 
Also, it highlights the main urban problems and the quality of life in large cities of 
Africa.
4.3.1 Patterns of Urban Change in Africa
Usually, residents of urban areas in African countries are regarded as fairly well off 
compared with their rural counterparts. Their incomes were reported to exceed those 
generated in rural economic activities. Therefore, rural-urban income gap was 
regarded correctly as the main cause of rapid urbanization, which was largely fuelled 
by rural-urban migration. Higher income, however, was not the only advantage that 
the urban populace was deemed to have, higher living standards is another important 
factor. Access to superior services, such as piped water, schools, and clinics, was a 
significant advantage. Another important factor was that African governments tended 
to subsidize urban food prices. All these factors have simultaneously fostered 
urbanisation in Africa.
As a result, urban systems in almost all African countries have faced many 
unprecedented changes during the last five decades. Although these changes were 
similar to those experienced in all developing countries, the rate and the scale of urban 
changes in Africa were very much beyond the capacity of the socio-economic systems 
of many African countries. Rapid urbanisation and the concentration of urban 
population and the emergence of primate cities are the main patterns of urban change 
in Africa.
4.3.1.1 Rapid Urbanisation:
At the beginning of the 1960s less than a fifth (18.5 per cent) of Africa's population 
lived in urban areas. This percentage has been doubled to reach 37 per cent in year 
2000 and expected to reach 53 per cent in year 2030. During 1995-2000, the annual 
urban population growth rate was 3.91 while the total population annual growth rate
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was only 2.41. The total urban population of the continent has increased from only 51 
millions in 1960 to 295 millions in 2000 and expected to reach 787 millions in 2030 
(Figure 4.13).
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Figure 4.13: Growth of urban and rural populations in Africa during 1950-2030.
In 2001, Egypt has had the largest urban population in the continent (29.5 millions), 
followed by South Africa (25.3 millions) (UN, DESA, 2002). The percentage of urban 
population in the two countries is increasing rapidly. Figure 4.14 clearly depicts that 
the average percentage of urban population in Africa is increasing sharply since 1950. 
However, such percentage is higher for both South Africa and Egypt during 1950- 
2002 period and expected to further increase till 2030.
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Figure 4.14: Growth of urban population percentage in Egypt and South Africa during 1950-2030.
Although the percentage of urban population in Africa is low when it is compared to 
that in developed countries, urban growth rates in Africa have been consistently 
among the highest in the world over the past 35 years, approximately the period since 
most African countries were decolonized and colonial restrictions on rural-urban 
mobility and migration rescinded (Simon, 1997). Also, the increasing level of 
industrialisation in many of the African countries, such as South Africa and Egypt, is 
one of the main driving forces behind such trend.
4.3.1.2 Urban Primacy and Concentration of Urban Population:
The rapid rate of urbanisation in Africa has been accompanied by a more rapid rate of 
increase in the size of many of its large cities. In 1950, there were only two cities in 
Africa with more than 1 million inhabitants (Cairo and Alexandria). By 1960, 
Johannesburg and Casablanca had also reached 1 million; while by 1970 there were 
eight cities of this size - four in North Africa, two in South Africa, and only two 
elsewhere in the continent: Lagos and Kinshasa. The number of these cities has grown 
to 15 in 1980, to 35 in 2000, and expected to reach 61 in 2015. The number of cities of 
more than 5 million inhabitants has grown from 1 in 1975 to 3 in 2000, and expected 
to reach 5 in 2015 (UN, DESA, 2002).
Another striking feature of Africa’s urbanization is that although the number of its 
mega-cities is increasing, the size of these cities is considerably increasing UN, 
DESA, 2002. While the average size of settlements of more than 1 million inhabitants
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is rapidly increasing, the average size of settlements of less than 1 million inhabitants 
is declining (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Change in the average size of different size-categories of cities in Africa 1975-2015
(1000).
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10 million or more 0 0 0 0 0 0 10614 12197 13748
5 to 10 million 6079 6843 7666 8296 7673 7727 6231 6608 7034
1 to 5 million 1733 1596 1673 1858 1903 2007 2162 2072 2203
500 000 to 1 million 744 693 668 715 678 678 713 660 690
Source: Prepared by the researcher; data from: UN, DESA, 2002
This phenomenon has been associated with a rapid rate of urban concentration in these 
large or primate cities. While the percentage of urban population in the large cities is 
increasing, such percentage is considerably declining in small cities of less than a 
million inhabitants. Figure 4.15 presents the change of urban population percentage in 
different city-sizes since 1975 to 2015.
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Figure 4.15: Change in the percentage of urban population in different size-categories o f cities in
Africa 1975-2015
Because of the relatively low rate of population natural increase in urban areas, the 
increasing rate of urbanisation and urban concentration in Africa is usually related to 
the increasing rural-urban migration (Zachariah and Conde, 1981). Early migration
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theories suggested that the volume of migration was related to urban-rural income 
differentials. Because of continued rapid migration despite of increasing 
unemployment and the inability of formal sector job creation to keep up with growth 
of the urban labour force, many of these models were modified to consider not only 
urban wages but also the probability of obtaining a formal sector job (Rakodi, 1997; 
Lipton, 1977).
Based on the statistical analysis of the percentage of urban population in different 
size-categories of cities in Africa 1975-2015, it appears that many but by no means all 
of the primate cities have continued to grow very rapidly. Jamal and Weeks, (1988, 
1993) relate this to the relative lack of attractive alternative destinations for migrants 
and the prospects of access to facilities and income-earning opportunities, even during 
recession and structural adjustment, which have relatively reduced traditional rural- 
urban income disparities.
Regarding the nature of urban primacy in Africa, El-Shakhs (1997) argues that almost 
all the mega-cities of Africa, with the exception of Cairo, Egypt and Johannesburg, 
South Africa, may not be considered primate on the basis of population alone. 
However, their dominant positions within their urban systems become clearly evident 
if their shares of the formal socio-economic activities, their privileged quality of life 
(personal income, education, levels of services, and amenities among others), or their 
shares of decision-making power and political control in their systems are taken into 
consideration (Rondinelli, 1988). El-Shakhs (1997) stressed that such dominant 
positions have inadvertently been bolstered further by the introduction of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), because of the relatively superior competitive 
advantage of these cities.
The increasing concentration and dominance of many large cities in Africa are 
accompanied by mounting problems, diseconomies, and disparities. These problems as 
well as opportunities spurred efforts by both the private sector and governments 
towards decentralization and counter-primacy measures. These measures took a 
variety of forms, ranging from administrative decentralization and strengthening local 
governments to radical measures such as the building of a new capital in Nigeria or 
the new desert cities in Egypt. As these processes pick up momentum, the real or 
perceived advantages of primate cities may tend to become less and less compelling; 
and smaller and medium-sized cities may become more and more attractive to 
migrants and to investments.
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4.3.2 Is there a link between economic and urban growth in Africa?
Although there are many forces that affect urban change, especially in Africa where 
the political and social factors play a significant role, economy is generally seen as of 
a prime impact on urban change. However, the relationship between economic and 
urban growth is very complex and far from direct. This clearly manifested in the 
different views and debates about such relationship. It is the purpose here to 
investigate the possible role of the economy on shaping urban change patterns in 
Africa.
4.3.2.1 Economic Growth and Urbanisation Level in Africa
Africa presents a strange phenomenon of rapid urbanisation without economic growth. 
However, this strange phenomenon is an invalid claim against economic-urban growth 
association argument as such phenomenon is mainly related to the special socio­
economic and political changes that took place in Africa during the past six decades. 
There are two main explanations for such strange phenomenon. First, one of the main 
reasons why urban change has been so rapid in recent decades is that it began from 
such a small base. The European colonial powers, who controlled virtually all of 
Africa 60 years ago, had kept down urban populations by imposing restrictions on the 
rights of their national populations to live and work in urban centres. The removal or 
weakening of the colonial apartheid-like controls on population movements was one 
of the main reasons why urban populations grew very rapidly just before or after the 
ending of colonial rule (Potts, 1995). For example, urban growth dynamics over the 
last 40 years in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe cannot be understood without 
taking into account the profound impact of controls on people’s movement imposed 
by white minority regimes on the composition and growth of cities. For South Africa, 
the lifting of long-applied restrictions on national population movement and on 
African urbanisation in 1986 and then the ending of the apartheid government, urban 
population have considerably increased (see Figure 4.14). Also, these political 
changes made the country an increasingly popular destination for refugees and 
migrants from other African nations, which had a profound impact on urban 
development (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). Second, the achievement of political 
independence was one of the main reasons for rapid urban population growth in 
Africa. Newly independent governments had to build the institutions of governance 
that nation-states need and also to expand and improve the higher education system 
that had been so undeveloped under colonial rule. This obviously boosted growth in 
the urban centres that were the main political and administrative centres. Many studies 
view the rapid growth of sub-Saharan African cities over the last 50 years as a serious 
problem (Satterthwaite, D. 2002).
In support of the economic-urban growth association argument, David Simon (1997) 
argues that African urbanisation rates were highest during the immediate post-colonial 
period, coinciding with the economic boom years of the 1960s and early 1970s. And 
that thereafter, the process slowed down somewhat in many countries, before 
accelerating again. Economic crisis, growing indebtedness, and the impact of 
structural adjustment during the 1980s and early 1990s have created a more complex 
and diverse picture.
4.3.2.2 Economic Growth and Urban Concentration in Africa
There is an overwhelming consensus that the relatively higher economic growth rates 
in some African cities, compared to that in rural areas, were a direct cause of urban 
concentration and urban primacy of many of these cities. This consensus is based on 
some important arguments.
For these cities, being the place of residence for politicians, senior civil servants, and 
diplomats has helped to bias public expenditure on specialist health and other services 
and infrastructure towards them. In addition to this, the need for access to government 
offices has in turn made them the most likely locational choice for both transnational 
and domestic investments. Although transnational investment in services in African 
countries is limited, such investments are usually concentrated in largest cities (Thrift, 
1987). Also, FDI is even more concentrated than domestic investment in the largest 
cities, because of executives' greater knowledge of the city economic environment and 
the presence of commercial facilities to intermediate between extraction/production 
and the international market (Sit, 1993).
In addition, the locational attractions of the city are often magnified by policy, mainly 
with respect to transport tariffs, energy and service prices, and incentives for industrial 
development. In many African countries, official policies to encourage 
decentralization are often counteracted by the spatial effects of non-spatial policies.
For many large African cities, their leading economic functions in the international 
and national economy, compared to that of small and intermediate cities, have a 
multiplier effect, generating both formal and informal sector employment in wage and
consumer goods and services industries. Despite the decreasing ability of the formal
sector to absorb increased numbers in the labour force in large African cities 
(Rogerson, 1997), many of these cities continue to exert an attraction for migration. 
This is, in part, a result of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in rural areas. 
For rural areas, and despite the pro-agriculture policy changes which have formed part
of SAPs, many of these areas provide few economic opportunities for their growing
populations. Also, although the deterioration in infrastructure and services that has
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resulted from public expenditure cut-backs has been countrywide, rural areas started in 
a disadvantaged position. Although the chance of a better life in large cities is much of 
a gamble, it continues to attract rural migrants (Dogan and Kasarda, 1988). Also, one 
of the main reasons that helped many of African large cities to continue to exert an 
attraction for migration is the limited economic role of small and intermediate cities. 
The low investments directed to these cities in addition to their limited role as service 
provision centres are among the main reasons that limited the economic role of these 
cities at the national level.
4.3.3 Globalization and Urban Change in Africa
The foundations for Africa's incorporation into the world economic and political 
system were established during the colonial period. Despite the attempts of African 
countries to secure both political independence and economic autonomy, the colonial 
period left a political, economic, and urban legacy that survived the 1960s. Although 
political independence did bring some degree of autonomy, this was largely eroded by 
superpowers interests and continued economic dependence. Moreover, African states 
were overwhelmed by a wide range of domestic political difficulties, resulting in 
political instability and administrative weakness (Chazan et al., 1988). These two
problems largely influenced patterns of urbanization and adversely affected the
capacity of the public sector to manage urban growth in almost all African countries.
Colonial urbanisation was marked by a reorientation of urban patterns and systems to 
serve the needs of trade and administration. Consequently, some existing settlements 
prospered, while others stagnated or decayed, and a series of new centres was
established (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Mehretu, 1983; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). 
Since independence, there has been a relatively little change to this pattern. Most of 
this change has been associated with administrative rather than economic change. The 
rate of urban growth has significantly increased due to expansion of public sector 
employment, attempts to industrialize, development of transportation systems, an 
increased rate of natural increase, and relative neglect of rural areas Rakodi, 1997).
Despite the policy reforms applied in many African countries to redress anti- 
agricultural, anti-rural policy bias, and the efforts made to encourage investment in 
secondary cities and small urban centres, further concentration in the largest cities has 
occurred. This is mainly because large cities continue to provide the most profitable 
locations for investment and the best prospects for migrants, despite the decline in 
formal sector employment resulting from recession and the implementation of
structural adjustment programs (Rakodi, 1997).
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4.3.4 African Large Cities in the Global Urban System
The rapid urban concentration and urban primacy of many large African cities 
highlighted the need to define their position in the global urban system. It is evident 
that the internationalization of capital has led to the emergence of a hierarchy of cities 
with particular roles in the capitalist economic system (Rakodi, 1997). At the apex of 
that hierarchy are the so called "world or global cities," which are sites for the control 
and management of transnational corporations (TNCs) operations, specialized 
business services, and nodes in the world banking and commercial system (Friedmann 
and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1985; Thrift, 1987; Sassen, 1994). Second to these global 
cities are the regional or continental cities, which perform similar functions within the 
world capitalist system to global cities, but within a more restricted geographical 
region (Sit, 1993, Yeung and Lo, 1996). The third level in that hierarchy is national 
cities, which are foci for national accumulation but also provide a location for 
transnational offices and operations, banks, and corporate services, and are thus linked 
into the world economic system (Sit, 1993; Simon, 1992, 1993, 1995).
Not surprisingly, and taking into account Africa's marginality to the world economic 
system, none of the 'world cities' is located in the continent, although Cairo, 
Johannesburg, and Nairobi have regional roles. Moreover, Africa is not even part of 
the semi-periphery, and the functional city systems linked across national borders that 
have emerged in Asia are not evident in Africa. Most large African cities are centres 
of national economies, although they are connected to the world economy through 
unequal trade, investment, and aid relationships (Simon, 1992, 1993, 1997; Rakodi, 
1997).
4.3.5 Urbanisation and the Quality o f Life in Large African Cities
Urban life in Africa has never been easy, and even become harder in recent years. In 
addition to the severe inadequacy of public resources relative to need, the rate of 
growth in formal economic employment opportunities in Africa has never kept pace 
with population increase. Consequently, many large cities in Africa are currently 
facing serious problems of urban unemployment, shelter deficiency, increasing 
pollution, and inadequate infrastructure, social facilities, and management capacity of 
large cities (Simon, 1997; Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Drakakis-Smith, 1993)
Although, the sheer scale of so-called "mega-city problems" in Africa is not as severe 
as in Latin America and some parts of Asia, and given the state of most African 
economies, these problems may be extreme. Urban poverty, unemployment, 
environmental problems will be examined next in this section.
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4.3.5.1 Urban Poverty and Unemployment:
Urban poverty is one of the most characterising phenomena for almost all African 
large cities. Although accurate and recent city-wide data on income distribution are 
rare in Africa, many surveys show that the anti-urban policies, that Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) have insisted on in almost all African countries, has 
largely been misplaced, since by the time of their implementation the presumed 
privileges of urban residents had already largely disappeared. The SAP policies of the 
1980s and 1990s have drastically, and sometimes tragically, increased the hardships of 
urban residents, most of whom were already poor and vulnerable (Potts, 1997).
In many surveys, the levels of income reported were so low that it is hard to see how 
households can feed themselves, let alone cover other necessary costs, such as housing 
and transport to work, or vital welfare expenditure on health, education, or clothing. 
Jamal and Weeks (1993) argue that there is much evidence that average rural incomes 
frequently exceed the incomes available from most formal wage work in the cities. 
The reversal of the income gap in Africa has been clearly documented for Nigeria, 
Uganda, and Tanzania (Jamal and Weeks, 1993; Collier, 1988; Mtatifikolo, 1992).
The fact that urban poverty may now surpass rural poverty is of particular significance 
to any study of the nature of urbanization in Africa. The nature of the rural-urban 
income gap is, in theory, the most important factor influencing rural-urban migration, 
and hence urban growth rates (Potts, 1995, 1997).
In addition to the reversal of urban-rural income gap, Deborah Potts (1997) argues that 
the boost to urban living standards that used to derive from superior access to 
affordable public services compared with rural areas has also very significantly 
diminished in many African cities. Cuts in health and education expenditure mean that 
schools and clinics are quite unable to cope with the demand and the private 
alternatives are unaffordable for the urban poor. The crucial area of housing has also 
suffered. Although the need for low-income housing was never satisfied in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the adoption of more realistic approaches to this sector in the 1970s had led 
to some improvements. The cease of arbitrary demolition of unplanned settlements, 
and ’’squatter" upgrading programmes went some way to providing basic services in 
some of these settlements and enhancing security of tenure. Also, the site and service 
housing approach helped the poor to some degree, although the hoped-for benefits 
were often reduced by stubborn insistence on overly high building and service 
standards squeezed out many of the intended beneficiaries (Amis and Lloyd, 1990; 
Stren, 1990; Potts with Mutambirwa, 1991). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
public housing programmes in almost all African countries often languished or ceased 
altogether, owing to lack of finance (Dubresson, 1997).
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4.3.5.2 Environmental Problems
Although the UNEP/WHO (1992) study of air pollution in mega-cities with 
populations of over 10 million did not include any African city, this does not give 
cause for complacency and does not reflect the severity of current environmental 
problems of many African large cities. African industrial cities and those with high 
numbers of motor vehicles - the two principal sources of pollution - such as Cairo, 
Johannesburg, Lagos, Durban, and Cape Town, suffer significant environmental 
problems. However, the UNEP/WHO 1992 report stressed that the mega-cities of the 
South suffer from poorer air quality and the associated problems more than those of 
the increasingly post-industrial North. Rapid urban growth in the South, especially in 
Africa, is certainly widened this gap. In addition, inability of public sector authorities 
to provide infrastructure, enforce regulations governing land development and 
industrial emissions significantly contribute to environmental problems in Africa.
In addition to their severe economic problems, the urban poor in almost all African 
cities are highly exposed to many environmental hazards. They are most likely to 
depend on untreated water, to live in risky areas, to be not provided with sanitation 
and solid waste collection services, and to live in overcrowded conditions and work in 
unregulated enterprises (Rakodi, 1997). Their vulnerability to ill health arising from 
environmental problems is aggravated by poor nutrition and inadequate access to 
health care.
Despite its serious impacts, action on environmental problems is always late and 
occurs, in almost all cases, when the better-off are affected, as for example by air 
pollution, contaminated food, or bad effects on economic activities such as tourism. 
And in many cases, such action is late and comes after a disaster. Therefore, many 
unsustainable practices and environmental problems are not tackled until disaster 
occurs or until organized groups increase their pressure for change. Action on 
environmental problems in African cities is needed to tackle negative externalities 
such as pollution directly and as well as to monitor the upstream resource-using and 
downstream disposal or recycling of wastes in the city and its region (Rakodi, 1997).
Despite the numerous problems of urban poverty and unemployment, shelter 
deficiency, and increasing pollution in African large cities, David Simon (1997) 
argues that although these phenomena are conventionally constructed as "problems’, 
by national elites and professionals, it is far from clear that all urban residents, 
especially some of the urban poor, would share such sentiments. He argues that if 
migrants found conditions significantly worse than in their (rural or other urban) areas 
of origin, many would return there. Although this argument does not mean that people
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are necessarily happy with their lot, or that they do not suffer hardship and very real 
threats to their health and well-being, it neglects the fact that the majority of these 
people are so poor and can not afford the cost of relocation and search for a place and 
job in a new location. Despite the higher unemployment levels in urban areas, they 
still offer more jobs, especially in underclass jobs such as garbage collection, which 
the urban and the rural poor are looking for and which do exist in rural areas.
In order to understand the nature and the extent of current urban problems in Africa’s 
primate cities, the thesis presents in section 5.3 an analysis of the main urban primacy 
problems in Africa's largest city; Cairo, Egypt.
Conclusion:
In this chapter the thesis has thoroughly investigated the relationship between 
technology and patterns of urban change and identified the main differences in 
patterns of urban change in technology advanced countries and developing countries. 
Also, the thesis has examined urban change patterns in Africa, as a group sample of 
developing countries. Through this chapter, the thesis has reached some important 
conclusions.
First, technology affects the size of urban settlements. The successive changes in 
settlements size from small to large and primate during the agricultural, industrial and 
post-industrial eras reflects the role of technology in introducing these changes. The 
development of urban systems has been classified into five stages based on the relative 
size of settlements in each stage and the corresponding spatial patterns of population 
movement -  which depends, to large extent, on the nature and level of technology 
prevailing in each stage.
Second, technology affects the spatial distribution of urban settlements through 
affecting the size and the function of these settlements and the relationships between 
them. Developments in telecommunications, transport, railroads, the automobile and 
aircraft technologies, have considerably modified the locational advantages of existing 
urban centres, have created opportunities for new centres in previously less accessible
areas, and have permitted different spatial patterns both within cities and the
surrounding hinterlands.
Third, there is an association between the level of technology prevailing in a society
and patterns of urban change in that society. The thesis empirical analysis of urban
change patterns in countries of different technological capabilities (developed, less, 
and least developing countries) reveals two main important facts (section 4.2). First, 
developed and developing countries present different trends regarding the shares of
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different sizes of settlements of their national urban populations. In more developed, 
and more technically advanced countries, the share of large urban settlements is 
considerably decreasing and the share of smaller ones is increasing. This is while 
almost all developing regions present a different pattern of increasing share of large 
settlements and sharply declining share of smaller ones. Second, developed and 
developing countries present contrasting trends regarding the average size of 
settlements. While the average size of large urban settlements is declining in more 
developed countries, it is rapidly increasing in developing countries. This analysis 
shows that there is a strong correlation between the level of technology prevailing in a 
society and patterns of urban change in that society. In addition, this analysis clearly 
shows that urban systems in developing countries suffer two main problems: the 
increasing size of its primate cities and the rapid rate of urban concentration.
Fourth, urban systems in Africa, as a group sample of developing countries, suffer the 
same problems of urban concentration and the increasing primacy of its large cities. In 
addition, Africa presents a strange phenomenon of rapid urbanisation without 
economic growth. Urban poverty, unemployment, and environmental pollution are 
serious problems in almost all African cities, especially primate ones.
In the next chapter, and after analysing urban change patterns and problems in Africa, 
the thesis will thoroughly examine urban change patterns and problems in Egypt. 
Also, the thesis will closely investigate the main urban problems that accompanied the 
increasing primacy of Greater Cairo region, as an example of primate cities in 
developing countries.
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Chapter F ive
AN ANALYSIS OF URBAN CHANGE PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS IN EGYPT 
Introduction:
The thesis tries in this chapter to provide reasoned answers to two main questions that 
usually arise in the area of this research: First: is Egypt facing urban change? And if 
so, what are the main features of such change and their corresponding problems? 
Second: are the technological capabilities of Egypt sound enough to affect the future 
of urban change in the country? In reaching for an answer to each of these questions, 
this chapter starts by presenting an overview of the development history and current 
development status in Egypt and its technological capabilities. Then, the research 
presents an extensive analysis of current urban change patterns and problems in the 
country. Finally, the thesis closely investigates the main urban problems that 
accompanied the increasing primacy of Greater Cairo region, as an example of primate 
cities in developing countries.
5.1 EGYPT: DEVELOPMENT HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY STATUS
5.1.1 Geographic Settings:
Egypt lies in the northeast comer of Africa, connecting Asia with Africa and the Red 
Sea with the Mediterranean that produced the unique connection between the west and 
the east through the Suez Canal. The country is essentially desert of about 1,000,000 
square kilometres, and is a part of the desert belt of northeast Africa. This desert has 
been, until modem times, uninhabited except for the ‘Nile Valley’. The Nile flows
through Egypt from the south to the north, forming its own valley as a strip of
agricultural land between the parallel ranges of hills. On the west side of the Nile, the 
hills form the Western Desert Plateau in which lies a series of scattered oases. On the 
east side, the hills form a north-south chain of mountains that cascade down to the Red 
Sea. North of Cairo, the Nile is divided into two main branches forming the fertile 
agricultural lands of the Delta. The arable land of the Nile Valley and the Delta 
amounts to about five percent of the country’s area. Another important division of
Egyptian territory is Sinai Peninsula, lies between the two branches of the Red Sea in 
the south and the Mediterranean Sea in the north. Figure 5.1 depicts the main
geographic features of Egypt.
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Figure 5.1: Geographic Settings of Egypt
5.1.2 Development H istory
The start of modem development in Egypt dates back to the start of the nineteenth 
century when Egypt had started to modernise its development capabilities. The 
development strategy was based on agricultural expansion and the establishment of a 
sound industrial base. The government has expanded the area under cultivation and 
planted crops specifically for export, such as long-staple cotton, rice, indigo, and 
sugarcane. The surplus income from agricultural production was used for public 
works, such as irrigation, canals, dams, and barrages, and to finance industrial 
development and the military. In industry, the government set up modem factories for 
weaving cotton, jute, silk, and wool. Factories for sugar, indigo, glass, and tanning 
were set up with the assistance of foreign advisors and imported machinery. Industries 
employed about 4 percent of the population, or between 180,000 and 200,000 persons 
of over fifteen years of age. The textile industry was protected by government 
embargoes prohibiting the import of the cheap textiles from abroad. Commercial 
activities were geared toward the establishment of foreign trade monopolies and an 
attempt to acquire a favourable balance of trade (Metz, H. 1990).
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Such development trend continued at varying rates until 1879. During that period, an 
additional 506,000 hectares were brought under cultivation, representing a sizeable 
increase in both production and income. To service the cotton crop, which was the 
basis of Egypt's prosperity, roads, bridges, railways, harbours, and telegraph lines had 
been constructed. During that period, 112 canals, 13,440 kilometres long, were dug; 
400 bridges were built; 480 kilometres of railroad lines were laid; and 8,000 
kilometres of telegraph lines were erected. Towns and cities were modernized by the 
expansion of public services such as water distribution, transport, street lighting, and 
gas supply. Public education was reorganized and expanded, and a postal service was 
established. The army and the government system were expanded and modernized 
(Metz, H. 1990).
By 1880, the country went through many economic and political problems that had 
been aggravated by the First and the Second World Wars and extended to the middle 
of the twentieth century. By 1952, the first republican government came to power; it 
was the first time for Egypt to be governed by the Egyptians since the days of 
Pharaohs. The government paid significant attention to securing enough funds to 
develop the country. In 1956, Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal. By 1960, Egypt 
constructed the Aswan High Dam, which saved Egypt from the yearly flooding and 
water shortage during the last ten years; and represents the main source of electric 
power in the country up till now.
Since 1952, Egypt went into war with Israel for three times in 1956, 1967 and 1973; a 
war every decade. These wars had further deteriorated the economy and added a very 
heavy burden of debt. After signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1978 and gaining 
control over all the Egyptian territory, the Egyptian economy is experiencing a very 
rapid growth rate. It can be said that by 1980, only about 20 years ago, Egypt had 
started its real modem development age. Since then; Egypt has redirected its resources 
for building the infrastructure, starting new large-scale development projects, and 
promoting ambitious social and urban development programs.
5.1.3 Technology Status
The technological capabilities of Egypt have increase substantially during the last 30 
years. In the area of telecommunications, the number of telephone lines increased 
from 0.51 million to 3.36 million to 4.3 million in year 1981, 1994 and 1997 
respectively. Automatic phone service covered 220 cities in 1994 compared to only 
seven cities 13 years earlier. Furthermore, the number of Fax lines increased by 63 
folds between 1986 and 1994 (Huzayyin, A. 1995; CAPMAS 1999). Moreover,
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cellular phone service is now covering the whole country with a very high 
subscription rate.
In the area of transportation, Egypt has experienced substantial growth of motor 
vehicles of all types, especially intercity taxi and private cars. During 1965 to 1979, 
the vehicle fleet has increased sharply from 126,000 in 1965 to 501,000 in 1979 to
2,343,000 in 1998 (PADCO, Inc. et al 1982; CAPMAS, 1999). On the national level, 
car ownership increased sharply from about 4 to 12 to 38 cars per 1000 inhabitant in 
years 1965, 1979 and 1998 respectively. In Cairo, car ownership sharply increased 
from 10 to 15 to 40 to 75 cars per 1000 inhabitant in year 1974, 1980, 1984, and 1998 
respectively (Afifi, A. K. 1991; CAPMAS, 1999). To cope with this unprecedented 
growth of motor vehicles, lengths of paved road network increased from 17,700 km in 
1981 (SIS, 2001) to 50,000 km in 2000/01 (CIA, 2001). In addition, Egypt constructed 
the Cairo underground metro to be the first in Africa and the Middle East. The first 
metro line was opened to service in 1987. This 42 km line is currently carrying about 
one million passengers every day. The second metro line opened in 1999, about 20 km 
long, designed to carry some 4 million passengers every day. These few indicators 
show how much technology achievements had influenced the urban development in 
developing countries. During this period, the international road on the Mediterranean 
Sea affording the road link between Asia and Africa had been completed. The road 
connection with Sudan with a total length of 290 km had been completed to provide 
the first road link of inland Africa to North Africa and Asia. Also, considerable 
achievements have been made in both rail and air transportation.
Concerning energy production, the generated electric power rose from 18 billion kw/h 
in 1981/1982 to 77 billion kw/h in 2000/2001. The consumed electric power increased 
from 17.4 billion kw/h in 1981/82 to 65.4 billion kw/h in 2000/01. Over the period 
1981-2001, the electricity sector has achieved an annual growth rate of 8.2%. Average 
per capita share of consumed power rose from 430 kw/h in 1981/82 to 1,350 kw/h in 
2000/01 (SIS, 2001). Hydroelectric power is an important source of energy in Egypt. 
During the 1980s, the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River provided half of Egypt's 
electricity. This percentage has fallen while energy demand has increased, but in 1998 
hydropower still contributed 22% of the total energy generated in the country. Aside 
from hydroelectricity, Egypt is boosting its use of renewable energies such as solar 
and wind power. The Egyptian Authority of New and Renewable Energy made many 
agreements with USA and Japan. As a result, renewable energy consumption in Egypt 
is on the increase, having jumped 10% to 176 trillion Btu in 1997 (EIA, 2000). All 
health and service units on desert regional roads and all remote wireless telephone 
exchanges are powered by solar energy.
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As a result of the increasing capabilities of water technologies, the available capacity
of water stations rose from 4.70 million m^/day in 1981/82 to 16.8 million m^/day in 
2000/01, at an annual growth rate of 6.9%. Consumption increased from 3.30 million
m^/day in 1981/82 to 13.2 million m^/day in 2000/01, at an annual growth rate of 
7.5%. The per capita share of water consumption rose from 78.50 litre/day in 1981/82 
to 201.9 litre/day in 2000/01, at an annual growth rate of 5.1% (SIS, 2001). Also, 
sanitary drainage capacity and the design absorptive capacities of lifting stations
increased from 2.20 million m^/day in 1981/82 to 14.09 million m^/day in 2000/01, at 
an annual growth rate of 10.3%. Available capacity of treatment stations rose from
0.85 million nvVday in 1981/82 to 7.3 million m^/day in 2000/01, at an annual growth 
rate of 12% (SIS, 2001). According to the UNSD - United Nations Statistics Division 
(2002), Egypt ranks the first in Africa and the Middle East regarding the percentage of 
population with access to improved drinking water and sanitation resources, with a 
percentage of 97 and 98 percent respectively.
This clearly shows that the technological capabilities of Egypt are rapidly growing and 
will have considerable impacts on shaping the future of urban development in the 
country.
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5.2 PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS OF URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT
During the period before the start of the twentieth century, Egypt’s population was 
growing at very low rate, doubling in about 4000 years and growing from 5 million in 
2000 B.C. to only 9.7 million in 1896 A.D (PADCO, Inc. et al 1982). By the start of 
twentieth century, Egypt experienced unprecedented population growth, from 11.3 
millions in 1907 to 66.4 million by the turn of the century and doubling every 34 years 
(TTSD, 2001). Figure 5.2 presents the temporal change of the total and urban 
populations of Egypt during the period extending from 2000 B.C. to 2000 A.D. It 
depicts that Egypt’s population have experienced unprecedented growth during the 
last two centuries, especially in the last half of the twentieth century. Such growth was 
at an astonishingly high rate, doubling about 26 times in the last 200 years; a matter 
that reflects the fact that Egypt had experienced radical social, economical, and 
technological changes.
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Figure 5.2: Egypt’s Temporal Urban and Total Population Growth
The urban population in Egypt has grown very rapidly from 2.250 million in 1937 to 
12.033 million in 1966 to 28.837 in 2000, doubling about 13 times in the last 63 years. 
During the twentieth century, the percentage of the urban population to total 
population has grown from 17 percent in 1907 to 45 percent in 2000. Although, rural- 
to-urban migration was the main reason for the growth in urban population, this does 
not slow down the growth rate of the rural population. Figure 5.3 presents the change 
in urban and total populations of Egypt during the last two centuries.
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If the fact that the Egyptian classification of settlements as urban or rural is not 
determined by population size, but rather by a combination of administrative 
procedures and purposes, are taken into account, urban growth in Egypt will be much 
higher. According to the Egyptian Census definition, “urban” comprises all cities and 
towns in a govemorate (province), together with their constituents of smaller 
administrative units such as kisms (district/county) or shiakhas (within the district). On 
the other hand, “rural” includes all villages with their associated hamlets (CAPMAS, 
1999). Based on this classification, there are many villages that are larger in size than 
towns. Therefore, the urban classification in Egypt does not appropriately reflect the 
reality of urbanisation in the country. Therefore, if Egypt adopted the Indian definition 
of urban settlements (as communities of more than 5,000 inhabitants), around 80 
percent of Egypt’s population would be urban or, and if applying the definition used in 
the Philippines, 100 percent would be living in cities (Bayat, A. and Denis, E. 2000, 
192; Moriconi, F. 1995).
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Figure 5.3: Egypt’s urban and total population growth during the last two centuries
As a result of this unprecedented growth of urban population, existing cities have 
experienced a very rapid and unbalanced growth during the twentieth century. The 
number of urban settlements has increased from 100 in 1947, to 158 in 1976, to 214 in 
2000; their share of the total population increased from 31.4 percent to 43.5 percent to
45.1 percent respectively (PADCO, Inc. et al 1982; World Bank, 2001-b. Egypt: Data 
Profile).
In a serious effort to control the unbalanced urban growth, and during the last 25 
years, Egypt had built 19 new cities with a planned capacity of about 8 million
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residents. During 1982-2001, 327,000 housing units had been completed in these new 
cities. In addition, 14 new towns had been planned and another 28 towns are under 
study. Moreover, existing cities have been radically expanded, especially large cities 
such as Cairo, Alexandria and all other regional cities. About 2.5 million housing units 
had been added to these cities during the same period; 95% of which are built by the 
private sector (SIS, 2001).
Despite all these efforts, Egypt’s urban system is still suffering serious structural 
imbalances. These imbalances are in fact identical to those identified and examined in 
the previous chapter about technology and patterns of urban change in developing 
countries. The research defines two main features of such an imbalance in Egypt: first, 
is the increasing concentration of urban population in certain regions of the country; 
and second, is the differential growth of the different classes of settlement sizes which 
resulted in increasing size difference between large and small urban settlements. In the 
following sections, both of these points will be thoroughly examined.
5.2.1 Urban Concentration
Urban concentration is the main striking characteristic feature of Egypt's urban 
system. Because of the influential economic and political role of primate cities, they 
were the main targets of rural-urban migration. Although the number of urban 
settlements of more than 1 million inhabitants has grown from only 1 in 1947 to only 
3 in 1996 out of the country’s 211 urban settlements; their share of the total urban 
population was about 49 percent in 1996 and reached 51.14 percent in 2003. This 
situation proves that the country suffers high urban concentration levels.
Because of the low natural population growth rate usually experienced in urban areas, 
interregional migration is regarded as the main cause of urban concentration in Egypt. 
Inter-govemorates migration in Egypt is generally characterised by: a) being from 
South to North and the Canal Zone; b) being from all of Egypt’s hinterland to Cairo 
and Alexandria; c) migration streams from urban areas are mainly going to urban 
areas, but are usually from small to large urban centres; and d) recently a growing 
share of urban out-migration is heading to rural areas. Many academic and 
governmental studies have shown that the biggest convergence of migration streams 
culminates in the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), which includes Cairo, Giza, and 
Qualyoubia govemorates (Zohry, A. 2002; Adams, 1986; Aldakhil, 1999; El-Boraey, 
1984; El-Kurdy, 1974; Ibrahim, 1986; Nassef, 1985; Shoieb et al., 1994). In addition, 
new cities policy adopted in Egypt since 1977 did not play any significant role in 
correcting this situation. Next, the thesis will examine each of the characteristics of 
internal migration and the development of new towns in Egypt.
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5.2.1.1 Migration from South to North and the Canal Zone
In the present context, South refers to the govemorates of Middle and Upper Egypt 
which are located to the south of the GCR (Figure 5.4). It includes Fayoum, Minia, 
Beni-Sueif, Assiut, Souhaj, Qena, and Aswan govemorates. These govemorates 
represent a relatively narrow strip of green land on both sides of the Nile. As a 
function of limited opportunities for either vertical or horizontal agricultural expansion 
(i.e. intensification of the already highly intensive agricultural regime or expansion of 
cultivation to new areas), mounting population pressure has been markedly felt for the 
last hundred years. One response to this pressure has been a steady stream of out­
migration to the north. Assiut, Souhaj, Qena, and Aswan have been the major
suppliers of out-migrants to the North -  mainly to Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez 
Canal govemorates. The net loss from the South to the North is about one million over 
the first six decades of the twentieth century (Zohry, A. 2002; Hassan, A.M.N. 1969). 
This figure is very much lower than the volume of internal migration recorded in 
recent decades, but it must be borne in mind that the total Egyptian population was 
low -  only 19 millions in 1947. El-Badry (1965) contends that during these same 
decades, these four southernmost govemorates exported a net 13.0 percent of their 
total population to other regions in Egypt, mainly Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez 
Canal. During the last four decades; from the 1960s to the 1990s; the same trends 
continued but at varying rates.
5.2.1.2 Migration from the hinterland to Cairo and Alexandria
The two largest Egyptian cities have been the greatest magnets of migration streams. 
Beside their net population imports from the South, noted above, the two cities 
attracted similar streams from the Delta.
Concerning Cairo, its net gain from the South averages about 40 percent of its total in­
migrants. The Delta govemorates contributed the balance of 60 percent during the 
twentieth century. Cairo has long been a net population importer, with the biggest
suppliers being Menoufia, Souhaj, Assiut, Gharbia, Daquhlia, Qualyoubia and Qena.
Only in very recent years does the momentum of (recorded) population arrival seem to 
be declining.
Similarly; Alexandria has been a net migration gainer since the start of the twentieth 
century, although at a rate lower than that of Cairo. Like Cairo, the city of Alexandria 
received most of its migrants from Menoufia in the Delta, and from Souhaj, Qena, and 
Aswan in the South.
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Figure 5.4: Geographic distribution of the Egyptian govemorates and Planning Regions
5.2.1.3 Migration Streams: Origin and Destination
In understanding urban changes in Egypt, it is important to define the origin and the 
target of main migration streams in the country. Figure 5.5 depicts an overview of 
inter-govemorate migration for urban and rural areas by rural/urban origin or 
destination for the last three censuses: 1976, 1986, and 1996. This figure shows two 
important characteristics of population movement in Egypt. First, is that the urban-to- 
urban movement are usually the highest of all other movement. However, the ratio of 
urban-to-urban movement has shown a considerable decline since 1986. More 
importantly, the majority of such movement has usually been from small- and 
intermediate cities to large cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Second, is that the 
urban-to-rural movement is the only progressively growing stream, growing from 6.5
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percent in 1976 to 10.3 percent in 1986 to 22.6 percent in 1996. This attitude reflects 
the mounting environmental and economic problems in urban areas and it also reflects 
the increasing competitiveness of rural areas after the majority of these areas have 
been provided with the basic infrastructure facilities; mainly electricity, water, and 
paved roads. However, there is a slight increase in rural-to-urban movement, 
increasing from 13.1 percent in 1986 to 13.4 percent in 1996.
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Figure 5.5: Urban/Rural Migration by Type of Movement, Egypt, 1976-1996
As shown previously, the urban population was mainly concentrated in two main 
urban centres; Cairo and Alexandria. The most recent census, in 1996, showed that 
these two entirely urban govemorates absorb 40 percent of the total national urban 
population; 27 percent in Cairo and 13 percent in Alexandria. This is while the 
remaining 209 cities of Egypt house only 60 percent of the national urban population. 
More strikingly, the urban population in all Upper Egypt Region that includes 64 
cities; is only 16 percent of the total national urban population, a little more than
Alexandria and only a half of Cairo.
Table 5.1 presents migration movements at the regional level during 1986-1996 
period. Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 depict the magnitude and percentage of net 
migration at the regional level based on 1996 census. These figures show that the 
Greater Cairo Region (GCR) and the urban govemorates of Alexandria, Port Said, and 
Suez were the main target for population migration with net in-migration of about 
1.056 million people in their urban centres and about 388,000 people in their rural
areas. This is while the Delta and Upper Egypt regions have lost about 840,000 and
685,000 of their urban population. The highest percentage population loss was in the 
Upper Egypt region that lost about 17 percent of its urban population during this
period.
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Table 5.1: M igration movement on the govemorates and regional levels, 1986-1996
Urban Rural
Urban
Population In Out Net
% Net to 
urban
Rural
Population In Out Net
% Net to 
rural
Upper Egypt 4069453 165690 851181 -685491 -16.84 12792355 125289 254269 -128980 -1.01
Greater Cairo R. 10731714 1718383 1184685 533698 4.97 4154721 448246 59605 388641 9.35
Urban Gover. 
Exec. Cairo 4228938 676629 153392 523237 12.37 NA NA NA NA NA
Delta Gover. incl. 
Ismailia 5776114 431946 1271813 -839867 -14.54 16741663 487454 388905 98549 0.59
Frontier Gov. 480216 105687 24282 81405 16.95 337860 36111 7303 28808 8.53
Source: Calculated by the researcher; data compiled from: Zohry 2002; CAPMAS, 1996 Census report. 
NA- Not Applicable - urban govemorates
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F igure 5.6: M agnitude o f net urban m igration at the regional level, 1996.
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F igure 5.7: Percentage o f net urban m igration at the regional level, 1996.
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5.2.1.4 New Towns and Urban Concentration:
The adoption of the new towns strategy in Egypt is relatively new. This strategy has 
been divided into three generations. The start was made in 1977 by the construction of 
the first generation cities at distances of between 40 to 95 kilometres from Cairo and 
Alexandria. In this generation, three independent cities of sizes ranging from 350,000-
500,000 inhabitants (10th of Ramadan, Sadat, 6th of October) and four satellite cities of 
smaller sizes (15th May, New Damietta, New Burj El-Arab, and Al-Salehia) were 
built. The second generation consists of five cities of smaller sizes. Of which two are 
around Cairo (Al-Obour and Badr), one near Alexandria (Nobaria), and two in the 
North Upper Egypt Region (New Bani-Suef and New Minia). The third generation 
consists of three cities in South Upper Egypt (New Assuit, New Souhaj, and New 
Aswan) and ten urban centres around Cairo. Infrastructure works in the majority of 
Upper Egypt new towns are not finished yet.
Despite these efforts, new towns in Egypt did not significantly correct the problem of 
urban concentration in Egypt for two main reasons: (1) the development of these cities 
is very slow, and (2) their share of urban population is very small (Jossifort, S. 1995; 
Sutton, K. and Fahmi, W. 2001, 141). Table 5.2 shows that the percentage occupancy 
in these cities is very low. Second, the majority of new cities especially those of the 
first generation were built around Cairo and Alexandria, aiming mainly to mitigate 
urban problems in these large agglomerations (Figure 5.8). This situation is expected 
to further increase urban concentration in these cities as it opens many new housing 
and job opportunities. Such opportunities in addition to the usual advantages of large 
urban agglomerations will certainly increase the attractiveness and population 
concentration in these large cities.
Table 5.2: The targeted and percentage occupancy of new cities around Cairo, 1996.
Target Populations 1996 Population % Occupancy
lOthRamadhan 500,000 47,839 9.57
6th October 500,000 35,477 7.10
15th May 100,000 65,865 65.87
Badr 250,000 248 0.10
Sadat City 500,000 16,312 3.26
El Obour__________________ 250,000________________ No data_____________________ —
Sources: Compiled from: Sutton, K. and Fahmi, W. 2001; Stewart, D. 1996; CAPMAS 1996; and Denis, 
E. 1999.
125
Tanta
B eib e is ' v s r r j? ^
Alexandria
El-Sadat
10 Ramadan . Suez
4  EL-Obonr
CAIRO Badr
Al-Amal
|  New Cities 
4  Satellite Towns 
□  New Settlements O Existing Towns and Cities
4  15 May
Source: Adapted from: Yousry, M. and Aboul Atta, T. A. 1997 and GOPP, General Organisation for
Physical Planning, Egypt. 1982
Figure 5.8: New cities, satellite towns, and new settlements around Greater Cairo Region
5.2.2 Differential Growth o f Different Settlement Sizes
Another important characteristic problem of the Egyptian urban system is the 
unbalanced growth of different sizes of cities. Large cities are usually growing faster 
than smaller ones, which usually lose their population in favour of large cities. As 
shown in the previous section, urban-to-urban migration is the highest of all migration 
streams in the country.
Table 5.3 clearly demonstrates that although primate cities of over one million 
inhabitants have shown a decline in their relative share of the total urban population 
during 1976 to 1996 period, their share starts to increase again since 1996 reaching 
about 50% of the national urban population in 2003. More strikingly; these primate 
cities were only three in 1996; Cairo, Alexandria, and Giza; and four in 2003 adding 
Shubra Al-Khaymah to them. Regarding large cities (500,000-999,999), there was 
only one city in this category since 1986 with a share of around 3.4 percent in 1996 
and considerably declined to 1.8 in 2003. Both the Intermediate Cities (100,GOO- 
499,999) and Small Cities (20,000-99,999) have the second largest share of the 
national urban population of about 23.6 and 22.6 respectively in 2003. But it should be 
noted that in 2003 there were only 32 intermediate cities while there were 147 small
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cities. This proves that small cities offer a more dispersed urban population than other 
categories. Concerning smaller settlements (less than 20,000); they have experienced a 
sharp decrease both in number and the relative share of the national urban population. 
Their number has declined from 58 cities in 1986 to only 30 in 2003, and their relative 
share of national urban population has declined from 11.14 percent to only 0.62 
percent during the same period.
Table 5.3: The Number and the Population Change of Different Urban Settlements’ Sizes in Egypt
Since 1976.
Size Class Number of Cities % of Urban Population
1976 1986 1996 2003 1976 1986 1996 2003
Primate (1,000,000-over) 2 3 3 4 56.67 51.38 48.80 51.14
Large Cities (500,000-999,999) 0 1 1 1 0 3.38 3.44 1.82
Intermediate Cities (100,000-499,999) 17 20 24 32 18.34 19.91 22.75 23.67
Small Cities (20,000-99,999) 86 104 125 147 19.86 14.19 23.77 22.75
Smaller Settlements (< 20,000) 53 58 58 30 5.13 11.14 1.24 0.62
186 211 214 100 100 100 100
Source: Prepared by the researcher; Details for 1976 from: PADCO, Inc. et al 1982; Details for 1986, 
1996, and 2003 are calculated by the researcher based on data from: (CAPMAS, 1976,1986, 
1996); (City Population, 2003); and (The World Gazetteer, 2002).
The development of the last three categories (intermediate, small, and smaller 
settlements) is of considerable importance to control the dominance of the primate 
cities category and to attain a more dispersed urban population all over the country. 
Also; this is important to improve the living and the environmental conditions of the 
primate cities as well. Cairo, with about 10 million inhabitants in 1996, marks the 
second highest population density in the world, after Hong Kong, with a density of
about 23,166 p e r s o n / k m ^  (Demographia, 2001). As a result o f this very high 
population density, slum areas are wide spread in these large agglomerations. During 
the 1987-1992 period, the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) informal housing market 
increased in size by 69%, while the overall GCR housing stock increased by 34% In 
1992, about 19.4 percent of the GCR urban population, or nearly 2.5 million people, 
were living in slum and informal communities (El Araby, M. 2002). In addition, the 
slum housing stock was expected to increase by 81% to roughly 426,000 units by 
1996 (CAPMAS, 1991, 111).
Because of the fact that the Egyptian definition of urbanisation is mainly concerned 
with administrative purposes, focusing on urban settlements according to the 
government’s definition may be misleading and hides another important pattern of 
unrecognised urbanism in Egypt. In fact, there is an alternative process of 
urbanization, namely, that which concerns mostly small towns and the struggling
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urban villages with a population of 10,000 or more. Although these settlements are 
usually classified as rural, they start acquiring many urban characteristics such as
greater social distance and anonymity among their inhabitants, a more extensive 
exchange of goods and services, division of labour and occupational diversity.
Moreover, modem transportation, telecommunication and television, and new
consumption patterns have enabled these villages to develop some aspects of urban
life. The efficient provision with electricity and infrastructure is a significant factor 
contributing to the emergence of some urban life aspects in rural communities. The 
majority of rural households (86 percent) enjoy electricity and well over half of them 
(57 percent) have access to running water.
The agglomeration process of this type of community has a momentum that tends to 
reproduce the process. As more people gather in these communities, diversification 
increases and new activities and occupations are created which, in turn, make these 
locations more attractive to those in over congested urban centres. Occupations in 
such urban villages are no longer limited to the traditional farmers and shepherds but 
include many modem occupations such as teachers, mechanics, drivers, lawyers, 
doctors, employees of day-care centres and government officials. The radical change 
in housing style is another important way of showing how the countryside is being 
urbanized. The rapid increase in construction of flats (as opposed to typically rural 
dwellings) signifies a convergence in the living conditions between urban and rural 
areas. In 1996, for example, there were as many apartment buildings being constructed 
in rural areas as in the cities, and the number built in rural areas was double that of ten 
years earlier (Bayat, A. and Denis, E. 2000, 194).
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5.3 Problems of Urban Primacy: the case of Cairo, Egypt
The previous analysis of Egypt’s urban system clearly reveals that urban primacy is a 
characterising phenomenon of that system. Although this phenomenon reflects the 
relative advantages of primate cities on the national and regional levels, it creates 
many serious problems in these cities. In this chapter the thesis tries to examine the 
main problems of urban primacy in Greater Cairo Region (GCR), as it is one of the 
best examples of urban primacy centres that suffer many serious socio-economic and 
environmental problems. However, and to give a broader idea about the GCR's role on 
the national and international levels, the thesis will start this section by highlighting 
the main factors behind the increasing primacy of the region.
5.3.1 Primacy Factors in Greater Cairo Region
In investigating the factors behind the increasing primacy of Greater Cairo Region, the 
thesis will focus on the demographic, economic, and political factors as they are the 
main factors behind such phenomenon in Cairo and as they are getting more 
influential with the increasing primacy of the region.
5.3.1.1 Demographic Factors:
At the start of the twentieth century, Cairo was already a rather crowded capital, with 
more than half a million inhabitants. However, its population has increased very 
rapidly to 11.2 million in 1996, just before the end of that century (CAPMAS, 1997) 
and reaching about 16 million inhabitants in 2003 (The World Gazetteer, 2003). This 
means that the GCR's population is increasing at an annual average rate of
approximately 4.7% since World War II. Moreover, the GCR's share of national total
population has increased from 12.5% in 1960 to 22.7% in 1996, and is expected to 
reach 25% by the year 2010 (El Araby, 2002). More strikingly, the GCR population 
was about 40% of national urban population in 2003 (The World Gazetteer, 2003). All 
of these facts demonstrate the increasing primacy of GCR. Rural-urban migration is 
seen as the main driving force behind the urban primacy of the region (Yousry and 
Aboul Atta, 1997). High rates of natural increase in Egypt partly account for rapid 
urban growth rates, especially in Cairo and almost all urban centres in Egypt where 
population natural growth rate is very much lower that that in rural areas. The analysis 
of population migration streams and magnitude in Egypt, presented in section 6.2.1, 
clearly demonstrates that Cairo was the main destination of many of these streams.
Within the urban sector, and as shown in section 6.2.2, Greater Cairo Region has
witnessed higher rates of population growth than medium- and small-sized centres.
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While the population of Egypt has increased by more than 5 times in the twentieth 
century, Cairo's population has increased by nearly 16 times.
In 2002, The Greater Cairo Region ranked the tenth largest mega-city in the world and 
expected to grow to 16 million by the year 2006 (World Bank, 1997; El Araby, 2002). 
Although the GCR occupies 928 km2, Cairo marks the second highest population 
density in the world, after Hong Kong, with a density of about 23,166 person/sq. km 
(Demographia, 2001). The region is spatially distributed over three govemorates: 
Cairo, Giza and Qaliubiah and contains the cities of Cairo, Giza, Shubra El Kheima, 
five small towns, 10 villages and contiguous suburban and agricultural areas (Fig. 
5.9). Moreover, five satellite towns; the Tenth of Ramadan, Sixth of October, Obur, 
Fifteenth of May and Asalam; are located adjacent to the boundary of the region but 
not included in it. Therefore, while acquiring an increasing share of national 
population, growth within the GCR is experiencing an increasing urban growth in the 
periphery areas. While the population of Giza and Qalubiah increased by 49.5% 
during the 1976-1996 period, the population of Cairo increased by only 24.8% during 
the same period (MHNCU, 1988 and 1992).
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Figure 5.9: The Greater Cairo Region (GCR)
Because of its largest share of both urban and total national population, Cairo and, to a 
lesser extent, Alexandria, with a population of about 3.9 million in 2003, dominates
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the urban system and there is a wide gap between these two cities and the remaining 
settlements. Yousry and Aboul Atta (1997) stress that indices of primacy in Egypt are 
among the highest in the world.
From the administrative point of view, GCR is currently the most important urban 
agglomeration in the country and serves as the main centre of government, finance, 
commerce, education and culture, as well as a transportation hub. These features also 
make the GCR the national citadel of the expertise, resources, and political power 
needed to combat chronic economic, social and environmental problems.
5.3.1.2 Economic Factors:
Since the start of the British colonization of Egypt in 1882, government policies have 
favoured urban areas and particularly large centres, and consequently a strongly 
primate settlement system was developed, focusing on Cairo as the political and 
administrative centre. Alexandria was also developed as a port that links the country 
with the outside world and to facilitate the export of agricultural products. After the 
1952 revolution and gaining independence, this attitude has continued as the 
government has directed its major resources towards these large urban centres for 
efficiency, political, and sometimes prestige reasons. It was believed then that it is 
more efficient to develop urban centres because of the availability of services, 
infrastructure, power, and skilled labour. Moreover, the favoured strategy, for political 
as well as developmental reasons, has focused on industrialization and concentrated 
industrial activities in urban centres, especially Cairo. This is while rural areas did not 
receive much attention, with the exception of a few instances where rural development 
experiments have been carried out, such as in Mudiriat El Tahrir in the 1950s and 
Salhia in the 1970s. The underdevelopment of rural areas has been the driving force 
behind rural-urban migration.
Since 1952, when Egypt began to implement its national industrial plan, the share of 
the industrial sector in the total economy increased from 8 per cent in 1952 to 22 per 
cent in 1961 and to 42 per cent in the late 1970s. Since early 1980s, it has decreased in
relative terms, to 25 per cent and 28 per cent in 1980 and 1985, respectively, leaving
the lead to the service sectors since 1983. Most of this industrial development was
concentrated in the GCR. In 1976 more than 55 per cent of Egypt's industrial
establishments, 48 per cent of industrial employment, and 51 per cent of industrial 
output were located in the GCR. Although these percentages have fluctuated since, 
industries are still highly concentrated in the GCR.
During the last 50 years, the GCR region has witnessed dramatic economic changes, 
including the transformation of the Egyptian economy from state-controlled to state-
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organized economic mechanisms. During the 1990s, and because of these economic 
transformations, the region observed the growth of national economies, which 
expanded in real terms at an annual average rate of approximately 6.2% during 1994— 
1997 “boom” period (Rodenbeck, 2000). Furthermore, the GCR’s role in the Egyptian 
economy significantly increased during this period, and accounted for over 45% of 
GDP, and nearly 40% of manufacturing output in 2001 (Bush, 2001). The Economic 
Reform Policy emphasizes the stimulation of private investment and promotion of
national-export-oriented industrialization, based primarily on manufacturing activity. 
The measures adopted include privatization, public sector reform, price liberalization, 
and opening markets to the world economy (Bush, 2001). This process led to a rapid 
transformation of small-scale industries into other GCR-based service businesses, and 
increased the number of large manufacturing-oriented and service industries in the 
region (El Araby, 2002). Since 1980s major investments have been directed towards 
industrial development in the new cities, particularly those near the GCR such as 6 
October and 10 Ramadan Yousry and Aboul Atta (1997). Such process had further 
pushed its economic pre-eminence.
As a result, the GCR share of the national GDP has increased from 42.4 to 50.1% during 
the 1986-1996 period (Rodenbeck, 2000). By the end of 1990, GDP per capita in the 
GCR was roughly US$ 1890, whereas GDP per capita in the rest of the country was barely 
US$ 820. El Araby (2002) argues that the trend towards an increasing GCR share of 
economic output shows no sign of abating in the near future. Moreover, increasing spatial 
disparities in economic activity have also produced growing disparities in household
income. During 1975-1988 period, the share of total income earned by Egyptian 
households in the lowest 20% of the household income spectrum declined from 6.1 to 
4.5%, while the share earned by households in the top 20% increased from 38.9 to 55.0%.
By 1995, the spatial disparity in income had also become extreme, with monthly
household income in GCR averaging US$ 124, in contrast to the rest of the country, where 
it was only USS 68 (USAID, 1997). This increase in income disparity gave Egypt the 
distinction of having the most inequitable income distribution among several countries in 
Africa and elsewhere (El Araby, 2002).
Concentration of investments and the widening income disparities in favour of GCR 
led to the concentration of services in the region, which in turn became an important 
factor in attracting more migrants from rural and urban areas to it.
5.3.1.3 Political Factors:
The centralization of government in Egypt is a major factor in Cairo's increasing urban 
primacy. Moreover, decision makers, government ministries and institutions, central 
offices for all Egyptian organizations, major investors, and elite groups that possess
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economic and political power are all concentrated in Cairo. Many studies (such as
Todaro, 1981; Yousry and Aboul Atta 1997) have discussed the role of the elite group 
in the concentration process and came to two main points. First, that elitism implies 
the concentration of power and influence over decision-making in a few hands 
Second, that when economic planning decisions on what to produce and for whom to 
produce are made under elitist conditions, income generation and distribution will be 
biased in favour of groups influencing those decisions. Conversely, individuals and
groups excluded from the decision-making process will be losers, as reflected in
greater income inequality and poverty.
Before 1952, the elite consisted of those of aristocratic origin and top bureaucrats
related to colonization and the ruling system. After the 1952 revolution, the elite group 
consisted of the top military class, which ruled the country since then. Over time, 
especially since early 1980s, this has been slightly transformed into a wider elite of 
families and social groups with close relations with the ruling system. These types of 
relationships facilitated political power and wealth accumulation in Cairo (Yousry and 
Aboul Atta 1997).
Also, and from a prestige point of view, the government has emphasized the 
development of Cairo as Egypt's display window to the outside world. Extravagant 
services were concentrated in high-class districts and on major roads. Because public 
investments were concentrated in the core region and not in peripheral regions, 
inequalities increased within the country and further increased the primacy of GCR.
GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Many studies (El-Shakhs, 1971; Ibrahim, 1984; Moselhi, 1988, 1995; Yousiy and 
Aboul Atta 1997) suggest that a notable part of the growth of GCR is due to its 
international relations and its position within the world system. Egypt has been 
integrated into the world economy since the dawn of civilization owing to its strategic 
location at the centre of the old world. By the nineteenth century, this integration 
became more evident with the opening of the Suez Canal, the expansion of the port of 
Alexandria, and the construction of Suez and Port Said ports.
After the 1952 revolution and independence, the government's industrial development 
programme was based on high-technology and capital-intensive processes imported 
from the former USSR and Eastern countries. During the 1970s, Egypt began its 
"open-door'' policy aiming at attracting foreign investment, particularly from the 
United States and Western countries, as part of the process of shifting to a mixed 
economy. This period was marked by high inflation rates, sharp rises in imports, 
significant imbalances in both the trade account and government budgets, and, above
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all, growing foreign debt. Within Egypt, Cairo has been the centre of financial 
activities, housing multinational corporations and institutions, and has, as a result, 
become more and more integrated into the world economy. To fulfil this role, 
additional high-class residential areas, infrastructure facilities, and services were 
developed, reinforcing Cairo's growth and primacy.
In addition, Cairo is strongly interrelated with its surrounding regional subsystems: the 
Arab world, the Islamic world, and Africa. In the Arab world, Egypt is the largest 
country in terms of population and represents its heart. Cairo is the seat of almost half 
of the Arab political, economic, and cultural organizations, particularly in the Arab 
League, and an important banking centre. It provides military support to other Arab 
countries, as well as being a major source of labour (Findlay, 1994). Cairo is also 
considered to be the cultural centre of the Arab world by most Arab states (Eddie 
Ibrahim, 1987). In the Islamic world, Cairo plays an extremely important role owing 
to the existence of Al-Azhar Mosque and University, which are the centre of Islamic 
knowledge. In Africa, Egypt has several times been elected as head of the 
Organization of African Unity, including twice during the 1980s. Cairo is also the seat 
of many African political, economic, social, and sporting organizations. All these 
aspects have further increased the primacy of GCR.
5.3.2 Problems o f Urban Primacy in Greater Cairo Region
Because of the increasing primacy of Greater Cairo Region, Cairo suffers from serious 
physical, economical, social, and environmental problems. In this section, the thesis 
tries to highlight the most serious problems in the GCR: urban poverty, social 
problems, housing shortage, emergence and growth of slums; transportation and 
infrastructure; social problems and inequality; and environmental problems.
5.3.2.1 Urban Poverty: Social Problems, Housing Shortage, and Slum Growth in GCR
The increasing primacy of GCR has resulted in the increase of urban poverty in the 
region, which in turn has created many social problems, aggravated housing problems, 
and accelerated the growth of urban slums in the region. The thesis tries here to 
examine the extent and the impacts of each of these problems.
- GROWING URBAN POVERTY
Since the adoption of the "open-door" or "economic liberalization" policy in 1974 and 
the recent implementation of the IMF's structural adjustment program, socioeconomic 
disparity in Cairo, the largest urban agglomeration in the country, is growing rapidly. 
The proliferation of more than 100 squatter communities with some six million 
inhabitants signifies only one, but perhaps the starkest, outcome of such disparity.
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Since then, income poverty has been on the rise, “reaching the critical area of food 
intake to the extent of severely undermining the productive potential of future 
generations of Egyptians” (Fergany, 1998). Unemployment risen from 10.7% in 1986 
to 14.1% in 1992 and is now estimated to be 17% (Danida, 2002). Karima Korayem 
(1995) pointed out that between 1981 and 1991 rural poverty doubled and urban 
poverty increased more than 1.5 times. This is while the richest of urban households 
(the top 10 percent) which controlled about 26 percent of disposable income in 1981 
had, by 1991, increased their share to 32.6 percent.
The percentage of urban poor in Egypt increased from 37.5% of the urban population 
in 1991 to reach 45% by income in 1996 (Abdelhalim, 2002). According to UNDP's 
Egypt Human Development Report (1996), 22.5% of urban population are absolute 
poor (cannot afford basic needs) of whom 7.7% are ultra poor (cannot afford basic 
food consumption), and 22.5% are in a moderate poverty (Figure 5.10).
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Figure 5.10: Types and Scale of Urban Poverty in Egypt
Due to the high levels of unemployment, inflation, and real income decline, and 
despite slight improvement in macro-economic indicators, the living standard of the 
majority of the urban population is deteriorating. Moreover, ‘capability poverty’, 
which means the deprivation from capability to be well nourished and healthy, of 
healthy reproduction, and to be educated and knowledgeable, has also risen due to the 
limited and inequitable access to socio-economic resources. This in turn affected the
housing conditions of the poor by absorbing a large section of their income for health
and education at the expense of other expenditures including housing. Capability 
poverty in Egypt is 34%: 21% in urban areas and 43% in rural areas (UNDP, 1996).
Income and capability types of poverty lead to ‘housing poverty’ (UNCHS, 1996),
whereby the urban poor cannot afford adequate housing without compromising their 
living standard. Housing poverty in Egypt transcends income and capability poverty
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by about 30%, reaching 75% of total urban population. Although capability poverty is 
not that high in urban Egypt compared to rural areas, housing poverty is the reverse.
For GCR, and taking into account the impacts of its increasing primacy, Karima 
Korayem (1995) pointed out that by early 1990s more than half of Cairo and adjacent 
Giza were classified either as "poor" or "ultra-poor". Under such conditions, urban 
poor in Cairo cope with these economic realities either by stretching their resources 
through working for longer hours or by cutting down on their expenditures. Seeking 
cheap, or sometimes a free inadequate shelter in cemeteries, is a matter of no choice 
for them to cut housing expenditures in a city suffering acute shortage in housing 
supply.
-SOCIAL PROBLEMS
The rapid increase in GCR's population that accompanied the increase of its primacy 
has created many social problems in the region. This situation has been aggravated by 
the negative consequences of the implementation of IMF's structural adjustment 
program that highly increased the socioeconomic disparities in Egypt, and especially 
in Cairo. Levels of unemployment, real and disguised, have risen sharply in the 
region, particularly during the past decade. Wage jobs in the formal sector have not 
kept pace with demand. As a result, the informal sector, which it was hoped would 
diminish over time, has shown clear signs of expansion. Interclass and inter-sector
disparities have widened over time to add a new dimension to the polarization process, 
despite protests by the urban poor and, increasingly, the lower rungs of the middle 
classes (Yousry and Aboul Atta 1997).
Although data on income distribution in Egypt are very scarce, income disparities
became more obvious in recent years. The CAPMAS 1974 surveys showed that the 
share of the top 20 per cent of the population was around 47 per cent of total income, 
while the share of the lowest 40 per cent was 17 per cent. In 1980, a study by the 
World Bank showed that the share of the top 5 per cent of the population had
increased from 17 per cent of the national income in the late 1960s to 27 per cent in 
the late 1970s; and the share of the lowest 20 per cent had decreased from 7 per cent to 
5 per cent during the same period (Abdel Khalek and Tignor, 1982). In addition,
Karima Korayem (1995) pointed out that in 1991 the richest of urban households (the 
top 10 percent) was controlling about 32.6 percent of disposable income, up from
about 26 percent in 1981. Moreover, the share of wages in national income, which
decreased from 50 per cent in 1967 to less than 34 per cent in 1986, indicates the shift
towards an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth.
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Social problems, such as lack of safety, illiteracy, crime, homelessness, extremism, 
and violence have appeared in some parts of GCR, affecting both rich and poor areas. 
It has become evident, during recent decades, that government institutions are unable 
to cope properly with the ever-increasing rate of growth of Cairo.
- HOUSING SHORTAGE
Many housing studies indicated that 45% of the urban population in Egypt have an 
insufficiency problem by early 1990s: 33% lack access to housing and 12% are using 
inadequate shelter (UNDP, 1996; Amer and Taher, 1992; El-Kasaby, 1992; Mahmoud, 
1992; Abdelhalim, 2002). In addition to increasing volume of migration to Cairo, the 
decline in average household size in GCR has significantly increased demand for 
housing. During the 30-year period of 1960 to 1990, and for a number of reasons, 
including increasing levels of education and a highly successful family planning 
programs, the average household size in GCR declined from 6.23 to 4.47 people 
(NUPS, 1960; 1970; 1980; NUPS, 1992). Correspondingly, while the GCR population 
increased by 161% during the same period, the number of households increased by 
263%. This phenomenon of smaller households, though far more numerous, is 
currently generating tremendous demands for housing.
The shortage in housing supply in Egypt was a direct result of economic and 
regulatory problems the country has experienced during the last five decades. Housing 
supply was mostly provided by the private sector until the late 1950s, when rent 
control laws were applied. As a result, many of developers in the housing market 
shifted their investment to other sectors. Consequently, the total number of housing 
units built per year by both public and private sectors decreased from 56,000 units in
the early 1950s to fewer than 30,000 in the late 1960s (Yousry and Aboul Atta 1997).
Low- and medium-cost housing was financed by personal and family savings, loans 
from the General Organization for Housing Cooperatives and the Bank of Housing, as 
well as low-interest loans to govemorates to finance public housing.
The change in Egypt's economic policy during the second half of the 1970s caused
drastic changes in the housing market. The annual number of units built increased
steadily to reach more than 180,000 in 1990. The role of the public sector diminished 
and was limited to the provision of low- and medium-cost units, mainly in the new 
towns and settlements around the GCR. Private investment in the housing and real 
estate sectors has increased continuously in the past two decades, despite the fact that 
these sectors are, in theory, tightly regulated and rent controlled and suffer from credit 
shortages. According to estimates by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, 
private sector gross investment in housing grew from £E 732 million in 1982/83 to £E
137
2,950 million in 1991/92, to about £E 4,500 million in 2002/03, representing about 25 
per cent of the total private investment in Egypt.
Despite all these efforts, housing shortage is still acute in Egypt, especially for the 
urban poor. Together with a growing section of the middle-income, the urban poor
encounter unaffordable housing development costs and/or rents due to increasing
commercialisation. The lack of access to housing restricts the formulation of new 
families, increases overcrowding, and creates many social, economic and spatial 
pressures that are difficult for the urban poor to cope with, given their limited 
resources.
Under these conditions, the urban poor face a web of social, economical, and spatial 
problems in both formal and informal housing options. Formal options are insufficient 
(less than 10%) and inaccessible to the majority of the urban poor due to high 
standards, restrictive regulations, unaffordable terms of provision, and/or
inappropriate features. Site and services housing approach, although offering a 
reasonably accessible option, was limited to few experimental projects that
encountered problems in implementation and were discontinued. The only resort for
the urban poor is informal housing, where they reside together with two thirds of the 
relatively poor (65% of the urban population). Although the bulk of informal housing 
is of a comparable standard to the formal, the process is affected by the government's 
disapproval and the subsequent lack of planning, technical support, and access to
resources, which all affect its adequacy, quality and cost.
- EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF URBAN SLUMS IN CAIRO
Following the Second World War, and under the pressures of growing urban poverty 
and the shortage in housing supply, slums and deteriorated urban areas start to appear 
in almost all Egyptian cities, especially in GCR. Emergence of slums in GCR can be 
chronologically classified into two main stages.
During the first stage, which started early 1940s, slums appeared inside the city in 
areas very close to the CBD. These areas were at an average distance of about 3.2 km
from the CBD. During this stage, three forms of slums appeared: (1) deteriorated
urban pockets in the old centre of the city, (2) squatters and poor quality shelters in 
forms of tin shacks and tents (called Eshash) built on vacant lands in central area and 
along some of the major roads, and (3) living in and around cemeteries (Musailhi, 
1995). For the deteriorated urban pockets, they are mainly inhabited by the urban poor 
originally from Cairo who were unable to maintain their buildings or to move to urban 
areas of better conditions. High population density and lack of maintenance and 
infrastructure are the main causes for the deterioration of these areas. Regarding the
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tin shacks and poor quality shelters (Eshash), they are usually inhabited by the poor 
rural migrants (see Figures 5.11 and 5.12).
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Regarding living in cemeteries, it was the first type 
of slums that appeared in Cairo. Such process has 
started by the undertakers and poor religious t ^  
people who used to provide the service of burying f - * ' :
the dead. As housing shortage problems became 
more acute, poor people start residing in 
cemeteries. It should be noted here that cemeteries
in Cairo are of two types. The first one is that Figure 5.11: Cemeteries in Cairo being used
for residence
where bodies are buried underground with only a 
small stone appears over-ground. The second type 
of cemeteries is the courtyard cemeteries, where 
bodies are buried underground in an uncovered 
courtyard, and it usually includes two rooms or 
more, a kitchen, and a small toilet. Also, people 
can build new rooms in the cemetery courtyard 
and in the in-between spaces. In addition, such 
cemeteries are highly decorated and of good 
architectural styles that can hardly be found
outside such cemeteries (Musailhi, 1995). Despite 
the inhuman condition of living with the dead, it 
provides the urban poor a form of shelter and
central location in the city. More interestingly,
40% of cemeteries’ residents think it is a logical 
solution as they believe that the government will 
not provide housing for them; 40% think it is an 
arbitrary situation and accept to move if alternative 
housing is provided; and 20% refuse to move and 
have vested interest in staying (Soliman and 
Shenoda, 1988; p. 353).
The second stage of slum emergence in GCR 
started early 1960s. During this stage, slums start
to appear on the fringes of the built up areas in the 
form of what so called "ashwa'iyyat" or "informal 
or unapproved subdivisions". Informal housing, in 
the form of illegal subdivisions for low- and
Figure 5.12: Slum typology of informal 
housing on the outskirts o f Cairo
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Figure 5.13: Informal housing in El- 
Konayesa Area, Giza
middle-income classes, is usually built on privately owned land (generally agricultural 
land) that is subdivided into small parcels without informing the local authorities and 
then sold to buyers without any legal deeds.
Consequently, no building permits are issued.
The magnitude of this process is far greater than 
the capacity of government authorities to 
organize or control it. The result is usually 
unplanned, high-density, and low-quality
developments deprived of basic services and
infrastructure. However, when such areas reach a 
population size large enough to exert political ^
pressure, the government is forced to provide
them with water, electricity, and sometimes 
sewerage networks. Therefore, many housing 
studies do not classify some of these informal
housing areas as slums as they are of a 
comparable standard to formal housing projects
(Musailhi, 1995; Soliman, 2002). Figure 514: Owner-occupied popular
housing, El-Konayesa, Giza
Informal housing is estimated to represent more
than 70% of the urban housing built in the last
four decades (Abdel-Kader, 1991; Hanna, 1996;
Abdelhalim, 2002). According to Ministry of
Housing (MoH) estimates, informal settlements
comprise about half the built up area of large
cities such as Greater Cairo, and 84% of its urban I f . '
mass by origin (MoH, 1998), given that many Figure 5.15: The lack o f sewer network;
collection from tanks by truck, El-Konayesaformal areas are originally consolidated informal 
developments. According to 1996 census, there 
are 68 informal areas in Cairo and 69 in 
Alexandria (CAPMS, 1996). However, MoH
(2000) reported that there are 1034 informal areas
in Egypt as a whole, covering 344 km^, the
majority of these areas is expected to be Cairo
and Alexandria. Soliman (2002) estimated thatv J Figure 5.16: Informal housing projects of
2.63 millions of informal housing units exist in comparable standard to formal housing,
1
Greater Cairo.
Faiysal area, Giza
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According to the 1996 census, 28% of Cairo's population live in informal housing 
areas. However, other studies have estimated that 40% (Dorman, 2000) to 45% (Harris 
and Wahba, 2002) of Greater Cairo residents, or about 6.4 millions, live in informal 
areas (Soliman 2002). These figures demonstrate that informal housing constitutes the 
bulk of ongoing housing development such that it now represents the norm of urban 
growth in GCR. Urban poor is the largest section of such populations, for whom 
informal housing can be considered the main option for being the most affordable and 
suited to their needs.
- The correlation between slums, urban poverty, and social problems in GCR
Fathy Musailhi (1995) stresses the strong correlation between slums and urban 
poverty in Cairo. In his study about urban poverty in Cairo, he found that the average 
yearly income of slum residents is only about LE 189 (about US$ 54), which is less 
than the third of the average per capita income at the national level. This study 
classified families of slum areas in Cairo, according to the family yearly income, into 
four groups: (1) families of a yearly income less than LE 600 (US$ 171) and 
represents 10.8% of all families living in slum areas in Cairo, (2) families of a yearly 
income between LE 600-1080 (US$ 171-309) and represents 60.5% of all families, (3) 
families of a yearly income between LE 1080-1680 (US$ 309-480) and represents 
22.8% of all families, and these of a yearly income more than LE 1680 (US$ 480) and 
represents 8.4% of all families living in slum areas in Cairo. In addition, the labour 
force in these slums is only 18.2% of its total population. About 70% of them are 
employed by the private sector. Garbage collection, street cleaning, private service 
activities (home cleaning, car wash...), and construction are the main jobs for 
residents of slum areas in Cairo.
On the other hand, David Sims (2003) argues that in Cairo, as in most Egyptian cities, 
urban poor are not notably concentrated in particular geographic areas. Poor and ultra 
poor families are found mixed in with lower and middle income families. A small 
percentage of poor families may also be found even in older upper class 
neighbourhoods. Conversely, in most informal areas a small percentage of well-off 
entrepreneurs and professionals will be found. This mix of income groups or “income 
heterogeneity” in geographical space is due to a number of historical factors, including 
the lack of residential mobility due to rent control and imperfect real estate markets. 
However, urban slums can be easily identified in Cairo. These areas are characterised 
by the prevalence of poverty, high residential density and deteriorated urban 
environment.
For the correlation between slums and social problems in GCR, Fathy Musailhi (1995) 
identified a number of social problems prevailing in slum and poor areas in GCR. The
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most important of these problems is the spread illiteracy. Three-quarters of people 
living in these areas are illiterate, which is more than the double of illiteracy level in 
Cairo as a whole (34%). Also, labour force in these communities is very low and
estimated to only 18.3% of its total population, while it reaches 30% in Cairo as a
whole. More important, population density in these areas is very high and reaches
128,000 capita / km^; while it is only about 28000 capita / km^ in Cairo. Crime is 
widespread in slum areas and appears in the life of almost one-third of the families 
living in these areas. Robbery and break-in are the main types of crimes in these areas, 
however rape crimes is relatively high in these areas compared to the low level of
these crimes in Cairo or the Egyptian society in general.
- Government efforts to improve slum areas
The hard economic situation that was prevalent until late 1980s was the direct reason 
that prevented all the successive governments to effectively develop slum and 
deteriorated areas. In addition, improving the infrastructure networks in large cities 
took higher priority, and has further delayed the government intervention in improving 
slum and deteriorated areas.
Recently, the Egyptian Government has recognised the acuteness of the socio­
economic problems prevalent in deteriorated and under-served urban areas in GCR. 
Starting in 1992, after some poorer urban areas were perceived as breeding grounds 
for Islamic fundamentalism, the government launched a programme to improve many 
of the deteriorated informal areas throughout Egypt. In Greater Cairo a total of 81 
informal areas were identified, of which 63 were deemed up-gradable and 18 smaller 
pockets were slated for demolition and the resettlement of the inhabitants (Ministry of 
Local Development 2001).
In GCR, the government, and in cooperation with some international organisations 
such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and some European development organisations, 
was successful in upgrading many deteriorated urban areas in Cairo; mainly Zainhom 
and Zabbaleen (garbage collectors) areas. In Zainhom upgrading project, squatters in 
an area of about 5 hectares have been demolished and new housing blocks were built. 
During this process, 941 families have been relocated in government owned housing 
blocks, out of them 348 families have returned to the new houses built in the area. In 
the current stage of this project, 1802 families will be relocated. In Moqattam 
Zabbaleen area, similar upgrading program has been applied. In such program, the 
zabbaleen (garbage collectors) were encouraged to convert their homes from tin 
shacks into stone and brick buildings. In doing so, the government had set up a loan 
fund for housing construction, offering architectural services to loan beneficiaries and
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other community members. The upgrading scheme also aimed at cleaning up the 
settlement to improve sanitation. This was partly achieved through the construction of 
a compost plant transforming organic waste to a high quality fertilizer. With the 
participation of Oxfam, a "Small Industries Program" has been initiated to upgrade the 
residents' waste cycling capabilities by introducing mechanization into the process.
In early 2004, Ministry of Local Development reported the completion of upgrading 
programs in 284 slum areas (out of 1130 areas in need for development in the country) 
and that upgrading programs in 588 slum areas are taking place. Also, Ministry of 
Local Development reported that the total governmental investments in upgrading 
slum and informal areas since 1993 have reached about LE 5.2 billions. In addition, it 
reported that it is planned to invest about LE 1.5 billion during the 2002-2007 plan for 
improving infrastructure in slum and informal areas.
5.3.2.2 Transportation and infrastructure
The sharp decline in the efficiency of GCR's transportation system is the most evident 
impact of the increasing primacy of the region. Although the road network in GCR 
represents nearly 25 per cent of its total area, which is acceptable according to 
planning standards, its practical capacity is inadequate. Although there are many 
reasons for this, such as lack of maintenance, poor driving habits, low vehicle 
occupancy, and lack of parking lots and garages; the increasing number of vehicles in 
the region, that accompanied its increasing primacy, is one the main reasons for the 
poor performance of transportation system in GCR. Car ownership in GCR sharply 
increased from 10 cars per 1000 inhabitant in 1974 to 75 in 1998 (Afifi 1991; 
CAPMAS 1999), and it is estimated that more than 1.2 million vehicles were on the 
road in 2003, up from only 0.53 million in 1983 (Yousry and Aboul Atta, 1997).
Because of this rapid increase in the number of vehicles in GCR, that accompanied its 
increasing primacy, slow and idling traffic are currently among the most serious 
transportation problems in the region. In 1989, the average travel speed on main roads 
in the Cairo metropolis was only 8.1 km per hour during peak hours in downtown 
areas (TETC, 1991). Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to identify peak travel periods 
in Cairo, for congestion now exists throughout the metropolis from early morning to late 
evening. During the last two decades, idling traffic has become an issue of national 
consequence, as because of this unproductive activity millions of dollars of fuel are 
wasted annually. Egypt’s Ministry of Transportation estimated the cost of fuel 
consumed while idling in traffic to be US$ 500 million per year. For the GCR, it is 
estimated that each of the nearly 1.92 million households living in the GCR in 1996 
“paid” US$ 260 per year or the equivalent of 16 weeks of average household income, 
solely for the purchase of fuel to be wasted while idling in traffic (El Araby, 2002).
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In 1986, about 56% of final energy demand was in the transport sector, up from 46%
in 1973. More importantly, the 56% share was the highest such level of 13 African
countries surveyed by World Bank (UNDP, 1991). Only South Africa, with a 36%
share, approached the Egyptian figure. While the share is projected to fall slightly to 
about 52% by 2001, largely due to increased consumption in other economic sectors, 
the share of final energy demand in the transport sector will still be much higher than 
in neighboring countries. In the light of the increasing primacy of the GCR, the region 
will remain in contention for having the world’s worst traffic conditions well into the 
future due to the limited potential of proposed projects to ameliorate prevailing 
conditions, let alone solve traffic problems (El Araby, 2002).
For infrastructure, the increasing primacy of GCR and the accompanied rapid urban 
growth has overloaded the existing old water and sanitation networks and equipments. 
Also, the rapid urban expansion on the fringes of Cairo and the extension of
infrastructure networks to these areas has resulted in the loss or wasting of a
considerable share of its capacity. Although the General Organization for Water in the 
GCR was providing almost 3 million m3 of potable water per day in 1996, which is 
sufficient by international standards to supply the population, more than 25 per cent of 
this capacity is lost or wasted due to the lack of maintenance of pipelines, equipment, 
and fittings (Yousry and Aboul Atta, 1997). The old water network and the small pipe 
diameters add more problems to the distribution of water to many of the new areas on 
the fringe of the city. For the sewer network the situation is even worse, even in
districts connected to the system. Because of the sharp increase in population densities 
that accompanied the increasing primacy of the region, the discharge in many districts 
of the GCR far exceeds the capacity of the sewerage system. This causes frequent 
overflows and represents a dangerous source of pollution.
Moreover, garbage collection and disposing is a serious problem in Cairo, where more 
than 7,000 tons of garbage is produced daily in 2000 (UNCSD, 1997; El Araby, 2002). 
Sixty per cent of which is collected by private contractors and the remaining 40 per 
cent is collected by local municipalities. Informal sector operators based in "refuse 
settlements- or Zabbaleen areas" pay for the rights to collect refuse from wealthier 
parts of the city, using female household labour to sort it into recyclable waste for
sale, organic waste for animal fodder, and unusable waste, which is burnt. However,
and because of the increased volume of solid waste and the geographical expansion of 
the city, neither the private contractors nor the municipalities are able to keep up with 
the need (Yousry and Aboul Atta, 1997).
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5.3.2.3 Environmental Problems of GCR’s Urban Primacy
Each of the previously mentioned problems of the increasing primacy of GCR has its 
adverse environmental impacts on the region. The cumulative environmental impacts 
of these problems have resulted in the deterioration of air quality and public heath, 
water quality, and waste treatment.
-AIR QUALITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
In GCR, current air quality conditions pose a far greater risk to public health than it is 
currently known. Traffic and industrial emissions are the major sources of air 
pollution in GCR.
Traffic emissions:
According to UNCSD (1997), motor vehicle emissions currently account for 60-70% 
of all air pollution in GCR. Based on studies conducted by the national environmental 
board (UNCSD 1997) vehicle emissions along major roads in the more intensively 
developed portions of the region were found to be dangerous to human health between 
1989 and 1997. Using an air quality index of 100 as the maximum acceptable 
tolerance level, the board measured an annual average of 277. Another study found 
that approximately 900,000 of GCR downtown residents -  almost 10% of the region's 
total population -  suffered from respiratory illnesses due to air pollution (Rodenbeck, 
2000; El Araby, 2002). In 1990, a UNICEF study found that Cairo’s children have the 
highest blood lead levels in the world, even exceeding the levels found among the 
children of Mexico City, long viewed as the city with the worst air pollution in the 
world (UNICEF, 1990). The introduction of low-lead fuel in 1991 and natural gas in 
1999 were positive steps to improve the city’s air quality.
Industrial emissions:
Industrial emissions are the other major source of air pollution in GCR. Concentration 
of many polluting industries, such as steel and cement industries that were established 
in GCR during early 1960s to meet the increasing need for jobs, has significantly 
contributed to air pollution in the region. Not only has the number of industries grown 
rapidly in the recent past, but also many factories now bum lignite (a soft coal) to cut 
operating expenses (CAPMAS-b, 1997, vol 1, SA7, p 50). As long as pricing policies 
favour lignite over cleaner fuels -  and readily available ones -  the growing number of 
factories in the GCMR could also result in exceptionally high levels of industrial air 
pollution.
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WATER QUALITY
The Nile, that once served as the basis for the Egypt’s description as “Egypt is the gift 
of the Nile”, some of its canals that go through Cairo now receive all manner of 
untreated industrial and domestic pollutants and have become dangerously polluted. In 
many parts of these canals, the level of dissolved oxygen (a measure of the “ability” of 
water to support life and synthesize organic pollutants) is almost zero. Within the 
GCR, about 1.5 million m3 of wastewater are released into waterways every day. To 
improve water quality in GCR, the government has recently approved a sewerage and 
secondary treatment system. However, such system is only capable of treating 510,000 
m3 of wastewater per day, or only 33% of current wastewater volume (El Araby, 
2002). Therefore, and despite such improvements, water quality is not anticipated to 
improve radically due to predictable population growth.
WASTE MANAGEMENT
The increasing primacy of GCR has created serious problems of waste management in 
Cairo. In 1987, the GCR was burdened with the task of collecting and disposing of 
6100 tons of garbage per day, and increased by 17.6% to reach about 7000 tons per 
day in 2000 (UNCSD, 1997). That is while the population of metropolitan Cairo 
increased by only 4.5% during the 1987-1996 period, a matter that reflects a growing 
trend of increasing levels of waste per capita as incomes and purchases of heavily 
packaged consumer items increase (El Araby, 2002).
Although collection rates have improved dramatically over time, the treatment and 
disposal of garbage is still a major problem in GCR. Under current rates of waste 
generation, the three open dumpsites in GCR will reach capacity in six to seven years. 
Moreover, most of the estimated 2760 tons of refuse generated daily in the five towns 
outside the metropolitan Cairo were disposed of in a similar manner. In addition, the 
rapid emergence of manufacturing activities during the last two decades has resulted 
in a shift from largely organic forms of refuse to greater quantities of hazardous (and 
toxic) waste. Most of this waste, along with increasing amounts of medical waste, is 
disposed of in much the same way as garbage. Until 1997, there was only one 
hazardous waste treatment plant in the GCR, with a treatment capacity of only 40,000 
tons per year (UNCSD, 1997). This means that less than 3% of the hazardous waste 
generated in Metropolitan Cairo since 1991 was treated prior to disposal.
Generally, it can be asserted that domestic and industrial waste generated in GCR has 
never been adequately and safely treated and disposed of. Moreover, the increasing 
primacy and the high population growth expected in GCR in the coming years is likely 
to mean greater generation of hazardous and toxic wastes, as well as the distinct 
possibility that these wastes will generate irreversible and significant adverse public 
health and environmental impacts (El Araby, 2002).
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Conclusion:
In this chapter, the thesis has analysed patterns and problems of urban change in 
Egypt. Also, it has thoroughly examined the problems of urban primacy in Greater 
Cairo Region. Through this chapter, the thesis came to some important conclusions.
Through reviewing the development history and the technology status in Egypt, it can 
be asserted that the technological capabilities of Egypt are rapidly growing and will 
have considerable impacts on shaping the future of urban development in the country.
Through the investigation of urban change in Egypt, the thesis came to three important 
conclusions. First, the urban system of Egypt suffers high urban concentration levels 
in certain regions of the country; namely Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and Canal cities. 
To these very small regions, all migration streams are heading from all over the 
country, from both the urban and rural areas. Upper Egypt regions are the main losers 
of both urban and rural populations. Second, new towns built in Egypt since 1977 
were of very limited influence in correcting this pattern of urban concentration. Third. 
the urban system of Egypt suffers high differential growth of the different settlement 
sizes as large cities are usually growing faster than smaller ones which usually lose 
their population in favour of larger cities. In 2003, 51% of the country’s urban 
population were in only 2 large cities of over a million people in size: Greater Cairo 
(Cairo, Giza, Shubra Al-Khaymah) 38 percent, and Alexandria 13 percent.
The detailed analysis of urban problems that accompanied the increasing primacy of 
Greater Cairo region reveals three important facts. First, despite the numerous 
advantages of the region that usually attracts more people and investments to it, such 
increasing primacy created a web of social, economical, and urban problems. Second. 
urban poverty and its associated social and urban problems are high and growing in 
GCR. Housing shortage and emergence and the growth of slums are very high and 
rapidly growing in the region despite the government efforts to control them. Third. 
the region is facing mounting transportation, infrastructure, and environmental 
problems. These mounting problems of the increasing primacy of GCR call for a more 
comprehensive vision at the national level to control and minimise the increasing 
primacy of the region and to overcome its problems in the region itself and in the 
country as whole. In doing so, the adoption of some national policies, designed to 
control and minimise regional disparities, is a necessary approach.
In the next chapter, the thesis proposes three approaches for managing the urban future 
in developing countries: urban decentralisation, small-size settlements, and the
incremental planning and development of urban settlements.
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Chapter Six
PROPOSED APPROACHES FOR MANAGING THE URBAN FUTURE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Introduction:
The previous analysis of urban change patterns and problems in developing countries 
(Chapter 4) and the extensive analysis of these problems in Egypt (Chapter 5) show 
that these countries suffer mounting problems of urban concentration and differential 
growth of different settlement sizes. Taking these problems into consideration and 
based on the analysis provided in the previous chapters (2, 3, and 4) about technology 
and its impacts on urban change in both the developed and developing countries, the 
thesis proposes three complementary approaches for managing the future of urban 
development in developing countries during the next 30 to 40 years. These approaches 
are: urban decentralisation, small-size urban settlements, and the incremental planning 
and development of future urban settlements. These approaches are seen to be 
appropriate for managing future urban development in developing countries and are 
expected to be highly facilitated by the future technological achievements. In this 
chapter, each of these approaches will be examined regarding its advantages, 
disadvantages, the role of technology in the adoption of each approach, an appraisal of 
its application in Egypt, and the ways in which the appropriateness and applicability of 
each of these approaches will be assessed.
6.1 URBAN DECENTRALISATION
In the light of the increasing technological impacts and the mounting urban problems 
in developing countries, the research argues that urban decentralisation would be an 
appropriate approach to meet the future urban impacts of technology and to help 
overcome the mounting urban concentration problems in these countries. But, before 
proceeding to the discussion of the different aspects of urban decentralisation, it is 
better to start by defining the meaning of such an approach.
Webster’s Dictionary (2001) defines “decentralization” as the dispersion of functions 
and potentials from central authorities, usually in large urban centres, to suburban 
areas and outlying districts. Rondinelli et al (1984, 9) defined decentralization as the 
transfer of responsibilities and functions from central governments and its agencies to 
the local authorities. In that sense, decentralisation is mainly concerned with the 
spatial distribution of population, activities and resources. Kammeier (2002, 6) argues 
that decentralization could be defined in at least four distinctly different dimensions - 
political, administrative, fiscal, and economic decentralization (market-related policies) -
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with separate objectives and instruments for implementation. He also argues that these 
dimensions are complementary and should not be handled separately. The core of 
most of these definitions and approaches to is the issue of organisational strategy that 
focuses on the political and economical issues. Concerning technology impacts on 
urban decentralisation, Kain (1975, 80) described the urban decentralisation process as 
being “the result of several important technological and economical changes that have 
made decentralisation is more feasible, more economic, or more desirable choice for 
increasing numbers of households and businesses”.
The definition of “urban decentralisation” varies greatly according to the scale of the 
decentralisation process. At the local level, urban decentralisation revolves around 
questions of overcrowding, decongestion and space standards, primarily with respect 
to the living conditions in the older urban areas. At that level, urban decentralisation 
usually deals with the distribution of population and industry in city’s core and outer 
rings and the emerging forms of suburbanisation, edge cities, and satellite towns. At 
the regional level, urban decentralisation deals mainly with the regional imbalances of 
urban systems. At that level, urban decentralisation aims to overcome the urban 
problems of a given city within its regional context. At that level, urban 
decentralisation usually deals with the distribution of both population and investments 
between the different regions of the country and the magnitude and directions of 
migration streams between them. In that context, urban decentralisation is mainly a 
tool for, and an objective of, the national development policy. Urban planners, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, often used the term “decentralization” in a sense of spatial 
deconcentration, focusing on better distribution of population, services, and industries 
(Kammeier 2002, 6).
In investigating the importance and effectiveness of urban decentralisation for 
developing countries, the research adopts the following four-stages process. First it 
presents an analysis of the main arguments for and against urban decentralisation, 
especially for developing countries. Second, it investigates the possible role of 
technology as an enabler of urban decentralisation in developing countries. Third, it 
presents an appraisal of the application of the decentralisation approach in urban 
development process in Egypt. Fourth, it analyses the methods used by the research in 
assessing the future importance and applicability of urban decentralisation approach.
6.1.1 Arguments for Urban Decentralisation
Almost all urban planning theorists view urban decentralisation as a necessary 
approach for achieving a more sustainable urban development. Ebenezer Howard is 
one of the most influential proponents of urban decentralization. In introducing his
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book “Garden cities of To-Morrow” (1902), he asserted the growing consensus against 
the concentration of more people in the already over-crowded cities. In support of his 
arguments for decentralisation, Howard critically examined the evils of slum housing, 
gin palaces, long work journeys, foul air, fogs and high rents in these overcrowded 
cities. Consequently, he suggested that city dwellers should be relieved of these 
disadvantages through being moved into new ‘garden Cities” beyond a ‘green belt’ of 
agricultural land around existing overcrowded cities (Osborn 1966, 42). The UK New 
Towns Act (1946) was mainly aiming at decentralisation that is based on Howard’s 
vision: the decongestion of urban areas through the transfer of people and jobs to New 
and later Expanding Towns. Moreover, Lewis Mumford viewed decentralisation as a 
necessary approach to avoid the danger of turning “town and country” into an 
“amorphous suburban mass” (Mumford 1966, 34). Consequently, decentralisation
became a major aim of post-war British urban policy (Coursey 1977, 11). Since then, 
more attention has been paid to what is called “the missing half’ of Howard’s case for 
decentralisation. This argument means that the planned transfer of families and jobs 
would not provide a better and more ample life only for the working class families 
who moved out, but it would also improve conditions for those who remained behind, 
in the inner areas, which should be redeveloped or rehabilitated at lower density with 
generous provision of open spaces (Ward 1973,13).
Coursey (1977, 13) argues that the advent of the motor vehicle and other technological 
innovations changed the nature of the case for decentralisation in other ways Howard 
could not have envisaged: it became a widespread autonomous trend both for 
households and firms. Consequently, higher incomes and changes in production 
technology led to a demand for higher space and environmental standards, and
improvements in transport technology made this possible.
Although most of the frequently stated advantages of decentralisation are mainly
focusing on its effects at the local level, the most important advantages of urban 
decentralisation are at the regional level. At the regional level, the urban
decentralisation approach addresses urban problems within their regional and national 
contexts that usually influence urban localities, as the urbanisation process is in fact a
product of complex and interdependent socio-economic relations between urban units
and their regional, national and sometimes the international domains. Therefore,
managing urban areas within these perspectives is seen to be more effective and more 
rewarding for the urban areas and their rural hinterlands. In many cases, urban 
decentralisation at local level could represent in itself some sort of urban 
concentration, as is the case of new towns around Cairo (section 5.2.1.4). Although
these towns were an attempt to achieve some urban decentralisation of Cairo’s
population, this process has improved life quality and the economic prosperity of
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Cairo’s urban region, compared to other regions of the country, and consequently 
increased its attractiveness to new migrants from different urban and rural regions of 
Egypt. Therefore, although this process represents urban decentralisation at local 
level, it is an urban concentration process at national level.
6.1.1.1 Advantages of Urban Decentralisation for Developing Countries
For developing countries, where the pace of urban growth and urban concentration has 
reached critical levels, urban decentralisation, especially at the regional level, is of 
particular importance. The constantly high rates of population natural increase and the 
rapid rural-urban migration are simultaneously causing immense growth in urban 
population in these countries. The continuously increasing size of Third World cities 
and its impacts on concentrated poverty and urban deterioration has drawn the 
attention of national planners, policy makers and researchers alike. Most of the
national governments in developing countries have begun to realise that the 
concentration of activities and population in a few leading cities and the resultant 
deterioration in living conditions in them are serious threats to the achievement of 
their stated development goals.
Concentration of urban population in large urban agglomerations; especially those in 
developing countries in Asia and Africa such as Bombay, Tehran, Jakarta, Cairo, and 
Lagos; have resulted in many serious problems at both local and regional levels. At 
the national level, many of these settlements have grown to form large urban 
agglomerations of multimillion inhabitants. Controlling or managing the growth of 
such large urban agglomeration is far beyond the capacity of developing countries.
Consequently, all these countries suffer serious imbalances in the distribution of urban
population at the national level. In Egypt, the Greater Cairo Region grew rapidly to
reach more than 12 million inhabitants in 1994, which was more than 45 percent of the 
national urban population (Yousry and Aboul Atta 1997). In 2003, 51 percent of the 
country’s urban population were in only 2 large cities of over a million people in size: 
Greater Cairo (Cairo, Giza, Shubra Al-Khaymah) and Alexandria. In a situation like 
this, urban growth is very hard, if not impossible, to control, as the in-migration from 
both rural and other urban settlements from all over the country is very high. 
Countries in this situation suffer high economic and social regional disparities. These 
disparities, which are usually in favour of large urban agglomeration, if not controlled, 
will further intensify the in-migration process. Therefore, urban decentralisation at the 
regional level is expected to be highly effective in controlling these disparities and 
consequently in managing urban development in these countries.
At the local level, and for reasons of scale and intensity, large urban centres in 
developing countries suffer serious problems; such as traffic congestion, urban
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unemployment, shelter deficiency, increasing pollution and urban decay, and 
inadequate infrastructure, social facilities, and management capacity. These increasing 
problems supported the growing consensus about urban decentralisation towards 
smaller urban centres as an effective policy in managing urban development in 
developing countries (Simon 1997, Gilbert and Gugler 1992; Simon 1992; Drakakis- 
Smith 1993; Kasarda and Parnell 1993). However, urban decentralisation requires that 
out-migration from retarded rural and small urban settlements are to be kept to 
minimum. This requires the adoption of national development policies that minimize 
the economic and social development gaps between these retarded regions and the 
large metropolitan centres.
El-Shakhs (1997) argues that the increasing concentration and dominance in many 
African urban systems are accompanied by mounting problems, diseconomies, and 
disparities. The resulting dissatisfactions as well as opportunities spurred efforts by 
both the private sector and governments towards decentralization and counter-primacy 
measures. These efforts came in a variety of forms, ranging from administrative 
decentralization and strengthening local governments to radical measures such as the 
building of a new capital in Nigeria or the new desert cities in Egypt. As these 
processes pick up momentum, the real or perceived advantages of primate cities may 
tend to become less and less compelling, and smaller and medium-sized cities may 
become more and more attractive to migrants and to capital.
In addition to the advantages of urban decentralisation in minimising and controlling 
the problems in large urban concentrations, such an approach has many advantages at 
both regional and national levels. First dispersed urbanisation, especially towards 
desert and remote regions, would foster the regional development activities and 
facilitates the utilisation of the national natural resources. Second, urban 
decentralisation would minimise the expansion of large urban concentrations on the 
limited agriculture land, especially when we know that the urban growth in Egypt
consumes about 40,000 acres of the prime agricultural land each year, and that during 
the past two decades alone, urban sprawl consumed more than 30 per cent of that land 
(Said, R. 2000). Third, dispersed urbanisation is expected to minimise the acute
regional disparities in many of the developing countries and to ensure the dispersion
of investments and services to the retarded regions (Van den Berg, 1998; Krakover,
1986; Sonis, 1978). This is expected to minimise the out-migration of the skilled and 
more-educated personnel from these regions.
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6.1.2 Arguments Against Urban Decentralisation
Criticism of urban decentralisation is largely based on the alleged failure of the “other 
half’ concept of Howard’s case for decentralisation as older and inner parts of large 
urban areas continue to suffer many problems and as the conditions for non-movers 
did not improve as it is expected. Such problems have been described as the state of 
“multiple deprivation” in the “inner city” (Coursey 1977, 14). There is an increasing 
consensus of opinion that social problems are mainly concentrated in large cities and 
particularly in their inner areas (Shelter 1972, p. 15). For inner areas in large urban 
centres, urban decentralisation is seen to have increased public welfare costs arising 
from the increasing concentration of socially disadvantaged, increased urban service 
costs per head and spare infrastructure capacity owing to the combination of fixed 
overheads and falling population (Power and Mumford 1999; Eversley 1970, 1972; 
Stone, 1975) Urban decentralisation is also seen to be the cause of these problems as it 
facilitates the inner city to lose the successful population and activities and to retain 
ever-higher proportions of those requiring support.
However, it is also argued that urban concentration is necessary for economic growth 
and the development of economies of scale. This argument is based on the fact that 
urbanisation level and economic growth go hand-in-hand in developing countries. But 
this argument neglects that urbanisation could be distributed in a number of small 
settlements instead of being concentrated in a large one. And the point is that some
sort of balance in using resources is to be achieved. Resources should not be spread
too thinly/evenly across cities with insufficient concentration in certain cities to 
exploit the economies of scale in production which were cited above, nor be over­
concentrated in one or two excessively large cities. The implication is that there is an 
optimal degree of urban concentration, and that both over and under- concentration is 
very costly in terms of economic efficiency and national growth rates (Henderson 
2000, 2).
Moreover, it is argued that the resources allocated to assist decentralisation are pre­
empting resources required for the pressing tasks of urban renewal. In a similar vein, 
the Greater London Council (GLC) accepted a recommendation to slow down the 
development programmes of new towns around London and to divert the saved 
resources to urban renewal in London (GLC 1975). Similarly, Stone (1975, 189) 
argued that it may be necessary to reduce or even phase out the growth area policy and
to allocate the resources freed to improving the standard of the built environment and
services in older and larger cities.
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Although such arguments against urban decentralisation are important and require 
more attention, the majority of the problems claimed to be associated with urban 
decentralisation are in fact a direct result of decentralisation processes that focus only 
at local level without addressing the regional dimensions of these problems. In many 
cases, such as the case of Cairo, while urban decentralisation efforts have been 
successful in relocating a large number of city population out the city core and other 
deprived areas, a larger number of in-migration from other regions are accumulating 
in these deprived areas. This situation supports the argument that the proposed urban 
decentralisation approach would be more effective if it addresses local urban problems 
within their regional and national context.
Moreover, these arguments focus mainly on urban problems at the local level and
neglect the numerous advantages of urban decentralisation on both the regional and 
national levels. While only urban cores of large urban areas have claimed to be 
disadvantaged by the decentralisation process, many medium and small-size cities in 
rural areas have benefited from this process. Without urban decentralisation, urban 
cores would have deteriorated more as population density could have been higher and 
urban renewal programmes could have been less efficient and more expensive.
6.1.3 Technology as an Enabler for Urban Decentralisation
Many urban studies argue that technological achievements have significantly 
influenced the distribution of urban population. This argument is mainly based on the 
experience that all countries of the industrial world have shown a considerable degree 
of urban decentralisation while countries in the developing world are still experiencing 
growing trends of urban centralisation. The comparative analysis of the relationship 
between technology level and prevailing patterns of urbanisation in both the
developed and developing countries, presented in section 4.4, has confirmed this
argument. The rapid advancements of modem technology have supported the 
argument that while the technology of the Industrial Age has fostered urban
concentration and the emergence of large metropolitan areas, technologies of the 
Information Age are expected to promote urban decentralisation activities.
The logic of the expected changes towards urban decentralisation is based, to a great 
extent, on the experience gained with the previous 'spatial technology', namely the 
automobile, the railways, and telecommunications. During the twentieth century the 
automobile substituted the horse-drawn carriage, and to some extent also rail lines, 
and thus substantially enabled people to expand their choice of residential location 
(Muller 1986, 24). In the United States, and to a lesser, but significant degree in 
Europe, the sprawl into the suburban bedroom communities was followed by a
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suburbanisation of retail and employment, escaping the growing congestion and the 
increasing blight of central cities. Edge cities are one consequence of this centrifugal 
force which pushes first residences and then retail, employment and leisure activities 
out of the central city of the metropolis (Garreau 1991). Large metropolitan areas 
spread even further into what is becoming known as “exurbia”, where physical 
amenities of rural settings can be combined with urban production and particularly 
consumption patterns (UNCHS-Habitat 1995).
Brochie, Newton, Hall, and Nijkamp (1985, 12) have studied the role of technology in 
the spatial diffusion of urbanisation. They argue that technology affects the dispersion 
of urban activities and the interactions between them. Their argument is based on the 
idea that the dispersal of non-residential activities may be measured by their mean
distance from the urban centre or by the number of dispersed centres within the
metropolitan area, and the dispersal of interactions may be measured by the mean flow
distance. They expressed these two parameters as the two axes of a graph, 
representing an activity-versus-interaction space (Figure 6.1). The triangle ABC 
represents the feasible limits of that space. Point C represents pre-industrial or low 
urban technology (non-motorised travel) and low density concentration. Point A 
represents the extreme of concentrated industrial technology, supported by public and
private radial mass transport systems, and high-rise buildings. It represents the 
industrial society and its organisational structure, dependence, hierarchies, 
concentration, limited choice, representative democracy and institutional help. Point B 
represents an urban system that is based on information technology in which dispersed 
activities interact electronically -  the fully interconnected, wired city. It represents the 
information society, interdependence, networks, diversity and participatory 
democracy. Point C represents pre-industrial or the alternative society, independence, 
Tow tech’ or ‘high touch’, self-help and the informal sector (Brochie et al 1985, 13).
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5 - A bso lu te  decen tra lisa tio n
Source: Brochie, J. et al 1985, p. 12 
Figure 6.1: Technology and the Spatial Dimensions of Urban development
According to their suggested trajectory of the urban system over time, early stages of 
metropolitan development are accompanied by a movement inwards, or concentration. 
The later industrial and post-industrial development stages are accompanied by an 
outwards movement. They suggest that information-based industries will move 
towards B, especially where interactions are primarily electronic. They argue that this
movement may be slowed by the need for some of these industries to retain ‘high
touch’, face-to-face interaction for transactions needing trust. Material- and energy- 
based industries, too, are expected to take a lower trajectory, especially when the
interactions are largely energy-based, and when the movement of heavy materials is 
involved. Therefore, they argue that changes occurring in a society and its urban 
systems as a consequence of the information revolution are by no means similar or 
unidirectional, but on the contrary, they are diverse, profound and multifaceted 
(Brochie et al 1985, 13). In their study of land-use and transport interactions Mackett 
and Lodwick (1985, 254) acknowledged the argument of Brochie, Newton, Hall, and
Nijkamp (1985) calling their graph (shown in Figure 6.1) an “urban technological 
triangle”.
The previous analysis of urban impacts of different technology sectors (presented in 
Chapter 3) demonstrates that these technologies could facilitate urban decentralisation. 
For transportation technologies, Peter Hall (1970) asserted that there is a close 
interrelationship between the available forms of urban transport and the form of urban 
growth. Pacione (2001, p.248) stressed that the development of railways and trams 
during the nineteenth century was crucial in separating home and workplace,
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encouraging functional specialization of land uses in the city. Also, Many urban 
experts such as Hall 1993, Pacione 2001, Herbert and Thomas 1997, Hart 2001, argue 
that transportation technologies of the Post-Industrial era would facilitate population 
deconcentration, post-suburbanisation - the emergence of edge cities -  on the local 
level, and would promote urban decentralisation and diffusion of settlements on the 
regional level (table 3.2, Chapter 3).
For telecommunications technologies, and almost thirty years ago, Manuel Palao and 
Garcia-Suelto (1975) emphasised the regional impacts of telecommunications and 
argued that ICTs would contribute to physical decentralisation. They argued that new 
ways of using ICTs should be found both to ease problems of city congestion and to 
improve the quality of life in rural areas. In a similar vein, Roger Pye and Thomas, H. 
(1976) confirmed that telecommunications were extremely important in decisions 
about office relocation. They were perceived to be important by managers responsible 
for such decisions. Office workers who were relocated from some firms in London 
had fewer meetings, even before relocation, than was typical. After relocation, many 
meetings had to be retained with people in London and the costs of the travel could 
negate the other considerable costs savings that might be obtained on relocation 
especially if this was to a site outside the South East of England. In view of the large 
potential of telecommunications as a substitute for travel, they expected that
telecommunications would be a powerful instrument to encourage relocation. 
However the research also showed that the use of telecommunications would, on its 
own, only encourage more offices to relocate to the area around London. Relocation to 
other regions, especially to those less developed, would be assisted through the use of 
telecommunications only if there were policies promoting this movement (Pye and 
Thomas 1976, 92).
Many recent studies have supported the previous arguments of Manuel Palao and
Garcia-Suelto (1975), and Roger Pye (1979). Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson 
(1997, 95) argue that the rapid advances in communications technologies would 
facilitate the movement out of cities that the automobile had initiated. They argue that 
today's cities will continue to become less compact and the city of the future will be
anything but compact. Many other studies argue that technology will eliminate the
need for cities as centres of interaction (Moss and Townsend 2000, 32; UNCHS- 
Habitat 1995; Caimcross 1997, 18). Nicholas Negroponte (1996, 165) and Wheeler et 
al (2000, 3) argue that the post-information age will remove the limitations of 
geography. Digital living will be less and less dependent upon being in a specific 
place at a specific time, and the transmission of place itself will start to become 
possible. Even the concept of the "edge city," is an indication of how both 
transportation and communication technologies are considered as forces that have
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fostered the out-migration of work and housing from the central city (Moss and 
Townsend 2000, 32).
Similarly, future achievements of both renewable energies and urban utilities 
technologies are expected to facilitate urban decentralisation as they offer economic 
alternatives to overcome energy and utilities problems in remote and rural areas. 
Clearly, these technologies add more freedom in locating urban development projects 
and allow them not to be strictly located near electricity grids or water and sanitary 
stations (see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.3).
6.1.4 An Appraisal o f Urban Decentralisation in Egypt
Although policymakers in Egypt, as in all the developing countries, claim to have 
adopted of urban decentralisation, it seems that such approach have been applied only
at the local level. The analysis provided in section 5.2.1 clearly demonstrates that
government efforts mainly focused on alleviating urban problems of primate and large 
cities of the country.
The three ‘generations’ of new towns in Egypt were built around very close to these 
large cities. The sequence of these ‘generations’ has been in accordance with urban
concentration level of these cities. Cities of the first generation were built in 1977 
around Cairo and Alexandria. In this generation, three independent cities (10th of 
Ramadan, Sadat, 6th of October) and four satellite cities of smaller sizes (15th May, 
New Damietta, New Burj El-Arab, and Al-Salehia) were built. The second generation 
consists of five cities of smaller sizes; of which two are around Cairo (Al-Obour and 
Badr), one near Alexandria (Nobaria), and two in the North Upper Egypt Region 
(New Bani-Suef and New Minia). The third generation consists of three cities in South 
Upper Egypt (New Assuit, New Souhaj, and New Aswan) and ten urban centres 
around Cairo. All cities built in both North and South Upper Egypt regions were in 
fact very close to the main large cities of these regions. This shows that the adopted 
urban policy was mainly focusing on alleviating the urban problems of these large 
cities through displacing some their population to these new satellite towns. Therefore, 
these new towns may have been successful in attracting some of the local population, 
but they did not significantly correct the regional problem of urban concentration in
Egypt. This is mainly because building the majority of these cities around Cairo and
Alexandria has opened many new housing and job opportunities in these cities and
increased their attractiveness to both rural and urban population of other regions. As a 
result, and during 1986-1996 period, the GCR and the urban govemorates of 
Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez were the main target for population migration with
net in-migration of about 1.056 million people in their urban centres and about
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388,000 people in their rural areas. This is while the Delta and Upper Egypt regions 
have lost about 840,000 and 685,000 of their urban population. The highest percentage 
population loss was in the Upper Egypt region that lost about 17 percent of its urban 
population during that period.
This analysis, in addition to the analysis of migration streams of urban population in 
Egypt presented in section 5.2.1.3, clearly demonstrate that the adopted urban 
decentralisation policy was mainly at the local level with limited effect at the regional 
level.
6.1.5 Urban Decentralisation: Approach Assessment
Through reviewing the literature about urban impacts of technology and urban
decentralisation and through the analysis of urban problems in Egypt, it becomes clear
that urban decentralisation would be an effective approach for overcoming mounting 
problems of urban population concentration in developing countries. In a further step 
to assess the appropriateness and applicability of urban decentralisation, the thesis will 
survey the opinions of both technology and urban development experts about such 
approach through the forecasting survey presented in the next three chapters.
In doing so, the forecasting survey investigates several points of considerable
importance for examining the appropriateness and applicability of the urban 
decentralisation approach. First, the research surveys the opinions and expectations of 
urban development experts about the appropriateness of such approach and the
possibility of future technological achievements (transportation, telecommunications, 
renewable energy, and utilities) to facilitate its application. Second, the research
surveys the expectations of urban experts about whether these technologies would 
promote local or regional decentralisation of urban population. Therefore, urban 
experts are asked about their expectations regarding the movement of urban
population at both the local and regional levels, and about the location of future urban 
settlements. Through these questions, and others concerning the size and function of 
these settlements and the changing home and work environments, it is expected that 
the thesis will come to a clear idea about the suitability and applicability of urban
decentralisation approach for managing urban activities in developing countries.
Third, the research surveys the expectations of urban experts about the future impacts 
of technology on the future size and function of existing settlements.
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6.2 SMALL-SIZE URBAN SETTLEMENT
Because of the rapid increase in the size of large urban settlements in developing 
countries, especially in Egypt where about half of the country’s urban population is 
concentrated in two cities only, and because of the mounting problems associated with 
this phenomenon, the research proposes the small-size settlement approach as an 
appropriate approach for managing the future of urban development in developing 
countries. This argument is based on the idea that the recent and the expected 
technological achievements would be in favour of small-size settlements. In 
investigating the rationale of this argument, the research adopts the following four- 
stages process. First, it sheds light on the expected advantages of small-size 
settlements and the declining attractiveness of large ones. Second, it investigates the 
possible role of technology as an enabler of such approach in developing countries. 
Third, it presents an appraisal for the application of the small-settlements approach in 
Egypt. Fourth, it analyses the methods used by the research in assessing the 
importance and applicability of such approach.
Although settlement size may be defined by area or by population, and for the purpose 
of this study, the thesis uses the population size as a measure of the settlement size 
because population and settlement size is usually linked in urban studies. In addition, 
population data is more available and more credible.
6.2.1 Arguments for Small-Size Urban Settlements
Thirty-eight years ago, Constantinos Doxiadis (1965, 6) predicted the emergence of
the ‘E c u m e n o p o lis in the second part of the 21st century. However, he stressed the
values that small cities have for their own inhabitants, for those in big cities, and for
the world population and civilisation. Regarding their values for their own inhabitants, 
he argued that if they provide shelter, employment and community life of a quality 
that is not available in big cities, then they do have a great value for their inhabitants. 
Concerning their value for the population of big cities, he argues that this is due not 
only to the services they provide to big cities, especially as centres of primary 
production, but also due to the fact that small cities preserve human values which are 
gradually being lost within big cities. Finally, and concerning their value for the entire 
population and civilisation, he argues that this is due to the fact that we all depend on a 
complicated system of enormous number of human settlements, ranging from the
largest to the smallest ones, and it is not possible to allow any part of that system to
1 E cum en opolis is the Universal City that is predicted by Constantinos Doxiadis to emerge as dynamic cities are 
gradually going to be interconnected into a continuous network of built-up areas which in the second half o f the 21st 
century is expected to cover the entire earth with a net-like city having a probable population of about 10-30 billion 
people.
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disintegrate without endangering our possibilities for survival. Moreover, he posed an 
important question: how do we know that big cities can survive without the small 
ones? And argued that this has never happened before and that we are not allowed to 
let it happen without being aware of its repercussions to our welfare.
Currently, the role of small-size settlements in regional development constitutes an 
important subject of debate. Numerous studies have confirmed the importance of this 
size-category in attaining economic growth and in developing more balanced urban 
systems. The academic opinions differ regarding the possible contribution of small- 
size settlements to the spread of modernisation, their impact on the development of the 
rural areas, their functioning as service centres, and their role in damming the rural 
exodus (Hinderink and Titus 2002, 379). However, the conventional wisdom of 
regional planners and policy-makers is that small towns play an essential role as 
regional service centres in rural hinterland development through direct production 
linkages and ‘spread’ and ‘trickling down’ effects. In this argument, the reinforcement 
of the small town production and institutional structures not only contributes directly 
to rural and regional development, but also is seen as a necessary condition 
(Rondinelli 1988, 1991; Evans 1992; Gaile 1992, 133).
The role of this size-category of settlements is widely recognised as vital for economic 
growth and restructuring the regional and national urban systems. This is, in part, 
because of the recognition that a considerable proportion of the world’s population 
live in them. In 2000, over half the world’s urban population and a quarter of its total 
population lived in urban centres of less than half a million inhabitants (UN, World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, 172). Much of this population was in 
market towns and administrative centres with between 5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants 
(Satterthwaite, D. and Tacoli, C. 2003, 1). Also in 2000, more than three-fifths of 
urban population of Africa, the Caribbean and Southeastern Asia were in urban 
centres with less than half a million inhabitants (as was also the case in Europe) (UN, 
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, 173-180). This is despite the fact 
that in many nations, there is an underestimation of the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas, especially in small centres, as they adopt higher population 
thresholds for considering settlements as urban1.
In addition to the fact that the high percentage of population living in small 
settlements in almost all countries proves that this size-category of settlements have
JF o r exam ple, b y  1996, 17 .5  p e rc e n t o f  E g y p t’s  to ta l p o p u la tio n  liv e d  in se ttlem en ts o f  be tw een  1 0 ,0 0 0  a n d  2 0 ,0 0 0  
inhabitan ts th a t h a d  m an y urban ch arac teris tics , in clu d ing  sign ifica n t n o n -a g ricu ltu ra l eco n o m ies a n d  
occu p a tio n a l structures. These se ttlem en ts a re  n o t c la ss if ie d  a s  urban  a re a s  (Sa tter th w a ite  a n d  T aco li 2 003 , 8). I f  
E g y p t a d o p te d  the Indian  defin ition  o f  urban se ttlem en ts (as com m u n ities o f  m ore than  5 ,0 0 0  inhabitan ts), a ro u n d  
8 0  p e r c e n t o f  E g y p t ’s  p o p u la tio n  w o u ld  be urban or, a n d  i f  a d o p te d  the P h ilip p in es defin ition , 1 0 0  p e r c e n t w o u ld  
b e  urban  (B aya t a n d  D en is  2000 , 192; M o rico n i 1995).
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some qualities that enabled them to attract and sustain this huge number of population 
worldwide, there are many recent studies that identified the advantages and the 
potentials of these settlements. Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2003, 12) stressed the 
potential role of small and intermediate urban centres for rural and regional 
development. They argue that these settlements increase rural agricultural incomes by 
acting as centres of demand and market nodes for agricultural produce from the rural 
region. In addition, they argue that small settlements reduce costs and improve access 
to a range of public and private services and goods from within and outside their 
region by acting as centres for the production and distribution of goods and services to 
their rural region. Also, they could reach these objectives through function as centres 
for the growth and consolidation of non-farm activities and employment for rural 
residents and through the development of small and medium-sized enterprises or 
through the relocation of branches of large private or public enterprises. Moreover, 
they argue that this size-category of settlements is effective in attracting rural migrants 
from the surrounding region through demand for non-farm labour and thereby 
decreases pressure on larger urban centres.
In addition to their environmental qualities that are of increasing interest for large 
proportion of large urban centres residents, technological achievements especially in 
areas of telecommunications and transport technologies have significantly increased 
the attractiveness of small urban settlements. These technologies have made life in 
these settlements more attractive as they made them more physically accessible and 
virtually connected with the rest of their region and country. Moreover, these 
technologies have introduced in these settlements many of the formerly large- 
settlements’ services, mainly entertainment, shopping, and education. Moreover, the 
emergence and the growth of telework activities have made these settlements more 
attractive to a wide variety of new businesses.
In the light of these advantages, the proposed small-size settlements approach is 
expected to be an effective tool for the adjustment of the urban national and regional 
imbalances for many reasons. First, and because of dispersed nature of existing rural 
settlements in Egypt, small-size settlements are expected to be more efficient in 
meeting the socio-economic needs of the small clusters of rural and urban settlements. 
Second, these small-size settlements can easily fit within, and adapted to, the regional 
settings of existing urban and rural settlements. Small-size settlements offer better 
chances for the incremental development and the continuous evaluation and 
reassessment of the approach’s effectiveness and suitability. A matter that is not 
achievable with large-size settlements, as is the case in Egypt where a bundle of large 
settlements were built in a form of what is know as First, Second, and Third 
“generations”. Such adopted policy in Egypt, in addition to the facts that it increased
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regional imbalances and that the occupancy rate in almost all of these large
settlements are very low1, the resultant problems on the long run are expected to be 
very hard, if not impossible, to correct. Third, small-size settlements are expected to
facilitate the implementation of the proposed urban decentralisation and incremental
planning and development approaches, as it would facilitate the dispersion of urban 
population to a larger number of settlements that could be built according the need. 
More important, small-size settlements are easier to manage and suit the management 
capacity of developing countries.
In addition, Gerald Dix (1986, 274) argues that the main advantage of small cities lies 
in the possibility of developing in them a sense of identity, a feeling of belonging and 
participation among residents, a corporate spirit and outlook covering the whole 
population. Such qualities may make government easier and encourage civic 
development initiatives. On the other hand, he forewarns that if these small
settlements grow too quickly they can easily suffer many of the disadvantages of 
metropolises without ever enjoying their advantages.
These arguments coincide with the ideas of Constantinos Doxiadis (1965, 7) that 
stress the necessity to give back, to the existing small cities, and develop, in the new 
ones, the original and fundamental qualities of small cities. To achieve these qualities, 
he recommends some important actions that can be summarised in the following three 
points. First we must give back to small cities the human scale which they are tending 
to lose by imitating the big ones. Second, is to keep natural resources intact, as the 
beauty of landscape and intact non-spoiled nature are the basic recourses of small 
cities. Third, that we should physically develop small-cities in a way that minimise 
transport, organise their functions in order to provide the best services to all members 
of the community, and to give them an architectural scale and to improve their 
esthetical values.
All of these arguments and views confirm the important role of small cities as a tool 
for economic growth and correcting the regional urban imbalances. Also, they 
demonstrate that the proposed small-size settlement approach could be of considerable 
importance for urban development in developing countries.
However, defining the optimum size for the small city is still an important issue. In 
connection to Henderson’s argument (2000, 2) that both over and under- concentration 
is very costly in terms of economic efficiency and national growth rates, and although 
defining an optimum size for the future urban settlement is a hard task and depends on
1 The occu p a n cy  ra te  in a ll  new  c itie s  a ro u n d  C airo, w h ich  is the h igh est am o n g  a ll  o th er n ew  c itie s  in the co u n try  
a n d  a fte r  a b o u t 2 5  y e a r s  o f  th eir construction , is  le ss  than 10  p e rc e n t f o r  the f iv e  se ttlem en ts w ith  ta rg e t p o p u la tio n  
o f 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 -5 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; a n d  65  p e rc e n t f o r  the 15th o f  M a y  c ity  ( ta rg e t p o p u la tio n  o n ly  100 ,000), w h ich  is in f a c t  a  
p a r t  o f  G rea te r  C a iro  R egion. (See: Sutton, K. a n d  Fahm i, W. 2 001; S tew art, D . 1996; C A P M A S  1996; a n d  D en is, 
E. 1999).
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the socio-economic conditions and the development level of each country or a region, 
defining a certain minimum size, however, is a useful criterion. Waugh (1968) 
suggests that a community of 6,000 is the minimum size needed to constitute a 
suburban area, since at that size there will be sufficient services to justify recognition 
as a separate entity. The suburb is seen therefore as a particular kind of central place, 
yet its service function is unimportant and for some areas of less than 6,000 local 
services exist. Because of the high level of car ownership of the newcomers to these 
areas, further development of local services has often been unnecessary (Connell 
1974).
In confirmation with these arguments, many countries use smaller number of 
population as a threshold for settlements to be considered as urban1. A recent and 
valuable study, prepared for the Irish Environmental Protection Agency, that 
investigates the key links between the size of settlements and their sustainability, has 
recommended some smaller and some larger sizes as well. It recommends that a 
minimum population threshold level of 1000-2000 enhances viability for a primary 
school, some local services and centralised sewage treatment. Also, a settlement with 
15,000-30,000 people enables a secondary school, public and commercial services, 
and some environmental infrastructure. More important, it recommends that a 
development pattern with settlement sizes in the 1000-2000 and 20,000-30,000 
population bands clustered around public transport nodes is likely to be most 
sustainable (Richard Moles, R. et al 2000, viii).
In addition to the size, settlement shape and density are strategic factors in 
determining its sustainability. Although the thesis recommends that these two points 
should be thoroughly investigated as important areas of future research, it tries to 
introduce an initial investigation about the expected impacts of these two factors. 
Regarding the population density, which was and still an area of extensive debate, 
there are two main arguments: the dispersed and the compact city. The claimed 
advantages of the compact city have been well documented. Conservation of the 
countryside, less car travel and associated emissions, better support for public 
transport and walking and cycling, increased access to services and facilities, more 
efficient utility and infrastructure provision, and the revitalisation and regeneration of 
inner urban areas are the main sustainability advantages of the compact settlement 
pattern (Burton, 2000). However, even compact city advocates recognise that the 
evidence to support sustainability claims are complex and often contradictory (Guy 
and Marvin, 2000). Moreover, some side-effects of intensification have been 
highlighted, including loss of greenery in towns and increased environmental wear and
1 U rban  p o p u la tio n  th resh o ld  is on ly  2 0 0  in D en m ark  a n d  Sw eden, 1 ,0 0 0  in C an a d a  (H erb ert a n d  T hom as 1997), 
2 5 0 0  in the U.S. (G ibson , C. 1998), 5 0 0 0  in India, a n d  less  than th a t in the P h ilip p in es (B a ya t a n d  D e n is  2000).
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tear (Williams 2000). However, and despite its all disadvantages, compact city is seen 
the best urban form for countries of arid desert climates, such as Egypt (Golany 1980; 
Pearlmutter 2000). Regarding the settlement shape, “shape” usually refers to the 
moncentric or polycentric form of the city physical structure. Although each of these 
two patterns has its own advantages and disadvantages, and because of the small size 
of proposed city and to go with recommendation of the compact city, it seems that the 
monocentric shape could be the most suitable for the future city in developing 
countries.
6.2.2 Declining Attractiveness o f Large Urban Settlements
A vast literature, old and new, testifies to the crisis of large cities expressed in high
ratings on the scales of noise, pollution, crime and some other undesired
characteristics. The old metropolitan cities of the industrial countries are becoming 
less attractive as places of residence and less adaptable to new businesses’
requirements (Alexander and Falk 1974, 87). Constantinos Doxiadis (1965, 5) made a 
strong statement about the security problems in big cities:
“For the first time in the human history it is safer to be in the countryside than in 
the city. In the past the safest place on earth was the centre o f the city; now it is the 
most dangerous both during the day and night”.
Moreover, population over-concentration in large cities increases commuting,
congestion, living costs to excessive levels, and the costs of production of goods.
Also, it lowers the quality of urban service provision and creates enormous regional
disparity problems (Henderson 2000, 2).
In the following sections (6.2.2.1-4), the thesis tries to reassess the traditional 
advantages of large urban settlements in the light of the increasing urban problems in 
developing countries and their increasing technological capabilities.
6.2.2.1 Agglomeration Economies Old Arguments
One of the main arguments for the existence and development of large cities is the 
notion of agglomeration economies. These economies were of considerable advantage 
for production that derive from the spatial proximity of producers of goods and 
services in an interrelated economy. Through agglomeration, producers reduce the 
transportation costs of moving goods from one firm or stage of the production process 
to another or from the factory to the customer. The agglomeration economy argument 
works well in explaining the development of the great industrial urban centres in the 
U.S. and Europe during the late 19th and early 20th century. In the production of 
durable goods (automobiles, appliances, etc.) it was advantageous for producers to 
congregate. Such agglomeration economies were also viewed to be advantageous in
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the service sector, where face-to-face contact through physical proximity served to cut 
costs and foster the more rapid spread of ideas (Speare and White 1990).
Many economists argue that technological advances of the twentieth century have 
chipped away at agglomeration economies. Transport achievements including road 
improvements and the shift toward truck from railroad car, and most recently the 
development of high-speed electronic communication have worked in this direction. 
They were effective in promoting suburbanisation and then enabling movement to 
even lower density settings, including smaller urban areas and rural communities. 
Now an organization far from a major metropolis can instantly access the financial 
markets and other sources of news and information, just as it can deliver that
information quickly and electronically. For all these reasons many of the so-called 
back offices of major financial institutions moved out of the high rent downtown areas 
to suburban or exurban locations (Speare and White 1990; Marsal 2002).In addition to 
economies of agglomeration, there also exist diseconomies of agglomeration, mainly 
the increased costs or disadvantages associated with higher density and proximity. 
Congestion costs are the most frequently mentioned of these. Although proximity
should reduce the cost of delivering goods and services by decreasing the length of 
transport needed, traffic, the bane of the urbanite’s daily travel routine, is perhaps the 
most obvious congestion cost. Recent data from U.S. censuses indicate that workers in 
larger metropolitan areas spend a longer time getting to work than that in smaller 
urban areas. Much of this difference is due to congestion; the remainder is due to the 
greater physical distance to be covered in a larger, more agglomerated urban area
(Speare and White 1990; Camagni et al 1995).
Although there is an apparent consensus in favour of small-size settlements, there
appears to be no consensus on an exact optimum value for city population. Social
scientists have tried to estimate the magnitudes and effects of agglomeration
economies and diseconomies but no concrete results have been reached as it is very 
difficult to disentangle the "true" effects of agglomeration on industrial productivity, 
congestion and pollution (Speare and White 1990).
In 1985, an attempt to estimate the impact of recent changes in agglomeration
economies on large industries in the USA had found that the productivity advantages
of large cities have declined (Moomaw 1985, 73). In 1986, another study using
industrial data from the United States and Brazil found that economies of scale in
manufacturing were more due to localization (being near related activity) rather than 
to urbanization (size of place) (Henderson 1986, 47). Productivity improvement rose 
with size of place, but then declined. In 2000, Vernon Henderson, using a panel of 80- 
100 countries every 5 years from 1960 to 1995, concluded that productivity
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advantages decline with the increase of the size of primate cities. If technological 
change continues along the same line as it has in recent years, then any productivity 
advantage of large urban areas will continue to dissipate (Speare and White 1990).
There are many studies that tried to assess the costs and benefits of increasing city 
sizes. The empirical work of Tolley et al (1979), for example, suggests that the social 
marginal costs of increasing population in large or over-sized cities exceed the 
marginal benefits. Richardson (1987, p.561) argues, based on his work on Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, that the social investment costs of absorbing an extra
family in typical large urban areas are threefold that of rural areas, and even more for
the largest city in a country. As related evidence on private costs, the UN data for 
1996 on metro area rents and commuting costs for a sample of 80-100 cities across 15- 
20 countries world-wide, suggest that, if urban area sizes increase from 25,000 to 2.5 
million, commuting and rent costs each rise by 115 percent (Henderson 1999). This 
literature tends to presume that the social marginal benefits of moving a family to 
large urban areas do not justify the various costs (Henderson 2000, 3).
It is claimed that more sparse development patterns result in higher public services
costs, as more miles of sewers and roads are needed. Although higher costs might be
associated with lower densities if infrastructure costs were the dominant factor in 
public service budgets, there are a number of reasons why the reality differs from the
theory on urban costs. Operating costs, not infrastructure costs, represent more than 60
percent of most local government budgets, and those costs tend to be much higher in 
the more dense central cities (Ladd 1992, 273; Cox 1997). Moreover, the larger,
denser local government units tend to have larger bureaucracies and their political 
processes are more susceptible to special interest control, which usually tend to 
increase costs (Cox 1999).
6.2.2.2 Environmental Costs of Large Urban Concentrations
At the international level, urbanization's effect on the global environment is very 
important. Large, modernizing cities are often referred to as "heat centres" and blamed 
for contributing to the destruction of the ozone layer. Although motor vehicles are the 
primary cause of pollution in cities, the increased demand for energy to run air 
conditioning and electrical appliances is contributing to pollution in many cities. 
Producing such energy often involves burning fossil fuels, which releases such
greenhouse gases. These emissions are seen to lead to global warming, which can 
cause climate change, rising sea-levels, changes in vegetation, and severe weather 
events. Oxides of sulphur and nitrogen emitted to the atmosphere from cities have led 
to acid rain that have killed lakes and forests in North America and Northern Europe 
(Brockerhoff 2000).
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Speare and White (1990) argue that large population concentration usually requires 
higher costs per person for the maintenance of clean water and the safe removal of 
garbage. Air quality, in particular, may be difficult to maintain at high population 
densities if there is not a natural flow of air through the area. Some cities, such as Los 
Angeles, have difficult problems dealing with air quality because air is often trapped.
Smaller cities are seen to have three advantages in dealing with the environment 
problems. First because of their smaller size and typically lower density, they have 
less concentration of pollutants to deal with. Second, because they have a smaller and 
often more homogeneous population, they may have an easier time mobilizing support 
for programs to regulate and reduce pollution (Speare and White 1990). Third. 
because of their small size, their environmental problems could be better managed and 
controlled by local governments in developing countries.
6.2.2.3 The Social Costs of Urban Scale
Although much of the attention of literature on the costs and benefits of urbanization 
has focused on economic criteria, social costs are extremely important. These include 
the relative distribution of income and other resources for urban areas, crime, anti­
social behaviour, and racial and ethnic conflict.
Regarding income distribution, there is a growing belief that the rich are richer and the 
poor are poorer in large cities compared to smaller ones. Using data on income 
distribution for the 79 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, Speare and White (1990) found 
that there is a relation between income inequality and the settlement size. In Europe, 
similar conclusions have been reached using data about Swedish cities (Gustafsson 
and Johansson 2000, 22). Although, these studies showed a modest relationship, they 
do suggest that the distribution of income is more unequal in larger metropolitan areas 
(Speare and White 1990). In large metropolitan areas, costs of living are usually 
higher, and therefore an equivalent amount of money may provide less in terms of 
goods and services compared to a rural area or a small city. In addition, large cities are 
widely known as sites of more crime, personal danger, and other deviant behaviour. 
Statistically, the rates of robbery and property crimes show the sharpest rise with 
urban size (Fischer 1988, 104). Moreover, the US Bureau of Justice Statistics showed 
that homicides were highest in large cities followed by the suburbs, small cities, and 
rural areas (US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001).
The recent wave of drug-related violence has been heavily concentrated in large cities. 
Moreover, racial and ethnic conflict is distinct in large cities, as urbanization brings 
into close proximity those of disparate backgrounds. Larger metropolises exhibit
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higher rates of segregations and ethnic antagonism becomes manifest in big-city 
politics, where the race of the candidate matters greatly (Speare and White 1990).
The increasing social problems in large cities and the wide-scale population 
deconcentration experienced in many large cities during 1970s evoked a lively debate 
on whether or not people were giving up the higher incomes and other benefits of 
large cities for the higher perceived quality of life in small towns and rural areas. 
Many studies of residential preferences over the past 40 years have consistently shown 
that many people who live in large cities prefer to live in smaller cities, towns or rural 
areas. However, most of those wishing to live in rural areas preferred them to be 
within 30 miles of a city of over 50,000 inhabitants (Fuguitt and Zuiches 1975, 491). 
What seems to be preferred is a relatively small scale for one's immediate residential 
surroundings, but, at the same time, with the availability of shopping, services, 
cultural and recreational opportunities associated with a metropolitan area (Filion et al 
1999, 1341; Speare and White 1990).
6.2.2.4 Large Cities and the Natural and Human-made Disasters
Vulnerability of large cities in facing both the natural and human-made disasters is a 
serious issue that usually overlooked in urban studies. Population concentration in 
large cities can exact a heavy death toll from natural disasters, as illustrated by 
Hurricane Mitch, which destroyed much of Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and other Central 
American cities in 1998, and by major earthquakes near Taipei, Taiwan, and Istanbul, 
Turkey, in 1999. Many cities of less developed countries are especially vulnerable to 
flooding and storm damage because they were established in coastal areas, along 
routes most suitable for trading (Brockerhoff 2000).
In addition to all the above-mentioned environmental drawbacks of large urban 
settlements, human-made threats especially weapons of mass-destruction and traffic 
accidents are serious threats to large cities. In the era of spread and proliferation of 
weapons of mass-destruction, having large cities or metropolitan agglomerations 
became a very serious strategic mistake. For a country like Egypt, having about 20 
percent of the country’s total population in a single location, such as Cairo, is really a 
serious problem. In a situation like this, population dispersion to a number of small- 
size settlements is the most effective and necessary measure. The same argument is 
valid for large-scale environmental hazards such as floods and earthquakes. On the 
other hand, Motor vehicles are a less sensational and yet a more significant 
environmental threat to urban residents. Vehicle fleet size in less developed countries 
has been growing exponentially (Newton and Manins 1999, 277). The International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1998) reported that by 2020, 
traffic accidents in urban areas are projected to be the third largest cause of death and
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disability in the world, ahead of war and infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS 
(Brockerhoff 2000).
6.2.3 W ill Technological Achievements Facilitate the Adoption o f Small-Size
Settlement Approach?
Throughout history, it is well documented that technology in its different forms and 
levels has affected the form and the size of urban settlements. In fact, technology was 
one of the driving forces that brought cities into existence. Before the Industrial 
revolution, city size was determined by the walking distance of human capacity or the 
animal they domesticated. Consequently, cities all over the world, both in the East and 
in the West, were relatively of similar size. By the Industrial Revolution, and the 
introduction of railways, tramways, and the automobile, cities grown very rapidly. At 
the start, this growth was very prominent in western countries where these 
technologies were developed. Then, and after developed countries had transferred 
these technologies to their colonies, cities in developing countries grew faster. The 
same argument could be drawn on other technologies, such as energy and 
infrastructure technologies.
During the last three decades, large cities in developed countries start to experience 
out-migration and deconcentration processes to the suburbs, the exurbs, and the rural 
communities. Such movement is seen to be highly facilitated by the influential new 
technologies, mainly transportation and telecommunication technologies. New 
transport technologies and the increasing population mobility and telecommunication 
technologies have facilitated the emergence of many teleactivities that minimise the 
need to live in large cities (Chapter 3). Also, recent developments in renewable solar 
and wind energies, making them more efficient and more economic, could facilitate 
settling areas that are away from the national grid. Also, the development of small 
water purification and sanitary treatment is expected to support this attitude.
6.2.4 An Appraisal o f the Application of Small-Settlements Approach in Egypt
The extensive analysis of the differential growth of different settlement sizes Egypt, 
presented in section 5.2.2, demonstrates that the proposed small-size settlement 
approach is not among the main objectives of urban development policy in Egypt. 
This is true for both old and new urban settlements in the country.
Regarding old cities, large urban agglomerations continue to dominate the distribution 
of urban population in Egypt. Although the share of primate cities (of more than 1 
million population) of total urban population has declined from 56.6 percent in 1976 
to 48.8 percent in 1996, it starts rising again and reached 51.1 percent in 2003. On the
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other hand, and while the urban population share of settlements of 100-500 thousand 
inhabitants has increased from 18.3 percent in 1976 to 23.6 in 2003 and the share of 
settlements of 20,000-99,999 inhabitants has increased from 19.8 percent in 1976 to 
22.7 in 2003, the share of smaller settlements of less than 20,000 inhabitants has
declined sharply from 5.1 percent to 0.6 in during the same period (table 5.3).
For the new cities, almost all of the 16 new cities are of large size. Four of these cities 
are of 500,000 target population and are located around Cairo, 7 are of 250,000 target 
population -  6 of them are located around Cairo, 2 are of 120,000 target population 
and are located in North Upper Egypt Region, 2 of 70,000 target population and 
located around Alexandria, and only 1 of 35,000 target population located in South
Upper Egypt Region.
On the other hand, the last 20 years have witnessed the dramatic spread of large 
villages (with 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) across the Egyptian countryside. Although 
these settlements are rural either regarding their lifestyle or the agricultural economic 
base, some studies have classified them as “urban villages” (Bayat and Denis 2000,
193). In 1996, urban villages of more than 10,000 people have increased in number
from only 400 in 1986 to about 628 in 1996. Moreover their share of the total
population has progressively increased from 3.2 percent in 1947 to 8 percent in 1976, 
and to 17.5 percent in 1996. This situation reflects the increasing attractiveness and 
competitiveness of this category of settlements. It also reflects the importance of this 
category of rural settlements in developing a more balanced urban system in Egypt 
and confirms Jamal Hamdan’s idea (1990) that “urbanism begins in the village”1.
6.2.5 Small-Size Urban Settlement: Approach Assessment
Although it has been clear through the literature review provided earlier and through 
the analysis of ever-increasing growth of large urban centres, as is the case of Egypt, 
that such approach could be appropriate for managing the urban future in developing 
countries, the thesis will further examine the suitability and applicability of such 
approach in these countries through the forecasting survey presented in the next three
chapters (7, 8 and 9). In doing so, the survey will investigate several points of
considerable importance in defining the size of future settlements. First, the survey
will ask both technology specialists and urban experts about the appropriateness of 
such approach and the possibility of future technological achievements (transportation, 
telecommunications, renewable energy, and utilities) to facilitate its application. 
Second, as settlement size depends mainly on its function, the research will enquire 
about the most probable future functions of new settlements. Third, the research will
1 J a m a l H am dan, the m o st p ro m in en t urban g eo g ra p h e r  in E gypt, a rg u es th a t the v illa g e  is the orig in  o f  the c i ty  a n d  
is the a n sw er to  m ost o f  its  p ro b le m s (H am dan, J. 1990).
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enquire about the possible ways for the provision of infrastructure (energy, water, and 
sanitation) and services (education, heath, entertainment, ... etc) in future settlements 
and the possible changes in work environment. Then, the research asks directly about 
the most appropriate size for future settlements in developing countries. Through these 
questions, it is expected that the thesis would come to a clear idea about the suitability 
and applicability of the small-size urban settlements approach in developing countries.
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6.3 INCREMENTAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN SETTLEMENTS
Because of the nature of this study aiming at forecasting the future impacts of 
technology on urban development in developing countries, and despite all the efforts 
made to precisely define these impacts, a number of uncertainties are still expected. 
These are: (1) uncertainties in defining the extent and the rate of future technological 
change in developing countries, (2) uncertainties about developing the necessary
capacity in these countries needed to better define the future urban impacts of 
technology and to devise and implement the policies and strategies necessary to 
manage such impacts, and (3) uncertainties about the degree of acceptance and 
adaptability of local populace to the proposed approaches. In addition to these 
uncertainties, the volume of the expected urban change is high. Therefore, the research 
proposes the incremental planning and development approach as a necessary approach 
to best deal with these uncertainties.
By the end of the 1960’s incremental planning developed to overcome the 
shortcomings of Rational Comprehensive Planning (RCP) methodology. In fact, the 
RCP rose in response to urban growth problems in the Nineteenth Century when
scientific methods were applied to find solutions to urban problems (Hodge 1991. p. 
83). This planning methodology is evident in almost all official plans and the plan- 
making process which involve scientific instruments like forecasts, analyses of issues 
and concerns, studies of anticipated social and environmental impacts and goal
statements (Perks and Jamieson 1991. p. 490). To apply RCP approach, the decision­
makers should have: (1) a well-defined problem; (2) a full array of alternatives to 
consider; (3) complete information about the consequences of each alternative; (4) full 
information about the values and preferences of citizens; and (5) full adequate time, 
skills, and resources (MacLeod 1996). Hudson (1979, 388) argues that RCP
approaches problems from a systems (integrated) viewpoint, using conceptual or 
mathematical models that relate ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints) 
with heavy reliance on numbers and quantitative analysis. Also, it attempts to sidestep 
the issue of conflict by presuming a discemable public interest. This assumes that a 
community's various collective goals can be measured in some effective way 
(Altshuler 1965).
Because of all these requirements, MacLeod (1996) views the RCP approach as 
unrealistic and can only be applied to relatively simple problems and in a modified 
form. While in the real world, inherent limitations on resources, information and time 
make it impossible to use RCP in its purest form. Lindblom (1959) went so far as to 
argue that its non-implementability takes away any point in using it (Faludi, 117). In a 
similar vein, Etzioni (1967, 219) considered the impossibility of predicting all
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consequences or grasping all variables and the lack of resources and time to collect 
information needed for rational choice in RCP to considerably limit its practicability.
Therefore, and based on these shortcomings of RCP and taking all the uncertainties 
mentioned before into account, the RCP seems to be inappropriate for managing the 
urban future in developing countries experiencing rapid technological and socio­
economic changes.
6.3.1 Analysis o f Incremental Planning
The concept of incremental planning first emerged in 1955 in a study of the Chicago 
Housing Authority by Martin Meyerson and Banfield who argued that planning 
practice was different from the theory of planning. For them, planning practice was 
not a rational activity governed by experts using scientific knowledge but rather an 
irrational process dominated by petty political concerns (Gunton, T.J. 1984. p. 404). In 
spite of planners' best efforts, slum clearance schemes, sterile suburbs, communities 
alienated by planning decisions, environmental degradation and loss of historic 
buildings revealed problems with the RCP (Wolfe 1994, 27; Perks and Jamieson 
1991,. 504). Also, planning came to be perceived as a political process (MacLeod 
1996).
Perks and Jamieson (1991., 507) argue that under these conditions, the relationship 
between planners and the community changed dramatically. In addition, they argue 
that planning doctrines that had proved adequate in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries were successfully challenged as socio-economic conditions and 
technological capabilities of societies are rapidly changing and as new pluralism of 
values was taken into account in a more technology-based and multi-cultural society.
The incremental planning approach, developed by Charles E. Lindblom in 1959, was 
an effective response to the challenges of the 1960s. He described this approach as 
"partisan mutual adjustment" or “disjointed incrementalism”. Amitai Atzioni (1967, 
219-220) argues that according to this approach, the problem confronting the decision­
maker is continually redefined. Incrementalism allows for countless end-means and 
means-ends adjustments that, in effect, make the problem more manageable. 
Consequently; there is no one decision or "right" solution but a "never-ending series of 
attacks" on the issues at hand through serial analyses and evaluation. These features 
make such an approach more appropriate for a situation where high level of 
uncertainties is expected.
In incremental planning, plans are not constructed by a strict process but by a series of 
consultations largely based on peoples' actual experiences, needs and aspirations
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(Hudson 1979, 389). Moreover, large decisions are divided into smaller ones and 
distributed among a large number of stages and actors who make decisions 
independently and pursuing their separate interests in the light of the prevailing 
conditions at each stage (Friedmann 1987. 129). The state serves as an independent 
adjudicator seeking compromises between these groups. According to the Incremental 
Planning approach, this process brings out the public interest in the light of the actual 
socio-economic and technological capabilities of the society (Gunton 1984,405).
In the incremental planning approach comparisons are limited to the few factors that 
differ in relatively small degree from existing policies rather than undertaking 
fundamental inquiry into alternatives and consequences each time. It is only necessary 
to study the aspects in which the proposed alternative and its consequences differ from 
the status quo (Lindblom 1959, 161) Gunton (1984, p. 406) argues that the small 
differences involved are more agreeable to interest groups and politicians and the 
reliance on minor changes may allow for greater learning and avoidance of large 
errors.
John Friedmann (1987, 130) argues that in “Incrementalism” social interaction is 
substituted for mental processes in systematic calculation and that subjectivity is part 
of this process. Whereas for RCP, exclusion of factors is accidental, in Incrementalism 
it is deliberate, systematic and defensible (Lindblom 1959, 165). Incrementalism
rejects the notion that policies can be guided in terms of central institutions of a 
society expressing a collective "good" (Forester 1987, 51).
MacLeod, D. (1996) argues that although incremental decisions outnumber 
fundamental ones, they do not outweigh them and that fundamental decisions set the 
context for incremental ones. Furthermore, he argues that no single tradition of 
planning can do everything. Actually, each of these theories describe only half the 
planning picture, one provides an ideal model, the second a realistic view of the real 
world. In practice, planners usually make repetitive attempts to solve problems,
starting off being incremental and becoming more comprehensive. They thus take 
advantage of the strengths of each approach while avoiding their respective
shortcomings, a methodology known as "Mixed Scanning". Usually, planning 
departments use the RCP approach to develop the Official Plan and employ the 
incremental approach to implement it in daily planning practice.
In fact, incremental planning is usually associated with incremental implementation of 
the proposed plans. The basic idea of incremental implementation is to blur the 
distinction between the design and implementation phases. The main idea of this
approach is founded on the experience-based assumption that design and
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implementation decisions strongly affect one another, and thus a rigorous separation 
of design and implementation does not accomplish its goal.
MacLeod (1996) argues that the greatest strength of incremental planning and 
development approach is that instead of attempting to be rational and comprehensive it 
describes decision-making as it actually occurs. Such approach recognizes that policy 
is continually being made and re-made, thereby avoiding errors that come with radical 
change in policy and stays within predictive capability (Lindblom 1959, 165). In other 
words, in this approach defects can be easily and continually detected and isolated and 
thus avoids the accumulation of errors. In addition, it provides better chances of 
continual evaluation of the advantages and shortcomings of each stage, and 
consequently ensures the optimum use of resources. Moreover, incremental planning 
and development provides better opportunities of compliance with the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions and technological status of societies and better helps meet 
the real needs of inhabitants.
Moreover, MacLeod (1996) argues that the basic weakness of incremental planning is 
its assumption of a pluralistic society composed of and dominated by small interest 
groups, which makes competition unequal and undemocratic. Therefore, it is argued 
that decisions reached using incrementalism mainly reflect the interests of the more 
powerful rather than those of the community in general (Atzioni 1967, 221). Other 
critics argue that Incremental Planning only addresses a limited range of alternatives 
and does not allow for fundamental decisions to be made and neglects basic societal 
innovations (Faludi 1973, 119). Moreover, with its limited consideration of variables, 
incrementalism has nothing to guide the accumulation of small steps that could lead to 
significant change (Atzioni 1967, 221).
Despite these drawbacks, and for the purpose of this research focusing on developing 
countries, Incremental Planning and Development approach is expected to be highly 
appropriate for many reasons. First it best deals with the lack of necessary reliable 
data in these countries. Second, it provides better chances for the optimal use of 
financial and environmental resources as it continuously evaluates the socio­
economic, technological, and environmental changes in the society. Third, it ensures 
the gradual transition from the existing to the targeted situations and consequently 
protects societies from the unexpected socio-economic impacts of sudden changes.
6.3.2 An Appraisal o f the Application o f Incremental Planning Approach in Egypt
Incremental planning is not applied in the urban development policy of Egypt either 
on the local or the regional level. On the local level, and although the development of 
each new city was set in stages, all these stages are planned and designed in advance
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with no possibility of modification in the light of the changing socio-economic and 
technological condition. This is mainly because almost all infrastructure networks, 
mainly transportation, are usually built at one time for the whole city. This predefines 
the physical form of the city and, to a large extent, its population size. In addition, the 
first stage is usually about the half of the city. Moreover, in many large new cities 
such as 10th of Ramadan and 6th of October, sparse development activities started in all 
the stages within the first five years of the city development start. More important, the 
large size of almost all new cities in Egypt contradicts with the principles of
incrementalism.
On the regional level, a number of new cities were built together giving no chance for 
assessment and evaluation. For example, four cities with total target population of 
about two millions inhabitants were built almost at the same time around Cairo. This 
was, in fact, in addition to another six settlements of 250,000 inhabitants each. The 
large size in addition to the large number of these settlements demonstrates that
incrementalism is not applied in Egypt’s urban development policy.
6.3.3 Incremental Planning: Approach Assessment
It should be kept in mind, that the main purpose of the research here is to shed light on 
the importance of incremental planning and development approach and to examine its 
importance for developing countries. Through the literature review about incremental
planning and development of urban settlements and through the analysis of urban 
problems in Egypt, where the percentage occupancy in almost all new towns that were 
built 25 years ago still very low (section 5.2.1.4), it becomes clear that incremental 
planning and development could be an effective approach for managing urban 
development in developing countries with increasing technological capabilities. In a
further step to examine the appropriateness of such approach, the thesis will examine 
this approach through the forecasting survey presented in the next three chapters.
In doing so, a direct question about the most appropriate approaches for the 
development of future urban settlements in developing countries during the next 30-40 
years had been presented to urban development experts. In that question, urban experts 
were asked to select from the following options: whole settlement built in one time, 
gradually built, expansion in the form of new suburbs, or expansion in the form of 
new independent urban units. Through this question and other questions about the 
appropriate size and location of future cities, it is expected that the research could 
draw a general conclusion about the appropriateness of the proposed incremental 
planning and development approach.
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Conclusion:
Through the extensive analysis of the proposed approaches, the thesis has reached 
some important conclusions.
First, urban decentralisation and dispersion of urban population, mainly at the regional 
level, is a necessary approach for managing the urban future in developing countries, 
especially those suffering increasing urban concentration problems. In addition, this 
approach helps in spreading development activities all over the country and 
consequently the utilisation of its natural resources in remote and frontier regions. 
Although policymakers in Egypt, as in all the developing countries, claim to have 
adopted of urban decentralisation, such approach have been applied only at the local 
level. It is highly expected that future technological advancements will facilitated the 
adoption of such approach in developing countries (section 6.1.3).
Second, small-size urban settlement is a necessary approach to avoid the mounting 
problems of current large-scale urban centres and to help implement the proposed 
urban decentralization approach. The extensive analysis of the differential growth of 
different settlement sizes Egypt, presented in section 5.2.2, demonstrates that the 
proposed small-size settlement approach is not among the main objectives of urban 
development policy in Egypt. This is true for both old and new urban settlements in 
the country. It is highly expected that future technological advancements will 
facilitated the adoption of such approach in developing countries. Technological 
achievements have significantly increased the attractiveness of small urban 
settlements. These technologies have made life in small settlements possible and more 
attractive. The emergence and the growth of telework activities made these settlements 
more attractive to a wide variety of new businesses. Also, recent developments in 
renewable solar and wind energies and the development of small water purification 
and sanitary treatment systems would facilitate settling remote areas.
Third, incremental planning and development of the future urban settlements is a 
necessary approach to deal with the uncertainties that will always exist regarding the 
extent of future technological change and its urban impacts, especially in developing 
countries. It provides better chances for the optimal use of financial and environmental 
resources as it continuously evaluates the socio-economic, technological, and 
environmental changes in the society. Moreover, it ensures the gradual transition from 
the existing to the targeted situations, and consequently protects societies from the 
unexpected socio-economic impacts of sudden changes.
In a further step to assess the appropriateness and applicability of these approaches, 
the thesis will survey the opinions and expectations of both technology and urban 
development experts in the forecasting survey presented in the next three chapters.
178
Chapter Seven
AN APPLICATION OF FUTURE RESEARCH IN URBAN STUDIES 
Introduction:
Although the analysis presented in the previous chapter revealed that the proposed 
approached would be effective in managing the urban future in developing countries, 
the thesis tries to confirm this result and to assess the appropriateness and applicability 
of these approaches in developing countries. through surveying the opinions and 
expectations of both technology and urban development experts. Also, through this 
survey the thesis aims to define the possible impacts of technology on This chapter 
presents the forecasting survey methodology, questionnaires design, sample selection 
and data collection, and survey scoring and data evaluation.
7.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FORECASTING STUDIES
Opinions about the value of studies that attempt to forecast the future are sharply 
divided. For the opponents of future studies, we have those such as Ackoff (1981, ix), 
who argue that "To the extent we can control the future we do not have to forecast it... 
To the extent that we can respond rapidly and effectively to changes that we neither 
control nor expect.... we need not to forecast them”. Proponents of future studies, 
such as Constantinos Doxiadis (1965, 3) argues that we are compelled to forecast the 
future and that if we do not we deprive ourselves of the right to see where we are 
going and we doom ourselves to move in the darkness. In answering whether we may 
succeed in forecasting the future, he reiterated the ancient Greek saying:
"Only God knows the future; but wise people can see the tomorrow”.
Other proponents of future studies such as May (1982), stress the need for more 
future-oriented planning where the typical objective is to generate a number of 
probable scenarios in order to understand the implications of future movements for the 
present or to identify those policy and planning decisions required now in order to 
avoid or achieve possible future conditions. In this context, Newton and Taylor (1985, 
313) and Bell and Mau (1971) argue that images of the future are real and deserve 
examination, as they tend to orient human behaviour and social actions, and 
consequently provide an insight into what alternative futures are being prepared in the 
present. This is particularly so under the liberating conditions that technological 
advanced society makes possible, where the population is not wholly concerned with 
meeting subsistence needs and where the desire for self-determination is increasing.
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The study of the future implies the use of forecasting techniques. Forecasting applies 
available information to predict consequences of present policies and to propose 
actions to achieve desired goals. The Webster Dictionary defines the term 
‘forecasting’ as the process applied to calculate or predict (some future event or
condition) usually as a result of study and analysis of available pertinent data 
(Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2001). Forecasting is the estimation of the value of a variable (or
set of variables) at some future point in time. In this context, forecasting is mainly
concerned with the processes used to make forecasts and to assure that they are
properly presented and used. Typically, it is used to predict over time (time series 
forecasting), and to make predictions about differences among people, firms, or other 
objects (cross-sectional data) (Armstrong and Collopy 2001). Also, forecasting applies 
available information to predict consequences of present activities and expected 
changes to propose actions to achieve desired goals. Tarik A. Fathy (1991, 49) argues 
that forecasting, however, is not mere prediction; it needs to account for contextual 
situations, and uses informed judgments about events to draw a wide range of possible 
consequences. As such, many forecasting methods qualify as tools for planning public 
policymaking. Yet, the field of planning seldom devotes enough attention to forecasts 
(Wachs 1985).
Usually, there is some confusion between forecasting and planning. To clarify this, 
forecasting is concerned with what the future will look like, while planning is 
concerned with what it should look like (Armstrong and Collopy 2001). Forecasting 
starts from the present, or even the past, to conceive the image of the future, while 
planning starts from the future and how it should look like and trace back the
necessary actions to be taken in the present. Therefore, forecasting can be considered 
as an integral stage of planning necessary to minimize uncertainties before setting the 
planning goals and objectives. Usually, forecasting exercises are carried out in order to 
provide an aid to decision-making and in planning the future. Typically all such
exercises work on the premise that if we can predict what the future will be like we 
can modify our behaviour and take actions now to be in a better position, than we 
otherwise would have been, when the future arrives (Beasley 2001).
Forecasting the social impact of technology belongs to a class of social sciences
problems that requires a more complex logic than that of simple causality (direct 
relationship among few variables and their explicit sequences). Tarik Fathy (1991, 49) 
argues that the dual effects are one of the main reasons for the paucity of the literature 
on its impact. Moreover, the rapid advances of modem technologies make any study 
of their consequences much more difficult to pin down. Therefore, a study of the 
impact of new technologies should account for the fast-paced change by addressing 
future changes rather than studying only the present moment. In this context, Edward
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Cornish (1977) argues that the future lies in the domain of goals, and its plasticity 
makes it more important to study and more difficult to predict. In view of the fact that 
the future is not a mere temporal continuation of the past, it is likely to be significantly 
different from the present.
Boucher (1977, 6-9) stressed the fact that futures studies are generally characterized 
by the ambition to support decision-making by supplying relevant information for a 
long-range perspective. The function of futures research is to extend the range of 
public vision to encompass new alternative futures as well as reduce the uncertainty of 
events. Futures research methods have the ability to prepare sufficient information 
with a set of probabilities into the planning process. They do not forecast the "future" 
but generate possible alternative "futures" (King 1975).
7.1.1 Expansion o f Urban forecasting Studies:
The last four decades have witnessed a major expansion of forecasting studies in the 
United States, UK and Europe. The work of Herman Kahn and his colleagues at the 
Hudson Institute; the ‘Futuribles’ group in Paris; the Social Science Research Council 
in London, the De Jouvenel, E. masterpiece ‘The Art of Conjecture’, and the 
overwhelming contribution of Armstrong, J. S. since 1982 are only a few of the many 
now forecasting various aspects of life during the near and distant future.
Urbanization was the major theme of many of these forecasts, for it seems that more 
and more of the world’s population will live in a culture dominated by urban values 
even if they remain on a remote farm. But not many groups have taken the notion of 
urbanization as their main focus. Of course, everyone concerned with urban studies in 
the broadest sense, has his own views for the future, and quite specific forecasts have 
been made for particular cities or regions. But, such forecasts are, by definition, partial 
and limited (Cowan 1970).
181
7.2 FORECASTING SURVEY METHODOLOGY
Through the previous chapters, the thesis has thoroughly examined the theoretical 
bases and justifications of the proposed urban approaches and the future role of 
technology in applying them in developing countries. The proposed approaches are: 
(1) urban decentralisation; (2) small-size settlements; and (3) the incremental planning 
and implementation of urban programs. The main objective of this future research 
exercise is to examine the importance and applicability of these approaches for 
managing the urban future in developing countries and the future role of technology in 
applying them. Also, it is the purpose of this exercise to conceptualise the main 
consequences, recommendations, and guidelines for the application of such 
approaches in these countries. However, it is not the propose of this exercise to define 
certain future impacts of technology at certain times, but rather to develop a verified 
and more accurate idea about the role of technology in shaping the urban future in 
developing countries.
7.2.1 Selection o f Forecasting Method
Forecasting methods, as defined by Armstrong in 1983, are explicit procedures for 
attaining and analyzing data to get a realistic idea about the future of a given 
phenomenon. Futures research methods are appropriate techniques for social 
forecasting. Their fundamental assumption postulates that society is not predestined or 
otherwise constrained to a particular long-run end state. Their procedures are based on 
two concepts: robustness and cybernetics. Robustness works with fundamental causes 
of change as the basis for designing new strategic options consistent with anticipated 
future environments (Nanus 1982). A robust concept can withstand large 
environmental changes. It provides effective performance under all likely future 
environments to enable flexible adjustment to these changes. Cybernetics is based on 
the perception that a single present situation will induce a set of alternative futures via 
a cybernetic process, and the future should only be viewed within a wide range of 
expectations. Futures research methods require more than observation; they require 
judgmental interpretation to relate past to future to prepare for action (Fathy 1991, 50). 
At present, there are a number of schemes for classifying forecasting methods. These 
schemes are based upon the type of data used, the type of people doing the 
forecasting, and the degree of sophistication of the methods used to analyse data.
7.2.1.1 Anticipatory and Exploratory Approaches
Peter Hall (1977) classified forecasting approaches as either of two types: anticipatory 
or exploratory. This classification is also termed by Jones, H. and Twiss, G. (1978) as
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‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’. In the anticipatory approach, the objective is to establish 
whether a specific normative goal or objective might be achieved. The objective set 
for or by the planner may result from a national policy, theoretical analysis, or vision. 
Initially, it should be merely a desirable target without having any clear idea of how it 
could be achieved and which of the alternative routes to be followed. For the 
exploratory approach, it highly meets the needs of urban planners concerned with 
management of complex urban systems, the evolution of which is the outcome of the 
joint operation of numerous factors which are located in the present (and the past) but 
which may evolve in a variety of ways in the future. For these situations, this approach 
provides a range of methods have been devised to assist in forecasting. These methods 
include: trend extrapolation, cyclic analysis, consensus methodologies such as Delphi, 
scenario construction, analogy, model-building and simulation (Newton and Taylor 
1985, 314). For the purpose of this research, and as it was for similar studies exploring 
the probable urban futures, exploratory approach and its suite of techniques seems 
highly suitable.
7.2.1.2 Judgmental and Statistical Approaches
In 2001, Armstrong and Collopy classified forecasting methods as either subjective or 
objective. Subjective, or judgmental, forecasts are perhaps the most widely used for 
important forecasts. Subjective or judgmental methods are those in which the available 
data are insufficient and not highly accurate or formal; a matter that is common in 
social studies. They may use objective data or subjective data as inputs but it is usually 
relative and depends on personal experience. Subjective methods may be based on 
simple or complex processes. Objective, or statistical, forecasts include extrapolation 
(such as moving averages, linear regression against time, or exponential smoothing) 
and econometric methods (typically using regression techniques to estimate the effects 
of causal variables). Objective or statistical methods are those that use well-specified 
processes to analyse the data. Ideally, they have been specified so well that other 
analysts can replicate them and obtain identical forecasts (Armstrong and Collopy 
2001). Figure 7.1 depicts the main characteristics of forecasting methods and their 
inter-relationships.
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StatisticalJudgmental
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Data-basedTheory-basedRole No role
MultivariateModelsExtrapolationModelsIntentions Expert OpinionsRole Playing
Analogies
Rule-BasedForecastingConjointAnalysis JudgmentalBootstrapping
ExpertSystems EconometricModels
Main Relationships .. Possible Relationships
Source: Armstrong, J. S. and Collopy, F. 2001.
Figure 7.1: Characteristics of Forecasting Methods and Their Relationships.
The choice between the two methods depends mainly on the purpose of forecasting, 
the sufficiency of the available data, and on the analysis technique adopted. In Urban 
studies, especially when the future is concerned, judgmental method is usually applied 
for long-term forecasting, while the statistical method is used for 5-10 years 
forecasting where enough data could be found. Most of recent urban forecasts are 
made using subjective methods. It also seems that the more important the forecast, the 
greater is the likelihood that subjective methods will be used (Armstrong and Collopy 
2001). For the purpose of this study, judgmental or qualitative method seems to be the 
most appropriate as it proved effective in long range forecasting where technological, 
political, etc. factors play a significant role (Owenb 1999). In judgmental or 
qualitative approach two main techniques are usually used: (1) subjective, based on a 
hunch, intuition; or (2) experience based: jury of executive opinion and Delphi 
techniques (Owen 1999). Delphi Technique is widely used in urban studies as the 
most developed form of urban forecasting according to the judgmental/qualitative 
approach.
7.2.1.3 Delphi technique:
The Delphi method, pioneered by Olaf Helmer and his associates at the Rand 
Corporation in the late 1960's, is a widely used polling technique that systematically 
and collectively solicits expert subjective or judgmental opinions in quantified form.
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The main objective of Delphi technique is to generate reliable consensus among 
people with exceptional knowledge about a particular subject. This technique is a 
group process which utilizes written responses as opposed to bringing individuals 
together (Michael 1994). This is mainly to avoid some of the bias that might result 
were they all brought together, e.g. domination by a strong willed individual, 
divergent (but valid) views not being expressed for fear of humiliation (Beasley 2001). 
At the same time, it maintains the heterogeneity of the participants to assure validity 
of the results and avoid the dominance of aggregating results by quantity. While some 
individual responses may be more informative and accurate, the aggregation process 
assimilates this expertise (Fathy 1991).
Fabiana Scapolo (1997) defined three quintessential attributes that distinguish Delphi 
technique from conventional face-to-face group interaction: anonymity, iteration with 
controlled feedback, and statistical response handling. Delphi does permit an effective 
interaction between members of the panel, even though this interaction is highly 
filtered by the moderators’ summarising of the arguments (Martino 1993). In 2002, 
Linstone and Turoff presented a detailed comparison of the main characteristics of the 
different group communication techniques (see Table 7.1).
Usually, Delphi technique is a series of two or more questionnaires. The first 
questionnaire asks individuals to respond to a broad question (questions might focus 
on emerging issues and forecasts for your community). Each subsequent questionnaire 
(one or more additional) is built upon responses to the preceding questionnaire 
(Michael 1994). However, the nature and the objective of the survey may limit the
number of questionnaires required. In many cases where it is not required to define
certain future impacts of technology at certain times, and because of the difficulty in 
getting response from the selected experts group for two or three times, many studies 
such as those of Newton and Taylor (1985), and Fathy (1991) have used a single­
round questionnaire.
In this research, the Delphi Technique is used to verify the conceptual analysis of the
effects of technological achievements on the proposed approaches for the future of
urban development in developing countries. In addition, Delphi method is used in this 
study to forecast the impacts of such approaches and to generate hypotheses about 
how to deal with these impacts.
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Table 7.1: Main Characteristics of Different Group Communication Techniques
Conference 
Telephone Call Comm ittee Meeting
Formal Conference 
or Seminar Delphi
Effective Group Size Small Small to Medium Small to Large Small to Large
Occurrence of 
Interaction by 
Individual
Coincident with 
group
Coincident with 
group
Coincident with 
group Random
Length of Interaction Short Medium to Long Long Short to Medium
Number o f Interactions
Multiple, as 
required by 
group
Multiple, 
necessary time 
delays between
Single Multiple, necessary time delays between
Normal Mode Range
Equality to 
chairman control 
(flexible)
Equality to 
chairman control 
(flexible)
Presentation
(directed)
Equality to monitor 
control (structured)
Principal Costs
Communications TravelIndividual’s Time
Travel
Individual’s Time 
Fees
Monitor Time
Clerical
Secretarial
Time -urgent 
considerations Forced delays Forced delays
Other Characteristics
Equal flow o f information to and 
from all
Can maximize psychological effects
Efficient flow of 
information from 
few to many
Equal flow o f information 
to and from all 
Can minimize
psychological effects 
Can minimize time 
demanded o f 
respondents or 
conferees
Source: adapted from: Linstone, H.A. and Turoff, M. 2002, 8,9.
7.2.2 Setting the forecasting time-horizon
Defining the suitable forecasting time-horizon is crucial to ensure the validity and 
reliability of forecasting exercise results. In this regard, it is clear that the further 
ahead we look the more uncertain the future will be. But on the other hand if horizons 
are too close forecasting work will lose much of its value. There are many arguments 
in this regard, some favouring short time-horizons while others prefer longer time 
horizons. However, both recommend to avoid choosing specific dates, especially 
dramatic dates such as ‘Towards 2000’ or similar dates, because it seem rather 
fictitious as one year is very much like another, and not much will separate 2000 from 
1999 or 2001 (Cowan 1970).
As urban development is the main subject of this study, it is recommended to review 
the time horizons adopted in previous urban studies. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the earlier town and country development plans in the UK, since 1951 onwards in 
accordance with the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, are based on a twenty-year 
planning period. Some studies in late sixties and early seventies have extended this
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time-period to about thirty-five years. They are not considered as ‘leaps into the 
future’, but as progress by reasoned stages. Jackson (1972) argues that the overall time 
span cannot be extended further with any degree of statistical accuracy as beyond 
thirty years there can be no reasonable limits of confidence about precise future 
conditions.
However, some experts recommend that the length of the planning period should be 
extended. Their main argument is that the twenty or thirty-five years are shorter than 
the life expectancy of many existing structures and of all major works to be 
constructed. Infrastructure and other development projects above and below ground 
will certainly outlive this period, and will continue thereafter to influence the form and 
direction of subsequent urban growth. Therefore, they argue that an average life 
expectancy of about seventy-five to a hundred years is reasonable time horizon 
(Jackson 1972). Another supporting argument, and from the social perspective, Cowan 
(1970) claimed that it is more useful that time horizon be couched in terms of 
generations. For instance, there may have been a genuine ‘change of outlook’ among 
the current generation of young people, and it is possible to suggest the kind of futures 
which the next generation will encounter. Thinking in terms of generations will be 
more helpful in tracing the consequences of current or just-emerging patterns (Cowan 
1970). The main drawback of this argument is that a century ahead is far beyond the 
capacity of economic, social and technological prediction (Jackson 1972), particularly 
in developing countries.
For the purpose of this study about urban future in developing countries, and in view 
of all previous arguments, time-horizon should not be too long for many reasons. First, 
the rapid pace of technological achievements and their socio-economic impacts as 
well as the rapid rate of change in developing countries make it risky and difficult to 
look for a century ahead. Second, there is a considerable level of political and 
economic instability in these countries that makes it hard to reasonably forecast the 
socio-economic conditions in the next fifty years. This is aggravated by the lack of a 
systematic reliable data in these countries. Therefore, a time horizon of about 30-40 
years seems to be more appropriate for the purpose of this study. Taking into account 
the history of socio-economic change, the proposed 30-40 years time-horizon goes 
well with both the short- and the long-wave economic cycles of Kuznets and 
Kondratieff. It is the double of Kuznets short-wave cycle (15-20 years) and slightly 
less than one long-wave Kondratieff cycle (50 years). Meanwhile, this time horizon 
can be regarded as the first phase in a continuous forecasting process to ensure the 
continuous evaluation and revision of the planning process.
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7.3 SURVEY DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The main purpose of this future research exercise is to survey the expectations of 
technology and urban development experts about the role future technology 
achievements in the adoption of the proposed approaches in developing countries. 
Also, it aims to survey the expectations of those experts on the consequences of the 
adoption of the proposed approaches on the future size and function of existing 
settlements. Therefore, and based on Delphi Technique requirements, the survey is 
conducted in three questionnaires in two consecutive stages.
Questionnaire I is designed for, and sent to, science and technology experts. 
Responses to Questionnaire I are then analysed and used as a basis for the next stage 
of the survey. Based on the results of Questionnaire I, Questionnaire II is designed for, 
and sent to, science and technology experts, while Questionnaire El is designed for, 
and sent to, urban development experts. Moreover, and to get a higher degree of 
consensus, results of Questionnaire I have been sent to all experts who are invited to 
take part in both Questionnaire II and Questionnaire III. To stick to the principles of 
Delphi Technique, results of Questionnaire El have been sent to urban experts for the 
second round. A summary of these stages is presented in Figure 7.2. In the following 
sub-sections, an analysis of the main objectives, structure, methods of sample 
selection and data collection for each questionnaire is presented.
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Figure 7.2: Stages of conducting the forecasting Survey
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7.3.1 Questionnaire I -  to Science & Technology Experts:
7.3.1.1 Questionnaire Design:
This questionnaire is of preliminary and exploratory nature. It asks broad questions 
about the nature and characteristics of emerging technologies and their future impacts. 
It consists of three parts. The first part aims to get information about the area of 
expertise of the interviewed expert (i.e. information technology, transportation, 
energy, utilities, etc.) and about his role in that field (i.e. R&D, design, production, 
management, etc.). The second part aims to survey the expectations of the interviewed 
expert about future changes in his field of expertise. It also asks experts about their 
expectations about the main technological achievements expected to influence the 
future of urban development in the next 30-40 years. It also asks them to rank these 
achievements according to their expected degree of influence. Finally, the 
questionnaire asks experts about any comments they may have in the area of this 
research.
This questionnaire is presented in full in Appendix 1. Also, it is posted online at: 
http://www.shu.ac.uk/schools/research/cbe/feedback/korin/
7.3.1.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:
Concerning sample selection, the initial goal of this questionnaire was to recruit 
between thirty to forty science and technology experts in industry and research 
institutions. Transportation, telecommunications, information technology, energy, and 
urban utilities were the main technology sectors for selection of targeted experts. Web 
search was the main way for getting the contact details of these experts. Using Google 
search engine, a list of 200 experts in both industry and research institutions, mainly 
from England and the United States, was developed. In this list, the affiliation and the 
direct contact details of each expert were compiled. This list consists of equal numbers 
of experts in all technology sectors mentioned before.
On Monday, 4 March 2002, selected experts were contacted by e-mail and invited to 
fill in the online-posted questionnaire. In the invitation letter, experts were asked to 
invite other interested experts to participate in this survey. Responses automatically 
saved in a data file which is compatible with almost all statistical packages such as 
Microsoft Excel and SPSS. After two weeks, the first reminder has been sent to 
experts who did not fill in the questionnaire. Two weeks later, the second reminder 
had been sent. On Monday, 15 April 2002, response data had been harvested. All 
returned responses that dose not have the respondents name were discarded. Thirty- 
five successfully returned responses were received, at a response rate of 19.5 percent.
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The invitation letter and a full list of participants’ names and their affiliations appear 
in Appendix 1.
Because expectations about the scope of future changes are determined by expertise 
and judgemental knowledge, there is no way to define the best judgement accurately. 
Consequently, all predictions are treated on the basis of having equal importance.
Therefore, the maximum and minimum values of variables have significance in 
determining the scope of future possibilities, while the mean and standard deviation 
provide confidence in “the most possible” cases.
Responses have been loaded on Microsoft Excel and SPSS spreadsheet files and a
statistical analysis for each question had been run. The main analysis produced
standard deviations, means, medians, minimum and maximum values, and frequency 
distributions. Results of this analysis have been used as a basis for the design of the 
second round of the survey. Also, these results have been presented in graphs and
tables and made ready to be sent to experts in the second round.
7.3.2 Questionnaire II -  to Science & Technology Experts:
7.3.2.1 Questionnaire Design:
Based on the results of Questionnaire I and its associated comments, Questionnaire II 
was designed to get a more detailed survey of science and technology experts’ 
expectations about the role of technology in shaping the urban future. This
questionnaire is divided into four main parts. The first part aims to get information
about the area of expertise of the interviewed expert and about his role in that field. It 
also aims to survey the expectations of the interviewed expert about future changes 
expected in his field of expertise in the next 30 to 40 years. The second part is about
how much the future technological achievements are expected to influence the urban
life in the next 30-40 years. The third part is about the expected role of future
achievements of major technology sectors (transportation, IT & telecommunications, 
renewable energy, urban utilities) on the adoption of the proposed approaches: urban
decentralisation and the small-size settlement. For each of these technology sectors,
questions about the main points expected to be influence the application of the 
proposed approaches have been asked. The fourth part is about the expectations of 
technology experts regarding the rate of technology transfer to developing countries. 
Questionnaire II is presented in full in Appendix 2 and posted online at:
http://homepages.shu.ac.uk/~aaboukor/Questionnaire%202.htm
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7.3.2.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:
To get more responses than that of Questionnaire I, Questionnaire II is sent to a larger 
sample of science and technology experts than that of Questionnaire I. The initial goal 
was to recruit of between forty to fifty experts in industry and research institutions. 
Transportation, telecommunications, information technology, energy, and urban 
utilities were the main technology sectors for selection of targeted experts. Again, web 
search was the main way for getting the contact details of these experts. In addition to 
the contact details for respondents to Questionnaire I, and using Google search engine, 
a new list of 200 experts, in both industry and research institutions, was developed. In 
this list, the affiliation and the direct contact details of each expert were compiled. 
This list consists of equal numbers of experts in all technology sectors mentioned 
before.
On Monday, 24 June 2002, selected experts were contacted by e-mail and invited to 
fill in the online-posted questionnaire. The overall results of Questionnaire I have been 
attached to the invitation letter. In the invitation letter, experts were asked to invite 
other interested experts to participate in this survey. Responses automatically saved in 
a data file which is compatible with almost all statistical packages such as Microsoft 
Excel and SPSS. After two weeks, the first reminder has been sent to experts who did 
not fill in the questionnaire. But this time, and to overcome the low response rate
experienced in Questionnaire I, thirty-five technology experts in the UK were contact 
by post. Two weeks later, the second reminder had been sent to those who did not 
respond yet. On Monday, 5 August 2002, response data had been harvested. Fifty 
successfully returned responses were received, fifteen of which were received by post. 
The overall response rate was about 25.5 percent and 42.8 percent for postal contacts. 
The invitation letter and a full list of participants’ names and affiliations appear in 
Appendix 2.
Responses have been loaded on Microsoft Excel and SPSS spreadsheet files and 
statistical analysis for each question has been run. The main analysis produced
standard deviations, means, medians, minimum and maximum values, and frequency 
distributions.
7.3.3 Questionnaire III -  to Urban Development Experts:
7.3.3.1 Questionnaire Design:
Again, based on the results of Questionnaire I and its associated comments, 
Questionnaire III is designed to get a more detailed survey of the expectations and
visions of urban development experts in developing countries about the importance of
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the proposed approaches and the role of technology in the adoption of these 
approaches in developing countries.
Questionnaire III consists of four parts, each of which is designed to fulfil a certain 
objective. The first part aims to get information about the area of expertise of the 
interviewed expert and his expectations about the extent to which future technological 
advancements are expected to affect urban development in developing countries in the 
next 30-40 years. The second part is designed to survey the expectations about the 
nature of the main technological advancements expected to influence the shaping of 
future urban development policies. It also asks about how future technological 
advancements are expected to influence some important urban life aspects. The third 
part asks questions about the expected role of future achievements of major 
technology sectors (transportation, IT & telecommunications, renewable energy, urban 
utilities) on the adoption of the proposed approaches: urban decentralisation, the 
small-size settlement, and incremental implementation of these approaches. In the 
fourth parts explicit questions have been asked regarding urban development experts’ 
expectation about the future function, location and size of new urban settlement in 
developing countries. Also, it asks some questions about the expected impacts of these 
approaches on the future size and function of existing settlements. Questionnaire III is 
presented in full in Appendix 3 and posted online at: 
http://homepages.shu.ac.uk/~aaboukor/Questionnaire%203-E.html (in English), and 
http://homepages.shu.ac.uk/~aaboukor/Questionnaire%203-A.html (in Arabic)
1.23.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection:
This questionnaire is sent to urban development experts in developing countries, 
mainly Egypt and South Africa. However, some experts in the UK, USA, and 
Australia who are of considerable knowledge about technology and urban change in 
developing countries have been invited to participate in this questionnaire.
Questionnaire III is sent to a sample of urban development experts larger than that of 
Questionnaire I and Questionnaire II. The initial goal was to recruit of between fifty to 
sixty urban development experts. Urban academics, city planners, city planning 
officials, and architects were the main targeted groups. As the thesis is focusing on 
urban development in developing countries, urban experts in Egypt and South Africa 
were the targeted experts. However, urban experts of high experience in that subjected 
in the UK and the United States have been invited to participate in that questionnaire.
The sample had been selected through three main venues. First, the contact details of 
the participants in two important conferences were collected: (1) the 37th International 
ISoCaRP Congress “Planning in the Information Age”, 16-20 September 2001,
192
Utrecht, The Netherlands; (2) the “Future Cities” symposium, 10-12 November 2001, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2001, organised by the Arab Urban Development Institute. This 
significantly helped reaching participants from Egypt and Europe. Second, the contact 
details for experts from South Africa were collected through the web search using 
Google search engine. Third, in the invitation letter experts were asked to invite other 
interested experts to participate in this survey, a matter that significantly helped in
gaining new participants from Egypt and South Africa.
On Monday, 24 June 2002, selected experts were contacted by e-mail and invited to 
fill in the online-posted questionnaire. The overall results of Questionnaire I has been 
attached to the invitation letter. This time, the majority of experts contacted in South 
Africa were first contacted by telephone and invited to complete the online 
questionnaire. Responses automatically saved in a data file which is compatible with 
almost all statistical packages such as Microsoft Excel and SPSS. After two weeks, the 
first reminder has been sent to experts who did not fill in the questionnaire. Two 
weeks later, the second reminder had been sent to those who did not respond yet. On 
Monday, 5 August 2002, response data had been harvested. Sixty-four successfully 
returned responses were received. The overall response rate was about 32 percent. The 
invitation letter and a full list of participants’ names and affiliations appear in
Appendix 3. Responses have been loaded on Microsoft Excel and SPSS spreadsheet
files and statistical analysis for each question has been run. The main analysis 
produced standard deviations, means, medians, minimum and maximum values, and
frequency distributions.
In order to adhere to the principles of Delphi Technique, urban experts who 
participated in the first round of this questionnaire were invited on Monday, 16 June 
2003 to participate in the second round. Urban experts from South Africa were first 
invited by telephone. The over all results of the first round were attached to the 
invitation letter. In this round, experts were asked to reassess their responses in the 
light of first round results. Two weeks later, the first reminder was sent to experts who 
did not reply yet. Again, urban experts from South Africa were contacted by 
telephone. On Monday, 14 July 2003, the last reminder was sent out. On Monday, 28 
July 2003, response data had been harvested. Responses came in three ways: 17 
experts have refilled the questionnaire, 3 experts send their comments by e-mail, and 4 
have expressed their comments through the telephone. The overall response rate to 
this round is about 43 percent. The old responses of these experts have been replaced 
the new ones, while responses of experts who did not participate in this second round 
are left the same as they were in the first round.
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Again, responses have been loaded on Microsoft Excel and SPSS spreadsheet files and 
statistical analysis for each question has been run. The main analysis produced
standard deviations, means, medians, minimum and maximum values, and frequency 
distributions.
7.4 SURVEY SCORING AND DATA EVALUATION
In designing the survey scoring method, the research tried to apply a numeric 
measurement, or scale variable, that enables the respondent to easily choose the 
direction and magnitude of expected change. In such measurement, the differences 
(“distances”) between possible responses are uniform. Therefore, and using this 
Likert-type scale, the scoring scale in the three questionnaires is divided into 7 points: 
3 positive (+1, +2, +3) for the expected increase, 3 negative (-1, -2, -3) for the
expected decrease, and 1 neutral (0) for no change. As indicated in each questionnaire; 
1 or -1 is equivalent to less than 20% of change, 2 or -2 is equivalent to 21-50% of 
change, and 3 or -3 equivalent to more than 50% of change. Also, for those who may 
have no opinion or do not know a (No Op.) selection is provided.
In the statistical analysis of the received data, the research has mainly employed the 
descriptive statistics for two main reasons. First, questions in each questionnaire are 
unrelated to each other, as each of these questions covers a different point. Second, the 
majority of these questions are closed questions where respondents are asked to
choose the answer among given alternatives. Therefore, the research depended on 
descriptive statistics in measuring the data position (or central tendency), variability 
(or dispersion -  spread of the data set), and skewness (data asymmetry). Also, the 
research uses the frequency distribution in measuring the distribution of responses
among the scale points.
For measuring the position (or central tendency), which describes where the data are 
concentrated, there are three main measures: Mean, Median, and Mode. The research 
applied the “Mean” in measuring the data central tendency for two main reasons. First. 
the “mean” is more representative for the whole data set while the “median” just looks 
at the middle observation of such set, and the “mode” looks at the value around which 
the greatest number of observation are concentrated, which is similar to the frequency 
distribution. Second, while the “median” overcomes the problems of outlying data, all 
the questionnaires are using equal-interval scales with no outlying points (Arsham, H. 
1996). Therefore, the mean is seen as the most appropriate measure of central 
tendency in all of the three questionnaires.
In measuring data variability (or dispersion -  spread), there are three main measures: 
Range, Variance, and Standard Deviation. The “range” is the difference between the
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largest and the smallest observations in the data set. Therefore, the “range” is a limited 
measure because it depends on only two of the numbers in the data set. Unlike range, 
“variance” takes into consideration all the data points in the data set. If all the 
observations are the same, the variance would be zero. The more spread out the
observation are, the larger the variance. Standard deviation is the positive square root 
of the variance, and is the most common measure of variability. Standard deviation 
indicates how close to the mean the observations are. The larger the standard 
deviation, the more variation there is in the data set (Pearson NCS 1995). Therefore, 
the research applies the standard deviation as the measure variability in all the three 
questionnaires.
Skewness is the degree of asymmetry of a distribution. If the data are not distributed 
symmetrically, the distribution is said to be skewed. One way of determining 
skewness is by looking at the frequency distribution of the data. Another way of
determining skewness is by comparing the values of the mean, median and mode. If 
the three are equal, then the data are symmetrical. If the mean is to the left of the 
median and mode, the distribution is said to be negatively skewed (skewed left). If the 
mean is to right of the median and mode, the distribution is said to be positively 
skewed (skewed right) (Pearson NCS 1995). Because of the purpose of this exercise to 
produce guidelines for the future trends and because of the direct nature of almost all 
questions, the research applied the skewness measure to some questions of the 
questionnaires.
Conclusion:
This chapter presents the survey design process including forecasting survey 
methodology, questionnaires design, sample selection and data collection, and survey
scoring and data evaluation.
Regarding the forecasting survey methodology, and after reviewing the relevant 
methods, the Delphi Technique is selected because it is a widely used to generate
reliable consensus among people with exceptional knowledge about a particular 
subject. In addition, it systematically and collectively solicits expert subjective or 
judgmental opinions in quantified form.
Regarding the questionnaires’ design, the survey is conducted in three questionnaires. 
Questionnaire I is designed for, and sent to, science and technology experts. Based on 
the results of Questionnaire I, Questionnaire II is designed for, and sent to, science and 
technology experts, while Questionnaire III is designed for, and sent to, urban 
development experts. To get a higher degree of consensus, results of Questionnaire I 
have been sent to all experts who are invited to take part in both Questionnaire II and
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Questionnaire III. To stick to the principles of Delphi Technique, results of 
Questionnaire III have been sent to urban experts for the second round (Figure 7.2).
Questionnaire I is of preliminary and exploratory nature. It asks broad questions about 
the nature and characteristics of emerging technologies and their future impacts. 
Questionnaire II is designed to survey the expectations of science and technology 
experts’ about the role of technology in shaping the urban future. Questionnaire III is 
designed to get a more detailed survey of the expectations and visions of urban 
development experts in developing countries about the importance of the proposed 
approaches and the role of technology in the adoption of these approaches in 
developing countries.
Regarding the forecasting time-horizon, and for the purpose of this study about urban 
future in developing countries, and in view of related arguments, time-horizon should 
not be too short as it will be unable to notice medium and long term changes. In this 
regard, it is worth noting that the earlier town and country development plans in the 
UK, since 1951 onwards in accordance with the Town and Country Planning Act 
1947, are based on a twenty-year planning period. Some studies in late sixties and 
early seventies have extended this time-period to about thirty-five years. However, 
time-horizon should not be too long because of the rapid pace of technological 
achievements and their socio-economic impacts and because of political and economic 
instability in these countries. Therefore, a time horizon of about 30-40 years seems to 
be more appropriate for the purpose of this study. The proposed 30-40 years time- 
horizon goes well with both the short- and the long-wave economic cycles of Kuznets 
and Kondratieff. It is the double of Kuznets short-wave cycle (15-20 years) and 
slightly less than one long-wave Kondratieff cycle (50 years).
In designing the survey scoring method, the research applies a numeric measurement, 
or scale variable, that enables the respondent to easily choose the direction and 
magnitude of expected change. In such measurement, the differences (“distances”) 
between possible responses are uniform. Therefore, and using this Likert-type scale, 
the scoring scale in the three questionnaires is divided into 7 points: 3 positive (+1, +2, 
+3) for the expected increase, 3 negative (-1, -2, -3) for the expected decrease, 1 
neutral (0) for no change, and (No Op.) for no opinion or do not know. As indicated in 
each questionnaire; 1 or -1 is equivalent to less than 20% of change, 2 or -2 is 
equivalent to 21-50% of change, and 3 or -3 equivalent to more than 50% of change.
The next chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the forecasting survey results.
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Chapter E ight
FORECASTING SURVEY: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction:
This chapter presents the statistical analysis of the main results of each of the three 
questionnaires. In the statistical analysis of the received data for each questionnaire, 
the research uses the descriptive statistics in measuring the data position (or central 
tendency), variability (or dispersion -  spread of the data set), and skewness (data 
asymmetry). Also, the research uses the frequency distribution in measuring the 
distribution of responses among the scale points. More details about survey scoring 
and data evaluation are presented in section 7.4.
In the statistical analysis, all responses are treated on the basis of equal value, and 
frequency distribution is used as the main criterion for measuring experts’ consensus. 
To do so, in weighting the relative values of responses among the different variables 
of a question, the highest number of responses received to a single variable is taken as 
a 100 percent and other variable are measured in relation to it. For example, if variable 
A received the highest number of responses among all variable, i.e. 100 responses, and 
variable B received 25 responses, then variable B is assessed as of having 25 percent 
of the responses. SPSS applies this method in measuring the frequency distribution 
among different variables.
In data analysis, the different levels of change are referred to as of some, considerable, 
or impressive (increase or decrease) for change of (1 or -1), (2 or -2), (3 or -3) 
respectively. When data represents a probability level, these levels are referred to as: 
somewhat (likely or less likely) for change of (1 or -1), Likely or less likely for change
of (2 or -2), and Most or Least Likely for change of (3 or -3). In expressing the
frequency distribution, the percentage of responses received for any variable are 
expressed as “percentage of total responses” or as “percentage of responses per 
variable”. “Percentage of total responses” refers to the percentage of responses 
received for each variable in a given question to the total responses received for that 
question, while “percentage of responses per variable” refers to the percentage of
responses for each level of change in that variable to the total responses received for
that variable.
To provide a clearer idea about the frequency distribution of responses to each 
question, frequency data is graphically presented in this chapter while the detailed 
frequency tables for Questionnaire II and III are presented in Appendix 4.
8.1 QUESTIONNAIRE I: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Responses to this questionnaire give a general idea about technology experts’ visions 
of the future impacts of technology on urban development in developing countries 
during the next 30-40 years. The main findings of this questionnaire are used as a base 
for developing the next questionnaires and sent with them to both technology and 
urban experts.
In this chapter, the received valid responses of technology experts for the different 
questions are statistically analysed. In doing so, the statistical software SPSS had been 
used in conjunction with Microsoft Excel Software. The data file generated by the 
online questionnaire replies had been loaded to SPSS and Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
files and statistical analysis for each question has been run.
8.1.1 Characteristics o f Experts Group: Area of Interest and Degree o f Relevance 
Question 1:
1. From vour wide interests and experience, please indicate all areas o f expertise
starting by the closest to vour field o f specialization = 1 
Table 8.1: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise
High Relevance | Medium Relevance Low Relevance % Per 1
%RT [ %RT %RT Sector
Information Technology 14.74 1 11.58 5.26 31.58
Transportation 4.21 | 5.26 10.53 20.00
Energy 12.63 1 3.16 7.37 23.16
Utilities (water, sewer, gas) 5.26 2.11 5.26 12.63
Other: Indicated below 11.58 1 1.05 0.00 12.63
% Responses 48.42 28.42 100.00
Total Responses 95
Notes: % RT= Percentage o f subgroup to total number o f responses 
Other areas of Interest include:
Architecture and Building Construction 6 Environmental technologies 3
Engineering 2 Biotechnology 1
Concerning experts’ experience relevance to the main areas of technology expertise, 
48 percent of the experts interviewed are highly relevant to their areas of expertise, 
while 23 and 28 percent of them are of medium and low relevance respectively. About 
15 percent of total valid responses state that information technology is their highly 
relevant area of expertise, followed by 13, 5, and 4 percent for energy, utilities and 
transportation respectively. Other areas of expertise, including housing and building 
construction; environmental technologies and engineering; represent about 12 percent. 
Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1 present the whole situation for all experts’ degrees of
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relevance to the main areas of technology. This analysis clearly shows that chosen 
sample of experts are of high relevance to the technology issues studied.
% of Total Valid Responses 
16
14
12
10
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6
4
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0
Question 2:
2. Please indicate all areas o f expertise starting by the closest to vour field o f  
specialization = 1
Table 8.2: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ field of specialisation
Highly Relevant Medium Relevance Low Relevance % Per
%RT %RT %RT Sector
a. Research & Development 17.39 11.96 2.17 31.52
b. Design 7.61 9.78 7.61 25.00
c. Production 4.35 5.43 8.70 18.48
d. Management 6.52 8.70 5.43 20.65
e. Other: indicated below 3.26 1.09 0.00 4.35
% Responses 100.00
Total No. of Responses 92
% RT= Percentage of subgroup to total number of responses
Other: Consultancy in: environment, planning, engineering, and marketing
Concerning experts’ fields of specialisation, Table 8.2 shows that about 32 percent of 
experts work in research and development; while 25, 21, and 18 percent of the experts 
work in design, management, and production respectively. About 17 percent of 
experts were highly relevant to research and development; followed by 8, 7, and 4 
percent for design, management, and production respectively.
M Highly Relevant 
EH Medium Relevance 
H Low Relevance
ICTs Transportation Energy Utilities Other
Figure 8.1: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise
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This analysis demonstrates that the chosen sample of experts consists mainly of R&D 
and design experts, whom usually are of wider vision and more concerned about the 
future impacts of technology.
8.1.2 Extent and Nature o f Expected Technological Change
Question 3:
4. To what extent do you think current operation and production systems in vour field 
will be chansed in the next forty years?
The importance of this question is that it gives a general idea about how technology 
experts view the future impact of technological change on current operation and 
production systems. Statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this 
question revealed some important points (see Table 8.3 and Figure 8.2). F irst none of
the experts expect that there would be no change. Second, more than 50 percent of the
responses expect that future technological achievements will have an impressive
effect, and 37 percent of the responses expect a considerable change in current 
operation and production systems.
This analysis explicitly reveals the high expectancy level among technology experts 
about the future impact of technological achievements on current operation and
production systems during the next 30-40 years.
Table 8.3: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise
Level o f Change %
a) No change.................................................... 0
b) Some change............................................... 12.5
c) Considerable change................................. 37.5
d) Impressive change..................................... 50.0
60
50
40
30
20 12.5
10
0
No Change Impressive ChangeConsiderable ChangeSome Change
Figure 8.2: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ areas of expertise
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Question 4:
4. To the best o f vour knowledge and in vour area o f expertise, what are the main 
technological achievements exvected to influence the future o f urban development 
in the next 30-40 years? Please start bv the most influential achievement and 
briefly clarify each o f vour choices.
Table 8.4: Frequency distribution and descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses about 
the main technological achievements expected to influence the future of urban
development in the next 30-40 years?
Expected Influence (% responses) % Per 
SectorArea of Achievement A-Very High B-High C-Moderate D-Low Mean STDEV
%RT %RT %RT %RT
ICTs 16 11 8 6 W Q M 10.25 4.35
Energy, renewable energy 8 7 5 4 I P  v M 6.00 1.83
Transportation 5 4 4 2 3.75 1.26
Utilities 3 3 2 1 2.25 0.96
Environment 3 2 1 0 1.50 1.29
Manufacturing & New materials 1 1 1 1 j M m 1.00 0.00
Building, Construction, smart Homes 0 2 1 1 4 1.00 0.82
Responses Subtotal % 29 100
Total No of Responses 103
% RT Percent sector to total responses
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question clearly shows 
that information and telecommunications technologies are expected to be of very high 
influence on the future of urban development. About 16 percent of the responses 
expect that ICTs will be of very high influence on urban development followed by 
transportation and energy sectors. About 8 percent of the responses expect that energy 
technologies would be of very high influence. Also, about 9 and 6 percent of the 
responses expect that transportation and utilities technologies will be high influence 
(Table 8.4 and Figure 8.3). This analysis proves that ICTs, energy, transportation, and 
utilities are the main technologies expected to influence the urban future in developing 
countries.
ICTs
Energy
Transport
4   ytilitiesi—Environment^
2 ^|anufacture .
Construction
 5— - —1
High ModerateVery High Low
Figure 8.3: Expected influence of different technological sectors on the future of urban 
development in the next 30-40 years
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8.2 QUESTIONNAIRE H: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the received valid responses for the different questions will be 
thoroughly statistically analysed. In doing so, the statistical software SPSS (Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences) had been used in conjunction with Microsoft Excel 
Software. The data file generated by the online questionnaire replies, after 
incorporating the postal replies, was loaded to SPSS and Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
files and statistical analysis for each question has been run. Descriptive statistics and 
frequency distribution were the main statistical analyses applied. In order to avoid 
repetition, the discussion of results implications has directly followed the statistical 
analysis.
8.2.1 Experts Relevance to Main Areas o f Technology
Question 1:
I. From vour wide interests and experience. please indicate all areas o f expertise
starting bv the closest to vour field o f specialization = 1 
Table 8.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ relevance to main areas o f technology
Highly Relevant Medium Relevance Low Relevance % Per
% RT % RT % RT Sector
Information Technology ICT 10.40 7.20 9.60 27.20
Transportation 4.80 6.40 4.80 16.00
Energy 16.80 3.20 4.80 24.80
Utilities (water, sewer, gas) 7.20 8.00 2.40 17.60
Other 10.40 4.00 0.00 14.40
% Responses 49.60 28.80 21.60 100.00
Total number o f Valid Responses 125
Notes: % RT= Percentage o f subgroup to total number o f responses 
Other areas of interest include:
Environment and Sustainable Development 6 Engineering 4
Regarding experts’ interests and experience relevance to technology sectors studied in 
this research, 50 percent of the participating experts are highly relevant to these 
technologies, while 28 and 22 percent stated they are of medium and low relevance 
respectively. For about 17 percent of total valid responses, energy is their highly 
relevant area of expertise, followed by 10, 7, and 5 percent for ICTs, utilities and 
transportation respectively. Other areas of expertise, including environmental 
management; sustainable development and engineering; represent about 10 percent of 
the sample. Table 8.5 and Figure 8.4 present the whole situation for all experts’ 
interests and experience relevance to the main areas of technology.
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% o f Total Valid Responses 
T67&
II Highly Relevant 
M Medium Relevance 
Low Relevance
Energy ICTs Utilities Transportation Other
Figure 8.4: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ relevance to main areas of technology
This statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that the chosen sample of experts is of 
high relevance to the technology sectors studied. It also shows that the distribution of 
experts in this sample is significantly balanced among all technology sectors.
Question 2:
2. Please indicate all areas o f  work starting bv the closest to vour field o f
specialization  =  1 
Table 8.6: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ work relevance
Highly Relevant Medium Relevance | Low Relevance % Per 
Sector% RT % RT % RT
R&D 15.82 5.06 4.43 25.32
Design 5.06 5.70 5 06 15.82
Production 0.63 1.90 3.16 5.70
Management 4.43 7 59 6.96 18.99
Consultancy 8.86 13.29 1.90 24.05
Other 5.70 1.90 2.53 10.13
% Responses m m m o m m m m W M -W W B ■p-:^2£05 100.00
Total Responses 158
Notes: % RT= Percentage o f subgroup to total number o f responses 
Other areas of work include: Policy Analysis and Assessment 6 Education 3
Regarding experts’ work relevance to technology fields studied in this thesis, about 41 
percent of the experts stated they are highly relevant, while 35 and 24 percent of them 
were of medium and low relevance respectively (Table 8.6 and Figure 8.5). R&D is 
the sector of highest relevance to participating experts, of about 16 percent of the total 
experts. It is followed by design and management sectors, at 5 and 4 percent 
respectively.
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% o f Total Valid Responses
H Highly Relevant
^  Medium Relevance 
M Low Relevance
4-3,29-
yy.y. s.y.'vi-
R&D Consultancy Management Design Other Production
Figure 8.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ work relevance
This analysis demonstrates that the chosen sample of experts consists mainly of R&D,
consultancy, design, and management experts, whom usually are of wider and leading 
vision and more concerned about the future impacts of technology.
8.2.2 Expected Impacts of Technology
Question 3:
1. To what extent do you think current operation and production systems in vour field  
w ill be changed in the next thirty to forty years?
The importance of this question is that it gives a comprehensive idea about the 
expected technological change in all fields of technology under consideration in this 
thesis. The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question
revealed some important points: (Table 8.7).
1. None of the experts expect that there will be no change in their different fields of 
expertise.
2. More than half of the valid responses expect that current operation and production 
systems in all fields of expertise will experience a considerable change in the next 
30-40 years.
3. About 39 percent of responses expect an impressive change to occur during this 
period.
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Table 8.7: Descriptive statistics of responses to the extent to which current operation and
production systems expected to changed in the next Thirty to forty years
%V Illustration
No change = 0 0.00
Some change = 1 10.20 10.2
Considerable change = 2 51.02 51.02
Impressive change = 3 38.78 18.78
! 100.00 0Total
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
2.29Mean
Skew -0.35
0.65STDEV
N= Number o f valid responses %V= percent o f valid responses to total responses
This statistical analysis explicitly reveals the high expectancy level among technology 
experts about the future high rate of change in operation and production systems. Such 
change could impose considerable impacts on the socio-economic and urban 
conditions of societies during the next 30-40 years.
Question 4:
4. How much do you expect technological achievements to influence the urban life in the next 
30-40 years?
Concerning the expected influence of technology on different urban life aspects, 
technology experts’ responses to this question give a comprehensive idea about the 
over all impacts of all technology sectors. The statistical analysis of these responses, 
presented in Table 8.8, Figure 8.6, and Table A4.1 in Appendix 4, came to the 
following important results:
1. Regarding the relation between home and work, about 50 percent of responses 
state that the total amount of time needed for travelling to work & other daily 
activities is expected to decline at an average of -0.18 (mean). Moreover, about 60 
percent of responses state that the usual interdependence between place of 
residence and work location is also expected to decline (-0.51). Also, about 65 
percent of technology experts expect that the commuting distance between home 
and work will increase significantly. This could be attributed to the advancements 
and spread of telecommunications or transportation technologies; either private or 
public transportation.
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2. Population mobility, through both public and private transportation modes, is 
expected to increase. For public transportation, about 63 percent of responses to 
this category expected an increase in the use of public transportation. About 60 
percent of the responses expected the same for the use of private transportation. 
Moreover, these responses reveal that both the public and the private 
transportation will experience the highest level of increase among all other urban 
life aspects examined, with an expected average increase (mean) of about 0.80 
and 0.84 respectively.
3. Settling in remote and uninhabited areas is expected by 65 percent of the 
responses to increase significantly at an average of 0.77 (mean), with the lowest 
STDEV among all other variables (1.452).
Table 8.8: Descriptive statistics of responses to the expected influence of technological achievements 
on urban life during the next 30-40 years
Variables
a) Total amount of time spent travelling to
work & other daily activities
b) Interdependence between place of 
residence and work location
c) Settling in remote or uninhabited
areas
d) Commuting distance between home
and work
e) The Use o f public transportation
f) Private transportation ownership
N= Number o f valid responses 
STDEV= Standard Deviation
Mean
-0.18
-0.51
0.77
0.75
0.80
0.84
Mean value illustrationSTDEV
-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses reflects the high expectancy 
level among technology experts about the importance of the future role of technology. 
It also demonstrates that the long-established close relationship between work location 
and place of residence will start loosening. Advancements and spread of transport 
technologies, public and private, is expected to significantly increase population 
mobility. This means that people will be more able than before to select their place of 
residence with lower influence of work location as determining factor. Therefore, it is 
expected that remote and uninhabited areas will experience more urban activities as 
they are of considerable environmental qualities and of cheap land prices.
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%  of Responses per variable 
40 H A-Total travelling time to work & other daily activities 
H B-Interdependence between work and residence 
H C-Settling in remote or uninhabited areas 
^  D-Commuting distance between home and work 
11 E-Use of public transportation 
H F-Private transportation ownership
0 = no change 
Level of Change IncreaseD ecrease
Figure 8.6: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected influence of technological 
achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years
Question 5:
5. In the area o f urban transportation. how much do you expect technological 
advancements to affect the follow ins aspects?
Concerning the expected impacts of the future technological advancements in urban
transportation, the statistical analysis of valid responses shows that:
1. All examined transport categories are expected to increase in the next 30-40 years. 
The highest expected increase is in vehicle capabilities and safety with an average 
increase of about 2.05 (mean), and followed by both the role public transportation 
on regional level and the role of public air transport with an average increase of 
1.32 and 1.26 respectively. About 75 percent of the responses expect an increase 
in role of public transportation at both the regional and local levels during the next 
30-40 years at an average of 1.32 and 1.09 respectively. This confirms the results 
reached in Question 4 reflects that public transport is highly expected to play the 
leading role among other transport modes in the expected increase of population 
mobility discussed earlier. Table 8.9 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
responses to all transport variables studied.
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2. Regarding vehicle capabilities and safety, 95 per of the responses expect that
vehicle capabilities and safety will experience the highest increase among all
other variables (2.05), with the lowest STDEV (0.85).
3. For the expected role of private transportation, 65 percent of responses expect an 
increase in the future role of private transportation at an average of 0.737.
4. For the future role of air transportation, about 72 percent of the responses expect a
considerable increase in public air transportation. The expected increase in the
role of public air transportation is more than that of private transport and public 
transport at local level. Also, about 47 percent of the responses expect an increase 
in the future role of private air transportation. Thus, air transportation, is expected 
to play a more influential role in urban development, especially at the regional
level.
Figure 8.7 and Table A4.2 (in Appendix 4) presents the frequency distribution of
technology experts’ responses to all transport variables examined.
Table 8.9: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
advancements in urban transport technologies
Variables N Mean
a) Vehicle speed 55 0.364
b) Vehicle capabilities & safety 
(Navigation systems, etc.) 57 2.053
c) Role o f private transportation 57 0.737
d) Role o f public transportation 
at local level 57 1.088
e) Role o f Public transportation 
at regional level 56 1.321
f) Role o f public air 
transportation 54 1.259
g) Role o f private air 
transportation 50 0.600
STDEV Mean value illustration
mmst
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
N= Number o f valid responses
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question demonstrates 
that transportation technology is highly expected to affect the future of urbanisation. 
Public transportation, at both the regional and local levels, as well as the increasing 
use of private transportation will considerably increase population mobility in the next 
30-40 years. The expected increasing in vehicle’s capabilities and safety and in the 
role of public and private transportation, including the expected increase in the role of 
air transportation, clearly demonstrate that transport technologies will induce
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considerable changes in the existing urban patterns and will open up new opportunities 
for urbanisation in rural and remote regions.
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Figure 8.7: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected impacts of advancements in urban
transport technologies
Question 6:
6. To the best o f vour knowledge, how much do you expect renewable energy sources 
(solar, wind,, etc) to affect the following aspects?
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question reveals that:
1. Dependence on fossil fuels is expected, by 82 percent of the responses, to 
considerably decline in the next 30-40 years with an average of -1.16 (mean). This 
means that an increase the use of renewable energies is highly expected.
2. About 84 percent of the responses expect that the cost of renewable energy
production will considerably decline at an average of -1.33. About 63 percent of 
responses expect that the cost of energy supply networks (solar, wind) will decline 
at an average of -0.62. This reflects the high expectancy that the use of renewable 
energy will be economically feasible.
3. Regarding the future urban impacts of renewable energy, about 47 percent of
technology experts’ responses expect that energy technologies will increase the
ability of settling out of congested areas at an average of 0.75. Also, about 44
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percent of the responses expect that the freedom of locating new urban 
communities will increase at an average of 0.35. However, about 33 and 32 
percent of the responses expect that there will be no change in these two variables. 
Although these ratios are high, they are lower than that of those who expect that 
there will be an increase in these two variables. Also, this is may be because 
technology experts are not highly aware of the spatial impacts of technology.
Table 8.10, Figure 8.8, and Table A4.3 (in Appendix 4) present the descriptive and the 
frequency distribution statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected 
impacts of renewable energy technologies.
Table 8.10: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc) on some urban aspects
a) Dependence on fossil fuels
N 1 
57
Mean i 
-1.16
STDEV Skew Mean value illustration
1.37 0.94 -1.1
b) The cost of renewable-energy 
production (solar, wind) 57 -1.33 1.21 1.17
1 1 1 1 J| i l i iJL3.1
c) Settling out of congested areas 51 0.75 1.13 0.09 c
]
0.75
d) The cost of energy supply 
networks (solar, wind ...) 55 -0.62 1.33 0.73
j
- 0.32 M D
e) The freedom of locating new 
urban communities 54 0.35 1.39 -0.54 E 1&3 5
-1.5 -1.25 -1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses reveals experts’ consensus 
that renewable energy is growing rapidly and is considerably challenging the 
traditional role of fossil fuels. It is expected that renewable energy technologies will 
free people from the necessity of being gathered in large urban centres, which is 
needed to ensure the economic operation of large fossil fuel stations. Future energy 
technologies are expected to open up new opportunities for the development of remote 
and uninhabited areas and to facilitate the start of new urbanisation activities in these 
areas.
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Figure 8.8: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc)
Question 7:
7. In the area o f utilities, to what extent do you expect technological advancements to 
affect the following aspects?
Table 8.11: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in urban 
utilities technologies
a) Introduction o f new techniques 
for water purification
N
42
Mean
1.71
STDEV Mean value illustration
0.89 .71
b) Introduction of new techniques 
for sanitary treatment 43 1.51 0.77 1.51
c) Introduction o f small water & 
sanitary treatment units 42 1.52 0.94 1.52
d) Facilitation o f settling remote 
areas 46 1.20 1.17
—
_ _ _ _ _ i  1.04
.20
e) Environmental improvement of  
rural communities 46 1.04 1.07
STDEV Standard Deviation 0 Q 25 Q 5 Q75 1 1 2g 1 g 1 75 2
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question reveals the 
following important results:
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1. Regarding the introduction of new water purification techniques, about 83 percent 
of the responses expect that it will experience the highest increase among all other 
variables examined, at an average of 1.71.
2. For water and sanitary treatment, about 87 percent of the responses expect that the
introduction of new techniques for sanitary treatment will increase at an average
of 1.51. Also, about 80 percent of the responses expect that the introduction of
small water & sanitary treatment units will increase at an average of 1.52.
3. Regarding the regional impacts of these technologies, about 78 percent of
responses expect that utilities technologies will help improve the environment of 
rural areas at an average of 1.04. Also, about 74 percent of these responses expect 
that these technologies will facilitate settling remote areas at an average of 1.20.
Table 8.11, Figure 8.9, and Table A4.4 (in Appendix 4) present the descriptive and 
frequency distribution statistics of technology experts’ responses about the expected 
impacts of urban utilities technologies.
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Figure 8.9: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in
urban utilities technologies
This high level of expectancy about the future impacts of urban utilities technologies 
clearly shows that these technologies could play a significant role in shaping the urban 
future. The expected increase in the introduction of new techniques for water 
purification and sanitary treatment as well as the increase in the introduction of small- 
scale water and sanitary treatment units will help overcome one of the main obstacles
212
H A-new techniques for water purification
□  B-new techniques for water purification 
EC-small water & sanitary treatment units
□  D-Settling remote areas
E E-Environmental improvement of rural communities
-3
D e c r e a s e
-2
I n c r e a s e
-1 0 = no change 1
Level of Change
in inhabiting remote or rural areas, especially for small-size settlements and will 
considerably facilitate the process of urban decentralisation.
Question 8:
8. In the area o f telecommunication and information technology. to what extent do you 
exvect technological advancements in the next 30-40 years to affect the following 
aspects?
Table 8.12: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
telecommunication and information technologies
N Mean STDEV Skew Mean value illustration
a) Home-based work 57 1.89 0.82 -0.41
b) Remote education 57 1.98 0.81 -0.38
T T T T .89
1.98
c) Online shopping 56 1.96 0.76 0.06 1.96
d) Home entertainment 57 2.21 0.80 -0.40 2.2ie) Concentration of business in CBD of existing cities 51 -0.18 1.60 0.05 0.18
f) Preserve current working 
conditions
1lQ0~
53 - 1.00 1.11 0.44
54 -0.13 1.36 0.24 - 0.1g) Congestion of existing urban centres....................
STDEV= Standard Deviation - 1.3 -1 - 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2  2.25 2.5
According to the statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses, information and
telecommunication technologies are expected to have impressive impacts on various
urban life aspects. Table 8.12 presents the descriptive statistics, while Figure 8.10 and
Table A4.5 (in Appendix 4) present the frequency distribution of these responses. The
main results of this analysis are:
1. Regarding the expected impacts of ICTs on work and living conditions, about 95 
percent of the responses expect that ICTs will considerably increase the home- 
based work at an average of 1.89 (mean). More important, about 70 percent of the 
responses expect a considerable decline in preserving current working condition at 
an average of 1.11. Also, about 98 and 96 percent of the responses expect that
ICTs will considerably increase online shopping and remote education at an
average of 1.96 and 1.98 respectively. All technology experts (100%) expect that 
home entertainment will experience the highest level of increase among all other 
categories, at an average of 2.21.
The main implication of these results is that new functions will be added to the
house. Work and education are the most prominent of these functions. Also, house
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is expected to be more enjoyable and that more time could be spent in the house. 
This reflects that houses could move further away of large urban concentrations.
2. Regarding the expected urban impacts of ICTs, about 47 percent of the responses 
expect that the concentration of business activities in CBDs of existing cities will 
experience some decline. For the congestion of existing urban centres, about 44 
percent of the responses expect similar attitude of decline.
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Figure 8.10: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
telecommunication and information technologies
The high expectancy level of technology experts about the future impacts of ICTs on 
different urban life aspects suggests some important implications. First, the expected 
high increase in tele-work, distance education, and online shopping shows that large 
cities will lose -to some extent- its role as centre for work, education, and commerce. 
Second, the need to settle in these large cities will considerably decline. Third, these 
impacts will increase the attractiveness of the small urban communities and will 
significantly facilitate the implementation of the proposed small-size settlements and 
urban decentralisation approaches. Fourth, the expected decline in both the 
concentration of business activities in CBDs of existing cities and in the congestion of
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existing urban centres necessitates the adoption of new policies for the future 
development of these cities taking into account the expected change in their size and 
function.
Question 9:
9. To the best o f vour knowledge, how much do you expect future impacts o f 
technological achievements to alter the urban pattern?
Responses of the technology experts about the expected urban impacts of technology 
are important as they reflect the overall perception of technology experts about the 
urban impacts of all and interrelated technologies. Although technology experts may 
be of limited knowledge about spatial and urban impacts of technological change, 
their responses could be used a guide about the possible urban changes.
Table 8.13: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of overall 
technological achievements on urban patterns
Variables
a) Concentration o f population in 
few urban centres
b) Dispersion of urban population 
to the suburbs_______________
c) Dispersion of urban population 
to rural settlements__________
d) Emergence of remote isolated 
urban communities_________
e) The size o f future new urban 
settlements
f) The future size of existing cities 
N= Number o f Responses STDEV= Standard Deviation 0
Mean value illustrationMean STDEV
a  o.8
0.25 0.5 0.75
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses shows that:
1. Regarding the expected impact of future technology achievements on the
dispersion of urban population, about 65 percent of the responses expect some 
increase in population dispersion to the suburbs at an average of 0.87 (mean), with 
lowest standard deviation (Table 8.13). Also, about 65 percent of the responses 
expect some increase in the dispersion of urban population to rural areas at an 
average of 0.85. On the other hand, about 56 percent of the responses expect some 
increase in the emergence of remote isolated urban communities at an average of
0.82. However, 49 percent of the responses expect a slight increase in the 
concentration of population in few urban centres.
This reflects the high consensus among technology experts that future 
technological achievements will facilitate population dispersion. Although the
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expected increase in population concentration in few urban centres seems in 
contradiction of the expected population dispersion, it should be notes that such 
increase is less than the half of the expected increase either to the suburbs, rural 
areas, or to new settlements.
2. Regarding settlement size, about 45 percent of the responses expect some increase 
in the size of future new urban settlements at an average of 0.38. And about 64 
percent of the responses expect some increase in the future size of existing cities 
at an average of 0.80 (Figure 8.11 and Table A4.6 in Appendix 4). However, such 
expected increase in the future size of existing cities contradicts with the expected 
increase of population dispersion and with expected decline in the congestion of 
existing urban centres (Question 8).
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Figure 8.11: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
overall technological achievements on urban patterns
The main conclusion that can be drawn out of the responses to this question is that 
population dispersion to the suburbs, rural areas and to the remote areas is highly 
expected.
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£1 B-Dispersion of urban population to the suburbs 
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8.2.3 Technology Transfer and its Impacts in Developing Countries
Question 10:
10. How much do you expect the rate o f transferrins these technological achievements to affect 
urban life in progressive developing countries in the next 30-40 years?
Table 8.14: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses about how the rate of 
technology transfer is expected to affect urban life in progressive developing countries 
in the next 30-40 years
%  V Illustration%V
a) Decrease 1.92 - 1:32
b) No change 5.77 5.77
HIc) Some increase 46.15 46 15
d) Considerable change 38.46 38.46
e) Impressive change 7.69 .69
Total 100
N = Number o f valid responses V. % = Valid percent
Regarding the impact of technology transfer on urban life in developing countries 
during the next 30-40 years, the statistical analysis of the technology experts’ 
responses shows that about 92 percent of responses expect an increase, of different 
levels, in the impact of technology transfer on urban life in these countries (Table
8.14). Of this percentage, about 38 percent expect a considerable increase, and about 8 
percent expect an impressive increase in the impact of technology transfer on urban
life in developing countries. Also, about 46 percent expect that there will be some
increase. This is while only 6 percent expect that there will be no change.
The statistical analysis of technology experts’ responses to this question clearly 
demonstrates that technology transfer to developing countries is highly expected to
have a considerable impact on urban change in these countries. This implies the need
to investigate the possible and the best approaches for managing future urban change 
in developing countries to meet the expected impacts of technological change.
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Question 11:
11. Regarding technology transfer to developing countries. how much do you think it 
had been in the vast ten years and how much do you expect it will be in the next 
30-40 years?
Table 8.15: Descriptive statistics of technology experts’ responses about the past and the expected 
levels of technology transfer to developing countries.
a) The future importance of markets in 
developing countries
b) Transfer of telecommunication 
technologies in past ten years
c) Transfer of telecommunication 
technologies in next 30-40 years
d) Transfer of transportation technologies 
in the past ten years
e) Transfer of transportation technologies 
in next 30-40 years
f) Transfer o f utility technologies in the 
past ten years.
g) Transfer of utility technologies in the 
next 30-40 years.
h) Future importance of developing 
countries markets in technology transfer.
N= Number o f Responses STDEV= Standard Deviation
Mean value illustrationSTDEV
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
The statistical analysis of the technology experts’ responses to this question clearly
shows that:
1. Regarding the last ten years, technology experts’ responses confirm that
technology transfer to developing countries was increasing in all technology
sectors during that period. About 84 percent of the responses state that there was a
considerable increase in the transfer of telecommunications technologies to
developing countries at an average of 1.46. Also, about 65 percent of the 
responses stated that there were similar in the transfer of both transportation and
utilities technologies at an average of 0.84 and 1.02 respectively. Figure 8.12 and
Table A4.7 (in Appendix 4) present the frequency distribution of these responses.
2. Regarding the next 30-40 years, technology experts expect that technology
transfer to developing countries will considerably increase during that period. 
About 94 percent of the responses expect that there will be a considerable increase 
in the transfer of both telecommunication and transport technologies at an average 
of 2.00 and 1.67 respectively. About 86 percent of the responses expect a 
considerable increase in the transfer of utilities technologies at an average of 1.86.
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3. Regarding the future importance of developing countries markets in technology 
transfer, about 94 percent of the responses expect that the importance these 
market will significantly increase at an average of 1.90.
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Figure 8.12: Frequency distribution of the technology experts’ responses about technology transfer
to developing countries
This statistical analysis clearly shows that the transfer of telecommunication, 
transportation, and utilities technologies to developing countries is highly expected to 
increase substantially during the next 30-40 years. This expected high increase in 
technology transfer to developing countries would certainly affect urban change 
patterns in these countries.
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8.3 QUESTIONNAIRE ffl: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the received valid responses of urban experts for each question are 
statistically analysed. In doing so, the data file was first developed using the urban 
experts responses in the two rounds. The old responses of experts who participated in 
the second round have been replaced by the new ones, while responses of experts who 
did not participate in that round are left the same as they were in the first round. Then, 
the developed data file was loaded on SPSS and Microsoft Excel and the statistical 
analysis for each question had been run. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, and skewness) and frequency distribution were the main statistical analyses 
applied. In this analysis, all responses are treated on the basis of equal value and 
frequency distribution is used as the main criterion for measuring experts’ consensus. 
In order to avoid repetition, the discussion of results implications has directly followed 
the statistical analysis.
In the analysis of this questionnaire, related questions are grouped according to their 
main objective under the title of their objective.
8.3.1 Experts Relevance to Main Areas o f Urban Development
Question 1:
2. From your wide interests and experience, please indicate all areas o f expertise 
starting by the closest to your field o f specialization = 1
Table 8.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ relevance to main areas of expertise
Highly Relevant Medium Relevance Low Relevance
% T % T % T
Urban Academics 26.09 4.35 2.90 33.33
City Planners 10.14 11.59 5.07 26.81
City Planning Officials 2.90 2.90 4.35 10.14
Architects 11.59 4.35 2.17 18.12
Other 6.52 4.35 0.72 11.59
%  Responses 57.25 27.54 15.22 100.00
Total Valid Responses 138
Notes: % T= Percentage o f subgroup to total number o f responses 
Other areas of interest include:
Housing and Building Services 4 Transportation Planning 3
GIS urban applications 2
Concerning experts’ experience relevance to the main areas of urban expertise, 57 
percent of the participating experts are highly relevant to their areas of expertise, while
22 0
28 and 15 percent are of medium and low relevance respectively. Urban academic is 
the highly relevant area of expertise for about 26 percent of participating experts, 
followed by 11, 10, and 3 percent for architects, city planners and city planning 
officials respectively. Other areas of expertise, including housing and building 
services, transportation planning and GIS urban applications are the highly relevant 
areas of expertise for about 7 percent of the participating experts. Table 8.16 and 
Figure 8.13 present the frequency distribution of responses regarding experts’ degrees 
of relevance to the main areas of urban expertise. This analysis clearly shows that the 
selected sample of experts is of high relevance to the urban issues studied.
% of Total Valid Responses
m  Highly Relevant (57%)
H Medium Relevance (28%) 
□  Low Relevance (15%)
279 27?
Urban Academics Architects City Planners City Planning 
Officials
Other
Figure 8.13: Frequency distribution of responses about experts’ relevance to the main areas of
expertise
This statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that the chosen sample of urban experts is 
o f high relevance to the subject of this study.
8.3.2 Expected Urban Impacts o f Main Technological Forces
Question 2:
2. To what extent do you think future technological advancements will affect urban 
development in developing countries in the next 30-40 years?
The importance of this question is that it gives a comprehensive idea about how urban 
experts view the future impacts of technological change on urban development in 
developing countries. Statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question 
reveals the following important points (Figure 8.14):
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1. None of urban experts expects that there would be no change.
2. Half of them expect that future technological achievements will be of 
considerable effect on urban development in developing countries in the next 30- 
40 years.
3. About 28 and 13 percent of them expect that technological achievements will be 
of medium and impressive effects respectively.
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Figure 8.14: Frequency distribution of responses about the expected technology impacts on urban
development in developing countries
This analysis explicitly demonstrates the high expectancy level among urban experts 
that future technological achievements will have a considerable impact on urban 
development in developing countries during the next 30-40 years.
Question 3:
3. To the best o f vour knowledge, what are the main technological advancements you expect to 
influence the future urban development policies? Please start by what you think the most 
influential
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question shows that ICTs 
are expected to be of very high influence on the future of urban development (Figure
8.15). About 24 percent of responses expect that ICTs will be the most influential, 
followed by transportation (13%), energy (9%) and urban utilities technologies (8%).
222
%
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 8.15: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected influence of 
different technology sectors on urban development future
The main implication of theses results, and as ICTs are expected to be of the highest 
high influence on the future of urban development in developing countries, and 
because of the rapid and impressive advancement of these technologies, there will be a 
considerable degree of uncertainty in defining its urban impacts.
Question 4:
4. How do you expect future technological advancements to influence the follow ins urban life 
aspects in the next forty years?
Concerning the expected influence of technology on different urban life aspects, urban 
experts’ responses to this question reflect experts’ perception of the impacts of all 
technologies together. Table 8.17 presents the descriptive statistics of the valid 
responses received.
The statistical analysis of responses to this question (presented in Table 8.17, Figure 
8.16, and Table A4.8 in Appendix 4) reveals that:
1. Regarding the relationship between home and work, about 64 percent of the 
responses state that the total amount of time needed for travelling to work & other 
daily activities is expected to decline (mean = -0.72). Also, 49 percent of the valid 
responses expect that the usual interdependence between place of residence and 
work location will decline (mean = -0.29). Moreover, about 67 percent of the 
responses expect that the commuting distance between home and work will 
increase significantly. These expectations confirm with those of technology 
experts (Question 4 in Questionnaire II) and demonstrate the high confidence that
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the relationship between work location and place of residence will start loosening. 
The main implication of these results is that these technologies will facilitate 
population dispersion in developing countries.
2. Regarding the expected change in transportation patterns, private transportation is 
expected to increase at a rate higher than that of public transportation. About 74 
percent of responses expect that private transportation will considerably increase 
at an average of 1.31 (with lowest STDEV of 1.38), while 65 percent of responses 
expect that the use of public transportation will increase at an average of 0.85. 
Technology experts’ responses to Question 4 and Question 5 show different 
attitude stressing that public transport will play the leading role among other 
transport modes in increasing population mobility. However, both urban and 
technology experts expect that population mobility will significantly increase.
3. Regarding the expected changes in factors affecting the urban environment, urban 
experts expect that technological achievements will increase the attractiveness of 
rural settlements more than that of urban ones. About 51 percents of the responses 
indicate that the attractiveness of rural centres to urban population is expected to 
increase at an average of 0.49, while 49 percent of the responses show that 
attractiveness of urban centres will increase at an average of 0.36 only. Also, 
about 59 percent of valid responses expect that settling remote and uninhabited 
areas will increase at an average of 0.51. This result confirms with technology 
experts’ expectations (Question 4 in Questionnaire II).
Table 8.17: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of 
technological achievements on urban life aspects during the next 30-40 years.
Variables
A) Time spent travelling for 
work & daily activities
B) Interdependence between 
residence & work location
C) Settling in remote or 
uninhabited areas
D) Commuting distance 
between home and work
E) The use o f public 
transportation
F) Private transportation 
ownership
G) Attractiveness o f urban 
centres to rural population
H) Attractiveness of rural 
centres to urban population
N= Number o f valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation
Mean Value IllustrationSTDEV
   ! 0 55
i i  ^ i
J 0.
MU
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
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Figure 8.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of 
technological achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years
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The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question, and in 
confirmation with technology experts’ expectations (Question 4 in Questionnaire II) 
reflects the high consensus among urban experts about the importance of future role of 
technology. These technologies, especially the ICTs, are expected to loosen the long- 
established close relationship between work location and place of residence. Also, the 
advancements and spread of transportation technologies are expected to significantly 
increase population mobility. Therefore, it is expected that people will be more able 
than before to select their place of residence with lower influence of work location as 
determining factor. Also, it is expected that rural and remote areas will attract more 
urban activities.
Question 5:
5. In the area o f urban transportation, how do you expect technological advancements to affect 
the following aspects in developing countries?
Table 8.18: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of urban 
transport technologies in developing countries.
Mean Value IllustrationVariables STDEV
a) Vehicle speed
b) Vehicle capabilities and safety
1.26c) The role of private transportation.
d) The role o f public transport at 
local level
e) The role o f public transport at 
regional level
f) The role o f public an 
transportation
g) The role o f private an 
transportation
h) Population Mobility
i) The ability to settle in remote 
areas
N= Number o f valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation 0 0.5 1.5
Concerning the expected impacts of the future advancements in urban transportation 
technologies, the statistical analysis of valid responses shows that:
1. All examined categories are expected to increase in developing countries during 
the next 30-40 years. Table 8.18 presents the descriptive statistics of urban experts’ 
responses for all transport categories studied. Figure 8.17 and Table A4.9 (in 
Appendix 4) present the frequency distribution of these responses.
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2. Regarding population mobility, which gives a general idea about the over all 
impact of transport technologies, about 87 percent of the responses expect a 
considerable increase in this category with the highest mean of 1.79.
3. Regarding vehicle design, about 87 percent of the responses expect a considerable 
increase in vehicle capabilities and safety with the second highest mean of 1.69 
and the lowest standard deviation of 1.01. Also, about 66 percent of the responses 
expect that vehicle speed will increase at an average of 0.8.
4. For the expected role of different transport modes, the role of public transport at 
regional level is expected to grow higher that of all other modes. About 87 percent 
of the responses expect an average increase of 1.38 (mean) in the future role of 
public transport at regional level, while about 79 and 77 percent of the responses 
expect an increase of 1.26 and 1.10 (mean) in the roles of private transport and 
public transport at local level respectively. This coincides with technology experts’ 
expectation (Question 5 in Questionnaire II) and reflects the importance of the 
future role of public transportation. For the future role of air transport, about 69 
and 64 percent of the responses expect a considerable increase of 1.26 and 1.10 
(mean) in the roles of public and private air transport respectively. This expected 
increase reflects that air transportation is expected to influence urban change in 
developing countries, especially on the regional level.
5. Regarding the expected urban impacts of transport technologies, urban experts
expect that technological achievements will increase the attractiveness of About 74 
percent of urban experts expect that transport technology will considerably 
increase the ability to settle in remote areas at an average of 1.32.
The statistical analysis of the urban experts’ responses to this question clearly 
demonstrates that transportation technologies will considerably increase population
mobility and will influence the urban future in developing countries. The role of
public and private transportation, including air transportation, is also expected to 
increase. The expected increase in population mobility is expected to increase their
ability to reside in areas further away from the city. Also, the expected increase in the 
role of public transportation and public air transport is that it will introduce serious 
urban changes, mainly at the regional level. In this regard, it is highly expected that 
transport technology will considerably increase the ability to settle in remote areas.
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Figure 8.17: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
transport technologies in developing countries
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Question 6:
6. To the best o f your knowledge, to what extent do you expect renewable energy sources (solar, 
wind., etc) to affect the following aspects in developing countries?
Table 8.19: Descriptive statistics o f urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries.
Variables N Mean
-0.89
STDEV Skew Mean Value Illustration
a) Dependence on fossil fuels 56 1.50 0.72 b b m b |
b) The cost o f renewable-energy 
production 55 -0.95 1.60 0.61 ■ ■
c) Settling out o f congested urban 
areas 57 0.93 1.29 -0.22 ).93
d) The cost o f energy supply 
networks (solar, wind) 58 -0.55 1.60 0.42
i
-0.55 (1n _
e) The ability to settle in remote 
areas 59 1.14 1.36 -0.85
i i iH i-i4
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses about the future impacts of energy
technologies in developing countries reveals that:
1. For the future dependence on fossil fuels, about 66 percent of these responses
expect that such dependence will decline at an average of -0.89 (mean). This 
could be attributed to the declining cost of renewable energies in addition to their 
environmental advantages.
2. Regarding the costs of renewable-energy, about, 64 percent of the responses
expect that it will decline at an average of -0.95 (mean). Also, about 58 percent of 
the responses expect some decline in the cost of energy supply networks (solar, 
wind) (-0.55). These results highly confirms with technology experts’ 
expectations.
3. Regarding the ability of relocation, about 58 percent of urban experts’ responses 
expect that the future advancements of renewable energy technologies will 
increase the ability to settle out of congested areas, mainly around existing large 
cities, at an average of 0.93, with lowest standard deviation (1.29). Although the 
ratio of those who expect that there will be no change is relatively high (27
percent), the ratio of those who expect an increase is more than the double (58
percent). Moreover, 71 percent of these responses expect an increase in the ability 
to settle in remote areas, mainly in independent settlements, at an average of 1.14. 
Again this could be attributed to the fact that renewable energies offer economic 
alternatives for energy supply in these areas in developing countries.
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Table 8.19 presents the descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to this 
question. Figure 8.18 and Table A4.10 (in Appendix 4) present the frequency 
distribution of these responses.
%  of Responses per variable 
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Figure 8.18: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries.
This analysis demonstrates the high expectancy level among urban experts that 
advancements of renewable energy technologies will decrease the dependence on 
fossil fuels. In addition, they expect that these technologies will facilitate the 
dispersion of urban population out of congested urban areas towards the rural and 
remote areas. These technologies is expected to free people from the necessity of 
being gathered in large urban centres, which is needed to ensure the economic 
operation of large fossil fuel stations.
0A-Dependence on fossil fuels
□  B-Cost of renewable-energy production 
EC-Settling out of congested urban areas 
0! D-Cost of renewable energy networks
□  E-Ability to settle in remote areas
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Question 7:
7. In the area o f utilities, to what extent do you expect technological achievements to affect the 
following aspects?
In area of urban utilities, the statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses reveals the 
high expectancy level about the future impacts of urban utilities technological 
achievements (Table 8.20, Figure 8.19 and Table A 4.ll in Appendix 4). Through this 
analysis, the following results have been reached:
1. About 91 percent of the responses expect a considerable increase in the 
introduction of new techniques for water purification at an average of 1.80. Also, 
about 90 percent of these responses expect a considerable increase in the 
introduction of both new techniques for sanitary treatment and small water & 
sanitary treatment units at an average of 1.81 and 1.74 respectively. These results 
confirm with technology experts responses to Question 7 in Questionnaire II.
2. Regarding ability to relocate, about 80 percent of these responses expect that 
technological achievements in area of urban utilities will considerably facilitate 
settling in remote area and will considerably improve the environment of rural 
communities at an average of 1.24 and 1.37 respectively.
Table 8.20: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries.
Variables
a) Introduction o f new techniques for 
water purification
b) Introduction of new techniques for 
sanitary treatment
c) Introduction o f small water & 
sanitary treatment units
d) Facilitation o f settling remote areas
e) Environmental improvement o f  
rural communities
N= Number o f valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation 0
Mean Value IllustrationSTDEV
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Figure 8.19: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of 
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries
This analysis clearly demonstrates that technological advancements in urban utilities, 
especially in the introduction of small water and sanitary treatment units, are highly 
expected to overcome one of the main problems that confronted the dispersion of 
urban population to rural and remote areas and that these technologies would support 
the development of small-size settlements. This will be of considerable importance for 
the future of urban development in developing countries.
Question 8:
8. In the area o f telecommunication and information technology. to what extent do vou expect 
technological achievements in the next 30-40 years to affect the following aspects in 
developing countries?
Urban experts expect that ICTs will be of considerable impact on urban development 
in developing countries during the next 30-40 years. The statistical analysis of their 
responses, (Table 8.21, Figure 8.20 and Table A4.12 in Appendix 4), reveals that:
1. Regarding the expected changes in work and living conditions, about 98 percent 
of the responses expect that ICTs will considerably increase the home-based 
work, remote education, and home entertainment at an average (mean) of 1.97,
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2.13, and 1.95 respectively. Also, about 90 percent of the responses expect a 
considerable increase in remote social interaction and online shopping at an 
average of 1.92 and 1.69 respectively. About 83 percent of the responses expect a 
considerable change in the prevailing working condition (1.55).
2. Regarding the expected urban impacts of ICTs, about 63 percent of the responses 
expect some decline in the concentration of business activities in CBDs of 
existing cities (-0.55), and about 46 percent of the responses expect a slight 
decline in the congestion of existing urban centres (-0.25). Moreover, about 70 
percent of the responses expect a considerable increase in the ability to settle in 
remote regions (1.14).
Table 8.21: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about impacts of telecommunication 
& information technology in developing countries during the next 30-40 years.
Variables
a) Home-based work
b) Remote education (open 
universities, teleconferencing)
c) Remote social interaction (video 
phones, internet,....)
d) Online shopping
e) Home entertainment
f) Concentration of businesses in 
CBD of existing cities
g) Change in current work 
conditions._________
h) Congestion of existing urban 
centres _______ _
i) The cost of telephone and energy 
networks________________
j) The ability to settle in remote 
areas
Mean Value IllustrationSTDEV
i.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25
233
% o f Responses per variable
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
I! A-Home-based work 
H B-Remote education 
HC-Remote social interaction 
HD-Online shopping 
□  E-Home entertainment
1
-3
D e c r e a s e
-2 -1 0 = no change 1
Level of Change
% of Responses per variable
I n c r e a s e
HF-Concentration of businesses in CBD of existing cities 
G-Change in current work conditions 
□  H-Congestion of existing urban centres 
H I-Cost of telephone and energy networks
ED J-Ability to settle _
D e c r e a s e
■1 0 = no change 1
Level of Change I n c r e a s e
Figure 8.20: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of 
telecommunication & information technology in developing countries
This analysis clearly demonstrates that ICTs are expected to have considerable 
impacts on the urban future in developing countries. Urban experts highly expect that 
ICTs will facilitate home-based work and many other tele-activities. This expected 
increase in tele-activities will decrease the importance of large cities as centre for
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work, education, and commerce. Also, these technological advancements will increase 
the attractiveness of the small urban communities and will significantly facilitate the 
implementation of the proposed small-size settlements and urban decentralisation 
approaches. Also it is expected that ICTs will facilitate the dispersion of urban 
population out of congested areas to rural and remote areas, as these technologies will 
help overcome many of the problems that previously obstructed such process.
Question 9:
9. To the best o f vour knowledge, how much do you exvect future technological 
achievements to alter the movement o f urban population in developing countries?
Table 8.22: Descriptive statistics o f urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries.
Variables N Mean S T D E V Skew Mean Value Illustration
g) Concentration of population in few 
urban centres 59 -0.42 1.80 0.21 r ~  1
h )  Dispersion of urban population to rural 
settlements 59 0.41 1.50 -0.13
-UTTZ— H i if41 " 1
i) Dispersion of urban population to the 
suburbs 59 1.66 0.98 -0.64
j
■ ■ ■ i 3  1.66
j
j) Dispersion of urban population to new 
urban centres around existing large cities 60 1.83 0.94 -0.41
k) Dispersion of urban population to new 
remote urban centres 60 0.90 1.35 -0.33 F f S f  ;
N= Number of valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation
Urban experts’ responses to this question are of considerable importance as they 
provide clear idea about the future patterns of urban population dispersion in the light 
of the expected technological achievements. The statistical analysis of these responses, 
presented in Table 8.22, Figure 8.21 and Table A4.13 (in Appendix 4), reveals that:
1. Regarding the future impacts of technology achievements on concentration of
urban population in few urban centres, about 51 percent of these responses expect
that such concentration will decline at an average o f-0.42.
2. Regarding the future patterns of urban population dispersion, 90 percent of these
responses expect a considerable increase in the dispersion of urban population to 
new urban centres around existing large cities at an average of 1.83, with lowest 
standard deviation of 0.94; this is while 83 percent of responses expect a 
considerable increase in the dispersion to the suburbs (+1.66). Also, 67 percent of 
the responses expect some increase in the dispersion of urban population to new 
remote urban communities (+0.90), and about 50 percent of the responses expect 
some increase in the dispersion of urban population to rural settlements (+0.41).
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3. These results confirms with the results of the previous questions, regarding the
ability of settling in rural and remote areas and the concentrations of urban
population in existing urban centres (Questions 8, 7, 6, and 5 in Questionnaire
m).
%  of Responses per variable
50
H A-Concentration of population in few urban centres
□  B-Dispersion of urban population to rural settlements
□  C-Dispersion of urban population to the suburbs
H D-Dispersion to new urban centres around existing large cities
□  E-Dispersion to new remote urban communities
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Figure 8.21: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of 
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries
This statistical analysis proves that technological achievements are highly expected to 
facilitate the dispersion of urban population towards new urban centres around 
existing large cities - followed by the dispersion towards the suburbs, new remote 
urban communities and rural settlements.
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8.3.3 Technology and Future New Settlements
Question 10:
10. To the best o f your knowledge, how do you expect the function o f future urban
settlement to be?
Concerning the function of future urban settlements, the statistical analysis presented
in Table 8.23, Figure 8.22 and Table A4.14 (in Appendix 4) reveal that:
1. About 84 percent of urban experts’ responses expect that future urban settlements 
are likely to be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) with the highest 
average of 1.56. Only 6 percent of the responses expect that future settlements are 
less likely to be of multiple related functions.
2. The second expected function for these settlements is to work as centres for 
location-bound activities (tourism, mining). This is expected by about 84 percent 
of urban experts’ responses at an average of 1.45.
3. About 66 percent of the responses expect that the function of future urban 
settlements is somewhat likely to be a combination of multiple unrelated functions 
(0.84).
4. On the other side, about 54 percent of the responses expect that future urban 
settlements in developing countries are somewhat less likely to be of a single 
specialised function (IT, commercial, health, education, industrial, etc.) (-0.64).
Table 8.23: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of future
urban settlement.
Variables N ____ j
58
Mean
-0.64
jsTDEV
1.64
Skew Mean Value Illustration
a) Single specialised function (IT, 
commercial, education, industrial) 0.20 •0.64|Hi 1
b) Multiple related functions (IT & 
education, etc) 61 1.56 1.31 -1.42
j
I S — "■;........■;! 156
c) Multiple unrelated functions 58 0.84 1.64 -0.65 HI ______^ j.84
d) Centre for location-bound activities 
(tourism, mining, etc) 58 1.45 1.03 -1.31 ------ )1.45
N= Number o f valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation _j
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Figure 8.22: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of
future urban settlement
According to this analysis and on the frequency distribution of responses, it is highly 
expected that future urban settlements in developing countries will be of multiple 
related functions such as IT, education, and other related activities. Also, it is expected 
that these settlements could work as centres for location bound activities such as 
tourism or mining. The least expected function for future settlements is to work as 
centres for multiple unrelated activities.
Question 11:
11. To the best o f vour knowledge, what are the probable wavs for the provision o f services 
(education. health, shopping, etc.) in future new urban settlements?
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses regarding the probable ways for the 
provision of services in future new urban settlements, which is presented in Table 
8.24, Figure 8.23 and Table A4.15 (in Appendix 4), reveals some important findings:
1. About 84 percent of the urban experts’ responses expect that introduction of 
specialised service centres between a group of cities is most likely at an average 
of 1.38 (mean). This implies that service delivery will affect the regional 
distribution of new settlements.
2. About 82 percent of the responses expect that incorporation of primary services in 
every settlement is most likely at an average of 1.48 (mean). This reflects experts’
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high consensus that these settlements should be self-sufficient regarding basic 
services while specialised services could be gathered in large service centre 
between a group of cities.
3. About 66 percent of the responses expect that emergence of new forms for 
provision of some services (Education, health, police) is most likely at an average 
of 1.62 (mean), with lowest standard deviation (1.03). Urban experts suggest 
incentive-based / service-based service delivery, multi-function mixed-use 
centres, and community-based policing as the possible new forms of service 
provision in new settlements.
4. Only 54 percent of the responses view the introduction of specialised service 
centres in every settlement as likely to happen at an average of 0.34. Although this 
view has the lowest number of responses and the lowest average among other 
variables of this question, it is important to define the implications of this choice. 
This reflects that these experts expect that future settlements either will be of very 
large size or located at far distances from each other. However, these two 
possibilities are not consistent either with the literature review presented in 
Chapter Six, or with experts’ responses to other questions regarding the location 
and the size of future settlements (Questions 12 & 13).
Table 8.24: Descriptive statistics of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for the
provision of services in future new urban settlements.
Variables
a) Introduction of specialised service 
centres in every settlement
N
53
Mean STDEV Skew | Mean Value Illustration
0.34 1.67 -0.36 © 34
b) Introduction of specialised service 
centres between a group of cities 55 1.38 1.06 -1.02 38i f
c) Incorporation of primary services 
in every settlement 56 1.48 1.21 -0.50
i l
----------------------- 1.48
d) Emergence of new forms for the 
provision of some services 
(Education, health, police)
42 1.62 1.03 -0.27
■
1.62
N= Number of valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation 0
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Figure 8.23: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for the 
provision of services in future new urban settlements
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question demonstrates that 
introduction of specialised service centres between a group of cities is most likely way 
for the provision of services in future urban settlements in developing countries. 
Incorporation of primary services in every settlement is second most likely way for the 
provision of services in these settlements. The third most likely way is the emergence 
of new forms for provision of some services (education, health, police).
Question 12:
12. Resardine location o f future new urban settlements. to what extent do you expect they would 
be more likely located?
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question reveals that:
1. About 44 percent of these responses expect that future new urban settlements
would be located on more than 20 km away of large urban centres (Table 
8.25).
2. About 30 percent of the responses expect that these settlements would be
located on 10-20 km away of large urban centres.
3. Only 15 percent expect that these settlements could be freely located.
H A-Introduction of specialised service centres in every settlement
□  B-Introduction of specialised service centres between a group of cities
□  C-Incorporation of primary services in every settlement
£3 D-Emergence of new forms for the provision of some services (Education, police)
i i
0 = no change
le a s t  L ik e ly
2 3
M o s t  L ik e ly
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4. Only 11 percent of the responses expect that these settlements could be 
located on less than 10 km away from a large urban centre.
Table 8.25: Frequency distribution o f urban experts’ responses about the location of future new 
urban settlements.
Variables
a) Less than 10 km away from a large urban 
centre
N V.%
11.48
V. %  Illustration
11.48
b) 10 -  20 km away from a large urban centre 18 29.51 IK 29.51
c) More the 20 km away from a large urban 
centre 27 44.26 44.26
d) Freely located 14.75 14.75
N= Number o f valid responses V. % = Va id percent 0 10 20 30 40 50
This analysis demonstrates that large urban centres will continue to have some impact 
on locating future urban settlements, as the majority of people moving to the new 
settlements will be coming from these large urban centres. Also, this analysis shows 
that future technological achievements will facilitate locating these new settlements 
further away from existing large urban centres.
Question 13:
13. The future new urban settlement could be o f different sizes, which o f the following you 
consider to be the most appropriate in the next 30-40 years?
Table 8.26: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future new 
urban settlements.
Variables
a) Very small (<1,000 inhabitants, 
Group of families, environmental 
considerations)
N
54
Mean
-0.98
STDEV
1.72
Skew
0.71
Mean value illustration
11798"b) Small settlements (1,000-5,000 
inhabitants, support the economic 
provision of primary services)
54 -0.30 1.54 0.17 -0.3
c) Medium urban centres (5,000-10,000 
inhabitants) 54 1.07 1.34 -0.77 1.07
d) Large urban centres (10,000-20,000 
inhabitants) 51 1.71 1.12 -1.08
e) Very Large Urban Centres (20,000- 
50,000 inhabitants) 55 1.47 1.62 - 1.01 1  1.47
1.71
- 1 0  1 2  
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses about the size of future new
settlements are of considerable importance as they reflect the experts’ overall
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assessment of future technological achievements impacts in developing countries (see 
Table 8.26, Figure 8.24, and Table A4.16 in Appendix 4). This analysis shows the 
following important results:
1. For the very small settlement size category (less than 1,000 inhabitants), about 60 
percent of these responses expect that this size category is less likely to be 
appropriate at an average of -0.98. About 20 percent of these responses expect 
that this size category is least likely to be appropriate (-3.0). Only 15 percent of 
these responses view it as appropriate.
2. For the small size category of 1,000-5,000 inhabitants, 55 percent of the responses 
expect that it is less likely to be appropriate at an average of -0.30. However, 
about 35 percent of the responses expect that it is likely to be appropriate. This 
reflects that this size category is gaining more confidence among urban experts 
than the previous one, and that it could be appropriate for some settlements of 
special functions.
3. For the medium size category of 5,000-10,000 inhabitants, about 75 percent of the 
responses expect that this size category is likely to be appropriate, at an average of 
+1.07. This is while only 15 percent of these responses expect that it is less likely 
to be appropriate.
4. Regarding large size of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants, about 80 percent of the 
responses expect that this size category is more likely to be appropriate, at the
highest average among all size categories o f+1.71 (mean).
5. For settlement size category of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants, about 76 percent of the
responses expect that this size category is more likely to be appropriate, at an
average o f+1.47.
6. Only 5 responses (out of 273 total responses) expect that some other sizes, 
ranging from 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants, as more likely to be appropriate.
According to this analysis, urban experts consider settlement size of 10,000-20,000 
inhabitants as more likely to be appropriate for new settlements in developing
countries. Settlement size of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants is considered as the second 
size category that is more likely to be appropriate. And settlement size of 5,000-
10.000 inhabitants is ranked the third. This is while settlements sizes of less than
5.000 inhabitants are seen as less likely to be appropriate for new settlements in 
developing countries.
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Figure 8.24: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future new
urban settlements
Question 14:
14. The development o f future new urban settlement could take different approaches, which o f  
the following do you consider to be the most appropriate in the next 30-40 years?
Concerning the appropriate approaches for the development of future cities, the
statistical analysis of the urban experts’ responses reveals that:
1. About 56 percent of urban experts’ responses consider building the whole
settlement at one time as less appropriate at an average of -1.27. Moreover, about 
35 (out of this 56 percent) of the responses view this approach as least appropriate 
(Table 8.27, Figure 8.25, and Table A4.17 in Appendix 4).
2. About 93 percent of the responses consider the gradual development of future
settlements as most appropriate, with highest average increase (mean) of +2.06,
with lowest standard deviation of 1.13. Almost half of this percentage views this 
approach as most appropriate.
3. Regarding the possible ways for the development of future new urban settlements, 
about 86 percent of the responses view the expansion and growth of new urban 
settlements in the form of new suburbs as more appropriate at an average of 1.65. 
However, 71 percent of the responses view the expansion in the form of new 
independent urban units as more appropriate at an average of 1.33.
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0  A-Very small (<1,000 inhabitants)
HB-Small settlements (1,000-5,000)
M  C-Medium urban centres (5,000-10,000) 
HD-Large urban centres (10,000-20,000) 
ffl E-Very Large Urban Centres (20,000-50,000)
Table 8.27: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development of the future 
new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
Variables
a) Whole settlement built in one 
time
b) Gradually built
c) Expansion in the form o f new 
suburbs.
d) Expansion in the form o f new 
independent urban units
N= Number o f valid responses 
STDEV= Standard Deviation
Mean value illustrationSTDEV Skew
1.79 0.63
M 2.061.13 -1.64
1.20 -1.09
1.60 -1.27
This analysis reflects the high consensus among urban experts that the gradual 
development of new urban settlements is suitable for urban development in 
developing countries. To achieve this approach, urban experts highly recommend the 
growth of these settlements in the form of new suburbs or in the form of new 
independent urban units.
% of Responses per variable
□A-Whole settlement built in one time 
B B-Gradually built
□  C-Expansion in the form of new suburbs
□  D-Expansion in the form of new independent urban units
0 = no change
L ea st L ike ly M o s t L ik e ly
Figure 8.25: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development o f the 
future new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
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8.3.4 Technology and Existing Settlements
Question 15:
15. In vour opinion, and in the light o f the rapid technological change, how will the size o f 
existing, urban settlements change in the next 30-40 years?
Concerning the future impacts of technology on the size of existing settlements, the 
statistical analysis of the urban experts’ responses shows that:
1. About 60 percent of the responses expect that the increase in the size of existing 
settlements is less likely to continue (-0.61). Moreover, about 25 out of this 60 
percent of the responses expect that the increase in the size of existing settlements 
is least likely to continue. However, about 39 percent of the responses expect that 
the increase in the size of existing settlements is somewhat likely to continue.
2. About 57 percent of the responses expect that the size of these settlements is
likely to decrease at an average of 0.73 (mean), with lowest standard deviation
(Table 8.28, Figure 8.26 and Table A4.18 in Appendix 4). However, About 31 out 
of this 57 percent of the responses expect that the size of these settlements is 
somewhat less likely to decrease.
3. Moreover, about 62 percent of the responses expect that it is less likely that size of 
existing urban settlements will not be affected.
This analysis reveals the high consensus among urban experts that the size of the
existing cities is likely to decrease. Such decrease means that more people will move
out of these settlements towards new urban settlements. These results confirm with 
results reach from responses to Questions 9 and 12 in this questionnaire. These results 
reflect that existing settlements will continue to determine the distribution of new 
settlements.
Table 8.28: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of existing urban
settlements in the next 30-40 years
Variables N Mean STDEV Skew Mean value illustration
a) Continue to increase 63 -0.86 2.13 0.59 1 -0.86 r ™
b) Decrease 54 0.83 1.77 -0.53 .....................
■— u
c) Will not be affected 47 -1.57 1.44 0.88
r
E— ...................... -
N= Number of valid responses STDEV= Standard Deviation -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
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Figure 8.26: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of existing urban
settlements in the next 30-40 years
Question 16:
16. For developing countries. how do you expect the future function o f existing urban 
settlements in the next 30-40 years?
Table 8.29: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
Variables N Mean STDEV Skew Mean value illustration
a) Regional service centres (education, 
commercial, entertainment) 56 2.09 1.01 -1.27
i j
i 2-09
b) Continue performing the same 
functions 58 0.72 1.52 -0.10 H i  0.7  ^ |
c) New Functions (p lea se  spec ify ) 29 1.14 1.25 -1.11 --------- j 1.14-------- j---------j---------
N= Number of valid responses 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
STDEV= Standard Deviation
Regarding the future impacts of technology on the function of existing settlements in 
developing countries, the statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses reveals that:
1. About 90 percent of urban experts’ responses expect that these settlements are 
more likely to work as regional service centres (education, commercial, 
entertainment), with the highest average increase of =2.09 (mean) and lowest 
standard deviation (Table 8.29, Figure 8.27, and Table A4.19 in Appendix 4).
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2. About 55 percent of these responses expect that these settlements are likely to 
continue performing the same functions.
3. About 41 percent of the responses expect that existing settlements are more likely 
to perform some new functions; i.e. recreation, distribution centres, health, 
education, communication, retail etc.
% of Responses per variable 
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Least Likely Most Likely
Figure 8.27: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of 
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
Based on this analysis, it is highly expected that existing settlements could work as
regional service centres. These settlements can efficiently work as specialised regional
service centres, which are recommended in Question 1. Also, existing large urban 
centres could perform some new regional functions; i.e. recreation, distribution 
centres, health, education, communication, retail etc. In general, the future role of
existing cities, within the national and regional levels, is expected to face a
considerable change. Therefore, developing countries should take this expected 
change into consideration when developing their future regional and national urban 
plans.
BA-Regional service centres 
BB-Continue performing the same functions 
BC-New Functions
0 = no change
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8.4 RECEIVED COMMENTS
Generally, few comments have been received through the three questionnaires. The 
main comments received on this survey were mainly about the nature of technologies 
expected to be transferred to developing countries, stressing the difference between 
the use of technology (as products) and its invention (without the baggage of
developed countries solutions). For this research, the use of technology is its main 
concern. Although most of technologies currently in use in developing countries are 
designed and manufactured outside these countries, their socio-economic and urban 
impacts in these countries are substantial.
Also, some of the received comments were stressing the variation of the development 
status and technological capabilities among developing countries. The research is 
mainly focusing on progressively developing countries experiencing increasing 
technological capabilities. However, the research results and recommendation are
expected to be, to some extent, valid for less and least developing countries, as 
technology impacts in these countries are substantial, though at a lower scale 
compared to other developed and developing countries.
After sending the results of the first round of Questionnaire III (to urban experts),
another important comment was received. It claims that these results are not surprising 
and expected. Although it is not the objective of this research to get surprising results
and that extreme care had been taken to get the most possible reliable results, it should
be kept in mind that these results are about developing countries, with lower
technological capabilities compared to developed countries. This comment came
mainly from an expert in developed countries, while some experts from developed
countries viewed some of these results as being somewhat exaggerating. However,
and even if these results are not surprising, they are still of confirmatory value,
validating arguments otherwise will be regarded just as personal opinions.
Conclusion:
In this chapter, the statistical analysis of the results of each question in the three 
questionnaires is presented. Also, the thesis presents a brief explanation of the possible 
implications of results of each question. Because questions in each questionnaire are 
unrelated to each other, the thesis tries, in the next chapter, to formulate a synthetic
evidence for the validity of each of the proposed approaches from the results of
different questions in the three questionnaires.
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Chapter N ine
FORECASTING SURVEY: AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES 
Introduction:
Because each question covers a different point, the thesis tries in this chapter to 
formulate a synthetic evidence for the validity of each of the proposed approaches 
from the results of various questions in the three questionnaires. For each of these 
approaches, relevant data from the statistical analysis of both technology and urban 
development experts’ responses is compiled and analysed. To avoid repetition, this 
chapter starts by presenting an analysis of the technological impacts expected to be of 
considerable importance for all the proposed approaches. Then, other expected
impacts are considered in relation to each proposed approach.
9.1 EXTENT AND NATURE OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS
The forecasting survey tried through a series of questions to both technology and 
urban development experts to assess, as accurately as possible, the expected impacts
of technological achievements of the 21st century on shaping the urban future in
developing countries during the next 30-40 years. The statistical analysis of the
responses reveals the following broad results:
A. EXTENT OF THE EXPECTED CHANGE:
1. Through the three questionnaires, none of urban or technology experts 
expected that there will be no change in their different fields of expertise.
2. More than 90 percent of the technology experts’ responses expect a
considerable change in current operation and production systems (Question 3, 
Questionnaire II). Also, more than 67 percent of urban experts’ responses 
expect that future technological achievement will be of considerable impact on 
urban development in developing countries (Question 2, Questionnaire EH).
3. Regarding types of technologies expected to influence the urban future, 
information and telecommunications technologies are expected by both
technology and urban experts to be of a very high influence on the future of 
urban development. About 16 percent of the total technology experts’ 
responses expect that ICTs will be of a very high influence on urban
development followed by energy, transportation, and utilities technologies 
(Question 4, Questionnaire I). Similar trends has been expected by urban
experts where 24 percent of their responses expect that ICTs will be of a very
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high influence on urban development followed by transportation (13%), energy 
(9%) and urban utilities technologies (8%) (Question 3, Questionnaire III).
B. NATURE OF THE EXPECTED CHANGE:
The overall impacts of technology: both technology and urban experts (Question 4 in 
Questionnaires II and III) expect that technology will affect the following aspects:
1. Regarding the relation between home and work, about 50 percent of 
technology experts’ responses and 64 percent of urban experts’ responses 
expect that the total amount of time needed for travelling to work and other 
daily activities will decline. Also, the long established interdependence 
between place of residence and work location are also expected to decline by 
about 60 percent of technology experts and 49 percent of urban experts. Based 
on these two points, it was logic that 65 percent of technology experts and 67 
percent of urban experts expect that the commuting distance between home 
and work will increase significantly.
2. Regarding the changes to the factors affecting the urban environment, urban 
experts expect that technological achievements will increase the attractiveness 
of rural settlements more than that of urban ones. About 51 percent of the 
responses indicate that the attractiveness of rural centres to urban population is 
expected to increase at an average of 0.49, while 49 percent of the responses 
show that attractiveness of urban centres will increase at an average of 0.36 
only. Also, about 59 percent of valid responses expect that settling remote and
uninhabited areas will increase at an average of 0.51. Also, about 59 percent
urban experts and 65 percent of technology experts expect that settling remote 
and uninhabited areas will increase.
3. Regarding the expected change in transportation patterns, private 
transportation is expected to increase at a rate higher than that of public 
transportation. About 74 percent of urban experts and 60 percent of technology 
experts expect that private transportation will considerably increase, while 65 
and 63 percent of urban and technology experts expect that the use of public 
transportation will increase at a lower rate.
4. Regarding technology transfer to developing countries, technology experts’ 
responses are of considerable importance (Question 11 in Questionnaire II). 
About 94 percent of the responses expect that transfer of ICTs and
transportation technologies will significantly increase during the next 30-40 
years. For the transfer of utilities technologies, 95 percent expect a
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considerable increase in this category during the same period, of which 50 and 
23 percent expect a considerable and impressive increase respectively.
The impacts of different technology sectors: both technology and urban experts highly 
expect that:
5. Regarding information and telecommunications technologies, there is a high
consensus among technology and urban experts that ICTs will considerably 
affect the work and living conditions (Question 8 in Questionnaires II and III).
About 98 and more than 95 percent of urban and technology experts expect
that ICTs will considerably increase the home-based work, remote education,
and home entertainment. Also, more than 90 percent of urban and technology
experts expect a considerable increase in remote social interaction and online 
shopping. About 83 and 70 percent of urban and technology experts expect a
considerable change in the prevailing working conditions. It is also expected
that these technologies will have a considerable impact on the urban future in
developing countries (Question 8 in Questionnaire III).
6. Regarding transportation technologies, also there is a high consensus among
technology and urban experts that future transportation technologies will 
considerably affect population mobility and urban activities (Question 5 in 
Questionnaires II and III). Regarding population mobility, which gives a
general idea about the over all impact of transport technologies, about 87 
percent of urban experts expect a considerable increase in population mobility. 
For the expected role of different transport modes, about 87 and 75 percent of 
urban and technology expect that the role of public transport at regional level 
will grow higher that of all other modes. This is while about 77 and 75 percent 
of urban and technology experts expect an increase in the roles of public 
transport at local level. Also, 77 and 65 percent of urban and technology 
experts expect an increase in the future role of private transportation. Also, 
about 95 and 87 percent of technology and urban experts expect a considerable 
increase in vehicle capabilities and safety and about 45 and 66 percent of them 
expect that vehicle speed will increase. Regarding air transport, about 69 and 
72 percent of urban and technology experts expect a considerable increase in 
the roles of public air transport, and about 64 and 47 percent of urban and 
technology experts an increase in private air transport.
7. Regarding renewable energy technologies, it is highly expected that these
technologies will be of considerable impact on the future of urban change in 
developing countries (Question 6 in Questionnaires II and III). About 82 and 
66 percent of technology and urban experts expect that such dependence will
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decline. Also, about, 84 and 64 percent of technology and urban expect that the 
costs of renewable-energy will considerably decline.
8. Regarding urban utilities technologies, there is a high consensus among urban 
and technology experts that future utilities technologies will have a
considerable impact on the urban future in developing countries (Question 7 in 
Questionnaires II and HI). About 91 and 83 percent of urban and technology 
experts expect a considerable increase in the introduction of new techniques
for water purification. About 90 and more than 80 percent of urban and 
technology experts expect a considerable increase in the introduction of both 
new techniques for sanitary treatment and small water & sanitary treatment 
units.
Findings:
The statistical analysis of both urban and technology experts’ responses clearly
demonstrates that future technological achievements of the 21st century will have 
profound impacts on shaping the urban future in many of the developing countries. It 
is highly expected that these technologies will considerably change operation and
production systems and the home-work relationship. Also, it is highly expected that 
these technologies will increase population mobility and will help overcome energy 
and utilities problems that usually confront urban development activities in remote and 
rural areas.
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9.2 URBAN DECENTRALISATION APPROACH
While the importance and effectiveness of urban decentralisation approach was
comprehensively examined in Chapter Six, it is the purpose of this section to assess 
the role of future technology achievements in the application of such approach in 
developing countries. In doing so, the research will depend on the results of the related 
question in the forecasting survey. The statistical analysis of technology and urban 
experts’ responses to these questions reveal that:
A. There is a high level of expectancy among both technology and urban development 
experts that future technology achievements will highly facilitate the decentralisation 
of urban population in developing countries.
1. Regarding future changes to the factors affecting the spatial distribution of
urban population in developing countries, and as stated earlier, about 65 
percent of technology experts and 67 percent of urban experts expect that the 
commuting distance between home and work will increase significantly. Also, 
about 60 percent of technology experts and 49 percent of urban experts expect 
that the long established interdependence between place of residence and work 
location is expected to decline (Question 4 in Questionnaires II and III). About 
98 and more than 95 percent of urban and technology experts expect that ICTs 
will considerably increase the home-based work, remote education, and home 
entertainment (Question 8 in Questionnaires II and III). Also, about 87 percent 
of urban experts expect that transport technologies will considerable increase
population mobility (Question 5, Questionnaires III). All these points 
demonstrate that population ability to move out of congested areas will
considerable increase.
2. Regarding the spatial impacts of different technology sectors, it is highly
expected that each of these technologies will significantly facilitate the 
dispersion of urban population in developing countries. For ICTs, about 70
percent of urban experts expect a considerable increase in the ability to settle in
remote regions. Also, about 63 and 47 percent of urban and technology experts 
expect some decline in the concentration of business activities in CBDs of 
existing cities, and about 46 and 44 percent of them expect a slight decline in 
the congestion of existing urban centres (Question 8 in Questionnaires II and 
III). For transport technologies, and in addition to their expected role in 
increasing population mobility, about 74 of urban experts expect that transport 
technology will considerably increase the ability to settle in remote areas 
(Question 5, Questionnaires HI). For renewable energy technologies, about 58
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and 47 percent of urban and technology experts expect that the future 
advancements of renewable energy technologies will increase the ability to 
settle out of congested areas, mainly around existing large cities. Moreover, 71 
percent of urban experts expect an increase in the ability to settle in remote 
areas, mainly in new independent settlements (Question 6 in Questionnaires II 
and III). For urban utilities technologies, about 80 and 74 percent of urban and 
technology experts expect that technological achievements in area of urban 
utilities will considerably facilitate settling in remote area and will 
considerably improve the environment of rural communities (Question 7 in 
Questionnaires II and III).
B. Regarding the overall spatial impacts of future technology achievements, there is a 
high level of expectancy among urban and technology experts that urban 
population in developing countries will be more inclined to disperse out of 
congested urban centres.
3. For the targeted areas of population movement, 90 percent of urban experts 
expect a considerable increase in the dispersion of urban population to new 
urban centres around existing large cities, while about 83 and 65 percent of 
urban and technology experts expect that there will be a considerable increase 
in population dispersion to the suburbs. Also, about 50 and 65 percent of urban 
and technology experts expect a considerable increase in the dispersion of 
urban population to rural areas. Moreover, about 67 and 56 percent of urban 
and technology experts expect some increase in the emergence of remote 
isolated urban communities. On the other hand, 51 and 49 percent of urban and 
technology experts expect that concentration of population in few urban 
centres will decline (Question 9 in Questionnaires II and III).
4. For the location of future new urban settlements in developing countries, is it 
highly expected to be located further away of large urban centres. About 44 
percent of urban experts expect that future new urban settlements could be 
located on more than 20 km away of large urban centres. Also, while 30 
percent of urban experts expect that these settlements could be located on 10- 
20 km away of large urban centres, only 15 percent expect that these 
settlements could be freely located and 11 percent of the responses expect that 
they could be located on less than 10 km away from a large urban centre 
(Question 12, Questionnaires III). Such movement out of large urban centres 
demonstrates that future technology advancements will facilitate the proposed 
urban decentralisation approach
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C. Despite the high consensus about the expected role of technology in facilitating 
urban decentralisation, some of the received comments argue that the expected 
degree of change differs from country to country as the social-economic conditions 
and technical capabilities differ among these countries. Also, and emphasising the 
thesis argument that technology is just a tool that could be articulated to achieve 
certain targets; some of the received comments stress the role of prevailing political 
and socio-economic conditions and governmental regulations in this process. In the 
light of these comments, and to ensure the proper application of approach, 
technological achievements should be driven by a sincere political will and to be 
geared within the national policy to meet the socio-economic conditions prevailing 
in each country.
Findings:
Through the statistical analysis of both urban and technology experts’ responses, the 
forecasting survey demonstrates that urban decentralisation is expected to be effective 
in managing the urban future in developing countries. Also, it shows that future 
technological achievements are highly expected to facilitate the adoption of the 
proposed urban decentralisation approach in developing countries during the next 30- 
40 years.
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9.3 SMALL-SIZE URBAN SETTLEMENTS APPROACH
Although it has been evident through the theoretical analysis, presented in Chapter 
Six, that small-size settlements is an effective approach for urban development in 
developing countries, it is the purpose of this section to confirm its importance and to 
examine the role future technological achievements in the application of such
approach. In doing so, again, the research depends on the results of the related
question in the forecasting survey. In addition to responses about the size of future 
settlements, responses to questions regarding the function and the probable way for
the provision of services in these settlements will be considered. The statistical
analysis of the responses revealed the following important points:
A. Regarding the Size of New Urban Settlements:
1. About 80 out of the 92 percent of urban experts who responded to the question 
about this size category (Question 13 in Questionnaire III), expect that 
settlement size category of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants is more likely to be 
appropriate; at the highest average among all size categories of +1.71 (mean) 
and only 4 percent view it as somewhat less likely to be appropriate (Table 
8.27, Figure 8.23, and Table A4.16 in Appendix 4).
2. About 76 percent of urban experts expect that settlement size category of
20,000-50,000 inhabitants is more likely to be appropriate. Only 11 percent 
view it as less likely to be appropriate.
3. For settlement size categoiy of 5,000-10,000 inhabitants, about 75 percent of 
urban experts (out of 98 percent) expect that this size category is likely to be 
appropriate. This is while 15 percent of these responses expect that this size 
category is less likely to be appropriate. This reflects that this size category is 
gaining less confidence among urban experts than the previous ones.
4. For settlement size category of 1,000-5,000 inhabitants, 55 percent (out of 98 
percent) of urban experts expect that it is less likely to be appropriate. 
However, about 35 percent of the responses expect that it is likely to be 
appropriate.
5. For settlement size category of less than 1,000 inhabitants, about 60 percent of 
these responses expect that this size category is less likely to be appropriate. 
About 20 percent of these responses expect that this size category is least likely 
to be appropriate (-3). Only 18 percent of these responses expect that it will be 
appropriate. This reflects that this size category is of the lowest confidence 
among urban experts than all other size categories.
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6. Only 5 responses (out of 273 total responses) recommend that some other 
sizes, ranging from 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants, could be appropriate.
According to this analysis, settlement size of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants seem to be 
more appropriate for new settlements in developing countries, followed by settlements 
size of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants. This is while smaller settlements of 5,000-10,000 
and larger settlements of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants could be suitable for settlements 
of special functions within their regional settings. Settlements of less than 5,000 
inhabitants are not recommended.
B. Regarding the Function of New Urban Settlements: settlement’s function is a 
decisive factor in determining its size. Therefore, and through the analysis of 
urban experts responses regarding the future functions appropriate for new 
settlements in the light of future technological impacts in developing countries, it 
is expected to draw a more comprehensive idea about the future size of these 
settlements. The statistical analysis presented in Table 8.24, Figure 8.21 and Table 
A4.14 (in Appendix 4) reveal that:
1. About 84 percent of urban experts’ responses expect that future urban 
settlements are likely to be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc). 
Only 6 percent of the responses expect that future settlements are less likely to 
be of multiple related functions.
2. The second expected function for these settlements is to be centres for 
location-bound activities (tourism, mining). This is expected by about 84 
percent of urban experts’ responses. Only 2 percent of the responses expect 
that this function is less likely to be appropriate.
3. About 66 percent of the responses expect that the function of future urban 
settlements is somewhat likely to be a combination of multiple unrelated 
functions. However, 21 percent of urban experts expect that such function is 
somewhat less likely. This reflects the low consensus among urban experts 
about the appropriateness of this function for new urban settlements in 
developing countries.
4. About 54 percent of the responses expect that future urban settlements in 
developing countries are somewhat less likely to be of a single specialised 
function (IT, commercial, health, education, industrial, etc.). However, about 
28 percent of them expect that such function could be somewhat likely. Again, 
this reflects the low consensus about the appropriateness of this function for 
new urban settlements in developing countries.
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According to this analysis, it is highly expect that future urban settlements are likely to 
be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) or as centres for location-bound 
activities (tourism, mining). These two functions could be efficiently performed in 
small settlements within the recommended size categories of 10,000-20,000 or
20,000-50,000 inhabitants.
C. Regarding the Future ways for the provision of services in New Urban 
Settlements: The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to question 11 in 
Questionnaire III reveals that:
1. About 84 percent of the urban experts’ responses expect that introduction of 
specialised service centres between a group of cities is most likely. Only 7 
percent view this as somewhat less likely (Table 8.25, Figure 8.22 and Table 
A4.15 in Appendix 4).
2. About 82 percent of the responses expect that incorporation of primary
services in every settlement is most likely. Only 9 percent view this as
somewhat less likely.
3. About 66 percent of the responses expect that emergence of new forms for 
provision of some services (Education, health, police) is most likely. Only 2
percent view this as somewhat less likely.
4. Only 54 percent of the responses view the introduction of specialised service 
centres in every settlement as likely to happen. However, 32 percent of the 
responses view it as somewhat less likely. Which reflects the low consensus 
among experts about this alternative.
5. Only 9 responses (out of 206 total responses) recommend some other ways for 
the provision of services in new urban settlements. The most important of these 
ways are: incentive-based and performance based service delivery, business 
incubators, multi function mixed use centres.
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to this question reveals that the 
introduction of specialised service centres between a group of cities is the most likely 
way for the provision of services in future urban settlements in developing countries. 
Also, about 90 percent of urban experts’ responses to question 16 in Questionnaire III 
expect that existing urban settlements are more likely to work as regional service 
centres (Table 8.30, Figure 8.26, and Table A4.19 in Appendix 4). This reflects the 
experts’ belief that the majority of the proposed future settlements will not work as a 
regional service centres. This confirms the idea that the majority of these settlements 
will be of small size. This analysis also reveals that incorporation of primary services 
in every settlement is second most likely way for the provision of services in these
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settlements. This reflects experts’ belief that that new settlements should be self- 
sufficient, which in turn, will support the viability of the proposed small-size 
settlements approach.
Findings:
The statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses reveals the high consensus about 
appropriateness of the proposed small-size settlements approach for developing 
countries in the next 30-40 years. This analysis shows that settlement of 10,000-
20.000 inhabitants seem to be more appropriate for new settlements in developing 
countries, followed by settlements of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants. This is while smaller 
settlement of 5,000-10,000 inhabitants and larger settlements of 20,000-50,000 
inhabitants could be suitable for settlements of special functions within their regional 
settings. Settlements of less than 5,000 inhabitants are not recommended.
For the function of these settlements, it is highly expect that future urban settlements 
are likely to be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) or as centres for 
location-bound activities (tourism, mining). These two functions could be efficiently 
performed in small settlements within the recommended size categories of 10,000-
20.000 or 20,000-50,000 inhabitants.
Regarding the possible ways for the provision of services in these settlements, there is 
a high consensus among urban experts that the introduction of specialised service 
centres between a group of cities is the most likely way for the provision of services in 
future urban settlements in developing countries. Also, existing urban settlements are 
more likely to work as regional service centres. This reflects the experts’ belief that 
the majority of the proposed future settlements will not work as a regional service 
centres. This confirms the idea that the majority of these settlements will be of small 
size. This analysis also reveals that incorporation of primary services in every 
settlement is second most likely way for the provision of services in these settlements. 
This reflects experts’ belief that that new settlements should be self-sufficient, which 
in turn, will support the viability of the proposed small-size settlements approach.
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9.4 INCREMENTAL PLANNING APPROACH
The theoretical analysis, presented in Chapter Six, clearly demonstrates that the
proposed approach of incremental planning and development of urban settlements is
necessary to deal with the uncertainties that will always exist regarding the nature and
extent of future technological change and its urban impacts, especially in developing 
countries. However, it is the purpose of this section to empirically examine the
importance of this approach through the statistical analysis of urban experts’
expectations. The main points revealed from this analysis are:
1. About 56 percent of urban experts consider building the whole settlement at one
time as less appropriate (Question 14 in Questionnaire III). Moreover, about 35
out of this 56 percent view this approach as least appropriate. However, about 17
percent of urban experts view building the whole settlement at one time as
somewhat appropriate (Table 8.28, Figure 8.24, and Table A4.17 in Appendix 4).
2. About 93 percent of urban experts consider the gradual development of future
settlements as most appropriate, with highest average increase. Almost half of this 
percentage views this approach as most appropriate. Only 6 percent of urban
experts view this approach as somewhat less appropriate. This reflects the high
confidence among urban experts about the effectiveness of this approach.
3. Regarding the possible ways for the development of future new urban settlements,
about 86 percent of the responses view the expansion and growth of new urban 
settlements in the form of new suburbs as more appropriate. Only 6 percent of 
urban experts view this approach as somewhat less appropriate. However, 71 
percent of the responses view the expansion in the form of new independent urban 
units as more appropriate. About 11 percent view this approach as somewhat less 
appropriate.
Findings:
The statistical analysis of forecasting survey results reflects the high consensus among 
urban experts that the proposed incremental planning approach is the most appropriate 
way for the development of new settlements in developing countries, followed by 
expansion in the form of new suburbs and new independent urban units.
260
9.5 TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS
Concerning the expected impacts of future technological achievements on existing 
urban settlements, especially big cities, the research had focused on investigating two 
important aspects; the future size and function of these settlements. The statistical 
analysis of urban experts’ responses about these two points reveals that:
A. Regarding the Future Function of Existing Settlements:
1. About 90 percent (out of 97) of urban experts’ responses (Question 16 in
Questionnaire III) expect that these settlements are more likely to work as 
regional service centres for education, commerce, or entertainment. Moreover, 
only 3 percent of the responses view this as somewhat less likely. (Table 8.30, 
Figure 8.26, and Table A4.19 in Appendix 4).
2. About 55 percent of these responses expect that these settlements are likely to 
continue performing the same functions. However, about 22 percent of the 
responses view this as less likely. This reflects that this alternative is gaining 
less confidence than the previous one.
3. About 41 percent of the responses expect that existing settlements are more
likely to perform some new functions; i.e. recreation, distribution centres,
health, education, communication, retail etc. Only 3 percent of the responses 
view this as somewhat less likely.
B. Regarding the Future Size of Existing Settlements:
1. About 57 percent of urban experts responses (Question 15 in Questionnaire III) 
expect that the size of these settlements is likely to decrease. However, about 
22 percent of the responses expect that the increase in the size of existing 
settlements is somewhat less likely to continue.
2. About 60 percent of the responses expect that the increase in the size of
existing settlements is less likely to continue. Moreover, about 25 percent of 
the responses expect that the increase in the size of existing settlements is least 
likely to continue. However, about 39 percent of the responses expect that the 
increase in the size of existing settlements is somewhat likely to continue.
3. However, About 31 percent of the responses expect that the size of these 
settlements is somewhat less likely to decrease (Table 8.29, Figure 8.25 and 
Table A4.18 in Appendix 4).
261
Findings:
Based on this analysis, the future role of existing cities within the future national and 
regional urban systems in developing countries is expected to face a considerable 
change, which in turn will produce parallel changes in the size of these settlements. 
The most expected function for these settlements is to work as regional service centres 
for education, commerce, or entertainment. Concerning the size, this analysis shows 
that urban experts expect that the size of the existing cities is likely to decrease. Such 
decrease means that more people will move out of these settlements towards new 
urban settlements or existing rural ones.
These expected changes in the function and size of existing cities are of considerable 
importance and should be taken into account when developing future regional and 
national urban plans in developing countries.
Conclusion:
Future technological achievements of the 21st century are highly expected to have 
profound impacts on shaping the urban future in many of the developing countries. It 
is highly expected that these technologies will considerably change operation and 
production systems and the home-work relationship. Also, it is expected that these 
technologies will increase population mobility and will help overcome energy and 
utilities problems that usually confront urban development activities in remote and 
rural areas in developing countries.
Urban decentralisation is expected to be an effective approach for managing the urban 
future in developing countries. In addition, there is a high level of expectancy among 
both technology and urban development experts that future technology achievements 
will highly facilitate urban decentralisation in developing countries. Also, there is a 
high level of expectancy that the urban population in developing countries will be 
more inclined to disperse out of congested urban centres.
Regarding settlement size, there is a high consensus among urban development 
experts that the proposed small-size settlements approach would be effective in 
managing future urban development in developing countries. This analysis shows that 
settlement of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants seem to be more appropriate for new 
settlements in developing countries, followed by settlements of 20,000-50,000 
inhabitants. This is while smaller settlement of 5,000-10,000 and larger settlements of
20,000-50,000 inhabitants could be suitable for settlements of special functions within 
their regional settings. This is while ettlements of less than 5,000 inhabitants are not 
recommended.
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For the function of these settlements, it is highly expected that future urban 
settlements are likely to be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) or as 
centres for location-bound activities (tourism, mining). These two functions could be 
efficiently performed in small settlements within the recommended size categories of
10,000-20,000 or 20,000-50,000 inhabitants.
Regarding the possible wavs for the provision of services in these settlements, there is 
a high consensus among urban experts that the introduction of specialised service 
centres between a group of cities is the most likely way for the provision of services in 
future urban settlements in developing countries. Also, existing urban settlements are 
more likely to work as regional service centres. This reflects the experts’ belief that 
the majority of the proposed future settlements will not work as a regional service 
centres. This confirms the idea that the majority of these settlements will be of small 
size. This analysis also reveals that incorporation of primary services in every 
settlement is second most likely way for the provision of services in these settlements. 
This reflects experts’ belief that that new settlements should be self-sufficient, which 
in turn, will support the viability of the proposed small-size settlements approach.
The statistical analysis of forecasting survey results reflects the high consensus among 
urban experts that the proposed incremental planning approach is the most appropriate 
way for the development of new settlements in developing countries, followed by 
expansion in the form of new suburbs and new independent urban units. About 56 
percent of urban experts consider building the whole settlement at one time as less 
appropriate and view the gradual development of future settlements as most 
appropriate.
For existing urban settlements, the future role of these cities within the future national 
and regional urban systems in developing countries is expected to face a considerable 
change, which in turn will produce parallel changes in their size. The most expected 
function for these settlements is to work as regional service centres for education, 
commerce, or entertainment. Concerning the size, it is highly expected that the size of 
the existing cities is likely to decrease. Such decrease means that more people will 
move out of these settlements towards new urban settlements or existing rural ones.
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Chapter Ten
RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this research is to examine the nature and extent of the future 
urban impacts of technology in developing countries and to define the necessary 
approaches for managing the urban future in these countries. Through its 
different stages, the thesis has reached some important findings. A summary of these 
findings, an analysis of the validity of research hypothesis and the proposed 
approaches, thesis contribution to knowledge and the suggested areas for future 
research are presented in this chapter.
10.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
10.1.1 Technology and urban change
The first objective of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between technology 
and urban change and to explore the urban impacts of technological achievements in 
the areas of transportation, telecommunication, and infrastructure. In fulfilling this 
objective the thesis has examined the possible ways through which technology affects 
urban change (Chapter Two) and examined the possible urban impacts of the main 
technological forces (Chapter Three).
Based on the analysis of how technology affects the defining characteristics of 
urbanisation, technology is expected to affect urbanisation in three possible ways: (1) 
through changing the social behaviour and the nature of human needs and aspirations 
which in turn affect pattern of urban change, (2) through improving the prevailing 
economic conditions which affect the human abilities to meet their needs and 
aspirations, which in turn affects the pace and scale of urban change, and (3) through 
introducing and improving many technological forces; mainly transportation, 
telecommunications, energy and urban utilities which yield direct physical urban 
changes (Figure 2.1). These three factors are highly interrelated and affect each other. 
Because of the increasing international economic, cultural and political interaction, 
many studies view globalisation as an effective factor in shaping the urban future in 
both the developed and developing countries. Therefore, and in addition to the three 
factors mentioned earlier, the urban impacts of globalisation and the role of 
technology in this process have been discussed in details in Chapter Two.
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- Technology, Social Change, and Urbanisation:
In investigating the relationship between technology and social change and how social 
change affects urban change process, numerous studies have emphasised the crucial 
role of science and technology in transforming the socio-economic structures of 
societies. In addition, the analysis of the main theories about technology and social 
change reveals that, despite their different views on how technology introduces social 
change, all these theories agree that technology affects the social structures of all 
societies. Also, the analysis of technology's role in the improvement of health, food 
and nutrition, and economic growth, affirms that technology is of considerable 
importance for the future of human development. In addition, the analysis of the main 
urban sociology concepts, especially the 'ecological approach' in urban analysis 
developed by Robert Park, and the characterisation of 'urbanism as a way of life' 
developed by Louis Wirth, reveals that social factors are of considerable impacts on 
urban change process.
- Technology, economic Growth, and Urban Change:
For the relationship between technology and economic growth and how economic 
growth affects urban change process, there is an extensive literature that stresses the 
role of technological change and industrialisation in economic development. 
Technology systems shaped not only the evolving national economies but also the 
pace and character of urbanisation. Many economists argue that each technological 
stage has been followed by a corresponding economic cycle; such as Kondarative and 
Kuznets cycles, and a city development cycle. This analysis reveals that economic 
growth is one of the driving forces for urban change.
- Technology, Globalisation, and Urban Change:
For globalisation and how it is affected by technology and how it affects urbanisation, 
there is an extensive literature that views technology achievements, especially in areas 
of transportation and telecommunications technologies, as important catalysts for 
globalisation. Many studies argue that these technologies significantly increase the 
integration of production systems and markets, the speed of communications, and the 
velocity of capital flows. For the urban impacts of globalisation, many analysts stress 
the influential role of globalisation in the emergence of global functions for some 
cities and regions all over the world. The seminal work of John Friedmann, Peter Hall, 
and Saskia Sassen about 'world cities', 'global cities' and 'global city regions' 
emphasise the influential role of globalisation in shaping the urban future in both 
developed and developing countries.
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- Urban Impacts of Main technological Forces:
- TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY
Advancements in transportation technology have resulted in increasing mobility, 
improving accessibility, increasing diffusion and falling costs of transportation 
facilities, and space-time convergence. These changes have significantly influenced 
city’s size, form, structure, and function within the regional settings. The urban 
impacts of transport technology at the regional level were profound. In the pre­
industrial era, cities were in a balanced relationship with each other and with the rural 
surroundings. This situation explains why these cities were of similar size. Only 
during the Industrial Revolution and since the introduction of new transportation 
modes that affect the regional setting, especially the railways and the automobile, such 
balance had significantly changed. New technologies of high-speed ground transport, 
automated transit and ‘smart streets’ (intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems) are 
expected to be of high influence in shaping the future of urban development.
- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The increasing diffusion of information technologies is not only affecting where 
people work and live, but also changing the character of activities that occur in the 
home, workplace, and automobile. Information and telecommunications technologies
introduced many new, but widely used, prefixes especially Tele... and Distance. 
These technologies have also changed the home environment, function and design.
Many of public services that were usually provided within designated public buildings 
such as schools, libraries, or prisons are now being provided in the home. The 
diffusion of information technologies is expected to drastically increase the 
complexity of cities through increasing the numbers and types of interactions among 
individuals, firms, technical systems, and the external environment. Information
systems are opening new opportunities for new combinations of people, equipment, 
and places. Therefore, a dramatic change in the spatial organization of activities within 
cities and large metropolitan regions is highly expected.
Although there are some predictions that telecommunications will lead to "death of 
distance" and that "death of distance" will lead to "death of cities", many analysts
assert that telecommunication could both centralize and decentralize urban activities. 
Peter Hall (1999) considered the argument that the ‘death of distance’ will lead to the
‘death of cities’ as exaggerating simply because it ignores the significance of face-to-
face contact and the continuing significance of agglomeration. Moreover, while
telecommunications will significantly shrink the space and consequently reduce the
266
effect of distance as a deterrent factor, advantages of site location will continue to be 
influential. This will facilitate the development of rural, remote and under-developed 
regions and incorporating them in the national development plans.
- RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Renewable energy is the main effective alternative for the depleting fossil energies 
because it is abundant, with well-established technology and that its main ingredients 
are completely free. The cost of power generation from renewable sources has
dropped significantly over the past decade and several technologies are now cost 
effective not only for off-grid applications but for grid-connected power as well. Many 
of the developing countries, such as Indonesia, India, China, Egypt and Morocco, have 
progressively started production and installation the PV units. Renewable energy 
opens up new opportunities not only for urban development but also for the 
comprehensive development process at both regional and national levels. Renewable 
energies provide distributed, ubiquitous and redundant renewable power supply 
systems that are highly needed for the vast undeveloped deserts in many developing 
countries. For urban development, there is no doubt that these technologies will 
minimise the role of energy supply sources as determining factors in selecting the
location and size of future urban settlements. It clearly adds more freedom in locating 
urban development projects and not to be strictly located near electricity grids.
- NEW URBAN UTILITIES TECHNOLOGIES
New urban utilities technologies are of considerable importance in shaping cities and 
patterns of urbanisation. Technology advancements in areas of water supply and the 
use of solar pumps are rapidly advancing. In the area of sanitation, the World Bank 
supports the ecological sanitation approach which is designed to suite the need on 
remote location. Such approach respects ecological integrity, conserves and protects 
fresh water resources, promotes dignified and healthy living, and recycles nutrients for 
use in agriculture. Because of the rapid developments and the increased
competitiveness, the prices of many of these technologies are decreasing sharply. 
Advancements in urban utilities technologies are expected to affect the urban 
environment in two ways. First, the large size of population needed for the economic 
functioning of water and sanitation stations is no longer required. Many of the
currently available water and sanitation systems are suitable for small urban or rural 
communities, and even for single houses. Second, such systems represent an 
economical alternative for utilities networks in remote rural locations, and sometimes 
in urban fringes. These advantages make the construction and the functioning of small 
urban communities technically and economically possible. The analysis reveals that
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although new urban utilities technologies will have considerable impacts on existing 
settlements, they open up new opportunities for managing the urban future in many of 
the developing counties. Also, these technologies will facilitate the spread of 
development activities to remote and under-developed regions.
- URBAN IMPACTS OF MAIN TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES: FORECASTING SURVEY RESULTS
In confirmation with the literature review findings, the forecasting survey reveals that 
ICTs, transportation, energy, and utilities technologies are the main technologies that 
are highly expected to be of considerable impact on the urban future in developing 
countries (Questions 4 and 3 in Questionnaires I and III). According to the forecasting 
survey results, it is highly expected that these technologies will considerably change
current operation and production systems and home-work relationship. Also, it is
highly expected that these technologies will increase population mobility and will help 
overcome energy and utilities problems that usually confront urban development in 
remote and rural areas. A summary of the forecasting survey results regarding the 
expected urban impacts of each of these technologies is presented in section 9.1.
- Technology and Urban Change: Forecasting Survey Results
In confirmation with the above discussion about the possible impacts of technology on 
urban change in developing countries, more than 67 percent of urban experts’ 
responses expect that future technological achievements will be of considerable
impact on urban development in developing countries (Question 2, Questionnaire III). 
Technology is highly expected to change home-work relationship. About 50 percent of 
technology experts’ responses and 64 percent of urban experts’ responses expect that 
the total amount of time needed for travelling to work and other daily activities will 
decline (Question 4 in Questionnaires II and III). In addition, about 60 percent of 
technology experts and 49 percent of urban experts expect that the long established
interdependence between place of residence and work location will decline. Moreover, 
65 percent of technology experts and 67 percent of urban experts expect that the 
commuting distance between home and work will increase significantly.
There is a high consensus among urban experts that future technological achievements 
will increase the attractiveness of rural settlements more than that of urban ones 
(Question 4 in Questionnaires II and III). About 51 percent of the responses indicate 
that the attractiveness of rural centres to urban population is expected to increase, 
while 49 percent of the responses show that attractiveness of urban centres will 
increase at a lower rate. About 59 percent urban experts and 65 percent of technology 
experts expect that settling remote and uninhabited areas will increase.
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Through this extensive analysis of the four main ways through which technology 
affects urbanisation (social change, economic growth, globalisation, and technological 
forces), through the examination of the possible urban impacts of main technological 
forces, and through the analysis of relevant forecasting results, the thesis has 
thoroughly investigated the relationship between technology and urban change and 
fulfilled its first objective.
10.1.2 Patterns and Problems o f Urban Change in Developing Countries
The second objective of this thesis was to examine the nature and extent of the main 
urban change problems in developing countries and how they are different from those 
in more developed countries. In fulfilling this objective the thesis has investigated the 
main differences in patterns of urban change in developed and developing countries 
and patterns and problems of urban change in Africa, as a group sample of developing 
countries, and in Egypt.
- MAIN DIFFERENCES IN PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The thesis empirical analysis of urban change patterns in countries of different
technological capabilities (developed, less, and least developing countries) reveals two 
main important facts (section 4.2). First, developed and developing countries present
different trends regarding the shares of different sizes of settlements of their national 
urban populations. In more developed, and more technically advanced countries, the 
share of large urban settlements is considerably decreasing and the share of smaller 
ones is increasing. This is while almost all developing regions present a different
pattern of increasing share of large settlements and sharply declining share of smaller 
ones. Second, developed and developing countries present contrasting trends 
regarding the average size of settlements. While the average size of large urban 
settlements is declining in more developed countries, it is rapidly increasing in 
developing countries. This analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between
the level of technology prevailing in a society and patterns of urban change in that 
society. In addition, this analysis clearly shows that urban systems in developing 
countries suffer two main problems: the increasing size of its primate cities and the 
rapid rate of urban concentration.
- PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS OF URBAN CHANGE IN AFRICA
Urban systems in almost all African countries have faced many unprecedented 
changes during the last five decades. Although these changes were similar to those
269
experienced in all developing countries, the rate and the scale of urban changes in 
Africa were very much beyond the capacity of the socio-economic systems of many 
African countries. Africa presents a strange phenomenon of rapid urbanisation without 
economic growth. Rapid urbanisation and the concentration of urban population and 
the emergence of primate cities are the main patterns of urban change in Africa. Urban 
poverty, unemployment, and environmental pollution are serious problems in almost 
all African cities, especially primate ones.
- PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS OF URBAN CHANGE IN EGYPT
Through the investigation of urban change in Egypt, the thesis came to three important 
conclusions. First the urban system of Egypt suffers high urban concentration levels 
in certain regions of the country; namely Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and Canal cities. 
To these very small regions, all migration streams are heading from all over the 
country, from both the urban and rural areas. Upper Egypt regions are the main losers 
of both urban and rural populations. Second, new towns built in Egypt since 1977 
were of very limited influence in correcting this pattern of urban concentration. Third. 
the urban system of Egypt suffers high differential growth of the different settlement 
sizes as large cities are usually growing faster than smaller ones which usually lose 
their population in favour of larger cities. In 2003, 51% of the country’s urban 
population were in only 2 large cities of over a million people in size: Greater Cairo 
(Cairo, Giza, Shubra Al-Khaymah) 38 percent, and Alexandria 13 percent.
The detailed analysis of urban problems that accompanied the increasing primacy of 
Greater Cairo region reveals three important facts. First, despite the numerous 
advantages of the region that usually attracts more people and investments to it, such 
increasing primacy created a web of social, economical, and urban problems. Second. 
urban poverty and its associated social and urban problems are high and growing in 
GCR. Housing shortage and emergence and the growth of slums are very high and 
rapidly growing in the region despite the government efforts to control them. Third, 
the region is facing mounting transportation, infrastructure, and environmental 
problems. These mounting problems of the increasing primacy of GCR call for a more 
comprehensive vision at the national level to control and minimise the increasing 
primacy of the region and to overcome its problems in the region itself and in the 
country as whole. In doing so, the adoption of some national policies, designed to 
control and minimise regional disparities, is a necessary approach.
Through this analysis, the thesis asserts that the increasing size of large cities, the 
rapid rate of urban concentration, and the emergence of primate cities are the main 
urban change problems in developing.
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10.1.3 Proposed Approaches for Managing Urban Future in Developing Countries
The third objective of the thesis was to develop urban development approaches that 
could be more effective in addressing the main urban problems in developing 
countries and that could efficiently meet the expected impacts of future technological 
achievements. The selection of these approaches takes into account the possible urban 
impacts of different technological forces and how to utilise these technologies in 
implementing these approaches.
In fulfilling this objective, and after reviewing the relationship between technology 
and urban change and after examining patterns and problems of urban change in 
developing countries, the thesis has identified three approaches for managing the 
urban future in developing countries: urban decentralisation, small-size settlements, 
and incremental planning and development of urban settlements. Next, in section 10.3, 
the thesis presents an appraisal of these approaches regarding their importance in 
managing the urban future in developing countries and the role of technology in
implementing each of these approaches. Also, it presents the forecasting survey results 
regarding the appropriateness and applicability of each of these approaches.
10.2 AN APPRAISAL OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The thesis’ hypothesis is that future technological achievements of the 21st century 
will have significant impacts on shaping the urban future in many of the developing 
countries, as the prevailing economic and social forces will undergo significant 
changes. The previous analysis of the relationship between technology and urban
change and the theoretical analysis of technology impacts on social change, economic 
growth, and globalisation (Chapter Two) demonstrate that the rapid and impressive 
technology achievements of the 21st century will have significant impacts on shaping 
the urban future in many of the developing countries.
The extensive analysis of the urban impacts of main technological forces (Chapter 
Three) reveals that recent technological achievements, mainly the areas of 
transportation, telecommunications, renewable energies and urban utilities were of 
considerable impacts on the urban environment. It is highly expected that technology 
achievements of the 21st century will be more impressive and more influential in 
shaping the urban environment.
Through the forecasting survey, the statistical analysis of both urban and technology 
experts’ responses clearly reveals that future technological achievements of the 21st 
century are highly expected to have profound impacts on shaping the urban future in 
many of the developing countries. It is highly expected that these technologies will
considerably change operation and production systems and the home-work
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relationship. Also, it is highly expected that these technologies will increase 
population mobility and will help overcome energy and utilities problems that usually 
confront urban development activities in remote and rural areas. A summary of the 
statistical analysis of both technology and urban development experts’ responses to 
questions relevant to the research hypothesis is presented in section 9.1.
Through its different stages and its theoretical and empirical dimensions, this analysis 
demonstrates that technology achievements are advancing rapidly and are expected to 
have profound impacts on shaping the urban future in many of the developing 
countries, and hence proves that the thesis’ first hypothesis is valid.
10.3 AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
The third objective of the thesis was to develop urban development approaches that 
could be more effective in addressing the main urban problems in developing 
countries and that could efficiently meet the expected impacts of future technological 
achievements. The selection of these approaches takes into account the possible urban 
impacts of different technological forces and how to utilise these technologies in 
implementing these approaches.
In fulfilling this objective, and after reviewing the relationship between technology 
and urban change and after examining patterns and problems of urban change in 
developing countries, the thesis has identified three approaches for managing the 
urban future in developing countries: urban decentralisation, small-size settlements, 
and incremental planning and development of urban settlements. Next, in section 10.3, 
the thesis presents an appraisal of these approaches regarding their importance in 
managing the urban future in developing countries and the role of technology in 
implementing each of these approaches. Also, it presents the forecasting survey results 
regarding the appropriateness and applicability of each of these approaches.
10.3.1 Urban Decentralisation Approach
The thesis’ first proposed approach is that decentralization and dispersion of urban 
population, mainly at the regional level, is a necessary approach for managing the 
urban future in developing countries and that it will be highly facilitated by future 
technological achievements. The thesis argues that future technological achievements 
would increase population mobility and would introduce and enhance new forms of 
work, education, and entertainment, which consequently will facilitate the adoption of 
such approach. The importance and applicability of this approach has been tested 
through the literature review, the analysis of urban problems in Africa and in Egypt,
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and through the forecasting survey of both technology and urban development experts' 
opinions and expectations (section 9.2).
A-lndications from the Literature Review:
The literature review presented in section 6.1.1 reveals that almost all urban planning 
theorists view urban decentralisation as a necessary approach for achieving a more 
sustainable urban development. Ebenezer Howard and Lewis Mumford are among the 
most influential proponents of urban decentralization. In his book “Garden cities of 
To-Morrow” (1902), Howard asserted the growing consensus against population
concentration in the already over-crowded cities. In support of his arguments for
decentralisation, he critically examined the evils of slum housing, long work journeys, 
and the deteriorated environment in these overcrowded cities. Consequently, he 
suggested that city dwellers should be relieved of these disadvantages through being 
moved into new ‘garden Cities”. Lewis Mumford viewed decentralisation as a
necessary approach to avoid the danger of turning “town and country” into an 
“amorphous suburban mass” (Mumford 1966, 34). In practice, decentralisation
became a major aim of post-war British urban policy. The advent of the 'spatial 
technologies', namely the automobile, the railways, and telecommunications are 
argued to have changed the nature of the case for decentralisation in other ways 
Howard could not have envisaged: it became a widespread autonomous trend both for 
households and firms (Coursey 1977, 13).
Although most of the frequently stated advantages of decentralisation are mainly 
focusing on its effects at the local level, the most significant advantages of urban 
decentralisation are at the regional level. At the regional level, the urban 
decentralisation approach addresses urban problems within their regional and national 
contexts that usually influence urban localities. Therefore, managing urban areas 
within these contexts is seen to be more effective and more rewarding for the urban 
areas and their rural hinterlands. In many cases, urban decentralisation at local level 
could represent in itself some sort of urban concentration, as is the case of new towns 
around Cairo (section 5.2.1.4). Although these towns were an attempt to achieve some 
urban decentralisation of Cairo’s population, this process has improved life quality 
and the economic prosperity of Greater Cairo Region, compared to other regions of 
the country, and consequently increased its attractiveness to new migrants from 
different regions of Egypt. Therefore, although this process represents urban 
decentralisation at local level, it is an urban concentration process at national level.
For developing countries, where the pace of urban growth and urban concentration has 
reached critical levels, urban decentralisation is of particular importance. The 
constantly high rates of population natural increase and the rapid rural-urban
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migration are simultaneously causing immense growth in urban population in these 
countries. The ever-increasing size of Third World cities and its impacts on 
concentrated poverty and urban deterioration has drawn the attention of national 
planners, policy makers and researchers alike. Most of the national governments in 
developing countries have begun to realise that the concentration of population and 
activities in a few leading cities are serious threats to the achievement of their stated 
development goals. A more detailed investigation of urban decentralisation advantages 
for developing countries is presented in section (6.1.1.1).
-Technology as an Enabler fo r Urban Decentralisation:
Many urban studies argue that technological achievements have significantly 
influenced the distribution of urban population. Brochie, Newton, Hall, and Nijkamp 
(1985, 12) have studied the role of technology in the spatial diffusion of urbanisation 
and argue that technology affects the dispersion of urban activities and the interactions 
between them. This argument is based on the idea that the dispersal of non-residential 
activities may be measured by their mean distance from the urban centre or by the 
number of dispersed centres within the metropolitan area, and that dispersal of 
interactions may be measured by the mean flow distance (Figure 6.1). Mackett and 
Lodwick (1985, 254) acknowledged the argument of Brochie, Newton, Hall, and 
Nijkamp (1985) calling their graph (Figure 6.1) an “urban technological triangle”. A 
more detailed analysis of these arguments is presented in section 6.1.3.
The analysis of urban impacts of different technology sectors (presented in Chapter 3) 
demonstrates that these technologies could facilitate urban decentralisation. For 
transportation technologies (section 3.1), it is evident that such technologies have 
considerably increased population mobility, which in turn has increased their ability of 
residing further away from city centres. Peter Hall (1970) asserted that there is a close 
interrelationship between the available forms of urban transport and the form of urban 
growth. Pacione (2001, 248) stressed that the development of railways and trams 
during the nineteenth century was crucial in separating home and workplace, 
encouraging functional specialization of land uses in the city. Also, many urban 
experts such as Hall 1993, Pacione 2001, Herbert and Thomas 1997, Hart 2001, have 
emphasised the role of transportation technologies of the Post-Industrial era in 
facilitating population deconcentration, post-suburbanisation - the emergence of edge 
cities -  on the local level, and in promoting urban decentralisation and diffusion of 
settlements on the regional level (table 3.2, Chapter 3).
For telecommunications technologies (section 3.2), many urban studies have 
emphasised the regional spatial impacts of ICTs. Manuel Palao and Garcia-Suelto 
(1975) expect that ICTs would directly contribute to physical decentralisation. They
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argued that the new ways of using ICTs are found both to ease problems of city 
congestion and to improve the quality of life in rural areas. In a similar vein, Roger 
Pye and Thomas, H. (1976, 92) confirmed that telecommunications were extremely 
important in decisions about office relocation. Many recent studies have supported the 
previous arguments of Manuel Palao and Garcia-Suelto (1975), and Roger Pye (1979). 
Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson (1997, 95) stressed the role of the rapid 
advances in communications technologies in facilitating the movement out of cities 
that the automobile had initiated. They stress that today's cities will continue to 
become less compact and the city of the future will be anything but compact.
Many other studies argue that technology will eliminate the need for cities as centres 
of interaction (Moss and Townsend 2000; UNCHS-Habitat 1995; Caimcross 1997, 
18). Negroponte (1996) and Wheeler et al (2000) argue that the post-information age 
will remove the limitations of geography. Moreover, some studies argue that the future 
advancement of telecommunications technologies would lead to the “death of 
distance” which will lead to “death of cities” stressing that distance would no longer 
determine the cost of communicating electronically (Doxiadis, 1960; Gilder and Peter 
1995; Caimcross, 1997). Also, it is argued that telecommunications would surmount 
distance not only through ‘shrinking of space’ but also through ‘extension of people’ 
into a position in which they can bridge distances (SPECTRE 2002).
However, the argument “death of distance” will lead to “death of cities” has been 
criticised as being over simplistic and exaggerating. Jed Kolko (1998, 4) argued that 
telecommunications have led to the "death of distance" but not to the "death of cities". 
Also, Peter Hall (1999) considered the argument that the ‘death of distance’ will lead 
to the ‘death of cities’ as exaggerating simply because it ignores the significance of 
face-to-face contact and the continuing significance of agglomeration (section 
3.2.4.2). Admittedly, some other studies argue that telecommunications could both 
centralize and decentralize urban activities as it could help both to concentrate and to 
disperse economic activities (Gottmann, 1983; Scott, 1995; and Wheeler et a l 2000). 
But in fact this depends mainly on the advantages and motivations behind the decision 
to centralise or decentralise. This argument coincides with the thesis stance that views 
technology just as a tool, 'neutral' or 'value-free' (neither good or bad in itself), and 
that what matters is not the technology but the way in which we choose to use it. In 
this regard, the thesis argues that while telecommunications will significantly shrink 
the space and consequently reduce the effect of distance as a deterrent factor, site 
location will continue to be influential. For example, although the distance has not 
become the determining factor in choice between two locations, location advantages 
(i.e. regional settings, natural resources, environmental advantages) became more and
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more important in this regard. Therefore, the decision to settle or to build a new
settlement in any location will not be mainly governed by distance but rather by the
advantages of such location. This will increase the possibility of developing rural, 
remote and under-developed regions and incorporating them in the national
development plans (section 3.2.4.2).
Similarly, advancement of renewable energy and urban utilities technologies (section
3.3 and 3.4) is expected to facilitate urban decentralisation. For developing countries, 
photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy technologies offer unique opportunities for
supplying electricity to remote and scattered rural and desert settlements without the 
need for the extremely expensive networks. Also, these advancements are expected to 
help overcoming energy and utilities problems that usually confront urban 
development activities in remote and rural areas of developing countries.
Although it is evident from the literature review that future technological 
achievements will facilitate urban decentralisation, the research tried, in a further step, 
to empirically verify this argument. The comparative analysis of patterns of urban 
change in countries of different technological statuses (developed, less, and least 
developed countries), presented in section 4.4, confirms that there is a strong 
relationship between the level of technology and patterns of urban change prevailing 
in any society. This analysis reveals that all countries of the industrial world had 
shown a considerable degree of urban decentralisation, this is while all countries in the 
developing world are still experiencing urban centralisation and suffer mounting urban 
structure imbalances regarding the ever increasing size of large metropolitan areas.
-Urban Decentralisation in Egypt:
Although policymakers in Egypt, as in all the developing countries, claim to have 
adopted of urban decentralisation, it seems that such approach have been applied only 
at the local level. The analysis provided in sections 5.2.1 and 6.1.4 clearly demonstrate 
that government efforts mainly focused on alleviating urban problems of primate and 
large cities of the country. The three ‘generations’ of new towns in Egypt were built 
around very close to these large cities. Even the sequence of these ‘generations’ has 
been in accordance with urban concentration level of these cities.
The analysis of urban problems in Egypt, as an example of developing countries, 
revealed that urban concentration is one of the serious urban problems in the country 
(Chapter 5). Although there are only 3 cities of more than 1 million inhabitants out of 
the country’s 211 urban settlements in Egypt, their share of the total urban population 
reached 51.14 percent in 2003. Moreover, the analysis of current migration streams 
shows that the Greater Cairo Region and the urban govemorates of Alexandria, Port
276
Said, and Suez were the main targets for population migration with net in-migration of 
about 1.45 million people during 1986-1996 period. This is while the Delta and Upper 
Egypt regions have lost about 840,000 and 685,000 of their urban population. The 
highest percentage of population loss was in the Upper Egypt region that lost about 17 
percent of its urban population during the same period.
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:
In confirmation with the literature review findings, the statistical analysis of both 
urban and technology experts’ responses demonstrates that urban decentralisation is 
expected to be effective in managing the urban future in developing countries. Also, it 
shows that future technological achievements are highly expected to facilitate the 
adoption of the proposed urban decentralisation approach in developing countries. 
Section 9.2 confirms these points through presenting a detailed analysis of the 
forecasting survey results regarding factors affecting the spatial distribution of urban 
population in developing countries, the spatial impacts of different technology sectors, 
targeted areas of population movements, and the location of future new urban 
settlements in developing countries.
The literature review, the analysis of urban patters and problems in Africa and in 
Egypt, and the statistical analysis of forecasting survey results demonstrate that urban 
decentralisation is a necessary approach for managing the urban future in developing 
countries and that future technological achievements would highly facilitate urban 
decentralisation in these countries during the next 30-40 years.
Although it has been verified that urban decentralisation is an appropriate approach for 
most of the developing countries of increasing technological capabilities, national 
variations regarding socio-economic conditions and technological capabilities play a 
considerable role in determining the scale, pace, and policies needed to implement 
such approach. Therefore, the application of such approach should be based on an 
extensive analysis of the spatial characteristics and problems of urban systems, 
patterns of population distribution and migration streams, and the socio-economic and 
technological capabilities of each country.
Taking into account the thesis stance that views technology just as a tool that could 
both centralize and decentralize urban activities; achieving urban decentralisation 
requires that technological achievements should be driven by a sincere political will 
for implementing urban decentralisation. In this regard, urban decentralisation is 
expected to be better achieved within a wider national comprehensive process of 
political, economical, and administrative decentralisation. Moreover, governments 
should introduce some incentives that encourage real estate and industrial
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development companies to participate in the development of targeted regions. Also, 
new measures should be introduced for building technologically-sound regional 
infrastructure facilities. This is to ensure that these facilities could be adaptable to 
future technological changes and would be efficient for a considerable period of time. 
These facilities are of considerable importance for the implementation of urban 
decentralisation approach.
For Egypt, urban decentralisation at the regional level is of considerable importance. 
Focus should be directed to migration-generating regions rather than migration- 
targeted regions. Urban decentralisation towards migration-generating regions, such as 
Upper Egypt and frontier regions, will foster the development process and create more 
jobs in these regions. This will minimise the regional development disparities, and 
consequently alleviate urban problems in migration-targeted regions such as Cairo.
10.3.2 Small-Size Urban Settlements Approach
The thesis’ second proposed approach is that small-size urban settlement is a 
necessary approach to avoid the problems of current large-scale urban centres and to 
help implement the proposed urban decentralization approach. This approach has been 
tested through the literature review, the analysis of urban problems in Egypt and in 
Egypt, and through the forecasting survey of both technology and urban development 
experts’ opinions and expectations (section 9.3).
A-Indications from the Literature Review:
The literature review (section 6.2.1) reveals that small-size settlements are widely seen 
as of considerable advantage and necessary for achieving sustainable urban
development in developing countries. In 1965, Constantinos Doxiadis stressed the 
values that small cities have for their own inhabitants, for those in big cities, and for 
the world population and civilisation. Moreover, he posed an important question: how 
do we know that big cities can survive without the small ones? Also, he argued that 
this has never happened before and that we are not allowed to let it happen without 
being aware of its repercussions to our welfare.
The role of this size-category of settlements is widely recognised as vital for economic 
growth and restructuring regional and national urban systems. This is, in part, because 
of the recognition that a considerable proportion of the world’s population live in 
them. In 2000, over half the world’s urban population and a quarter of its total 
population lived in urban centres of less than half a million inhabitants. Much of this
population was in market towns and administrative centres with between 5,000 and
100,000 inhabitants (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2003). In 2000, more than 60 percent of
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urban population of Africa, the Caribbean and South-Eastern Asia were in urban 
centres with less than half a million inhabitants (UN, 2002).
The high percentage of population living in small settlements demonstrates that this 
size-category of settlements have some qualities that enabled them to attract and 
sustain this huge number of population worldwide. Many recent studies have 
investigated the advantages and the potentials of these settlements. The most 
important of these advantages is that these settlements increase rural agricultural 
incomes by acting as centres of demand and market nodes for agricultural produce 
from the rural region. In addition, small settlements reduce costs and improve access 
to a range of public and private services and goods from within and outside their 
region by acting as centres for the production and distribution of goods and services to 
their rural region. Moreover, this size-category of settlements is effective in attracting 
rural migrants from the surrounding regions through demand for non-farm labour and 
thereby decreases pressure on larger urban centres (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2003).
On the other hand, the thesis has examined the declining attractiveness of large urban 
settlements (section 6.2.2). In addition to the analysis of the old arguments about 
agglomeration economies, environmental and social costs of urban concentration, the 
thesis puts special emphasis on the impacts of natural and human-made disasters on 
large urban settlements in developing countries. In the era of spread and proliferation 
of mass-destruction weapons, having large cities or metropolitan agglomerations 
became a very serious strategic mistake. For a country like Egypt, having about 20 
percent of the country’s total population in a single location, such as Cairo, is really a 
serious problem. In a situation like this, population dispersion to a number of small- 
size settlements is the most effective and necessary measure.
In the light of the considerable advantages of small urban settlements, this approach is 
expected to be an effective tool for the adjustment of the urban national and regional 
imbalances for many reasons. First and because of dispersed nature of existing rural 
settlements in Egypt, small-size settlements are expected to be more efficient in 
meeting the socio-economic needs of the small clusters of rural and urban settlements 
and more adaptable to future technological changes. Second, these small-size 
settlements can easily fit within, and adapted to, the regional settings of existing urban 
and rural settlements. Small-size settlements offer better chances for the incremental 
development and the continuous evaluation and reassessment of the approach’s 
effectiveness and suitability. A matter that is not achievable with large-size 
settlements, as is the case in Egypt where a bundle of new large settlements were built. 
Third, small-size settlements are expected to facilitate the implementation of the 
proposed urban decentralisation and incremental planning and development
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approaches, as it would facilitate the dispersion of urban population to a larger number 
of settlements that could be built according to the need. Fourth, small-size settlements 
are easier to manage and suit the management capacity of developing countries.
Although the importance and effectiveness of the small-size settlements were evident 
through the previous arguments, defining the optimum size for the small city is still an 
important issue. Since defining an optimum size for the future urban settlement is a 
hard task and depends on the socio-economic conditions and the development level of 
each country or a region, defining a certain minimum size, however, is a useful 
criterion. Waugh (1968) suggests a community of 6,000 as the minimum size needed 
to constitute a suburban area, as at that size there will be sufficient services to justify 
recognition as a separate entity. In confirmation with these arguments, many countries 
use smaller number of population as threshold for settlements to be considered as 
urban. Moreover, Moles, R. et al (2000) recommend some smaller and some larger 
sizes as well. They recommend that a minimum population threshold level of 1000— 
2000 would enhance viability for a primary school, some local services and 
centralised sewage treatment. Also, a settlement with 15,000-30,000 people enables a 
secondary school, public and commercial services, and some environmental 
infrastructure. More important, it recommends that a development pattern with 
settlement sizes in the 1000-2000 and 20,000-30,000 population bands clustered 
around public transport nodes is likely to be most sustainable (Moles, R. et al 2000). 
More analyses of these and other arguments regarding settlement’s shape and density 
are presented in section 6.2.1.
-Technology as an enabler fo r the Small-Size Settlement Approach:
In addition to their environmental qualities, technological achievements especially in 
areas of telecommunications and transport technologies have significantly increased 
the attractiveness of small urban settlements. These technologies have made life in 
these settlements more attractive as they made them more physically accessible and 
virtually connected with the rest of their region and countiy. Moreover, these
technologies have introduced in these settlements many of the formerly large-
settlements’ services, mainly entertainment, shopping, and education. Moreover, the
emergence and the growth of telework activities made these settlements more
attractive to a wide variety of new businesses. Also, recent developments in renewable 
solar and wind energies, making them more efficient and more economic, could 
facilitate settling areas that are away from the national grid. Also, the development of 
small water purification and sanitary treatment is expected to support this attitude. 
More details about the urban impacts of these technologies are presented in Chapter 3.
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-An Appraisal o f Small-Settlements Approach in Egypt:
The extensive analysis of urban system in Egypt, presented in sections 5.2.2 and 6.2.4, 
demonstrate that the proposed small-size settlement approach is not among the main 
objectives of urban development policy in Egypt. This is true for both old and new 
urban settlements in the country.
Regarding old cities, large urban agglomerations continue to dominate the distribution 
of urban population in Egypt. Although the share of primate cities (of more than 1 
million population) of total urban population has declined from 56.6 percent in 1976 
to 48.8 percent in 1996, it starts rising again and reached 51.1 percent in 2003. Also, 
although the share of settlements of 100-500 thousand inhabitants has increased from
18.3 percent in 1976 to 23.6 in 2003 and the share of settlements of 20,000-99,999 
inhabitants has increased from 19.8 percent in 1976 to 22.7 in 2003, the share of 
smaller settlements of less than 20,000 inhabitants has declined sharply from 5.1 
percent to 0.6 in during the same period (table 5.3). For the new cities, almost all of 
the 16 new cities are of large size. Four of them are of 500,000 target population; 7 are 
of 250,000 target population; 2 are of 120,000 target population; 2 of 70,000 target 
population, and only 1 of 35,000 target population.
However, there was a dramatic spread of large villages (10,000-20,000 inhabitants) 
across the Egyptian countryside. Although these settlements are rural either regarding 
their lifestyle or the agricultural economic base, some studies have classified them as 
“urban villages”. In 1996, urban villages of more than 10,000 people have increased in 
number from only 400 in 1986 to about 628 in 1996, and their share of the total 
population has increased from 3.2 percent in 1947 to 8 percent in 1976, and to 17.5 
percent in 1996. This reflects the increasing attractiveness and competitiveness of this 
size-category of settlements. It also reflects the importance of this category of rural 
settlements in developing a more balanced urban system in Egypt and confirms Jamal 
Hamdan’s idea (1990) that “urbanism begins in the village” (section 6.2.4).
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:
In confirmation with the literature review, the statistical analysis of the forecasting 
survey reveals a high level of expectancy among both technology and urban
development experts that future technology achievements would highly affect the size
of both new and existing urban settlements in developing countries. It also reveals that
urban experts view the small size of urban settlements as more appropriate for
developing countries. According to this analysis, settlement size of 10,000-20,000 
inhabitants is highly expected be more appropriate for new settlements in developing 
countries, followed by settlements size of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants. This is while 
smaller settlements of 5,000-10,000 and larger settlements of 20,000-50,000
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inhabitants could be suitable for settlements of special functions within their regional 
settings. Settlements of less than 5,000 inhabitants are not recommended.
Section 9.3 confirms these points through presenting a detailed analysis of the 
forecasting survey results regarding the expected size of new urban settlements, the 
future function and the possible ways for the provision of services in these settlements. 
The last two points are of considerable importance in defining settlement size.
Regarding the future function of these settlements, it is highly expect that future urban 
settlements are likely to be of multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) or as 
centres for location-bound activities (tourism, mining). These two functions could be 
efficiently performed in small settlements within the recommended size categories.
Regarding the possible ways for the provision of services in new urban settlements, 
the statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses to Question 11 in Questionnaire III 
reveals that the introduction of specialised service centres between a group of cities is 
the most likely way for the provision of services in future urban settlements in 
developing countries. Also, about 90 percent of urban experts’ responses to Question 
16 in Questionnaire III expect that existing urban settlements are more likely to work 
as regional service centres. This reflects the experts’ belief that the majority of the 
proposed future new settlements will not work as a regional service centres. This 
confirms the idea that the majority of these settlements will be of small size. This 
analysis also reveals that incorporation of primary services in every settlement is 
second most likely way for the provision of services in these settlements. This also 
reflects experts’ belief that that new settlements should be self-sufficient, which in 
turn, will support the viability of the proposed small-size settlements approach.
The literature review and the statistical analysis of urban and technology experts’ 
responses demonstrate that the proposed small-size settlements approach would be 
effective in managing the urban future developing countries in the next 30-40 years. 
This analysis shows that settlement size of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants seem to be more 
appropriate for new settlements in developing countries, followed by settlements size 
of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants. This is while smaller settlement of 5,000-10,000 and 
larger settlements of 20,000-50,000 inhabitants could be suitable for settlements of 
special functions within their regional settings. Settlements of less than 5,000 
inhabitants are not recommended.
Although it has been verified that small-size settlements is an appropriate approach for 
most of the developing countries of increasing technological capabilities, national and 
regional variations regarding socio-economic conditions, technological capabilities, 
and regional potentials and problems play a considerable role in determining new 
settlements’ size, function, and location in relation to existing ones. This requires that
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these factors should be investigated at both the regional and national levels. Also, in 
addition to the size, settlement shape and density are decisive factors in determining 
its sustainability and require special investigation in each country.
For Egypt, this approach is of special importance for overcoming the mounting 
problems of its large urban agglomerations (section 5.3) and for the application of the 
proposed urban decentralisation approach. For the application of the small-size 
settlements approach in Egypt, the research recommends the development of large 
rural settlements through a ‘rural urbanisation’ process, and to incorporate these 
settlements within the national urban system. This process is expected to be more 
efficient in minimising regional disparities and in correcting urban system imbalances. 
Also, it is expected to be more economical than building new settlements.
10.3.3 Incremental Planning Approach
The thesis’ third proposed approach is that incremental planning and development of 
the future urban settlements is a necessary approach to deal with the uncertainties that 
will always exist regarding the extent of future technological change and its urban 
impacts, especially in developing countries where the availability and reliability of 
information is limited. These uncertainties are: (1) uncertainties in defining the extent 
and the rate of future technological change in developing countries, (2) uncertainties 
about developing the necessary capacity in these countries needed to better define the 
future urban impacts of technology and to devise and implement the policies and 
strategies necessary to manage such impacts, and (3) uncertainties about the degree of 
acceptance and adaptability of local populace to the proposed approaches. In addition 
to these uncertainties, the volume of the expected urban change is high. Therefore, the 
research proposes the incremental planning and development approach as a necessary 
approach to best deal with these uncertainties.
This approach has been tested through the literature review (section 6.3) and through 
the forecasting survey of urban development experts (section 9.4).
A-Indications from the Literature Review:
Incremental planning is developed mainly to overcome the shortcomings of Rational 
Comprehensive Planning (RCP) methodology. To apply the RCP approach, the 
decision-makers should have: (1) a well-defined problem; (2) a full array of
alternatives to consider; (3) complete information about the consequences of each 
alternative; (4) full information about the values and preferences of citizens; and (5) 
full adequate time, skills, and resources (MacLeod 1996). Due to all these 
requirements, the RCP approach is viewed as unrealistic and can only be applied to 
relatively simple problems and only in a modified form Lindblom (1959) argue that its
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non-implementability takes away any point in using it. Therefore, and based on these 
shortcomings of RCP and taking all the uncertainties mentioned before into account, 
the RCP seems to be inappropriate for managing the urban future in developing 
countries experiencing rapid technological and socio-economic changes.
In “Incrementalism” social interaction is substituted for mental processes in systematic 
calculation and that subjectivity is part of this process (Friedmann, 1987). Also, while 
exclusion of factors is accidental in the RCP, it is deliberate, systematic and defensible 
in Incrementalism (Lindblom 1959). Also, Incrementalism rejects the notion that 
policies can be guided in terms of central institutions of a society expressing a 
collective "good" that ensure the appropriate assessment of society’s potentials and 
needs.
MacLeod (1996) argues that although incremental decisions outnumber fundamental 
ones, they do not outweigh them and that fundamental decisions set the context for 
incremental ones. Furthermore, he argues that no single tradition of planning can do 
everything. In practice, planners usually make repetitive attempts to solve problems, 
starting off being incremental and becoming more comprehensive. They thus take 
advantage of the strengths of each approach while avoiding their respective 
shortcomings, a methodology known as "Mixed Scanning". Usually, planning 
departments use the RCP approach to develop the Official Plan and employ the 
incremental approach to implement it in daily planning practice.
The main advantage of the incremental planning approach is that according to this 
approach the problem confronting the decision-maker is continually redefined. This 
allows for countless end-means and means-ends adjustments that, in effect, make the 
problem more manageable. Consequently; there is no one decision or "right" solution 
but a "never-ending series of attacks" on the issues at hand through serial analyses and 
evaluation. These features make such approach more appropriate for situations where 
high levels of uncertainties are expected.
Also, incremental planning is more flexible and adaptable to societal changes, which 
makes it more suitable for planning the urban future in developing countries. In this 
approach, plans are not constructed by a strict process but by a series of consultations 
largely based on peoples' actual experiences, needs and aspirations (Hudson 1979). 
Moreover, large decisions are divided into smaller ones and distributed among a large 
number of stages and actors who make decisions independently and pursuing their 
separate interests in the light of the prevailing conditions at each stage. This again 
makes planning problems more manageable. The state serves as an independent 
adjudicator seeking compromises between these groups. This process brings out the
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public interest in the light of the actual socio-economic and technological capabilities 
of the society (Gunton 1984).
In practice, incremental planning is usually associated with incremental 
implementation of the proposed plans. The basic idea of incremental implementation 
is to blur the distinction between the design and implementation phases. The main idea 
of this approach is founded on the experience-based assumption that design and 
implementation decisions strongly affect one another, and thus a rigorous separation 
of design and implementation does not accomplish its goal (section 6.3).
Based on this analysis, and for the purpose of this research focusing on developing 
countries, incremental planning approach is expected to be highly appropriate for 
many reasons. F irst it best deals with the lack of necessary reliable data in these 
countries. Second, it provides better chances for the optimal use of financial and 
environmental resources as it continuously evaluates the socio-economic, 
technological, and environmental changes in the society. Third, it ensures the gradual 
transition from the existing to the targeted situations, and consequently protects 
societies from the unexpected socio-economic impacts of sudden changes.
-Incremental Planning in Egypt
Incremental planning is not applied in planning or implementation of urban 
development activities in Egypt, either on the local or the regional level. On the local 
level, and although the development of each new city was set in stages, all these stages 
are planned and designed in advance with no possibility of modification in the light of 
the changing socio-economic and technological condition. This is mainly because 
almost all infrastructure networks, mainly transportation, usually built at one time for 
the whole city. This predefines the physical form of the city and, to a large extent, its 
population size. Moreover, the first stage is usually about the half of the city. Also, in 
many large new cities such as 10th of Ramadan and 6th of October, sparse development 
activities started in all stages within the first five years of the city development start.
On the regional level, a number of new cities were built together giving no chance for 
assessment and evaluation. For example, four cities with total target population of 
about two millions were built almost at the same time around Cairo. This was, in fact, 
in addition to another six settlements of 250,000 inhabitants each. The large size in 
addition to the large number of these settlements demonstrates that incrementalism is 
not applied in Egypt’s urban development policy.
B-Indications from the Forecasting Survey:
The statistical analysis presented in section 9.4 reveals that about 93 percent of urban 
experts consider the gradual development of future settlements as most appropriate, 
with highest average increase. Almost half of this percentage views this approach as
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most appropriate (question 14 in Questionnaire III). Moreover, about 56 percent of 
urban experts consider building the whole settlement at one time as less appropriate, 
and about 35 (out of this 56 percent) view this approach as least appropriate (Table 
8.28, Figure 8.24, and Table A4.17 in Appendix 4). This reflects the high confidence 
among urban experts about the effectiveness of this approach for developing countries.
The literature review and the statistical analysis of urban experts’ responses 
demonstrate that the proposed incremental planning approach would be effective in 
managing the urban future in developing countries during the next 30-40 years. Such 
approach is a necessary approach to deal with uncertainties that will always exist 
regarding the extent of future technological change and its urban impacts, especially in 
developing countries where the availability and reliability of information is limited. 
According to this analysis, the gradual development of these settlements is expected to 
enable developing countries to be more efficient and more flexible in meeting the 
expected impressive socio-economic impacts of technology. Also, it ensures the 
gradual transition from the existing to the targeted situations, and therefore protects 
societies from the unexpected socio-economic impacts of sudden changes. Moreover, 
it provides better chances for the optimal use of financial and environmental resources 
as it continuously evaluates the socio-economic, technological, and environmental 
changes in the society.
10.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS
Because of the comprehensive nature of technology impacts on society, technology 
will introduce considerable changes to the urban system as a whole including existing 
cities, especially the large ones. To draw a comprehensive idea about future changes 
in the urban system, the forecasting survey tried to survey the expectations of urban 
development experts about the expected future changes to the size and functions of 
these cities.
The statistical analysis of forecasting survey results, presented in section 9.5, shows 
that the future role of existing cities is expected to face considerable changes, which in 
turn will produce parallel changes in the size of these settlements. The most expected 
function for these settlements is to work as regional service centres for education, 
commercial, or entertainment. Concerning the size, this analysis shows that urban 
experts expect that the size of the existing cities is likely to decrease. Such decrease 
means that more people will move out of these settlements towards new urban 
settlements or existing rural ones.
286
10.5 CRITIQUE OF METHODS
Although all efforts have been made to apply a rational methodology, now and after 
having a more comprehensive understanding of the research constraints and results, 
some points of self-critique have been reached, which could be helpful in advancing 
future research in this subject. F irst the subject ‘technology and urban change’ is a 
broad, complex, and debateable issue, which makes the task of this research very hard. 
However, this broad vision was necessary to reach a comprehensive understanding of 
the problem and its dimensions and then it would be possible to examine each of these 
dimensions in more details. Second, although Delphi Technique is an effective and 
recommended technique in the area of this research, it does not ensure the best 
possible results. In Delphi Technique, consulted experts are less encouraged to give 
comments about the raised issues. Such comments are necessary to add depth to the 
survey results through benefiting more from experts’ experiences and 
recommendations. Also, in Delphi Technique, responses are. based, in some cases, on 
expert’s personal interpretations of some of the questions, which may differ from that 
intended by the researcher. Third, although surveying experts’ expectations is 
important in the area of this research, city-residents expectations and preferences are 
also important and must be surveyed.
10.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
Through its different stages, this research has made an original contribution to 
knowledge in five main areas. In the following points, these contributions are listed 
in the order they are addressed in this thesis.
• The thesis has identified the possible urban impacts of main technological forces 
(Chapter Three). Although the urban impacts of telecommunications and 
transportation technologies have been studied before, the main contribution of the 
thesis in this regard is the identification of the possible urban impacts of 
renewable energy and urban utilities technologies in developing countries 
(sections 3.3 and 3.4). In addition, the thesis has verified the possible impacts of 
these technologies through the forecasting survey. According to the forecasting 
survey results, there is a high consensus among technology and urban 
development experts that these technologies will have a considerable impact on 
shaping the urban future in developing countries (section 9.1). It is highly 
expected that these technologies will help overcome energy and utilities problems 
that usually confront urban development in remote and rural areas. These 
technologies are expected to minimise the role of energy and urban utilities as 
determining factors in selecting the location and size of future urban settlements.
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• The thesis has empirically examined the theory that there is an association between
the level of technology prevailing in a society and patterns of urban change in that 
society. The thesis empirically demonstrated that countries of different 
technological capabilities present different patterns of urban change regarding the 
size of urban settlements and the concentration of urban population (section 4.2).
• Although there are some studies that have analysed the possible urban impacts of
technology in developing countries, the thesis has went further and investigated 
how these technologies could be employed for managing urban problems in these 
countries. The thesis has verified, through the analysis of relevant literature and 
through the forecasting survey, that future technological achievements are 
expected to facilitate the implementation of the proposed approaches for 
managing urban future in developing countries (Chapter Nine).
• The proposed approaches for managing urban future in developing countries
constitute an original contribution of the thesis. These approaches are of 
comprehensive and complementary nature and address a wide array of urban 
problems in developing countries. Through the forecasting survey, urban experts
expect that these approaches will be effective in meeting the comprehensive 
socioeconomic and urban impacts of technology in developing countries. While 
urban decentralisation is the ultimate objective, the small-size settlements 
approach is a necessary tool for achieving urban decentralisation in developing
countries. This is while the incremental planning approach deals with 
uncertainties that will always exist, especially in forecasting the future urban 
impacts of technology in developing countries. Also, it provides better chances for 
the optimal use of financial and environmental resources. To the author’s 
knowledge, the thesis was the first to propose and to empirically verify the 
importance and effectiveness of the incremental planning approach in managing 
the urban future in developing countries (sections 6.3 and 9.4).
• In addition to defining the appropriate size and function of new urban settlement, the
thesis has contributed to knowledge through defining the appropriate function and 
size of existing cities, especially the large ones. In this regard, the thesis argues 
that technology achievements will not only affect the new settlements, but it will 
introduce considerable changes to the urban system as a whole including existing 
cities, especially the large ones. The thesis, has examined this argument through 
the forecasting survey. The statistical analysis of forecasting survey results, 
presented in section 9.5, shows that the future role of existing cities is expected to
face considerable changes, which in turn will produce parallel changes in the size
of these settlements. The most expected function for these settlements is to work
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as regional service centres for education, commerce, or entertainment. Concerning 
the size, this analysis shows that urban experts expect that the size of the existing 
cities is likely to decrease. Such decrease means that more people will move out 
of these settlements towards new urban settlements or existing rural ones.
In addition, the research provides a unique methodological tool for the analysis of 
technology-urban change relationship in developing countries. This methodology has 
combined both the theoretical analysis of such relationship and the empirical 
investigation of its current and future impacts. Also, it has combined the development 
of the necessary approaches for meeting these impacts and the empirical examination 
of the effectiveness and suitability of these approaches through surveying the opinions 
and expectation of technology and urban development experts (forecasting survey). To 
the author’s knowledge, the thesis was the first to use such methodology in 
investigating the urban impacts of technology in developing countries.
10.7 POTENTIALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The comprehensive analysis of technology-urban change relationship presented in this 
research calls for a more detailed investigation of all the involved factors. The 
theoretical implication of conceptualising such relationship is the need for constant 
research on analysing the changing nature and effects of the various factors involved 
in this process. Also, more research is needed on adapting the proposed approaches to 
the changing socio-economic and political conditions in developing countries. Also, 
the research findings pinpoint and highlight several issues for future research, as many 
questions are still unanswered: What are the best strategies for employing future 
technological achievements in the implementation of the proposed approaches? How 
would these approaches affect, and be affected by, ongoing development activities?
And what are the possible role of local governments and non-governmental
organizations in developing, supporting and evaluating these approaches? These 
questions remain open for real-life experiences of professionals as well as for research 
to guide these experiences.
On the empirical side, the proposed approaches open up further areas for future 
research. Although the research has surveyed the opinions of urban experts, the public 
opinion of large cities residents in developing countries, regarding their locational-
preference and the expected changes to home-work relationship, is also important. 
Although this research has examined the appropriate size of new settlements in 
developing countries, more research is still needed regarding the spatial structure,
form, and density of these cities. Also, more research is needed in revising current city 
planning regulations to meet the future impacts of technologies. For Egypt, more
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studies are needed in defining the possibilities, advantages, and requirements of rural 
settlements upgrading through the recommended ‘rural urbanisation’ or ‘urban 
villages’ approach.
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Appendix 1
QUESTIONNAIRE I: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS
Questionnaire I: Form
I Sheffield Hallam University 
The Centre for the Built Environment
Questionnaire I
For Science and technology Specialists
Technological impacts on the future urban policies
This research aims at defining the impact of technology on shaping the future of urban 
development in the next 30-40 years. The main purpose of this first questionnaire is to have as 
many experts as possible engaged in an individual brainstorming process so as to generate as 
many expectations and comments as possible for dealing with this issue.
Your comments and expectations need not to be fully developed. In fact, it is 
preferable to have each idea expressed in one brief sentence or phrase. No attempt will 
be made to evaluate or justify these ideas at this point in time. Your expectations and 
comments will be anonymously incorporated in the next questionnaire.
1. From your wide interests and experience, please indicate all areas of expertise 
starting by the closest to your field of specialization = 1
1 2 3 Not relevant
a. Information Technology.............................................
b. Transportation............................................................
c. Energy..............................................................................
d. Utilities (water, sewer, gas)...........................................
e. Other: Please indicate below..........................................
2. Please indicate all areas of expertise starting by the closest to your field of specialization = 1
1 2 3 Not relevant
a. Research & Development...............................................
b. Design...............................................................................
c. Production..........................................................................
d. Management.....................................................................
e. Other: Please indicate below............................................
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3. To what extent do you think current operation and production systems in your field will 
be changed in the next forty years?
a) No change..................................................
b) Some change.............................................
c) Considerable change..................................
d) Impressive change.....................................
4. To the best of your knowledge and in your area of expertise, what are the main 
technological achievements expected to influence the future of urban development in 
the next 30-40 years? Please start by the most influential achievement and briefly 
clarify each of your choices.
A ) ..........................................................
Clarify
B ) .............
Clarify
C ) .............
Clarify
D ) .............
Clarify
E ) .............
Clarify
Please write any comment you think it is important in the area of this research:
If you need any help to answer any question, please do not hesitate to contact me on:
Antar A. Abou-Korin, Centre for the Built Environment, Sheffield Hallam University,
Unit 9, Sheffield Science Park, Howard Street, Sheffield SI 1WB, UK 
E-mail: Antar.Abou-Korin@shu.ac.uk 
Tel: 0044-114-279-9601 Fax 0044-114-225-3206
We need to contact you to provide you with the results o f this questionnaire and to complete the second 
phase o f it. So, it will be very kind o f you if you can provide us with your e-mail address and URL (it is 
completely confidential):
E-m ail:...........................................  U R L:..............................................................
N am e:.............................................  Job title :.........................................................
Thank you
The form is posted online at: http://www.shu.ac.uk/schools/research/cbe/feedback/korin/
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Questionnaire I: List of Participating Experts
Name Affiliation
Jean Rosenfeld Chairperson-2000, The UK SOLAR ENERGY Society, UK
Steve Wiese Conservation Services Group- Associate Members, Texas, USA
Brian Norton Dean o f the Faculty o f Engineering, University o f Ulster, UK
Peter L Pfeiffer Architect and renewable energy system consultant, Barley + Pfeiffer Architects, Texas, USA
Oliver Carsten Director o f Research, Institute for Transport Studies, Univ. o f Leeds, UK
Kim Chowns DTLR - Department o f Transport, Local Government and Regions, UK
Geoff Parker Junior Vice Chairman, Chartered Institution o f Water and Environmental Management, UK
Euan Robertson Online Communications Manager, British Energy, UK
G Hegeman Institute for Transport Studies- University o f Leeds, UK.
Hardev Singh Executive Director, Videsh Sanchar Bhavan, India
Matthew Page Institute for Transport Studies- University o f Leeds, UK
Juan S. Santos Senior Consultant, System Planning, Electric Reliability Council o f Texas, USA
Brian J. Reithel. President, The Association o f Information Technology Professionals, USA
Carol Harwell Product Development, Austin Energy, USA
Graham Soult Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Technology, University o f Newcastle, UK
Stas Burek Committee member, UK SOLAR ENERGY SOCIETY, Dept o f Energy & Environmental Technology, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK
Rodrigo Firmino Researcher, Centre for Urban Technology, University o f Newcastle, UK
Peter Rogers Lecturer, Centre for Urban Technology, University of Newcastle, UK
Greg Nemet Research Manager, Institute for the Future, USA
Mike Bramhall Professor, School of Engineering, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Tony Free British Energy, UK
C Hague Lecturer, School o f Engineering, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Nigel Mortimer Head o f Resources Research Unit, School o f Environment and Dev., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Ashley Dobbs Director, Telework Association, UK
Bala A Kumar Head, Precision Interconnect India Pvt Ltd, India
John Grant Resource Associate, School o f Environment and Dev., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
David Alsmeyer Information Services Manager, BTexact Technologies, UK
Ben Azvine Head o f Computational Intelligence Research, BTexact Technologies, UK
Ian Pearson Futurologist, BTexact Technologies, UK
Gordon Dabinett Reader in Urban & Regional Policy, School o f Environment and Development, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Maha Elsayed Research Associate, School of Environment and Dev., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Michael Reaney Research fellow, School o f Environment and Dev., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Bob Briscoe Head o f Edge Lab, BTexact Technologies, UK
Robert Janssen Hydraulic Engineer, Betchtel Group, USA
Ray Quay Assistant Director of Planning in Phoenix, Arizona, USA
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Appendix 2
QUESTIONNAIRE II: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS
Questionnaire II: Form
Sheffield Hallam University 
The Centre for the Built Environment
Questionnaire II
For Science and technology Specialists
Hello;
This research aims at defining the impact of technology on shaping the future of urban 
development. The main purpose of this questionnaire is to exploit expectations of science and 
technology specialists for 30-40 year time horizon under the rapidly changing technology 
affecting the urban environment. In doing so, Delphi technique is employed.
Your opinion is highly important to us. It would be very kind if you have some time to 
complete this questionnaire. Because of the multidisciplinary nature of this research, this 
questionnaire may not exactly match your experience. Please answer those questions you feel 
comfortable with.
We do appreciate you help and looking forward to hearing from you
Best Regards;
Antar A. Abou-Korin,
Centre for the Built Environment, Sheffield Hallam University 
Unit 9, Sheffield Science Park, Howard Street, Sheffield SI 1WB, UK 
E-mail'. Antar.Abou-Korin@shu. ac.uk
Tel: 0044-114-279-9601, 0044-7766026632 (mobile) Fax: 044-114-225-3206
1. From your wide interests and experience, please indicate all areas of expertise starting by the 
closest to your field of specialization = 1
a) Information T ech n o lo g y ..........................................................  ( )
b) Transportation.............................................................................  ( )
c) E n erg y ............................................................................................  ( )
d) Utilities (water, sewer, g a s ) ....................................................  ( )
e) Other: please indicate below................................................ ( )
2. Please indicate all areas of expertise starting by the closest to your field of specialization = 1
a) Research & Development.................................................. ( )
b) Design..................................................................................  ( )
c) Production.......................................................................... ( )
d) Management....................................................................... ( )
e) Consultancy.......................................................................... ( )
f) Other: p l e a s e  in d ic a te  b e l o w ............................................................  ( )
To what extent you think current operation and production systems in your field will be 
changed in the next forty years?
a) No change............................................................................ ( )
b) Some change........................................................................ ( )
c) Considerable change..........................................................  ( )
d) Impressive change...............................................................  ( )
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Note: In answering some o f the following questions, please note that:
0 = no change 1 or -1 equivalent to < 20% of change 2 or -2 equivalent to = 21 -50% o f change 
3 or -3 equivalent to > 50% of change No Op = No Opinion or do not know
4. How much do you expect technological achievements to influence the urban life in the next
forty years?
<r- Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a ) Total amount o f time spent travelling for work and 
other daily activities -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
b) Interdependence between place residence and work 
location -3 -2 -1 ill 1 2 3
c ) Settling in remote or uninhabited areas -3 -2 -1 .ill 1 2 3
d) Commuting distance between home and work -3 -2 -1 ill 1 2 3
e ) The Use o f public transportation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
f) Private transportation ownership -3 -2 -1 Sllil 1 2 3
5. In the area of urban transportation, how much do you expect technological advancements to 
affect the following aspects?
<- Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a ) Vehicle speed -3 -2 -1 III 1 2 3 |
b) Vehicle capabilities and safety (Navig. systems, etc.) -3 -2 -1 ill 1 2 3c) The role o f private transportation -3 -2 -1 111! 1 2 3d) The role o f public transportation at local level -3 -2 -1 Ill 1 2 3 1
e ) The role o f Public transportation at regional level -3 -2 -1 11! 1 2 3
f) The role o f public air transportation -3 -2 -1 Ill 1 2 3
g) The role o f private air transportation -3 -2 -1 Iq | 1 2 3
6. To the best of your knowledge, how much do you expect renewable energy sources (solar, 
wind,, etc) to affect the following aspects?.
<- Decrease Increase -» No Op. !
a) Dependence on fossil fuels -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
b)The cost o f renewable-energy production (solar, wind) -3 -2 -1 I ' l l 1 2 3
c) Settling out o f congested areas -3 -2 -1 S0f/ 1 2 3
d)The cost o f energy supply networks (solar, wind) -3 -2 -1 ff iil 1 2 3
e)The freedom o f locating new urban communities -3 -2 -1 i l l 1 2 3
7. In the area of utilities, to what extent do you expect technological advancements to affect the 
following aspects?.
< -  Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a) Introduction o f new techniques for water purification -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3
b) Introduction o f new techniques for sanitary treatment -3 -2 -1 111! 1 2 3
c) Introduction o f small water & sanitary treatment units -3 -2 -1 l l l l l 1 2 3
d) Facilitation o f settling remote areas -3 -2 -1 l i l t 1 2 3
e) Environmental improvement o f rural communities -3 -2 -1 i l i i 1 2 3
8. In the area of telecommunication and information technology, to what extent do you expect 
technological advancements in the next 30-40 years to affect the following aspects?
< -  Decrease Increase -> No Op.
a ) Home-based work -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3
b) Remote education (open univ., teleconferencing) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c ) Online shopping -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
d) Home entertainment -3 -2 -I 0 1 2 3
e ) Concentration o f business activities in CBD of  
existing cities -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
f) Preserve current working conditions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
g) Congestion o f existing urban centres -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
h) The ability to settle in remote areas -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
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9. To the best of your knowledge, how much do you expect future impact of technological 
achievements to alter the urban pattern?
<- Decrease Increase -> No Op.
1) Dispersion o f urban population to the suburbs -3 -2 -1 M i: 1 2 3 1m) Dispersion o f urban population to rural settlements -3 -2 -1 1 2 3n ) Concentration o f population in few urban centres -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3o) Emergence o f remote isolated urban communities -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3P) The size o f future new urban settlements -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
q ) The future size o f existing cities -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 1
10. How much do you expect the rate of transferring these technological achievements to affect 
urban life in progressive developing countries in the next 30-40 years?.
a) No change........................................................................... ( )
b) Decrease............................................................................... ( )
c) Some increase......................................................................  ( )
d) Considerable increase............................................................( )
e) Impressive increase...........................................................  ( )
11. Regarding technology transfer to developing countries, how much do you think it had been 
in the past ten years and how much do you expect it will be in the next 30-40 years?
<- Decrease Increase -> NoOp.
i) The future importance o f markets in Developing countries -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
j) Transfer o f telecommunication technologies in past ten years -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
k) Transfer o f telecommunication technologies in next 30-40 
years -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
1) Transfer o f transportation technologies in the past ten years -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
m) Transfer of transportation technologies in next 30-40 years -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
n) Transfer of utility technologies in the past ten years. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
o) Transfer o f utility technologies in the next 30-40 years. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
p) The future importance o f  developing countries markets in 
technology transfer in the next 30-40 years. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Please write any comment you think it is important in the area of this research:
We need to contact you to provide you with the results of this questionnaire and to complete the 
next phase of it. So, it will be veiy kind if you can provide us with your contact details (it is 
completely confidential):
Name:................................................  Job title:...............................................
E-mail:..............................................
Work Address:...........................................................................................................
T e l: ................................................... Fax:..................................................
•  Please put this questionnaire in the attached addressed and stamped envelope and mail it back to us.
Thank you
The fo rm  is p o s te d  online at: http://homepages.shu.ac.uk/~aaboukor/Questionnaire%202.htm
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Questionnaire II: List of Participating Experts
Name Affiliation
Geoff Parker J. Vice Chairman, Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, UK
Steve Wiese Senior Consulting Manager, Conservation Services Group, utilities, USA
Kim Chowns Policy Advisor, Environmental Impact Assess. Branch, Office o f Dep. Prime Minister, UK
Rodrigo Firmino Researcher, Centre for Urban Technology, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK
Matthew Page Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, UK
Romesh Kumar Manager, Fuel Cell Technology, Argonne National Laboratory, USA
Steven Plotkin Transportation energy analyst, Argonne National Laboratoiy, USA
Jamal Abed Assoc. Prof., American University o f Beirut, Lebanon
Tarek Kazzaz Associate Professor, American University of Beirut, Lebanon
Margaret Singh Transportation energy analyst, Argonne National Laboratory, USA
Safwan Khedr Professor and Chairman, Engineering, American University in Cairo, Egypt
Christopher Saricks Transport. Systems Analyst, Argonne National Laboratory, U.S. Depart, of Energy, USA
Mahmoud Farag Professor of Materials Engineering, American Univ. in Cairo, Egypt
Stuart Woodings Analyst, British Energy, UK
Keith Smith professor, Institute for New Technology, UN University, Netherlands
Lakshminarayanan Chief Technical Adviser, Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu Limited, India
Wu Kwok Cheung senior chemist, Sewage Treatment Division, Hong Kong
A.Sluzek Associate Prof., Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore
H.L. Al-Saedy Prof. of IT, Faculty Of Computer Science and Engineering, Ajman University of Science and Technology, United Arab Emirates
IM  Dharmadasa Reader in Applied Physics, School of Science & Math., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
JP Singh Senior General Manager,Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited, Mumbai, India
Wolf-Dieter Munz Professor, School of Engineering, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
J.LJ. Rosenfeld Chairperson, The UK SOLAR ENERGY Society, UK
Bill Barraclough Senior Lecturer, School of Engineering, Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Simon Marvin Co-Director, The Centre for Sustainable Urban and Regional Futures, Salford Univ.- and Associate Member at Centre for Urban Technology, Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK
Juan S. Santos Senior Consultant - System Planning, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, USA
Alison Hill Head of Communications, British Wind Energy Association, UK
Po-Han Chen Assistant Prof., Civil and Envir. Eng., Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore
N. Chaudhari Associate Prof., Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore
John Grant Research Associate, Resources Research Unit, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Age Mariussen S. research fellow, Studies in technology, Innovation & Economic Policy, STEP, Norway
Francis Wilson Ass. Prof., School of Civil and Environmental Eng., Nanyang Techn. Univ., Singapore
K. Anthony Jones Senior Lecturer, Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore
I M Robinson Professor, School of Engineering, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Hugh Lockhart-Ball Committee Member, The UK SOLAR ENERGY Society, UK
Jamal Khatib S. Lecturer; environment, water; School of Environment and Dev., Sheffield H. Univ., UK
Dan Davies Develop. Engineering, Solar Century Co., UK
Lucy Southgate Committee member-The UK SOLAR ENERGY Society, UK
Roger Booth Consultant, Solar Century Co., UK
Peter W. Bonsall Professor of Transport Planning, Institute for Transport Studies, Univ. of Leeds, UK
Chris A. Nash Professor of Transportation, Institute for Transport Studies, Univ. of Leeds, UK
Tim Evans Branch Chairman, Chartered Institution of Water and Environ. Management, UK
Toby Lee Project Developer, AMEC Wind, UK
Brian Norton Committee Member, UK Solar Energy Society & Dean, Fac. of Eng., Ulster Univ., UK
Niek Neal Consultant, ESD Ltd, UK
A. Chisholm Policy Officer, Chartered Institution of Water & Environmental Management, UK
Mark Standeven Consultant, ESD Ltd, UK
David Bridger Energy Consultant, ESD Ltd, UK
Ray Tillier J. Vice-Chairman, Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, UK
Tessa Tennant Director of Companies, Solar Century, UK
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Appendix 3
QUESTIONNAIRE III: FORM AND LIST OF PARTICIPATING EXPERTS
Questionnaire III: Form
Gil■ f f v : - :  I Sheffield Hallam University 
The Centre for the Built Environment
Questionnaire III
For Urban Academics, City Planners & Officials and Architects
Technology impacts on the future urban policies
D e a r ...................................................................................
This is a research questionnaire about the future impacts of the rapidly changing 
technology on urban development in developing countries. Through this 
questionnaire, we would like to survey the expectations of urban development 
specialists for the next 30-40 years.
Because of your high research profile in the area of this study, your opinion is very 
important to us. It would be very kind if you have some time to complete this short 
questionnaire.
We do appreciate you help and looking forward to hearing from you
Best Regards;
Antar A. Abou-Korin, Research Fellow, Centre for the Built Environment, Sheffield Hallam University 
Unit 9, Sheffield Science Park, Howard Street, Sheffield SI 1WB, UK 
E-mail: Antar.Abou-Korin@shu. ac. uk,
Tel.: 0044-114-279-9601, 0044-7766026632 (mobile), Fax: 0044-114-225-3206
1. From your wide interests and experience, please indicate all areas of expertise starting by the
closest to your field of specialization =
1 2 3 Not relevant |
a. Urban Academic
b. City Planner i
c. City Planning Official |
d. Architect |
e. Other: Please indicate below J |
2. To what extent do you think future technological advancements will affect urban
development in developing countries in the next 30-40 years?
a) Nil or un-measurable effect................................................. ( )
b) Some effect (less than 20% )...............................................  ( )
c) Medium effect (20-50%)....................................................  ( )
d) Considerable effect (50-70%)..............................................( )
e) Impressive effect (more than 70% )....................................  ( )
3. To the best of your knowledge, what are the main technological advancements you expect to 
influence the future urban development policies? Please start by what you think the most 
influential.
a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         ( )
b) ..............................................................................................  ( )
c) .......................................................................................... ( )
d) ..................................................................................................  ( )
Please give a brief description o f the most important one:
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Note: In answering some of the following questions, please note that:
1 or -1 equivalent to < 20% of change 2 or -2 equivalent to > 21-50% o f change
3 or -3 equivalent to > 50% of change No Op = No Opinion or do not know
4. How do you expect future technological advancements to influence the following urban life 
aspects in the next forty years?
| <- Decrease Increase -> No Op.
a) Total amount o f time spent travelling for work and other 
daily activities. -3
-2 -1 0 i 2 3 1
^Interdependence between place o f residence and work 
location
-3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3
c) Settling in remote or uninhabited areas. -3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3 1
d) Commuting distance between home and work. -3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3 1
e)The Use o f public transportation. -3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3
f) Private transportation ownership. -3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3
g)Attractiveness o f urban centre to rural population. -3 -2 -1 111 i 2 3
h)Attractiveness o f rural centre to urban population. -3 -2 -1 i l l i 2 3 I
5. In the area of urban transportation, how do you expect technological advancements to affect 
the following aspects in developing countries?
<- Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a) Vehicle speed -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
b)Vehicle capabilities and safety (Navigation systems, .etc.) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c)The role o f private transportation. -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
d)The role o f public transportation at local level -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
e)The role o f Public transportation at regional level
----
-3 -2 -1 '111 1 2 3
f) The role o f public air transportation -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
g)The role o f private air transportation -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
h)h) Population Mobility -3 -2 -1 ill 1 2 3
i) i) The ability to settle in remote areas -3 -2 -1 111 1 2 3
6. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent do you expect renewable energy sources (solar, 
wind,, etc) to affect the following aspects in developing countries?
<- Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a) Dependence on fossil fuels -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
b)The cost o f renewable-energy production (solar, wind) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c) Settling out o f congested urban areas -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
d)The cost o f energy supply networks (solar, wind) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
e)The ability to settle in remote areas -3 -2 -1 t i l 1 2 3
7. In the area of utilities, to what extent do you expect technological achievements to affect the 
following aspects?
<- Decrease Increase -» No Op.
a) Introduction o f new techniques for water purification -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
b) Introduction of new techniques for sanitary treatment -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c ) Introduction o f small water & sanitary treatment units -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
d) Facilitation o f settling remote areas -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
e ) Environmental improvement o f rural communities -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
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8. In the area of telecommunication and information technology, to what extent do you expect 
technological achievements in the next 30-40 years to affect the following aspects in 
developing countries?     ________ _________
< - D ecrease In c rease-*  No Op.
a) Home-based work -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Ib) Remote education (open universities, teleconferencing) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c) Remote social interaction (video phones, internet,....) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 1
d) Online shopping -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
e) Home entertainment -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
f) Concentration of businesses in CBD of existing cities -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
g) Change in current work conditions. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
h) Congestion of existing urban centres -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
0 The cost of telephone and energy networks. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
j) The ability to settle in remote areas -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 |
9. To the best of your knowledge, how much do you expect future technological achievements 
to alter the movement o f urban population in developing countries?
<- Decrease Increase -> No Op.
a) Concentration of population in few urban centres -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
b) Dispersion of urban population to rural settlements -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c) Dispersion of urban population to the suburbs -3 -2 -I 0 1 2 3
d) Dispersion of urban population to new urban communities around existing large urban centres -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
e) Dispersion of urban population to new remote urban communities -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
10. To the best of your knowledge, how do you expect the function of future urban settlement to
be?
<- Least likely M ost Likely -> No Op.
a) Single specialised function (IT, commercial, Health, 
education, industrial, etc.) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
b) Multiple related functions (IT & education, etc) -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
c) Multiple unrelated functions -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
d) Centre for location-bound activities (tourism, mining,.) -3 •2 -1 1 2 3
11. To the best of your knowledge, what are the probable ways for the provision of services 
(education, health, shopping, etc.) in future new urban settlements?_____________________
<—Least likely Most Likely No Op.
a) Introduction o f specialised service centres in every 
settlement -3 -2 -1 111 i 2 3
b) Introduction o f specialised service centres between a 
group o f cities -3 -2 -1 ill i 2 3
c) Incorporation o f primary services in every settlement -3 -2 -1 ill i 2 3
d) Emergence o f new forms for the provision o f some 
services (Education, health, police, etc.), please give 
example below
-3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3
12. Regarding location of future new urban settlements, to what extent do you expect they 
would be more likely located? Please tick one only._____________________
a) Less than 10 km away from a large urban centre
b) 1 0 -2 0  km away from a large urban centre
c) More the 20 km away from a large urban centre
d) Freely located
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13. The future new urban settlement could be of different sizes, which of the following you 
consider to be the most appropriate in the next 30-40 years?
<- Least likely Most Likely -» [ No Op.
a) Very small (<1,000 inhabitants, Group o f families, 
environmental considerations) -3 -2 -1 vOl 1 2 3b) Small settlements (1,000-5,000 inhabitants, that support 
the economic provision o f primary services) -3 -2 -1 M 1 2 3c) Medium urban centres. (5,000-10,000 inhabitants) -3 -2 -1 :: 1 I 1 2 3d) Large urban centres (10,000-20,000 inhabitants) J -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3
e) Very Large Urban Centres (20,000-50,000 inhabitants) j -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3f) Other: please indicate below | -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 I
14. The development of future new urban settlement could take different approaches, which of 
the following do you consider to be the most appropriate in the next 30-40 years? 
___________________________________________________________ [ <- Least likely Most Likely -> 1 No Op [
a) Whole settlement built in one time -3 -2 -1 0 i 2 3b)Gradually built -3 -2 -1 i l i i i 2 3
c) Expansion in the form o f new suburbs -3 -2 -1 111 i 2 3 1 1d)Expansion in the form o f new independent urban units -3 -2 -1 111 i 2 3 1 1
15. In your opinion, and in the light of the rapid technological change, how will the size of 
existing urban settlements change in the next 30-40 years?_____________________________
< -Least likely Most Likely -> [ No Op.
a) Continue to increase -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3b) Decrease -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3
c) Will not be affected -3 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3 I 1
16. For developing countries, how do you expect the future function of existing urban
settlements in the next 30-40 years? _________________________ ______
___________________________________________________________ | < -Least likely Most Likely -> | No Op.
a) Regional service centres (education, commercial, 
entertainment) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
b) Continue performing the same functions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
c) New Functions {please specify below) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Please write any comment you think it is important in the area of this research:
We m ay n eed  to contact yo u  to discuss som e o f  yo u r  comments. So, it w ill be very  k ind  
o f  yo u  i f  y o u  can p ro v id e  us w ith  yo u r contact deta ils (it is com pletely confidential):
N a m e : .............................................................  Job t i t l e : ....................................................................
E -m a il: ................................................... T e l : .......................................... F a x : ................................................
Thank you
This form is posted online at: http://hom epages.shu.ac.uk/~aaboukor/Questionnaire% 202.htm
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Questionnaire III: List of Participating Experts
Name Affiliation
Hazem A. Hammad Assistant Professor, Dept, of Arch. Assiut University, Egypt
Ashraf M. Soliman Assistant Professor, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Mahmoud A Abdellatif Professor, Dept, of Arch. Assiut University, Egypt
Mohamed Sadek Associate Professor, Faculty of Eng., Port Said, Egypt
Mohamed M. Maatouk Assistant Professor, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Ibrahim Alshaye Environmental Planner, Arriyadh Development Authority, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Mamdouh Ali Yousef Asociate Professor, Dept, of Arch. Assiut University, Egypt
Safwan Assaf Associate Professor, College of Architecture, Al-Baath University, Horns, Syria.
Kevin Keller Associate Planner, City of Los Angeles, American Planning Association, USA
Phil Winters TDM Program Director, Urban Transport Research Centre, Univ. South Florida, USA
Gary Brosch Research Associate, Urban Transport Research Centre, Univ. South Florida, USA
Ed Bart Research Associate, Urban Transport Research Centre, Univ. South Florida, USA
Bruce Tonn Professor, Graduate School of Planning, University of Tennessee, USA
Umar G. Benna Professor, College of Architecture and Planning, King Faisal University, Saudi Arabia
Steven Polzin Director - Public Transp., Urban Transport Research Centre, Univ. of South FI., USA
Jean-Paul Rodrigue Assistant Professor, Dept, of Geography, The Hofstra University, USA
Steve Fotios S. lecturer, Architecture group, Sch. of Env. and Dev., Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Steve Sharpies Professor - Urban Policy - Unit 9 Science Park, Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Jeremy Dawkins Convenor Centre for Sydney, UNSW Sydney NSW 2052 Australia
Anna de Jager Lecturer, Univ. of South Africa, Dept, of Geography and Environment, South Africa
Babar Aruna Reader in Housing Studies, Development Planning Unit, Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment - Univ. College London, UK
Anna Soave Teacher, Development Planning Unit, Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment - University College London, UK
S. Yirenkyi-Boateng Professor, Dept, of Geography, University of South Africa.
Amany Nagi Lecturer Assistant, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Alison Todes Prof., School of Architecture, Planning & Housing, University of Natal, South Africa
Michael Kahn Professor, School of Architecture, Planning & Housing, Univ. of Natal, South Africa
Nancy Odendaal S. Lecturer, School of Architecture, Planning & Housing, Univ. of Natal, South Africa
Mike Batty Professor of Spatial Analysis and Planning, Director of Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, UCL, London, UK
Karol A. Megalla City Planner, City Council, Minia, Egypt
Laurette Coetzee Board Member, The South African Planning Institution, South Africa
Ted Kitchen Professor of Planning and Urban Regeneration, School of Environment and Development, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Pieter Swanepoel Chairperson of Association of Municipal Planners, South Africa
Khaled Abdelhalim Assistant Professor, Dep. of Architecture, Helwan University, Egypt
Manar Ali Mohamed Architect, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Richard Cardew Associate Prof, Head of Real Estate program, Urban & Regional Studies, University of New South Wales, Australia
Paul Sanders lecturer - architect, University of Natal - Durban, South Africa
Percy Langa Board Member, The South African Planning Institution, South Africa
R Odney Harber Prof., School of Architecture, Planning, and Housing, Univ. of Natal, South Africa
M. Schoonraad Lecturer, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Univ. of Pretoria, South Africa
Amal Y. Mohamed City Planner, City Council, Minia, Egypt
Mashary A. Al-Naim Assistant Prof., College of Arch. & plan., KFU, Saudi Arabia
Alethea Duncan- Brown Senior lecturer, University of Natal, Durban, School of Architecture, South Africa
Aymen Hashem Alsayed Lecturer, Dept, of Architecture, Assiut University, Egypt
Mohamed Ayman Daef Associate Professor, Dept, of Architecture, Assiut University, Egypt
Continued.....
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Questionnaire HI: List of Participating Experts - Continued
Name Affiliation
Michelle van der Molen Director, The South African Planning Institution, South Africa
Ndaba Ndzombane Director, Eastern Cape Chairman, South African Planning Institution, South Africa
Ahmed 0 . El-Kholei Professor of Urban Planning, Faculty of Eng. Menofia University, Egypt
Hannes Lerm Town and Reg. Planner, Chairman, South African Planning Institution, South Africa
Ahmed Y. Rashed Assistant Prof., United Arab Emirates University, Arch Dept., UAE
Dalia Shawky Soryal City Planner, City Council, Minia, Egypt
Khaled S. Owaiss Architect, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Gordon Dabinett Reader in Town & Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, UK
Beverly Ward Director for Ethnography and Transport Systems, Centre for Urban Transport Research, University of South Florida, USA
Talal AL-Harigi City Planner / Facility Engineer, K. Saudi Arabia
Ahmad M. Hamada City Planner, City Council, Aswan, Egypt
Paul Syms Professor of Urban Land Use, Sheffield Hallam Univ., UK
Jenny Dixon Professor, Dept of Planning, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Heba Hassan Architect, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Hugh Reynolds Visiting research fellow, School of Environment & Dev., Sheffield H. Univ., UK
Mohamed M. Kamal Architect, Dept, of Archit., Minia Univ., Egypt
Dalia M. El Shreef City Planner, City Council, Minia, Egypt
Francis W. Wambalaba Research Faculty, Urban Transport Research Centre, Univ. South Florida, USA
Essam Abdel Aziz Assistant Professor, City Council, Minia, Egypt
S. Baylis Town Planner, Gauteng Chairman, South African Planning Institution, South Africa
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Appendix 4 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES II AND III
A4.1 Frequency D istribution o f Responses to Questionnaire II 
Table A4.1: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected influence of technological
achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years
Level of A B C D E F
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 1 1.75 6 10.53 3 5.26 0 0.00 1 1.75 2 3.51
-2 15 26.32 19 33.33 1 1.75 7 12.28 3 5.26 2 3.51
-1 11 19.30 I 9 15.79 6 10.53 9 15.79 9 15.79 5 8.77
0 = no change 9 15.79 2 3.51 i l l l 17.54 3 5.26 7 12.28 12 21.05
1 8 14.04 7 12.28 | 16 28.07 13 22.81 16 28.07 15 26.32
2 7 12.28 1 11 19.30 I 18 31.58 20 35.09 13 22.81 11 19.30
3 4 7.02 | 2 3.51 1 3 S l2 6 ; | 4 7.02 7 12.28 8 14.04
Total 55 96.49 56 98.25 | 57 100.00 56 98.25 56 98.25 55 96.49
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F = question 4 variables
Table A4.2: Frequency distribution of responses to the expected impacts of advancements in urban
transport technologies
Level of A B C D E F G
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. I V.%
-3 2 3.51 0 0.00 1 1.75 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.75 1 | 1.75
-2 4 7.02 0 0.00 4 7.02 4 7.02 1 1.75 0 0.00 0 I 0.00
-1 4 7.02 0 0.00 5 8.77 4 7.02 5 8.77 3 5.26 6 110.53
< 0 = no change 19 33.33 3 M B 10 17.54 10.53 8 14.04 9 15.79 16 28.07
1 16 28.07 10 17.54 20 35.09 20 35.09 14 24.56 19 33.33 18 131.58
2 8 14.04 25 43.86 13 22.81 15 26.32 17 29.82 11 19.30 6 i 10.53
3 2 3.51 19 33.33 4 7.02 8 14.04 11 19.30 11 19.30 3 | 5.26
Total 55 96.49 57 100.0 57 100.0 57 100.0 56 98.25 54 94.74 50 87.72
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G = question 5 variables
Table A4.3: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
renewable energy technologies (solar, wind,, etc)
Level of A B C D E
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. | V.%
-3 8 14.04 7 12.28 0 0.00 1 1.75 3 | 5.26
-2 16 28.07 22 38.60 1 1.75 14 24.56 2 ! 3.51
-1 23 40.35 19 33.33 4 7.02 21 36.84 6 | 10.53
0 = no change ! 8 | 2 l | ! m m I I M ® ! 5.26 33.33 6 10.53 18 ■ 31.58
1 3 5.26 5 8.77 13 22.81 9 15.79 14 i 24.56
2 5 8.77 0 0.00 i i 19.30 3 5.26 9 | 15.79
3 0 0.00 1 1.75 3 5.26 1 1.75 2 | 3.51
Total 57 100.00 57 100.00 51 89.47 55 96.49 54 94.74
Freq. =  Frequency V. % =  V alid percent A , B , C, D , E =  question 6 variables
329
Table A4.4: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected change in
urban utilities technologies
Level of A B C D E
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
-2 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.17 2 4.35
-1 0 6.66 0 0.00 0 6.66 2 4.35 2 4.35
0 = no change llllllll Ililoil 3 6.52 5 Slilil ;ilISll 1 1 1 ® ! 13.04
1 12 26.09 19 41.30 18 39.13 15 32.61 19 41.30
2 18 39.13 17 36.96 11 23.91 13 28.26 16 34.78
3 8 llifft 4 i s &q i 8 WMB. 6 13.04 1 2.17
Total 42 91.30 43 93.48 42 91.30 46 100.00 46 100.00
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E = question 7 variables
Table A4.5: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
telecommunication and information technologies
Level of A B C D I E F G
Change Freq. I V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% IFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 0 I ao o 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4 7.02 4 7.02 2 3.51
-2 0 | 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 | 5 8.77 12 21.05 4 7.02
-1 0 [ 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 | 18 31.58 24 42.11 19 33.33
0 = no change 3 ! 5.26 2 3.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 I l f ! 7.02 M i? 12.28 11 19.30
1 13 122.81 13 22.81 17 29.82 13 22.81 10 17.54 5 8.77 12 21.05
2 28 (49.12 26 45.61 24 42.11 19 33.331 9 15.79 1 1.75 4 7.02
3 13 (22.81 16 28.07 15 26.32 25 43.86( 1 1.75 0 0.00 2 3.51
Total 57 (100.0 57 100.0 56 98.25 57 T oo .o | 51 89.47 53 92.98 54 94.74
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G = question 8 variables
Table A4.6: Frequency distribution of technology experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
overall technological achievements on urban patterns
Level of A B C D E F
Change Freq. V.% J X eiL_ V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% | Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 1 1.82 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 3.64 I 1 1.82 0 0.00
-2 6 10.91 2 3.64 1 1.82 0 o.oo ; 3 5.45 3 5.45
-1 11 20.00 5 9.09 7 12.73 4 7.27 12 21.82 7 12.73
0 = no change 9 16.36 12 21.82 11 20.00 i l 2 l 21.82 1 16.36 P # l ; 16.36
1 17 30.91 18 32.73 22 40.00 18 32.73 | 11 20.00 | 20 36.36
2 10 18.18 15 27.27 8 14.55 7 12 73 13 23.64 ■ 9 16.36
3 0 0.00 3 5.45 6 10.91 6 10.91 1 1.82 1 6 10.91
Total 54 98.18 55 100.00 55 100.00 49 89.09 50 90.91 54 98.18
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F = question 9 variables
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Table A4.7: Frequency distribution of the technology experts’ responses about technology transfer
to developing countries.
Level of A B C D E F G HChange Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V. % Freq. < vO 0s -d •-i o P V. %!Freq. | V. %|Freq. V.%
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 | 0.00 o 0.00
-2 1 2.04 0 0 00 0 0.00 1 2.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0 00 0 0.00
-1 1 2.04 0 0.00 1 2.04 2 4.08 2 4.08 4 8.16 2 14.08 1 2.04
0 = no change 2 4.08 5 10.20 l l i l 4.08 10 20.41 l l i l 2.04 11711: 14.29 0 10.00 mQ 2.04
1 16 32.65 19 |38 78 11 22.45 24 48.98 18 36.73 18 36.73) 10 120.41 13 26.53
2 17 34.69 18 36.73 17 34.69 6 12.24 18 36.73! 12 24.49! 22 (44.90 20 O'! 00 to
3 10 20.41 4 8.16 18 36.73 2 4.08 10 20.411 2 4.08 | 10 ! Tf ! © i <N: 13 26.53
Total 47 95.92 46 93.88 49 100.0 45 91.84 49 1 o
 ° I o 43 87.76 44 (89.80 48 97.96Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H = question 11 variables
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A4.2 Frequency Distribution o f Responses to Questionnaire III
Table A4.8: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected influence of
technological achievements on urban life during the next 30-40 years
Level o f  
Change
A B C D E F G H
Freq. v .% Freq V.% Freq. V. % Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 3 4.92 11 18.03 3 4 92 1 1.64 1 1.64 0 0.00 6 9.84 1 1.64
-2 24 39.34 14 22.95 5 8.20 7 11.48 5 8.20 2 3.28 10 16.39 7 11.48
-1 12 19.67 5 820 9 14.75 2 3.28 8 13.11 8 13.11 5 8.20 11 18.03
0  -  no change M l i 11.48 w & 6.56 8 i 13.11 8 13.11 9.84 6.56 :n i , : 11.48 11 18.03
1 7 11.48 6 9.84 17 [27.87 7 11.48 18 29.51 10 16.39 5 8.20 10 16.392 6 9.84 14 22.95 15 [24,59 20 32.79 12 19.67 26 42.62 16 26.231 15 24.59
...........3 ...........J...2
Total 61
3.28 5 8.20 4 6.56 14 22.95 10 16.39 9 14.75 9 14.75 6 9.84
100.0 59 96.72 61 100.0 59 96.72 60 98 36 59 96.72 58 95 08 61 100 0
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H = question 4 variables
Table A4.9: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
transport technologies in developing countries
Level of A B C D 1 E F G ! H I
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. v.%! Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq [ V.% Freq V.% Freq I V.% Freq. V.%
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 I 0 0.00 1 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.64 1 0 0.00 0 0.00 !
-2 4 6.56 1 1.64 2 3.28 | 3 4.92 | 2 3.28 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 3.28 3 4.92 |
-1 4 6.56 0 0.00 8 13.11 j 6 9.84 | 4 6.56 1 1.64 1 1.64 | 2 3.28 2 3.28 j
0 = no change M 18.03 ’ 31 6.56 P I 4.92 6.56 W u . 11.48 11 18.03 10 16.39) 1 1.64 10 16.39 j
1 25 40.98 22 36.07 18 29.51 j 20 32.79! ll 18.03 17 27.87 29 47.54) 16 26.23 18 29.51
2 11 18.03 15 24.59 19 31.15! 23 37.701i 25 40.98 20 32.79 7 11.481 17 27.87 12 19.67
3 4 6.56 16 26.23 11 18.0314 6.56 | 9 14.75 5 8.20 3 4.92 j 20 32.79 15 24.59;
Total 59 96.72 58 95.08 61 100.0] 60 98.36( 58 95.08 54 88.52 51 83.611 58 95.08 60 98.36]
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I = question 5 variables
Table A4.10: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
advancements in renewable energy sources in developing countries.
Level of Change iV B C D EFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 4 6.78 10 16.95 0 0.00 6 10.17 2 3.39
-2 22 37.29 12 20.34 2 3.39 11 18.64 0 0.00
-1 13 22.03 16 27.12 5 8.47 17 28.81 3 5.08
0 = no change 4 ll)llll 10.17 16 27.12 IP  111! f |3 t 12 20.34
1 7 11.86 5 8.47 12 20.34 7 11.86 17 28.81
2 6 10.17 5 8.47 16 27.12 6 10 17 16 27.12
3 0 0.00 1 1.69 6 10.17 2 3.39 9 15.25
Total 56 94.92 55 93.22 57 96.61 58 98.31 59 100.00
Freq. =  Frequency V. % = V alid  percent A , B , C, D , E =  question 6 variables
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Table A 4 .ll:  Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses to the expected impacts of
technological advancements in urban utilities in developing countries.
Level o f Change A B C D EFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. v.% Freq. V.% Freq. v.%
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.72
-2 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.72 1 1.72 1 1.72
-1 1 1.72 1 1.72 0 0.00 2 3.45 0 0.00
0 = no change 4 6.90 5 8.62 5 8.62 5 l l l l l 10.34
1 14 m w m 13 22.41 19 32.76 26 44.83 19 32.76
2 24 41.38 24 41.38 15 25.86 15 25.86 21 36.21
3 15 25.86 15 25.86 18 31.03 5 8.62 6 10.34
Total 58 100.00 58 100.00 58 100.00 54 93.10 54 93.10
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E = question 7 variables
Table A4.12: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of 
telecommunication & information technology in developing countries during the next 30- 
40 years
Level of A B C D I F G H J
Change Freq. V.% Freq. V. %;Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V. %|Freq. V. %]Freq. V. %jFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freqj V. %
-3 c 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 6.561 0 0.00 3 4.92 7 11.4 1 1.64
-2 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 15 24.5 l 1.64 10 16.3 18 29.5 2 3.28
-1 1 1.64 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 17 27.8 l 1.64 15 24.5 11 18.0 5 18.20
0 = no change 1 1.64. 5 8.20 7 11.4 4.92 i M i l l !  7 11.4 10 16.3 4 6.56 8 13.11
1 20 32.7 14 22.9 16 26.2 19 31.1 19 31.1 8 13.11 17 27.8 8 13.1 6 9.84 14 |22.95
2 19 31.1 22 36.0 18 29.5 21 34.4 17 27 8 6 9.841 20 32.7 8 13.1 8 13.1 22 136.07
3 21 34.4 24 39.3 21 34.4 14 22.9 22 36 0 ? 2 3.28 5 8.20 7 [11.48
Total 61 100.0 61 I § 
I
1 © 
I
60 98.36 61 100.0 61 100.0 60 J98.36; 58 95.08 56 91.80 59 96.72 59 ; 96.72
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J = question 8 variables
Table A4.13: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected impacts of
technology on the movement of urban population in developing countries
Level of Change A B C D EFreq. v.% Freq. v.% Freq. v.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 7 11.67 1 1.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.67
-2 15 25.00 5 8.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
-1 9 15.00 13 21.67 1 1.67 0 0.00 10 16.67
0 = no change mm 11.67 10 16.67 13.33 10 00 9 " . 15.00
1 9 15.00 14 23.33 n 18.33 14 23.33 21 35.00
2 10 16.67 12 20.00 29 48.33 24 40 00 11 18.33
3 2 3.33 4 6.67 10 16.67 16 26.67 8 13.33
Total 59 98.33 59 98.33 59 98.33 60 100.00 60 100.00
Freq. = Frequency V. %  =  Valid percent A, B, C, D, E = question 9 variables
333
Table A4.14: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the expected function of
future urban settlement
Level of Change A B C D !Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 8 M 3 M :M 1 1.64 2 3.28 1 1.64 I
-2 13 2 3.28 5 8.20 0 0.00
-1 12 19.67 1 1.64 6 9.84 0 o.oo !
0 = no change 8 13.11 6 9.84 5 i i i l i i i 1111161111i S M m
1 9 14.75 12 19.67 18 29.51 22 36.07 i
2 8 13.11 26 m i m m 13 m i m m . 22 36.07 I
3 0 0.00 13 21.31 9 W i w M 7 11.48 |
Total 58 95.08 61 100.00 58 95.08 58 95.08 |
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D = question 10 variables
Table A4.15: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the probable ways for the
provision of services in future new urban settlements
Level of Change A B C DFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.%
-3 3 5.36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
-2 6 10.71 1 1.79 0 0.00 0 0.00
-1 9 16.07 3 5.36 5 8.93 1 1.79
0 = no change 5 8.93 ■ 4 7.14 ® 8 .? 3 j | i i M H i 7.14
1 16 28.57 18 32.14 17 30.36 15 26.79
2 10 24 42.86 16 28.57 12
3 4 7.14 5 8.93 13 10 !P § 8 6 3 l
Total 53 94.64 55 98.21 56 100.00 42 75.00
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D = question 11 variables
Table A4.16: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size of the future new
urban settlements
A B C D E
Freq. V.% Freq. v.% Freq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. v.%
-3 11 20.00 3 5.45 1 1.82 0 0.00 1 1.82
-2 16 29.09 9 16.36 1 1.82 1 1.82 4 7.27
-1 6 10.91 18 32.73 6 10.91 1 1.82 1 1.82
0 = no change 11 20.00 W S - 9.09 9.09 9.09 12.73
1 5 9.09 9 16.36 20 36.36 10 18.18 11 20.00
2 2 3.64 10 18.18 14 25.45 22 40.00 11 20.00
3 3 5.45 o 0.00 7 12.73 12 21.82 20 36.36
Total 54 98.18 54 98.18 54 98.18 51 92.73 55 100.00
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D, E = question 13 variables
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Table A4.17: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the development of the
future new urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
Level of Change A B C DFreq. V.% Freq. V.% Freq. v.% Freq. v.%
-3 22 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 4.76
-2 7 11.11 1 1.59 2 3.17 2 3.17
-1 6 3 4.76 2 3.17 2 3.17
0 = no change ill!!! IIii sffitsi 0.00 II i l i i l 11:31111 W$&iM
1 8 12.70 10 M s m m 19 11 17.46
2 1 1.59 22 34.92 19 30.16 21 33.33
3 2 3.17 27 42.86 16 ll25fi;;;:| 13 20.63
Total 55 87.30 63 100.0 60 95.24 58 92.06
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C, D = question 14 variables
Table A4.18: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the size o f existing urban
settlements in the next 30-40 years
Level of Change A B cFreq. v.% Freq. v.% | Freq. v.% |
-3 18 28l57 i l l 1 1.59 17 26.98
-2 18 28.57:11! 8 12.70 | 10 15.87
-1 5 7.94 5 7.94 ! 8 12.70
0 = no change SSltSSli; 0.00 wmmwisb WlW&Sm
1 8 12.70 ii 17.46 1 2 3.17 |
2 9 14.29 14 : 22.22 | 0 0.00
3 5 7.94 10 15.87 | 1 1.59 |
Total 63 100.00 54 85.71 47 I 74.60
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C = question 15 variables
Table A4.19: Frequency distribution of urban experts’ responses about the future function of
existing urban settlements in the next 30-40 years
Level of Change A | B CFreq. V. % | Freq. v.% Freq. V.%
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.72
-2 0 0.00 5 8.62 0 0.00
-1 2 3.45 8 13.79 1 1.72
0 -  no change 
1
w m sm im 3.45 i i  i l l l i l i l 22.41 ; 3
8 m m s m m 13 22.41 15 25.86
2 21 10 17.24 5 8.62
3 23 39.66 9 15.52 4 6.90
Total 56 96.55 58 100.00 | 29 50.00
Freq. = Frequency V. % = Valid percent A, B, C = question 16 variables
